"All that is properly perceived by the visual faculty amounts to no more than colours with their variations and different proportions of light and shade; but the perpetual mutability and fleetingness of those immediate objects of sight render them incapable of being managed after the manner of geometrical figures, nor is it in any degree useful that they should. It is true there be divers of them perceived at once, and more of some and less of others; but accurately to compute their magnitude, and a.s.sign precise determinate proportions between things so variable and inconstant, if we suppose it possible to be done, must yet be a very trifling and insignificant labour."
If, by this, Berkeley means that by vision alone, a straight line cannot be distinguished from a curved one, a circle from a square, a long line from a short one, a large angle from a small one, his position is surely absurd in itself and contradictory to his own previously cited admissions; if he only means, on the other hand, that his pure spirit could not get very far on in his geometry, it may be true or not; but it is in contradiction with his previous a.s.sertion, that such a pure spirit could never attain to know as much as the first elements of plane geometry.
Another source of confusion, which arises out of Berkeley"s insufficient exactness in the use of language, is to be found in what he says about solidity, in discussing Molyneux"s problem, whether a man born blind and having learned to distinguish between a cube and a sphere, could, on receiving his sight, tell the one from the other by vision. Berkeley agrees with Locke that he could not, and adds the following reflection:--
"Cube, sphere, table, are words he has known applied to things perceivable by touch, but to things perfectly intangible he never knew them applied. Those words in their wonted application always marked out to his mind bodies or solid things which were perceived by the resistance they gave. But there is no solidity, no resistance or protrusion perceived by sight."
Here "solidity" means resistance to pressure, which is apprehended by the muscular sense; but when in section 154 Berkeley says of his pure intelligence--
"It is certain that the aforesaid intelligence could have no idea of a solid or quant.i.ty of three dimensions, which follows from its not having any idea of distance "--
he refers to that notion of solidity which may be obtained by the tactile sense, without the addition of any notion of resistance in the solid object; as, for example, when the finger pa.s.ses lightly over the surface of a billiard ball.
Yet another source of difficulty in clearly understanding Berkeley arises out of his use of the word "outness." In speaking of touch he seems to employ it indifferently, both for the localization of a tactile sensation in the sensory surface, which we really obtain through touch; and for the notion of corporeal separation, which is attained by the a.s.sociation of muscular and tactile sensations. In speaking of sight, on the other hand, Berkeley employs "outness" to denote corporeal separation.
When due allowance is made for the occasional looseness and ambiguity of Berkeley"s terminology, and the accessories are weeded out of the essential parts of his famous Essay, his views may, I believe, be fairly and accurately summed up in the following propositions:--
1. The sense of touch gives rise to ideas of extension, figure, magnitude, and motion.
2. The sense of touch gives rise to the idea of "outness," in the sense of localization.
3. The sense of touch gives rise to the idea of resistance, and thence to that of solidity, in the sense of impenetrability.
4. The sense of touch gives rise to the idea of "outness," in the sense of distance in the third dimension, and thence to that of s.p.a.ce, or geometrical solidity.
5. The sense of sight gives rise to ideas of extension, of figure, magnitude, and motion.
6. The sense of sight does not give rise to the idea of "outness,"
in the sense of distance in the third dimension, nor to that of geometrical solidity, no visual idea appearing to be without the mind, or at any distance off (---- 43, 50).
7. The sense of sight does not give rise to the idea of mechanical solidity.
8. There is no likeness whatever between the tactile ideas called extension, figure, magnitude, and motion, and the visual ideas which go by the same names; nor are any ideas common to the two senses.
9. When we think we see objects at a distance, what really happens is that the visual picture suggests that the object seen has tangible distance; we confound the strong belief in the tangible distance of the object with actual sight of its distance.
10. Visual ideas, therefore, const.i.tute a kind of language, by which we are informed of the tactile ideas which will, or may, arise in us.
Taking these propositions into consideration _seriatim_, it may be a.s.sumed that everyone will a.s.sent to the first and second; and that for the third and fourth we have only to include the muscular sense tinder the name of sense of touch, as Berkeley did, in order to make it quite accurate. Nor is it intelligible to me that anyone should explicitly deny the truth of the fifth proposition, though some of Berkeley"s supporters, less careful than himself, have done so.
Indeed, it must be confessed that it is only grudgingly, and as it were against his will, that Berkeley admits that we obtain ideas of extension, figure, and magnitude by pure vision, and that he more than half retracts the admission; while he absolutely denies that sight gives us any notion of outness in either sense of the word, and even declares that "no proper visual idea appears to be without the mind, or at any distance off." By "proper visual ideas," Berkeley denotes colours, and light, and shade; and, therefore, he affirms that colours do not appear to be at any distance from us. I confess that this a.s.sertion appears to me to be utterly unaccountable. I have made endless experiments on this point, and by no effort of the imagination can I persuade myself, when looking at a colour, that the colour is in my mind, and not at a "distance off," though of course I know perfectly well, as a matter of reason, that colour is subjective. It is like looking at the sun setting, and trying to persuade oneself that the earth appears to move and not the sun, a feat I have never been able to accomplish. Even when the eyes are shut, the darkness of which one is conscious, carries with it the notion of outness. One looks, so to speak, into a dark s.p.a.ce. Common language expresses the common experience of mankind in this matter. A man will say that a smell is in his nose, a taste in his mouth, a singing in his ears, a creeping or a warmth in his skin; but if he is jaundiced, he does not say that he has yellow in his eyes, but that everything looks yellow; and if he is troubled with _muscae volitantes_, he says, not that he has specks in his eyes, but that he sees specks dancing before his eyes. In fact, it appears to me that it is the special peculiarity of visual sensations, that they invariably give rise to the idea of remoteness, and that Berkeley"s dictum ought to be reversed. For I think that anyone who interrogates his consciousness carefully will find that "every proper visual idea" appears to be without the mind and at a distance off.
Not only does every _visibile_ appear to be remote, but it has a position in external s.p.a.ce, just as a _tangibile_ appears to be superficial and to have a determinate position on the surface of the body. Every _visibile_, in fact, appears (approximately) to be situated upon a line drawn from it to the point of the retina on which its image falls. It is referred outwards, in the general direction of the pencil of light by which it is rendered visible, just as, in the experiment with the stick, the _tangibile_ is referred outwards to the end of the stick.
It is for this reason that an object, viewed with both eyes, is seen single and not double. Two distinct images are formed, but each image is referred to that point at which the two optic axes intersect; consequently, the two images exactly cover one another, and appear as completely one as any other two exactly similar superimposed images would be. And it is for the same reason, that, if the ball of the eye is pressed upon at any point, a spot of light appears apparently outside the eye, and in a region exactly opposite to that in which the pressure is made.
But while it seems to me that there is no reason to doubt that the extradition of sensation is more complete in the case of the eye than in that of the skin, and that corporeal distinctness, and hence s.p.a.ce, are directly suggested by vision, it is another, and a much more difficult question, whether the notion of geometrical solidity is attainable by pure vision; that is to say, by a single eye, all the parts of which are immoveable. However this may be, for an absolutely fixed eye, I conceive there can be no doubt in the case of an eye that is moveable and capable of adjustment. For, with the moveable eye, the muscular sense comes into play in exactly the same way as with the moveable hand; and the notion of change of place, _plus_ the sense of effort, gives rise to a conception of visual s.p.a.ce, which runs exactly parallel with that of tangible s.p.a.ce. When two moveable eyes are present, the notion of s.p.a.ce of three dimensions is obtained in the same way as it is by the two hands, but with, much greater precision.
And if, to take a case similar to one already a.s.sumed, we suppose a man deprived of every sense except vision, and of all motion except that of his eyes, it surely cannot be doubted that he would have a perfect conception of s.p.a.ce; and indeed a much more perfect conception than he who possessed touch alone without vision. But of course our touchless man would be devoid of any notion of resistance; and hence s.p.a.ce, for him, would be altogether geometrical and devoid of body.
And here another curious consideration arises, what likeness, if any, would there be between the visual s.p.a.ce of the one man, and the tangible s.p.a.ce of the other?
Berkeley, as we have seen (in the eighth proposition), declares that there is no likeness between the ideas given by sight and those given by touch; and one cannot but agree with him, so long as the term ideas is restricted to mere sensations. Obviously, there is no more likeness between the feel of a surface and the colour of it, than there is between its colour and its smell. All simple sensations, derived from different senses, are incommensurable with one another, and only gradations of their own intensity are comparable. And thus so far as the primary facts of sensation go, visual figure and tactile figure, visual magnitude and tactile magnitude, visual motion and tactile motion, are truly unlike, and have no common term. But when Berkeley goes further than this, and declares that there are no "ideas" common to the "ideas" of touch and those of sight, it appears to me that he has fallen into a great error, and one which is the chief source of his paradoxes about geometry.
Berkeley in fact employs the word "idea" in this instance to denote two totally different cla.s.ses of feelings, or states of consciousness.
For these may be divided into two groups: the primary feelings, which exist in themselves and without relation to any other, such as pleasure and pain, desire, and the simple sensations obtained through the sensory organs; and the secondary feelings, which express those relations of primary feelings which are perceived by the mind; and the existence of which, therefore, implies the pre-existence of at least two of the primary feelings. Such are likeness and unlikeness in quality, quant.i.ty, or form; succession and contemporaneity; contiguity and distance; cause and effect; motion and rest.
Now it is quite true that there is no likeness between the primary feelings which are grouped under sight and touch; but it appears to me wholly untrue, and indeed absurd, to affirm that there is no likeness between the secondary feelings which express the relations of the primary ones.
The relation of succession perceived between the visible taps of a hammer, is, to my mind, exactly like the relation of succession between the tangible taps; the unlikeness between red and blue is a mental phenomenon of the same order as the unlikeness between rough and smooth. Two points visibly distant are so, because one or more units of visible length _(minima visibilia_) are interposed between them; and as two points tangibly distant are so, because one or more units of tangible length _(minima tangibilia_) are interposed between them, it is clear that the notion of interposition of units of sensibility, or _minima sensibilia_, is an idea common to the two. And whether I see a point move across the field of vision towards another point, or feel the like motion, the idea of the gradual diminution of the number of sensible units between the two points appears to me to be common to both kinds of motion.
Hence, I conceive, that though it be true that there is no likeness between the primary feelings given by sight and those given by touch, yet there is a complete likeness between the secondary feelings aroused by each sense.
Indeed, if it were not so, how could Logic, which deals with those forms of thought which are applicable to every kind of subject-matter, be possible? How could numerical proportion be as true of _visibilia_, as of _tangibilia_, unless there were some ideas common to the two?
And to come directly to the heart of the matter, is there any more difference between the relations between tangible sensations which we call place and direction, and those between visible sensations which go by the same name, than there is between those relations of tangible and visible sensations which we call succession? And if there be none, why is Geometry not just as much a matter of _visibilia_ as of _tangibilia_?
Moreover, as a matter of fact, it is certain that the muscular sense is so closely connected with both the visual and the tactile senses, that, by the ordinary laws of a.s.sociation, the ideas which it suggests must needs be common to both.
From what has been said it will follow that the ninth proposition falls to the ground; and that vision, combined with the muscular sensations produced by the movement of the eyes, gives us as complete a notion of corporeal separation and of distance in the third dimension of s.p.a.ce, as touch, combined with the muscular sensations produced by the movements of the hand, does. The tenth proposition seems to contain a perfectly true statement, but it is only half the truth. It is no doubt true that our visual ideas are a kind of language by which we are informed of the tactile ideas which may or will arise in us; but this is true, more or less, of every sense in regard to every other. If I put my hand in my pocket, the tactile ideas which I receive prophesy quite accurately what I shall see--whether a bunch of keys or half-a-crown--when I pull it out again; and the tactile ideas are, in this case, the language which informs me of the visual ideas which will arise. So with the other senses: olfactory ideas tell me I shall find the tactile and visual phenomena called violets, if I look for them; taste tells me that what I am tasting will, if I look at it, have the form of a clove; and hearing warns me of what I shall, or may, see and touch every minute of my life.
But while the "New Theory of Vision" cannot be considered to possess much value in relation to the immediate object its author had in view, it had a vastly important influence in directing attention to the real complexity of many of those phenomena of sensation, which appear at first to be simple. And even if Berkeley was, as I imagine he was, quite wrong in supposing that we do not see s.p.a.ce, the contrary doctrine makes quite as strongly for his general view, that s.p.a.ce can be conceived only as something thought by a mind.
The last of Locke"s "primary qualities" which remain to be considered is mechanical solidity, or impenetrability. But our conception of this is derived from the sense of resistance to our own effort, or active force, which we meet with in a.s.sociation with sundry tactile or visual phenomena; and, undoubtedly, active force is inconceivable except as a state of consciousness. This may sound paradoxical; but let anyone try to realize what he means by the mutual attraction of two particles, and I think he will find, either, that he conceives them simply as moving towards one another at a certain rate, in which case he only pictures motion to himself, and leaves force aside; or, that he conceives each particle to be animated by something like his own volition, and to be pulling as he would pull. And I suppose that this difficulty of thinking of force except as something comparable to volition, lies at the bottom of Leibnitz"s doctrine of monads, to say nothing of Schopenhauer"s "Welt als Wille und Vorstellung;" while the opposite difficulty of conceiving force to be anything like volition, drives another school of thinkers into the denial of any connection, save that of succession, between cause and effect.
To sum up. If the materialist affirms that the universe and all its phenomena are resolvable into matter and motion, Berkeley replies, True; but what you call matter and motion are known to us only as forms of consciousness; their being is to be conceived or known; and the existence of a state of consciousness, apart from a thinking mind, is a contradiction in terms.
I conceive that this reasoning is irrefragable. And therefore, if I were obliged to choose between absolute materialism and absolute idealism, I should feel compelled to accept the latter alternative.
Indeed, upon this point Locke does, practically, go as far in the direction of idealism, as Berkeley, when he admits that "the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts, beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot."--Book II. chap, xxiii. -- 29.
But Locke adds, "Nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of these ideas."
Now, from this proposition, the thorough materialists dissent as much, on the one hand, as Berkeley does, upon the other hand.
The thorough materialist a.s.serts that there is a something which he calls the "substance" of matter; that this something is the cause of all phenomena, whether material or mental; that it is self-existent and eternal, and so forth.
Berkeley, on the contrary, a.s.serts with equal confidence that there is no substance of matter, but only a substance of mind, which he terms spirit; that there are two kinds of spiritual substance, the one eternal and uncreated, the substance of the Deity, the other created, and, once created, naturally eternal; that the universe, as known to created spirits, has no being in itself, but is the result of the action of the substance of the Deity on the substance of those spirits.
In contradiction to which bold a.s.sertion, Locke affirms that we simply know nothing about substance of any kind.[1]
[Footnote 1: Berkeley virtually makes the same confession of ignorance, when he admits that we can have no idea or notion of a spirit ("Principles of Human Knowledge," -- 138); and the way in which he tries to escape the consequences of this admission, is a splendid example of the floundering of a mired logician.]
"So that if anyone will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities, which are capable of producing simple ideas in us, which qualities are commonly called accidents.
"If anyone should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres? he would have nothing to say but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded what is it that solidity and extension inhere in? he would not be in much better case than the Indian before mentioned, who, urging that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on? to which his answer was, a great tortoise. But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise I replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases when we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children, who, being questioned what such a thing is, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something; which in truth signifies no more when so used, either by children or men, but that they know not what, and that the thing they pretend to talk and know of is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and are, so, perfectly ignorant of it and in the dark. The idea, then, we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot exist _sine re substante_, without something to support them, we call that support _substantia_, which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding."[1]
[Footnote 1: Locke, "Human Understanding," Book II. chap, xiii. -- 2.]
I cannot but believe that the judgment of Locke is that which Philosophy will accept as her final decision.