This means, I presume, that an animal, having the corporeal form and bodily powers of man, may have been developed out of some lower form of life by a process of evolution; and that, after this anthropoid animal had existed for a longer or shorter time, G.o.d made a soul by direct creation, and put it into the manlike body, which, heretofore, had been devoid of that _anima rationalis_, which is supposed to be man"s distinctive character.
This hypothesis is incapable of either proof or disproof, and therefore may be true; but if Suarez is any authority, it is not Catholic doctrine. "Nulla est in homine forma educta de potentia materiae,"[1] is a dictum which is absolutely inconsistent with the doctrine of the natural evolution of any vital manifestation of the human body.
[Footnote 1: Disput. xv. -- x. No. 27.]
Moreover, if man existed as an animal before he was provided with a rational soul, he must, in accordance with the elementary requirements of the philosophy in which Mr. Mivart delights, have possessed a distinct sensitive and vegetative soul, or souls. Hence, when the "breath of life" was breathed into the manlike animal"s nostrils, he must have already been a living and feeling creature. But Suarez particularly discusses this point, and not only rejects Mr. Mivart"s view, but adopts language of very theological strength regarding it.
"Possent praeterea his adjungi argumenta theologica, ut est illud quod sumitur ex illis verbis Genes. 2. _Formavit Deus hominem ex limo terrae et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae et factus est h.o.m.o in animam viventem_: ille enim spiritus, quam Deus spiravit, anima rationalis fuit, et PER EADEM FACTUS EST h.o.m.o VIVENS, ET CONSEQUENTER, ETIAM SENTIENS.
"Aliud est ex VIII. Synodo Generali quae est Constantinopolitana IV. can. 11, qui sic habet. _Apparet quosdam in tantum impietatis venisse ut homines duas animas habere dogmatizent: talis igitur impietatis inventores et similes sapientes, c.u.m Vetus et Novum Testamentum_ _omnesque Ecclesiae patres unam animam rationalem hominem habere a.s.severent, Sancta et universalis Synodus anathematizat_."[1]
[Footnote 1: Disput. xv. "De causa formali substantiali," -- x. No.
24.]
Moreover, if the animal nature of man was the result of evolution, so must that of woman have been. But the Catholic doctrine, according to Suarez, is that woman was, in the strictest and most literal sense of the words, made out of the rib of man.
"Nihilominus sententia Catholica est, verba illa Scripturae esse ad literam intelligenda. AC PROINDE VERE, AC REALITER, TULISSE DEUM COSTAM ADAE, ET, EX ILLA, CORPUS EVAE FORMa.s.sE."[1]
[Footnote 1: "Tractatus de Opere," Lib. III. "De hominis creatione,"
cap. ii. No. 3.]
Nor is there any escape in the supposition that some woman existed before Eve, after the fashion of the Lilith of the rabbis; since Suarez qualifies that notion, along with some other Judaic imaginations, as simply "d.a.m.nabilis."[1]
[Footnote 1: Ibid. Lib. III. cap. iv. Nos. 8 and 9.]
After the perusal of the "Tractatus de Opere" it is, in fact, impossible to admit that Suarez held any opinion respecting the origin of species, except such as is consistent with the strictest and most literal interpretation of the words of Genesis. For Suarez, it is Catholic doctrine, that the world was made in six natural days. On the first of these days the _materia prima_ was made out of nothing, to receive afterwards those "substantial forms" which moulded it into the universe of things; on the third day, the ancestors of all living plants suddenly came into being, full-grown, perfect, and possessed of all the properties which now distinguish them; while, on the fifth and sixth days, the ancestors of all existing animals were similarly caused to exist in their complete and perfect state, by the infusion of their appropriate material substantial forms into the matter which had already been created. Finally on the sixth day, the _anima rationalis_--that rational and immortal substantial form which is peculiar to man--was created out of nothing, and "breathed into" a ma.s.s of matter which, till then, was mere dust of the earth, and so man arose. But the species man was represented by a solitary male individual, until the Creator took out one of his ribs and fashioned it into a female.
This is the view of the "Genesis of Species," held by Suarez to be the only one consistent with Catholic faith: it is because he holds this view to be Catholic that he does not hesitate to declare St. Augustin unsound, and St. Thomas Aquinas guilty of weakness, when the one swerved from this view and the other tolerated the deviation. And, until responsible Catholic authority--say, for example, the Archbishop of Westminster--formally declares that Suarez was wrong, and that Catholic priests are free to teach their flocks that the world was _not_ made in six natural days, and that plants and animals were _not_ created in their perfect and complete state, but have been evolved by natural processes through long ages from certain germs in which they were potentially contained, I, for one, shall feel bound to believe that the doctrines of Suarez are the only ones which are sanctioned by Infallible Authority, as represented by the Holy Father and the Catholic Church.
I need hardly add that they are as absolutely denied and repudiated by Scientific Authority, as represented by Reason and Fact. The question whether the earth and the immediate progenitors of its present living population were made in six natural days or not, is no longer one upon which two opinions can be held.
The fact that it did not so come into being stands upon as sound a basis as any fact of history whatever. It is not true that existing plants and animals came into being within three days of the creation of the earth out of nothing, for it is certain that innumerable generations of other plants and animals lived upon the earth before its present population. And when, Sunday after Sunday, men who profess to be our instructors in righteousness read out the statement, "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is," in innumerable churches, they are either propagating what they may easily know, and, therefore, are bound to know, to be falsities; or, if they use the words in some non-natural sense, they fall below the moral standard of the much-abused Jesuit.
Thus far the contradiction between Catholic verity and Scientific verity is complete and absolute, quite independently of the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of evolution. But, for those who hold the doctrine of evolution, all the Catholic verities about the creation of living beings must be no less false. For them, the a.s.sertion that the progenitors of all existing plants were made on the third day, of animals on the fifth and sixth days, in the forms they now present, is simply false. Nor can they admit that man was made suddenly out of the dust of the earth; while it would be an insult to ask an evolutionist whether he credits the preposterous fable respecting the fabrication of woman to which Suarez pins his faith. If Suarez has rightly stated Catholic doctrine, then is evolution utter heresy. And such I believe it to be. In addition to the truth of the doctrine of evolution, indeed, one of its greatest merits in my eyes, is the fact that it occupies a position of complete and irreconcilable antagonism to that vigorous and consistent enemy of the highest intellectual, moral, and social life of mankind--the Catholic Church. No doubt, Mr. Mivart, like other putters of new wine into old bottles, is actuated by motives which are worthy of respect, and even of sympathy; but his attempt has met with the fate which the Scripture prophesies for all such.
Catholic theology, like all theologies which are based upon the a.s.sumption of the truth of the account of the origin of things given in the Book of Genesis, being utterly irreconcilable with the doctrine of evolution, the student of science, who is satisfied that the evidence upon which the doctrine of evolution rests, is incomparably stronger and better than that upon which the supposed authority of the Book of Genesis rests, will not trouble himself further with these theologies, but will confine his attention to such arguments against the view he holds as are based upon purely scientific data--and by scientific data I do not merely mean the truths of physical, mathematical, or logical science, but those of moral and metaphysical science. For, by science, I understand all knowledge which rests upon evidence and reasoning of a like character to that which claims our a.s.sent to ordinary scientific propositions. And if any one is able to make good the a.s.sertion that his theology rests upon valid evidence and sound reasoning, then it appears to me that such theology will take its place as a part of science.
The present antagonism between theology and science does not arise from any a.s.sumption by the men of science that all theology must necessarily be excluded from science; but simply because they are unable to allow that reason and morality have two weights and two measures; and that the belief in a proposition, because authority tells you it is true, or because you wish to believe it, which is a high crime and misdemeanour when the subject matter of reasoning is of one kind, becomes under the _alias_ of "faith" the greatest of all virtues, when the subject matter of reasoning is of another kind.
The Bishop of Brechin said well the other day:--"Liberality in religion--I do not mean tender and generous allowances for the mistakes of others--is only unfaithfulness to truth."[1] And, with the same qualification, I venture to paraphrase the Bishop"s dictum: "Ecclesiasticism in science is only unfaithfulness to truth."
[Footnote 1: Charge at the Diocesan Synod of Brechin. _Scotsman_, Sept. 14, 1871.]
Elijah"s great question, "Will you serve G.o.d or Baal? Choose ye," is uttered audibly enough in the ears of every one of us as we come to manhood. Let every man who tries to answer it seriously, ask himself whether he can be satisfied with the Baal of authority, and with all the good things his worshippers are promised in this world and the next. If he can, let him, if he be so inclined, amuse himself with such scientific implements as authority tells him are safe and will not cut his fingers; but let him not imagine he is, or can be, both a true son of the Church and a loyal soldier of science.
And, on the other hand, if the blind acceptance of authority appears to him in its true colours, as mere private judgment _in excelsis_, and if he have the courage to stand alone, face to face with the abyss of the Eternal and Unknowable, let him be content, once for all, not only to renounce the good things promised by "Infallibility," but even to bear the bad things which it prophesies; content to follow reason and fact in singleness and honesty of purpose, wherever they may lead, in the sure faith that a h.e.l.l of honest men will, to him, be more endurable than a paradise full of angelic shams.
Mr. Mivart a.s.serts that "without a belief in a personal G.o.d, there is no religion worthy of the name." This is a matter of opinion. But it may be a.s.serted, with less reason to fear contradiction, that the worship of a personal G.o.d, who, on Mr. Mivart"s hypothesis, must have used language studiously calculated to deceive His creatures and worshippers, is "no religion worthy of the name." "Incredibile est, Deum illis verbis ad populum fuisse locutum quibus deciperetur," is a verdict in which, for once, Jesuit casuistry concurs with the healthy moral sense of all mankind.
Having happily got quit of the theological aspect of evolution, the supporter of that great truth who turns to the scientific objections which are brought against it by recent criticism, finds, to his relief, that the work before him is greatly lightened by the spontaneous retreat of the enemy from nine-tenths of the territory which he occupied ten years ago. Even the Quarterly Reviewer not only abstains from venturing to deny that evolution has taken place, but he openly admits that Mr. Darwin has forced on men"s minds "a recognition of the probability, if not more, of evolution, and of the certainty of the action of natural selection" (p. 49).
I do not quite see, myself, how, if the action of natural selection is _certain_, the occurrence of evolution is only _probable_; inasmuch as the development of a new species by natural selection is, so far as it goes, evolution. However, it is not worth while to quarrel with the precise terms of a sentence which shows that the high watermark of intelligence among those most respectable of Britons, the readers of the _Quarterly Review_, has now reached such a level that the next tide may lift them easily and pleasantly on the once-dreaded sh.o.r.e of evolution. Nor, having got there, do they seem likely to stop, until they have reached the inmost heart of that great region, and accepted the ape ancestry of, at any rate, the body of man. For the Reviewer admits that Mr. Darwin can be said to have established:
"That if the various kinds of lower animals have been evolved one from the other by a process of natural generation or evolution, then it becomes highly probable, _a priori_, that man"s body has been similarly evolved; but this, in such a case, becomes equally probable from the admitted fact that he is an animal at all" (p. 65).
From the principles laid down in the last sentence, it would follow that if man were constructed upon a plan as different from that of any other animal as that of a sea-urchin is from that of a whale, it would be "equally probable" that he had been developed from some other animal as it is now, when we know that for every bone, muscle, tooth, and even pattern of tooth, in man, there is a corresponding bone, muscle, tooth, and pattern of tooth, in an ape. And this shows one of two things--either that the Quarterly Reviewer"s notions of probability are peculiar to himself; or, that he has such an overpowering faith in the truth of evolution, that no extent of structural break between one animal and another is sufficient to destroy his conviction that evolution has taken place.
But this by the way. The importance of the admission that there is nothing in man"s physical structure to interfere with his having been evolved from an ape, is not lessened because it is grudgingly made and inconsistently qualified. And instead of jubilating over the extent of the enemy"s retreat, it will be more worth while to lay siege to his last stronghold--the position that there is a distinction in kind between the mental faculties of man and those of brutes; and that, in consequence of this distinction in kind, no gradual progress from the mental faculties of the one to those of the other can have taken place.
The Quarterly Reviewer entrenches himself within formidable-looking psychological outworks, and there is no getting at him without attacking them one by one.
He begins by laying down the following proposition: ""Sensation" is not "thought," and no amount of the former would const.i.tute the most rudimentary condition of the latter, though sensations supply the conditions for the existence of "thought" or "knowledge"" (p. 67).
This proposition is true, or not, according to the sense in which the word "thought" is employed. Thought is not uncommonly used in a sense co-extensive with consciousness, and, especially, with those states of consciousness we call memory. If I recall the impression made by a colour or an odour, and distinctly remember blueness or muskiness, I may say with perfect propriety that I "think of" blue or musk; and, so long as the thought lasts, it is simply a faint reproduction of the state of consciousness to which I gave the name in question, when it first became known to me as a sensation.
Now, if that faint reproduction of a sensation, which we call the memory of it, is properly termed a thought, it seems to me to be a somewhat forced, proceeding to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation between thoughts and sensations. If sensations are not rudimentary thoughts, it may be said that some thoughts are rudimentary sensations. No amount of sound const.i.tutes an echo, but for all that no one would pretend that an echo is something of totally different nature from a sound. Again, nothing can be looser, or more inaccurate, than the a.s.sertion that "sensations supply the conditions for the existence of thought or knowledge." If this implies that sensations supply the conditions for the existence of our memory of sensations or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a truism which it is hardly worth while to state so solemnly. If it implies that sensations supply anything else, it is obviously erroneous. And if it means, as the context would seem to show it does, that sensations are the subject-matter of all thought or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact, inasmuch as our emotions, which const.i.tute a large part of the subject-matter of thought or of knowledge, are not sensations.
More eccentric still is the Quarterly Reviewer"s next piece of psychology.
"Altogether, we may clearly distinguish at least six kinds of action to which the nervous system ministers:--
"I. That in which impressions received result in appropriate movements without the intervention of sensation or thought, as in the cases of injury above given.--This is the reflex action of the nervous system.
"II. That in which stimuli from without result in sensations through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out--Sensation.
"III. That in which impressions received result in sensations which give rise to the observation of sensible objects.--Sensible perception.
"IV. That in which sensations and perceptions continue to coalesce, agglutinate, and combine in more or less complex aggregations, according to the laws of the a.s.sociation of sensible perceptions.--a.s.sociation.
"The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations, consisting, as they do at the best, but of mere _presentative_ sensible ideas in no way implying any reflective or _representative_ faculty. Such actions minister to and form _Instinct_. Besides these, we may distinguish two other kinds of mental action, namely:--
"V. That in which sensations and sensible perceptions are reflected on by thought, and recognized as our own, and we ourselves recognized by ourselves as affected and perceiving.--Self-consciousness.
"VI. That in which we reflect upon our sensations or perceptions, and ask what they are, and why they are.--Reason.
"These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations, performed, as they are, by means of representative ideas implying the use of a _reflective representative_ faculty.
Such actions distinguish the _intellect_ or rational faculty.
Now, we a.s.sert that possession in perfection of all the first four _(presentative)_ kinds of action by no means implies the possession of the last two _(representative)_ kinds.
All persons, we think, must admit the truth of the following proposition:--
"Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but _in kind_, if we may possess the one in perfection without that fact implying that we possess the other also. Still more will this be the case if the two faculties tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet this is the distinction between the _instinctive_ and the _intellectual_ parts of man"s nature.
"As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the first four groups of actions--that they may have, so to speak, mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of complexity, as governed by the laws of a.s.sociation. We deny to them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two kinds of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of reflecting on their own existence, or of inquiring into the nature of objects and their causes. We deny that they know that they know or know themselves in knowing. In other words, we deny them _reason_. The possession of the presentative faculty, as above explained, in no way implies that of the reflective faculty; nor does any amount of direct operation imply the power of asking the reflective question before mentioned, as to "what" and "why."" _(Loc. cit_. pp. 67, 68.)
Sundry points are worthy of notice in this remarkable account of the intellectual powers. In the first place the Reviewer ignores emotion and volition, though they are no inconsiderable "kinds of action to which the nervous system ministers," and memory has a place in his cla.s.sification only by implication. Secondly, we are told that the second "kind of action to which the nervous system ministers" is "that in which stimuli from without result in sensations through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out.--Sensation." Does this really mean that, in the writer"s opinion, "sensation" is the "agent"
by which the "due effect" of the stimulus, which gives rise to sensation, is "wrought out"? Suppose somebody runs a pin into me. The "due effect" of that particular stimulus will probably be threefold; namely, a sensation of pain, a start, and an interjectional expletive.
Does the Quarterly Reviewer really think that the "sensation" is the "agent" by which the other two phenomena are wrought out?
But these matters are of little moment to anyone but the Reviewer and those persons who may incautiously take their physiology, or psychology, from him. The really interesting point is this, that when he fully admits that animals "may possess all the first four groups of actions," he grants all that is necessary for the purposes of the evolutionist. For he hereby admits that in animals "impressions received result in sensations which give rise to the observation of sensible objects," and that they have what he calls "sensible perception." Nor was it possible to help the admission; for we have as much reason to ascribe to animals, as we have to attribute to our fellow-men, the power, not only of perceiving external objects as external, and thus practically recognizing the difference between the self and the not-self; but that of distinguishing between like and unlike, and between simultaneous and successive things. When a gamekeeper goes out coursing with a greyhound in leash, and a hare crosses the field of vision, he becomes the subject of those states of consciousness we call visual sensation, and that is all he receives from without. Sensation, as such, tells him nothing whatever about the cause of these states of consciousness; but the thinking faculty instantly goes to work upon the raw material of sensation furnished to it through the eye, and gives rise to a train of thoughts. First comes the thought that there is an object at a certain distance; then arises another thought--the perception of the likeness between the states of consciousness awakened by this object to those presented by memory, as, on some former occasion, called up by a hare; this is succeeded by another thought of the nature of an emotion--namely, the desire to possess the hare; then follows a longer or shorter train of other thoughts, which end in a volition and an act--the loosing of the greyhound from the leash. These several thoughts are the concomitants of a process which goes on in the nervous system of the man. Unless the nerve-elements of the retina, of the optic nerve, of the brain, of the spinal chord, and of the nerves of the arms went through certain physical changes in due order and correlation, the various states of consciousness which have been enumerated would not make their appearance. So that in this, as in all other intellectual operations, we have to distinguish two sets of successive changes--one in the physical basis of consciousness, and the other in consciousness itself; one set which may, and doubtless will, in course of time, be followed through all their complexities by the anatomist and the physicist, and one of which only the man himself can have immediate knowledge.