If our commanders on the ground wanted the full force, they would get it. I decided to send five brigades to Baghdad, plus two additional Marine battalions to Anbar Province. We would embed our troops in Iraqi formations, so that we could mentor the Iraqis on the battlefield and prepare the Iraqis to take more responsibility after the surge. Finally, I would accept three key recommendations from the Joint Chiefs. Condi would lead a surge in civilian resources. I would obtain public a.s.surances from Prime Minister Maliki about our troops" freedom to maneuver. And I would call on Congress to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps by ninety thousand forces.
On January 4, 2007, I held a secure videoconference with Maliki. "A lot of people here don"t think we can succeed. I do," I told him. "I"ll put my neck out if you put out yours." Two days later, he addressed the Iraqi people and signaled his commitment to the surge. "The Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of sectarian or political affiliation," he said.
The decision had been tough, but I was confident that I had made it the right way. I had gathered facts and opinions from people inside and outside the administration. I had challenged a.s.sumptions and weighed all the options carefully. I knew the surge would be unpopular in the short term. But while many in Washington had given up on the prospect of victory in Iraq, I had not.
At nine o"clock on the evening of January 10, 2007, I stepped before the cameras in the White House Library. "The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people-and it is unacceptable to me," I said. "Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me.
"It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq....So I"ve committed more than twenty thousand additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them-five brigades-will be deployed to Baghdad."
The reaction was swift and one-sided. "I don"t believe an expansion of twenty thousand troops in Iraq will solve the problems," one senator said. "I do not believe that sending more troops to Iraq is the answer," said another. A third p.r.o.nounced it "the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam." And those were just the Republicans.
The left was even more outspoken. One freshman senator predicted that the surge would not "solve the sectarian violence there. In fact, I think it will do the reverse." Capturing the view of most of his colleagues, a Washington Post Washington Post columnist called it "a fantasy-based escalation of the war in Iraq, which could only make sense in some parallel universe where pigs fly and fish commute on bicycles." columnist called it "a fantasy-based escalation of the war in Iraq, which could only make sense in some parallel universe where pigs fly and fish commute on bicycles."
Condi, Bob Gates Bob Gates, and Pete Pace testified on Capitol Hill the day after I announced the surge. The questioning was brutal from both sides of the aisle. "This is the craziest, dumbest plan I"ve ever seen or heard of in my life," one Democratic congressman told General Pace. "I"ve gone along with the president on this, and I bought into his dream," a Republican senator told Condi. "At this stage of the game, I just don"t think it"s going to happen." Afterward Condi came to see me in the Oval Office. "We"ve got a tough sell on this, Mr. President," she said.
Amid the near-universal skepticism, a few brave souls defended the surge. Foremost among them were Senator Joe Lieberman Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, a lifelong Democrat who had been cast aside by his party for supporting the war; Senator of Connecticut, a lifelong Democrat who had been cast aside by his party for supporting the war; Senator Lindsey Graham Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, a member of the Air Force Reserves; and Senator John McCain of Arizona. of South Carolina, a member of the Air Force Reserves; and Senator John McCain of Arizona.
McCain and I had a complex relationship. We had competed against each other in 2000, and we had disagreed on issues from tax cuts to Medicare reform to terrorist interrogation. Yet he had campaigned hard for me in 2004, and I knew he planned to run for president in 2008. The surge gave him a chance to create distance between us, but he didn"t take it. He had been a longtime advocate of more troops in Iraq, and he supported the new strategy wholeheartedly. "I cannot guarantee success," he said. "But I can guarantee failure if we don"t adopt this new strategy."
The most persuasive advocate of the surge was General Petraeus. As the author of the Army"s counterinsurgency manual, he was the undisputed authority on the strategy he would lead. His intellect, compet.i.tiveness, and work ethic were well known. On one of his visits home, I invited the general to mountain bike with me at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He was mainly a runner, but he had enough confidence to accept the challenge. He held his own with the experienced riders of the presidential peloton.
After the ride, I stepped inside a building at Fort Belvoir to take a call from the prime minister of j.a.pan. I heard a noise in the background. I peeked out the door and saw Petraeus leading the peloton through a series of post-ride push-ups and crunches.
Petraeus"s rise had attracted some resentment. I had heard gossip from several people warning that he had an outsize ego. Back in 2004, when Petraeus was leading the effort to train Iraqi security forces, Newsweek Newsweek had run a cover with a close-up photo of him above the headline "Can this man save Iraq?" When I raised the topic with him, he smiled and said, "My cla.s.smates from West Point are never going to let me live that down." I appreciated his self-deprecating remark. It was a good complement to his drive. had run a cover with a close-up photo of him above the headline "Can this man save Iraq?" When I raised the topic with him, he smiled and said, "My cla.s.smates from West Point are never going to let me live that down." I appreciated his self-deprecating remark. It was a good complement to his drive.
Petraeus"s confirmation hearings came late in January. "I think that at this point in Baghdad the population just wants to be secure," he said. "And truthfully, they don"t care who does it." When John McCain pressed him on whether the mission could succeed without more troops, General Petraeus answered, "No, sir." The Senate confirmed him, 81 to 0.
I called the general to the Oval Office to congratulate him on the vote. d.i.c.k Cheney d.i.c.k Cheney, Bob Gates Bob Gates, Pete Pace, and other members of the national security team were there to wish him well. "I"d like a moment alone with my commander," I said.
As the team filed out, I a.s.sured General Petraeus that I had confidence in him and that he could have my ear anytime. At the end of the meeting I said, "This is it. We"re doubling down."
As he walked out the door, he replied, "Mr. President, I think it"s more like all in."
On February 10, 2007, David Petraeus took command in Baghdad. His task was as daunting as any American commander had faced in decades. As he told his troops on his first day, "The situation in Iraq is exceedingly challenging, the stakes are very high, the way ahead will be hard and there undoubtedly will be many tough days." He continued: "However, hard is not hopeless. These tasks are achievable; this mission is doable."
As our surge troops flowed into Iraq, Generals Petraeus and Odierno relocated our forces from bases on the outskirts of Baghdad to small outposts inside the city. Our troops lived alongside Iraqi security forces and patrolled the city on foot, instead of inside armored Humvees. As they entered enemy strongholds for the first time, the extremists fought back. We lost 81 troops in February, 81 in March, 104 in April, 126 in May, and 101 in June-the first time in the war we had faced triple-digit losses three months in a row. The casualties were agonizing. But something felt different in 2007: America was on offense again.
General Petraeus drew my attention to an interesting metric of progress: the number of intelligence tips from Iraqi residents. In the past, Iraqis had feared retribution from insurgents or death squads for cooperating with our forces. But as security improved, the number of tips grew from about 12,500 in February to almost 25,000 in May. Our troops and intelligence operators used the tips to take insurgents and weapons off the street. The counterinsurgency strategy counterinsurgency strategy was working: We were winning over the people by providing what they needed most, security. was working: We were winning over the people by providing what they needed most, security.
We followed up the clearing and holding with building, thanks in large part to the civilian surge led by Amba.s.sador Ryan Crocker Ryan Crocker. I first met Ryan in Pakistan, where he was serving as amba.s.sador, during my visit in 2006. He came across as a patient, una.s.suming diplomat. But beneath his calm exterior was a fearless man widely regarded as the best Foreign Service officer of his generation. Fluent in Arabic, Ryan had served all over the Middle East, including several tours in Iraq. He had survived the 1983 terrorist attack on our emba.s.sy in Lebanon and escaped an angry mob plundering his residence in Syria. When I announced the new strategy in Iraq, I decided we should change amba.s.sadors, too. I nominated Zal Khalilzad, who had done a fine job in Baghdad, to be our permanent representative to the UN. Condi didn"t take long to recommend a replacement for him. She said Ryan was the only man for the job.
Ryan gained my respect quickly. He had a knack for detecting problems and heading them off. He spoke bluntly about challenges but had a wry sense of humor and liked to laugh. "What have you got for me today, Sunshine?" I asked him during one particularly rough stretch. He started his briefing with a big grin. He worked seamlessly with General Petraeus. And he earned the trust of Iraqis from all factions.
The heart of the civilian surge was doubling the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which paired civilian experts with military personnel. I held several videoconferences and meetings with PRT team leaders deployed across Iraq. They were an impressive group. Several were grizzled combat veterans. Another was a female Foreign Service officer whose son served as a Marine in Iraq. They described their projects, which ranged from supporting a local newspaper in Baghdad to helping set up courts in Ninewa to creating a soil-testing laboratory to improve agriculture in Diyala. It wasn"t always glamorous work, but it was critical to the counterinsurgency strategy we were carrying out.
I spoke to General Petraeus and Amba.s.sador Crocker by secure video-conference at least once a week, sometimes more often. I believed a close personal relationship and frequent contact were critical to making the new strategy succeed. The conversations gave me a chance to hear firsthand reports on conditions in Iraq. They allowed Petraeus and Crocker to share frustrations and push for decisions directly from the commander in chief.
With David Petraeus (right) and Ryan Crocker. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper The situation was improving, but we all worried about the possibility of another Samarra-like bombing, a game-changer that would reignite sectarian violence. Petraeus pinpointed another problem. "The Washington clock is ticking a lot faster than the Baghdad clock," he said.
He was right. Less than one week after General Petraeus arrived in Iraq, the new Democratic majority in the House of Representatives had pa.s.sed a nonbinding resolution that declared, "Congress disapproves of the decision of President George W. Bush announced on January 10, 2007, to deploy more than 20,000 additional United States combat troops to Iraq."
After a day of heavy violence in April, Senator Harry Reid Harry Reid of Nevada declared, "This war is lost, the surge is not accomplishing anything." The majority leader of the U.S. Senate had just used his platform to tell 145,000 American troops and their families that they were fighting for a lost cause. He had written off the surge as a failure before all of the additional troops had even arrived. It was one of the most irresponsible acts I witnessed in my eight years in Washington. of Nevada declared, "This war is lost, the surge is not accomplishing anything." The majority leader of the U.S. Senate had just used his platform to tell 145,000 American troops and their families that they were fighting for a lost cause. He had written off the surge as a failure before all of the additional troops had even arrived. It was one of the most irresponsible acts I witnessed in my eight years in Washington.
On May 1, Congress sent me a war-funding bill mandating a troop withdrawal deadline later in the year. Setting an arbitrary pullout date would allow our enemies to wait us out and would undermine our ability to win over the local leaders who were critical to our success. I vetoed the bill. Led by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell Mitch McConnell-who supported the surge after I announced it and graciously later admitted to me that he had been wrong to suggest a withdrawal-and House Minority Leader John Boehner John Boehner, Republicans on Capitol Hill stood firm. Democrats didn"t have the votes to override the veto. On May 25, I signed a bill fully funding our troops with no timetable for withdrawal.
They called it "The Awakening."
Anbar is Iraq"s largest province, a sprawling expanse of desert that extends from the western boundary of Baghdad to the borders of Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. At fifty-three thousand square miles, Anbar covers nearly the same amount of land as New York State. Its population is mostly Sunni. For almost four years, it served as a stronghold for insurgents-and a sanctuary for al Qaeda al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda took over Anbar"s princ.i.p.al cities, infiltrated the security forces, and imposed their ideology on the population. Like the Taliban, they forbade women from leaving their homes without a male escort and banned sports and other leisure activities. They attacked American troops, Iraqi security forces, and anyone else who resisted them. By 2006, Anbar was home to an average of forty-one attacks per day.
Our troops discovered an al Qaeda doc.u.ment laying out an elaborate governing structure for Anbar, including an Education Department, a Social Services Department, and an "Execution Unit." Our intelligence community believed Anbar was to be al Qaeda"s base for planning attacks on the United States. In August 2006, a senior Marine Corps intelligence officer in Anbar wrote a widely publicized report concluding that the province was lost.
Then everything changed. The people of Anbar had a look at life under al Qaeda, and they didn"t like what they saw. Starting in mid-2006, tribal sheikhs banded together to take their province back from the extremists. The Awakening drew thousands of recruits.
As part of the surge, we deployed four thousand additional Marines to Anbar, where they reinforced the tribal sheikhs and boosted their confidence. Many of the al Qaeda jihadists fled into the desert. Violence in the province plummeted by more than 90 percent. Within months, the brave people of Anbar-with support from our troops-had retaken their province. An al Qaeda safe haven had become the site of its greatest ideological defeat.
On Labor Day 2007, I made a surprise visit to Anbar. Air Force One flew over what looked like a giant sand dune and touched down at Al Asad Air Base, a patch of black asphalt amid miles of brown. We walked down the stairs into the searing heat and quickly moved to an air-conditioned room at the base. I listened to several briefings and then met with a group of tribal sheikhs who had started the Anbar uprising. They were a rough-hewn, earthy bunch. Their friendly, animated mannerisms reminded me of local officials in West Texas. But instead of jeans and boots, they were wearing full-length robes and colorful headdresses.
With the Anbar sheikhs who rallied their tribes against al Qaeda. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper The sheikhs beamed with pride as they described what they had accomplished. Violence was down dramatically; mayors" offices and city councils were functioning; judges were hearing cases and meting out justice. With the help of our civilian surge, the provincial council in Ramadi had reopened, with thirty-five members present for the inaugural session.
Prime Minister Maliki and President Jalal Talabani Jalal Talabani joined the meeting. It was extraordinary to watch Maliki, a Shia; Talabani, a Kurd; and a roomful of Sunni sheikhs discuss the future of their country. When the prime minister asked what they needed, they had a long list of requests: more money, more equipment, and more infrastructure. Maliki complained that there wasn"t enough in the budget for everything they asked for. Talabani helped referee the disputes. I sat back and enjoyed the scene. Democracy was at work in Iraq. joined the meeting. It was extraordinary to watch Maliki, a Shia; Talabani, a Kurd; and a roomful of Sunni sheikhs discuss the future of their country. When the prime minister asked what they needed, they had a long list of requests: more money, more equipment, and more infrastructure. Maliki complained that there wasn"t enough in the budget for everything they asked for. Talabani helped referee the disputes. I sat back and enjoyed the scene. Democracy was at work in Iraq.
I thanked the sheikhs for their hospitality and their bravery in the war on terror. "If you need us," one sheikh jubilantly told me, "my men and I will go to Afghanistan!"
Washington was abuzz when Petraeus and Crocker arrived on September 10 to testify before Congress and make recommendations on the way forward in Iraq. For months, Democrats had pledged to use their testimony to cut off funding for the war. In July, the New York Times New York Times declared the cause in Iraq "lost" and called for an all-out withdrawal, despite the likelihood that an immediate pullout could result in "further ethnic cleansing, even genocide" and "a new stronghold from which terrorist activity could proliferate." It was stunning to see the declared the cause in Iraq "lost" and called for an all-out withdrawal, despite the likelihood that an immediate pullout could result in "further ethnic cleansing, even genocide" and "a new stronghold from which terrorist activity could proliferate." It was stunning to see the Times Times, which rightly championed human rights, advocate a policy it admitted could lead to genocide.
The morning of the hearings, the left-wing group MoveOn.org MoveOn.org ran a full-page newspaper ad that read, "General Petraeus or General Betray Us? Cooking the Books for the White House." It was an astonishing character attack on a four-star general. It was also a political mistake. Democrats in Congress tried to avoid endorsing the ad while supporting the antiwar sentiment behind it. One New York senator denounced the ad but said Petraeus"s report required "the willing suspension of disbelief." ran a full-page newspaper ad that read, "General Petraeus or General Betray Us? Cooking the Books for the White House." It was an astonishing character attack on a four-star general. It was also a political mistake. Democrats in Congress tried to avoid endorsing the ad while supporting the antiwar sentiment behind it. One New York senator denounced the ad but said Petraeus"s report required "the willing suspension of disbelief."
For their part, Petraeus and Crocker were stoic, resilient, and highly credible. They reported the facts. Iraqi civilian deaths had declined 70 percent in Baghdad and 45 percent across the country. Deaths from sectarian violence had plunged 80 percent in Baghdad and 55 percent across the country. IED attacks had dropped by a third, and car bombings and suicide attacks had declined almost 50 percent. The Awakening movement Awakening movement we had witnessed in Anbar had spread to Diyala Province and the Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad. The picture was unmistakable: The surge was working. we had witnessed in Anbar had spread to Diyala Province and the Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad. The picture was unmistakable: The surge was working.
Two nights after the testimony, I spoke to the nation. "Because of this success, General Petraeus believes we have now reached the point where we can maintain our security gains with fewer American forces," I said. "...The principle guiding my decisions on troop levels in Iraq is "return on success." The more successful we are, the more American troops can return home."
The most quoted phrase in the speech was "return on success." The clever play on words was suggested by Ed Gillespie Ed Gillespie, a smart and valued friend who agreed to lead my communications team when Dan Bartlett Dan Bartlett returned home to Texas. But in my mind, the most important message was that we were keeping as many troops in Iraq as our commanders needed, for as long as they needed them. returned home to Texas. But in my mind, the most important message was that we were keeping as many troops in Iraq as our commanders needed, for as long as they needed them.
The day of my speech, I heard that General Petraeus"s friend, retired General Jack Keane, was meeting with d.i.c.k Cheney d.i.c.k Cheney. I liked and respected Jack. He had provided valuable advice during the decision-making process and supported the surge publicly. I asked Jack to convey a personal message from me to General Petraeus: "I waited over three years for a successful strategy. And I"m not giving up on it prematurely. I am not reducing further unless you are convinced that we should reduce further."
Three weeks after the much-awaited testimony, I rode to the military parade grounds at Fort Myer, Virginia, to say farewell to a friend.
Shortly after I announced the surge, Bob Gates Bob Gates had recommended that I not renominate General Pete Pace to a second term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The environment on Capitol Hill was hostile, and Bob had heard from several senators-especially had recommended that I not renominate General Pete Pace to a second term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The environment on Capitol Hill was hostile, and Bob had heard from several senators-especially Carl Levin Carl Levin, the new chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee-that Pete"s confirmation hearing would be contentious. The concern was that senators would use him as a punching bag for all their frustrations with Iraq.
I admired Pete. I had benefited from his advice for six years. I knew how much our troops loved him. I wanted to end the presidency with my friend as chairman. But I pictured the spectacle of the hearing-protestors yelling and senators preening for the cameras, all ending with a negative vote that would humiliate Pete. I reluctantly agreed with Bob"s judgment. I nominated Mike Mullen, a fine Navy admiral, to be the next chairman.
Pete never complained. He served n.o.bly to the end. After turning over his duties, he removed the four stars from his uniform, pinned them to a note card, and left it at the foot of the Vietnam Memorial near the name of a Marine lost four decades earlier. He brought no cameras or press. Later, the card was found at the foot of the wall. It read, "To Guido Farinaro, USMC, These [stars] are yours, not mine! With love and respect, Your platoon leader, Pete Pace."
At the 2007 retirement ceremony of Joint Chiefs Chairman Pete Pace (left). Next to us are his successor, Mike Mullen (right), and Bob Gates. White House/David Bohrer White House/David Bohrer I ached for Pete and his family. When I presented him with a well-deserved Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2008, it only partly a.s.suaged my regret.
The momentum of the surge continued into 2008. By spring more than ninety thousand Iraqis, both Sunni and Shia, had joined Concerned Local Citizens groups like those that had started in Anbar. Many of these forces, now known as Sons of Iraq, integrated into the increasingly effective army and police force, which had grown to more than 475,000. They drove the remaining hard-core insurgents and al Qaeda from their strongholds. The terrorists resorted to using children and the mentally handicapped as suicide bombers, revealing both their moral depravity and their inability to recruit.
Just as counterinsurgency experts predicted, the security gains of 2007 translated into political progress in 2008. Free from the nightmare of sectarian violence, the Iraqis pa.s.sed a flurry of major legislation, including a law resolving the status of former Baath Party members, a national budget, and legislation paving the way for provincial elections. While the government still had work to do on some key measures, including an oil-revenue-sharing law, the Iraqis" political performance was a remarkable feat given all that they had endured.
The biggest concern in the spring of 2008 was the presence of Shia extremists. While security in most of Iraq improved during the surge, Shia extremists, many with close ties to Iran, had taken over large parts of Basra, Iraq"s second-largest city.
On March 25, 2008, Iraqi forces attacked the extremists in Basra. Prime Minister Maliki traveled to the south to oversee the operation. Most of my national security team was somewhere between anxious and petrified. The military worried that Maliki did not have a well-defined plan. Some in the emba.s.sy questioned whether he had enough support within the Iraqi government. The CIA gave Maliki"s a.s.sault a bleak prognosis.
I felt differently. Maliki was leading. For almost two years, I had urged him to show his evenhandedness. "A Shia murderer is as guilty as a Sunni murderer," I said many times. Now he had followed through in a highly public way. When Steve Hadley Steve Hadley and and Brett McGurk Brett McGurk came to the Oval Office the morning after Maliki launched the attack, I said, "Don"t tell me this is a bad thing. Maliki said he would do this and now he"s doing it. This is a defining moment. We just need to help him succeed." came to the Oval Office the morning after Maliki launched the attack, I said, "Don"t tell me this is a bad thing. Maliki said he would do this and now he"s doing it. This is a defining moment. We just need to help him succeed."
The a.s.sault was far from textbook, but it worked. The Iraqi forces brought security to Basra. Their success stunned Shia radicals like Moqtada al Sadr Moqtada al Sadr and their backers in Iran. Above all, the Basra operation established Maliki as a strong leader. The prime minister had reached a major decision point of his own, and he had made the right call. and their backers in Iran. Above all, the Basra operation established Maliki as a strong leader. The prime minister had reached a major decision point of his own, and he had made the right call.
A few weeks after the Iraqi government"s offensive in Basra, Petraeus and Crocker returned to Washington to testify in April. This time, there were no antiwar ads in the newspapers and no prolonged battle for funding. NBC News, which in November 2006 had officially p.r.o.nounced Iraq in a state of civil war, stopped using the term. There was no grand announcement of the retraction.
Calling our gains in Iraq "fragile and reversible," General Petraeus recommended that we continue withdrawing troops until we hit pre-surge levels, and then pause for further a.s.sessment. As Ryan Crocker Ryan Crocker put it, "In the end, how we leave [Iraq] and what we leave behind will be more important than how we came. Our current course is hard, but it is working....We need to stay with it." I agreed. put it, "In the end, how we leave [Iraq] and what we leave behind will be more important than how we came. Our current course is hard, but it is working....We need to stay with it." I agreed.
It was a measure of the surge"s success that one of the biggest military controversies of early 2008 did not involve Iraq. In March, Admiral Fox Fallon-who had succeeded John Abizaid as commander of CENTCOM-gave a magazine interview suggesting he was the only person standing between me and war with Iran Iran. That was ridiculous. I asked Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen and Vice Chairman Hoss Cartwright Hoss Cartwright what they would do if they were in Fallon"s position. Both said they would resign. Soon after, Fox submitted his resignation. To his credit, he never brought up the issue again. At our last meeting, I thanked him for his service and told him I was proud of his fine career. what they would do if they were in Fallon"s position. Both said they would resign. Soon after, Fox submitted his resignation. To his credit, he never brought up the issue again. At our last meeting, I thanked him for his service and told him I was proud of his fine career.
I had to find a new commander to lead CENTCOM. There was only one person I wanted: David Petraeus. He had spent three of the past four years in Iraq, and I knew he was hoping to a.s.sume the coveted NATO command in Europe. But we needed him at CENTCOM. "If the twenty-two-year-old kids can stay in the fight," he said, "I can, too."
I asked General Petraeus who should replace him in Iraq. Without hesitation, he named his former deputy commander, General Ray Odierno. I first met Ray years earlier when I toured Fort Hood as governor of Texas. Six foot five with a clean-shaven head, the general is an imposing man. He was an early proponent of the surge, and he helped the strategy succeed by positioning the additional troops wisely throughout Baghdad.
For General Odierno, winning in Iraq was more than his duty as a soldier. It was personal. When Ray was home on leave in December 2004, I welcomed his family to the Oval Office, including his son, Lieutenant Anthony Odierno, a West Point graduate who had lost his left arm in Iraq. His father stood silently, beaming with pride, as his son raised his right arm to salute me. Even though Ray had just left for a top position back home at the Pentagon, he accepted the call to return as commander in Baghdad.
With Ray Odierno. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper It gave me solace to know that the next president would be able to rely on the advice of these two wise, battle-tested generals. In our own way, we had continued one of the great traditions of American history. Lincoln discovered Generals Grant and Sherman. Roosevelt had Eisenhower and Bradley. I found David Petraeus and Ray Odierno.
By the time the surge ended in the summer of 2008, violence in Iraq had dropped to the lowest level since the first year of the war. The sectarian killing that had almost ripped the country apart in 2006 was down more than 95 percent. Prime Minister Maliki, once the object of near-universal blame and scorn, had emerged as a confident leader. Al Qaeda Al Qaeda in Iraq had been severely weakened and marginalized. Iran"s malign influence had been reduced. Iraqi forces were preparing to take responsibility for security in a majority of provinces. American deaths, which routinely hit one hundred a month in the worst stretch of the war, never again topped twenty-five, and dropped to single digits by the end of my presidency. Nevertheless, every death was a painful reminder of the costs of war. in Iraq had been severely weakened and marginalized. Iran"s malign influence had been reduced. Iraqi forces were preparing to take responsibility for security in a majority of provinces. American deaths, which routinely hit one hundred a month in the worst stretch of the war, never again topped twenty-five, and dropped to single digits by the end of my presidency. Nevertheless, every death was a painful reminder of the costs of war.
My last major goal was to put Iraq policy onto a stable footing for my successors. In late 2007, we started work on two agreements. One, called a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), laid the legal predicate for keeping American troops in Iraq after the United Nations mandate expired at the end of 2008. The other, called a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), pledged long-term diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between our countries.
Hammering out the agreements took months. Maliki had to deal with serious opposition from factions of his government, especially those with suspected ties to Iran. In the middle of a presidential campaign, Democratic candidates denounced the SOFA as a scheme to keep our troops in Iraq forever. The CIA doubted that Maliki would sign the agreement. I asked the prime minister about it directly. He a.s.sured me he wanted the SOFA. He had kept his word in the past, and I believed he would again.
Maliki proved a tough negotiator. He would obtain a concession from our side**** and then come back asking for more. On one level, the endless horse trading was frustrating. But on another level, I was inspired to see the Iraqis conducting themselves like representatives of a sovereign democracy. and then come back asking for more. On one level, the endless horse trading was frustrating. But on another level, I was inspired to see the Iraqis conducting themselves like representatives of a sovereign democracy.
As time pa.s.sed without agreement, I started to get anxious. In one of our weekly videoconferences, I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I only have a few months left in office. I need to know whether you want these agreements. If not, I have better things to do." I could tell he was a little taken aback. This was my signal that it was time to stop asking for more. "We will finish these agreements," he said. "You have my word."
By November, the agreements were almost done. The final contentious issue was what the SOFA would say about America"s withdrawal from Iraq. Maliki told us it would help him if the agreement included a promise to pull out our troops by a certain date. Our negotiators settled on a commitment to withdraw our forces by the end of 2011.
For years, I had refused to set an arbitrary timetable for leaving Iraq. I was still hesitant to commit to a date, but this was not arbitrary. The agreement had been negotiated between two sovereign governments, and it had the blessing of Generals Petraeus and Odierno, who would oversee its implementation. If conditions changed and Iraqis requested a continued American presence, we could amend the SOFA and keep troops in the country.
Maliki"s political instincts proved wise. The SOFA and SFA, initially seen as doc.u.ments focused on our staying in Iraq, ended up being viewed as agreements paving the way for our departure. The blowback we initially feared from Capitol Hill and the Iraqi parliament never materialized. As I write in 2010, the SOFA continues to guide our presence in Iraq.
On December 13, 2008, I boarded Air Force One for my fourth trip to Iraq, where I would sign the SOFA and SFA with Prime Minister Maliki. On the flight over, I thought about my previous trips to the country. They traced the arc of the war. There was the joy of the first visit on Thanksgiving Day 2003, which came months after liberation and a few weeks before the capture of Saddam. There was the uncertainty of the trip to meet Maliki in June 2006, when sectarian violence was rising and our strategy was failing. There was the cautious optimism of Anbar in September 2007, when the surge appeared to be working but still faced serious opposition. Now there was this final journey. Even though much of America seemed to have tuned out the war, our troops and the Iraqis had created the prospect of lasting success.
We landed in Baghdad and choppered to Salam Palace, which six years earlier had belonged to Saddam and his brutal regime. As president, I had attended many arrival ceremonies. None was more moving than standing in the courtyard of that liberated palace, next to President Jalal Talabani Jalal Talabani, watching the flags of the United States and a free Iraq fly side by side as a military band played our national anthems.
From there we drove to the prime minister"s complex, where Maliki and I signed the SOFA and the SFA and held a final press conference. The room was packed tight, and the audience was closer than at a normal event. A handful of Iraqi journalists sat in front of me on the left. To my right was the traveling press pool and a few reporters based in Iraq. As Maliki called for the first question, a man in the Iraqi press rose abruptly. He let out what sounded like a loud bark, something in Arabic that sure wasn"t a question. Then he wound up and threw something in my direction. What was it? A shoe?
The scene went into slow motion. I felt like Ted Williams, who said he could see the st.i.tching of a baseball on an incoming pitch. The wingtip was helicoptering toward me. I ducked. The guy had a pretty live arm. A split second later, he threw another one. This one was not flying as fast. I flicked my head slightly and it drifted over me. I wish I had caught the d.a.m.n thing.
I wish I had caught the d.a.m.n thing. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper Chaos erupted. People screamed, and security agents scrambled. I had the same thought I"d had in the Florida cla.s.sroom on 9/11. I knew my reaction would be broadcast around the world. The bigger the frenzy, the better for the attacker.
I waved off Don White Don White, my lead Secret Service agent. I did not want footage of me being hustled out of the room. I glanced at Maliki, who looked stricken. The Iraqi reporters were humiliated and angry. One man was shaking his head sadly, mouthing apologies. I held up my hands and urged everyone to settle down.
"If you want the facts, it"s a size-ten shoe that he threw," I said. I hoped that by trivializing the moment, I could keep the shoe thrower from accomplishing his goal of ruining the event.
After the press conference, Maliki and I went to a dinner upstairs with our delegations. He was still shaken and apologized profusely. I took him aside privately with Gamal Helal Gamal Helal, our Arabic interpreter, and told him to stop worrying. The prime minister gathered himself and asked to speak before the dinner. He gave an emotional toast about how the shoe thrower did not represent his people, and how grateful his nation was to America. He talked about how we had given them two chances to be free, first by liberating them from Saddam Hussein and again by helping them liberate themselves from the sectarian violence and terrorists.
Having a shoe thrown at me by a journalist ranked as one of my more unusual experiences. But what if someone had said eight years earlier that the president of the United States would be dining in Baghdad with the prime minister of a free Iraq? Nothing-not even flying footwear at a press conference-would have seemed more unlikely than that.
Signing the SOFA and SFA agreements with Nouri al Maliki. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper
Years from now, historians may look back and see the surge as a forgone conclusion, an inevitable bridge between the years of violence that followed liberation and the democracy that emerged. Nothing about the surge felt inevitable at the time. Public opinion ran strongly against it. Congress tried to block it. The enemy fought relentlessly to break our will.
Yet thanks to the skill and courage of our troops, the new counter-insurgency strategy we adopted, the superb coordination between our civilian and military efforts, and the strong support we provided for Iraq"s political leaders, a war widely written off as a failure has a chance to end in success. By the time I left office, the violence had declined dramatically. Economic and political activity had resumed. Al Qaeda Al Qaeda had suffered a significant military and ideological defeat. In March 2010, Iraqis went to the polls again. In a headline unimaginable three years earlier, had suffered a significant military and ideological defeat. In March 2010, Iraqis went to the polls again. In a headline unimaginable three years earlier, Newsweek Newsweek ran a cover story t.i.tled "Victory at Last: The Emergence of a Democratic Iraq." ran a cover story t.i.tled "Victory at Last: The Emergence of a Democratic Iraq."
Iraq still faces challenges, and no one can know with certainty what the fate of the country will be. But we do know this: Because the United States liberated Iraq and then refused to abandon it, the people of that country have a chance to be free. Having come this far, I hope America will continue to support Iraq"s young democracy. If Iraqis request a continued troop presence, we should provide it. A free and peaceful Iraq is in our vital strategic interest. It can be a valuable ally at the heart of the Middle East, a source of stability in the region, and a beacon of hope to political reformers in its neighborhood and around the world. Like the democracies we helped build in Germany, j.a.pan, and South Korea, a free Iraq will make us safer for generations to come.
I have often reflected on whether I should have ordered the surge earlier. For three years, our premise in Iraq was that political progress was the measure of success. The Iraqis. .h.i.t all their milestones on time. It looked like our strategy was working. Only after the sectarian violence sectarian violence erupted in 2006 did it become clear that more security was needed before political progress could continue. After that, I moved forward with the surge in a way that unified our government. If I had acted sooner it could have created a rift that would have been exploited by war critics in Congress to cut off funding and prevent the surge from succeeding. erupted in 2006 did it become clear that more security was needed before political progress could continue. After that, I moved forward with the surge in a way that unified our government. If I had acted sooner it could have created a rift that would have been exploited by war critics in Congress to cut off funding and prevent the surge from succeeding.