On the other hand, there are some curious similarities between Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer, and these are sometimes so close, that, if Mr.
Mivart thought it worth while, I think he might make out a good case of plagiarism against the Reviewer, who studiously abstains from quoting him.
Both the Reviewer and Mr. Mivart reproach Mr. Darwin with being, "like so many other physicists," entangled in a radically false metaphysical system, and with setting at nought the first principles of both philosophy and religion. Both enlarge upon the necessity of a sound philosophical basis, and both, I venture to add, make a conspicuous exhibition of its absence.
The Quarterly Reviewer believes that man "differs more from an elephant or a gorilla than do these from the dust of the earth on which they tread,"
and Mr. Mivart has expressed the opinion that there is more difference between man and an ape than there is between an ape and a piece of granite.
[Footnote: See the _Tablet_ for March 11, 1871.]
And even when Mr. Mivart (p. 86) trips in a matter of anatomy, and creates a difficulty for Mr. Darwin out of a supposed close similarity between the eyes of fishes and cephalopods, which (as Gegenbaur and others have clearly shown) does not exist, the Quarterly Reviewer adopts the argument without hesitation (p. 66).
There is another important point, however, in which it is hard to say whether Mr. Mivart diverges from the Quarterly Reviewer or not.
The Reviewer declares that Mr. Darwin has, "with needless opposition, set at nought the first principles of both philosophy and religion" (p. 90).
It looks, at first, as if this meant, that Mr. Darwin"s views being false, the opposition to "religion" which flows from them must be needless. But I suspect this is not the right view of the meaning of the pa.s.sage, as Mr.
Mivart, from whom the Quarterly Reviewer plainly draws so much inspiration, tells us that "the consequences which have been drawn from evolution, whether exclusively Darwinian or not, to the prejudice of religion, by no means follow from it, and are in fact illegitimate" (p. 5).
I may a.s.sume, then, that the Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart admit that there is no necessary opposition between "evolution whether exclusively Darwinian or not," and religion. But then, what do they mean by this last much-abused term? On this point the Quarterly Reviewer is silent. Mr.
Mivart, on the contrary, is perfectly explicit, and the whole tenor of his remarks leaves no doubt that by "religion" he means theology; and by theology, that particular variety of the great Proteus, which is expounded by the doctors of the Roman Catholic Church, and held by the members of that religious community to be the sole form of absolute truth and of saving faith.
According to Mr. Mivart, the greatest and most orthodox authorities upon matters of Catholic doctrine agree in distinctly a.s.serting "derivative creation" or evolution; "and thus their teachings harmonise with all that modern science can possibly require" (p. 305).
I confess that this bold a.s.sertion interested me more than anything else in Mr. Mivart"s book. What little knowledge I possessed of Catholic doctrine, and of the influence exerted by Catholic authority in former times, had not led me to expect that modern science was likely to find a warm welcome within the pale of the greatest and most consistent of theological organisations.
And my astonishment reached its climax when I found Mr. Mivart citing Father Suarez as his chief witness in favour of the scientific freedom enjoyed by Catholics--the popular repute of that learned theologian and subtle casuist not being such as to make his works a likely place of refuge for liberality of thought. But in these days, when Judas Iscariot and Robespierre, Henry VIII. and Catiline, have all been shown to be men of admirable virtue, far in advance of their age, and consequently the victims of vulgar prejudice, it was obviously possible that Jesuit Suarez might be in like case. And, spurred by Mr. Mivart"s unhesitating declaration, I hastened to acquaint myself with such of the works of the great Catholic divine as bore upon the question, hoping, not merely to acquaint myself with the true teachings of the infallible Church, and free myself of an unjust prejudice; but, haply, to enable myself, at a pinch, to put some Protestant bibliolater to shame, by the bright example of Catholic freedom from the trammels of verbal inspiration.
I regret to say that my antic.i.p.ations have been cruelly disappointed. But the extent to which my hopes have been crushed can only be fully appreciated by citing, in the first place, those pa.s.sages of Mr. Mivart"s work by which they were excited. In his introductory chapter I find the following pa.s.sages:--
"The prevalence of this theory [of evolution] need alarm no one, for it is, without any doubt, perfectly consistent with the strictest and most orthodox Christian [Footnote: It should be observed that Mr. Mivart employs the term "Christian" as if it were the equivalent of "Catholic."] theology"
(p. 5).
"Mr. Darwin and others may perhaps be excused if they have not devoted much time to the study of Christian philosophy; but they have no right to a.s.sume or accept without careful examination, as an unquestioned fact, that in that philosophy there is a necessary antagonism between the two ideas "creation" and "evolution," as applied to organic forms.
"It is notorious and patent to all who choose to seek, that many distinguished Christian thinkers have accepted, and do accept, both ideas, _i.e._ both "creation" and "evolution."
"As much as ten years ago an eminently Christian writer observed: "The creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search after manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual "catastrophes." Creation is not a miraculous interference with the laws of Nature, but the very inst.i.tution of those laws. Law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the patristic ideal of creation. With this notion they admitted, without difficulty, the most surprising origin of living creatures, provided it took place by _law_. They held that when G.o.d said, "Let the waters produce," "Let the earth produce," He conferred forces on the elements of earth and water which enabled them naturally to produce the various species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains attached to the elements throughout all time." The same writer quotes St.
Augustin and St. Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that, "in the inst.i.tution of Nature, we do not look for miracles, but for the laws of Nature." And, again, St. Basil speaks of the continued operation of natural laws in the production of all organisms.
"So much for the writers of early and mediaeval times. As to the present day, the author can confidently affirm that there are many as well versed in theology as Mr. Darwin is in his own department of natural knowledge, who would not be disturbed by the thorough demonstration of his theory.
Nay, they would not even be in the least painfully affected at witnessing the generation of animals of complex organisation by the skilful artificial arrangement of natural forces, and the production, in the future, of a fish by means a.n.a.logous to those by which we now produce urea.
"And this because they know that the possibility of such phenomena, though by no means actually foreseen, has yet been fully provided for in the old philosophy centuries before Darwin, or even centuries before Bacon, and that their place in the system can be at once a.s.signed them without even disturbing its order or marring its harmony.
"Moreover, the old tradition in this respect has never been abandoned, however much it may have been ignored or neglected by some modern writers.
In proof of this, it may be observed that perhaps no post-mediaeval theologian has a wider reception amongst Christians throughout the world than Suarez, who has a separate section [Footnote: Suarez, _Metaphysica_. Edition Vives. Paris, 1868, vol. i Disput. xv. -- 2.] in opposition to those who maintain the distinct creation of the various kinds--or substantial forms--of organic life" (pp. 19-21).
Still more distinctly does Mr. Mivart express himself in the same sense, in his last chapter, ent.i.tled "Theology and Evolution" (pp. 302-5).
"It appears, then, that Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept the general evolution theory. But are there any theological authorities to justify this view of the matter?
"Now, considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations, it might hardly be expected _a priori_ that writers of earlier ages should have given expression to doctrines harmonising in any degree with such very modern views; nevertheless, this is certainly the case, and it would be easy to give numerous examples. It will be better, however, to cite one or two authorities of weight. Perhaps no writer of the earlier Christian ages could be quoted whose authority is more generally recognised than that of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the mediaeval period for St. Thomas Aquinas: and since the movement of Luther, Suarez may be taken as an authority, widely venerated, and one whose orthodoxy has never been questioned.
"It must be borne in mind that for a considerable time even after the last of these writers no one had disputed the generally received belief as to the small age of the world, or at least of the kinds of animals and plants inhabiting it. It becomes, therefore, much more striking if views formed under such a condition of opinion are found to harmonise with modern ideas concerning "Creation" and organic Life.
"Now St. Augustin insists in a very remarkable manner on the merely derivative sense in which G.o.d"s creation of organic forms is to be understood; that is, that G.o.d created them by conferring on the material world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions."
Mr. Mivart then cites certain pa.s.sages from St. Augustin, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Cornelius a Lapide, and finally adds:--
"As to Suarez, it will be enough to refer to Disp. xv. sec. 2, No. 9, p.
508, t. i. edition Vives, Paris; also Nos. 13-15. Many other references to the same effect could easily be given, but these may suffice.
"It is then evident that ancient and most venerable theological authorities distinctly a.s.sert derivative creation, and thus their teachings harmonise with all that modern science can possibly require."
It will be observed that Mr. Mivart refers solely to Suarez"s fifteenth Disputation, though he adds, "Many other references to the same effect could easily be given." I shall look anxiously for these references in the third edition of the "Genesis of Species." For the present, all I can say is, that I have sought in vain, either in the fifteenth Disputation, or elsewhere, for any pa.s.sage in Suarez"s writings which, in the slightest degree, bears out Mr. Mivart"s views as to his opinions. [Footnote: The edition of Suarez"s _Disputationes_ from which the following citations are given, is Birckmann"s, in two volumes folio, and is dated 1680.]
The t.i.tle of this fifteenth Disputation is "De causa formali substantiali,"
and the second section of that Disputation (to which Mr. Mivart refers) is headed, "Quomodo possit forma substantialis fieri in materia et ex materia?"
The problem which Suarez discusses in this place may be popularly stated thus: According to the scholastic philosophy every natural body has two components--the one its "matter" (_materia prima_), the other its "substantial form" (_forma substantialis_). Of these the matter is everywhere the same, the matter of one body being indistinguishable from the matter of any other body. That which differentiates any one natural body from all others is its substantial form, which inheres in the matter of that body, as the human soul inheres in the matter of the frame of man, and is the source of all the activities and other properties of the body.
Thus, says Suarez, if water is heated, and the source of heat is then removed, it cools again. The reason of this is that there is a certain "_intimius principium_" in the water, which brings it back to the cool condition when the external impediment to the existence of that condition is removed. This _intimius principium_ is the "substantial form" of the water. And the substantial form of the water is not only the cause (_radix_) of the coolness of the water, but also of its moisture, of its density, and of all its other properties.
It will thus be seen that "substantial forms" play nearly the same part in the scholastic philosophy as "forces" do in modern science; the general tendency of modern thought being to conceive all bodies as resolvable into material particles and forces, in virtue of which last these particles a.s.sume those dispositions and exercise those powers which are characteristic of each particular kind of matter.
But the Schoolmen distinguished two kinds of substantial forms, the one spiritual and the other material. The former division is represented by the human soul, the _anima rationalis_; and they affirm as a matter, not merely of reason, but of faith, that every human soul is created out of nothing, and by this act of creation is endowed with the power of existing for all eternity, apart from the _materia prima_ of which the corporeal frame of man is composed. And the _anima rationalis_, once united with the _materia prima_ of the body, becomes its substantial form, and is the source of all the powers and faculties of man--of all the vital and sensitive phenomena which he exhibits--just as the substantial form of water is the source of all its qualities.
The "material substantial forms" are those which inform all other natural bodies except that of man; and the object of Suarez in the present Disputation, is to show that the axiom "_ex nihilo nihil fit_," though not true of the substantial form of man, is true of the substantial forms of all other bodies, the endless mutations of which const.i.tute the ordinary course of nature. The origin of the difficulty which he discusses is easily comprehensible. Suppose a piece of bright iron to be exposed to the air.
The existence of the iron depends on the presence within it of a substantial form, which is the cause of its properties, _e.g._ brightness, hardness, weight. But, by degrees, the iron becomes converted into a ma.s.s of rust, which is dull, and soft, and light, and, in all other respects, is quite different from the iron. As, in the scholastic view, this difference is due to the rust being informed by a new substantial form, the grave problem arises, how did this new substantial form come into being? Has it been created? or has it arisen by the power of natural causation? If the former hypothesis is correct, then the axiom, "_ex nihilo nihil fit_," is false, even in relation to the ordinary course of nature, seeing that such mutations of matter as imply the continual origin of new substantial forms are occurring every moment. But the harmonisation of Aristotle with theology was as dear to the Schoolmen, as the smoothing down the differences between Moses and science is to our Broad Churchmen, and they were proportionably unwilling to contradict one of Aristotle"s fundamental propositions. Nor was their objection to flying in the face of the Stagirite likely to be lessened by the fact that such flight landed them in flat Pantheism.
So Father Suarez fights stoutly for the second hypothesis; and I quote the princ.i.p.al part of his argumentation as an exquisite specimen of that speech which is a "darkening of counsel."
"13. Secundo de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus [sc. materialibus]
dicendum est non fieri proprie ex nihilo, sed ex potentia praejacentis materiae educi: ideoque in effectione harum formarum nil fieri contra illud axioma, _Ex nihilo nihil fit_, si recte intelligatur. Haec a.s.sertio sumitur ex Aristotele 1. Physicorum per totum et libro 7. Metaphyss. et ex aliis auctoribus, quos statim referam. Et declaratur breviter, nam fieri ex nihilo duo dicit, unum est fieri absolute et simpliciter, aliud est quod talis effectio fit ex nihilo. Primum proprie dicitur de re subsistente, quia ejus est fieri, cujus est esse: id autem proprie quod subsist.i.t et habet esse; nam quod alteri adjacet, potius est quo aliud est. Ex hac ergo parte, formae substantiales materiales non fiunt ex nihilo, quia proprie non fiunt. Atque hanc rationem reddit Divus Thomas 1 parte, quaestione 45, articulo 8, et quaestione 90, articulo 2, et ex dicendis magis explicabitur.
Sumendo ergo ipsum _fieri_ in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri ex nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte praesupposita, ex quo fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum de novo fiunt, non fiunt ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex praesupposita materia, ex qua componuntur, et ita non fiunt, secundum se totae, sed secundum aliquid sui. Formae autem harum rerum, quamvis revera totam suam ent.i.tatem de novo accipiant, quam antea non habebant, quia vero ipsae non fiunt, ut dictum est, ideo neque ex nihilo fiunt. Attamen, quia latiori modo sumendo verb.u.m illud _fieri_ negari non potest: quin forma facta sit, eo modo quo nunc est, et antea non erat, ut etiam probat ratio dubitandi posita in principio sectionis, ideo addendum est, sumpto _fieri_ in hac amplitudine, fieri ex nihilo non tamen negare habitudinem materialis causae intrinsece componentis id quod fit, sed etiam habitudinem causae materialis per se causantis et sustentantis formam quae fit, seu confit. Diximus enim in superioribus materiam et esse causam compositi et formae dependentis ab illa: ut res ergo dicatur ex nihilo fieri uterque modus causalitatis negari debet; et eodem sensu accipiendum est illud axioma, ut sit verum: _Ex nihilo nihil fit_, scilicet virtute agentis naturalis et finiti nihil fieri, nisi ex praesupposito subjecto per se concurrente, et ad compositum et ad formam, si utrumque suo modo ab eodem agente fiat. Ex his ergo recte concluditur, formas substantiales materiales non fieri ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex materia, quae in suo genere per se concurrit, et influit ad esse, et fieri talium formarum; quia, sicut esse non possunt nisi affixae materiae, a qua sustententur in esse: ita nec fieri possunt, nisi earum effectio et penetratio in eadem materia sustentetur. Et haec est propria et per se differentia inter effectionem ex nihilo, et ex aliquo, propter quam, ut infra ostendemus, prior modus efficiendi superat vim finitam naturaliam agentium, non vero posterior.
"14. Ex his etiam constat, proprie de his formis dici non creari, sed educi de potentia materiae." [Footnote: Suarez, _loc. cit._ Disput. xv. -- ii.]
If I may venture to interpret these hard sayings, Suarez conceives that the evolution of substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature, is conditioned not only by the existence of the _materia prima_, but also by a certain "concurrence and influence" which that _materia_ exerts; and every new substantial form being thus conditioned, and in part, at any rate, caused, by a pre-existing something, cannot be said to be created out of nothing.
But as the whole tenor of the context shows, Suarez applies this argumentation merely to the evolution of material substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature. How the substantial forms of animals and plants primarily originated, is a question to which, so far as I am able to discover, he does not so much as allude in his "Metaphysical Disputations."
Nor was there any necessity that he should do so, inasmuch as he has devoted a separate treatise of considerable bulk to the discussion of all the problems which arise out of the account of the Creation which is given in the Book of Genesis. And it is a matter of wonderment to me that Mr.
Mivart, who somewhat sharply reproves "Mr. Darwin and others" for not acquainting themselves with the true teachings of his Church, should allow himself to be indebted to a heretic like myself for a knowledge of the existence of that "Tractatus de opere s.e.x Dierum," [Footnote: _Tractatus de opere s.e.x Dierum, seu de Universi Creatione, quatenus s.e.x diebus perfecta esse, in libro Genesis cap. i. refertur, et praesertim de productione hominis in statu innocentiae._ Ed. Birckmann, 1622.] in which the learned Father, of whom he justly speaks, as "an authority widely venerated, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned," directly opposes all those opinions for which Mr. Mivart claims the shelter of his authority.
In the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first book of this treatise, Suarez inquires in what sense the word "day," as employed in the first chapter of Genesis, is to be taken. He discusses the views of Philo and of Augustin on this question, and rejects them. He suggests that the approval of their allegorising interpretations by St. Thomas Aquinas, merely arose out of St. Thomas"s modesty, and his desire not to seem openly to controvert St. Augustin--"voluisse Divus Thomas pro sua modestia subterfugere vim argumenti potius quam aperte Augustinum inconstantiae arguere."
Finally, Suarez decides that the writer of Genesis meant that the term "day" should be taken in its natural sense; and he winds up the discussion with the very just and natural remark that "it is not probable that G.o.d, in inspiring Moses to write a history of the Creation which was to be believed by ordinary people, would have made him use language, the true meaning of which it is hard to discover, and still harder to believe." [Footnote: "Propter haec ergo sententia illa Augustini et propter nimiam obscuritatem et subtilitatem ejus difficilis creditu est: quia verisimile non est Deum inspira.s.se Moysi, ut historiam de creatione mundi ad fidem totius populi adeo necessariam per nomina dierum explicaret, quorum significatio vix inveniri et difficillime ab aliquo credi posset." (_Loc. cit._ Lib. I.
cap. xi. 42.)]
And in chapter xii. 3, Suarez further observes:--