The key test of the conference was whether Abbas and Olmert could agree on a joint statement pledging to open negotiations. When we boarded the helicopter for the flight to Annapolis, I asked Condi for the statement. She said they had made a lot of progress but hadn"t finished. "You"re going to have to deliver this one yourself," she said.
I pulled Abbas and Olmert aside individually. I told them the summit would be viewed as a failure and embolden the extremists if we couldn"t agree on a statement. They instructed their negotiators to work with Condi. A few minutes before we were due in front of the cameras, she brought me the doc.u.ment. There was no time to enlarge the font, so I pulled out my reading gla.s.ses and read from the page: "We agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty...and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008."
With Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas Mahmoud Abbas. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper The room broke into applause. Abbas and Olmert delivered speeches of their own. "Freedom is the single word that stands for the future of the Palestinians," President Abbas said. "I believe that there is no path other than peace....I believe it is time. We are ready," Prime Minister Olmert said.
It was a historic moment to see the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia listen respectfully to the prime minister of Israel and applaud his words. The Annapolis conference was hailed as a surprise success. "The cynicism about the Annapolis talks shouldn"t overshadow the hope that came out of the effort," the Los Angeles Times Los Angeles Times wrote. wrote.
Shortly after Annapolis, the two sides opened negotiations on a peace agreement, with Ahmed Qurei Ahmed Qurei representing the Palestinians and Foreign Minister representing the Palestinians and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni Tzipi Livni representing the Israelis. Palestinian Prime Minister representing the Israelis. Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad Salam Fayyad, an economist with a Ph.D. from the University of Texas, began carrying out long-needed reforms in the Palestinian economy and security forces. We sent financial a.s.sistance and deployed a high-ranking general to help train the Palestinian security forces. The day he left Downing Street, Tony Blair Tony Blair accepted a post as special envoy to help the Palestinians build the inst.i.tutions of a democratic state. It wasn"t glamorous work, but it was necessary. "If I win the n.o.bel Peace Prize," Tony joked, "you will know I have failed." accepted a post as special envoy to help the Palestinians build the inst.i.tutions of a democratic state. It wasn"t glamorous work, but it was necessary. "If I win the n.o.bel Peace Prize," Tony joked, "you will know I have failed."
The negotiations resolved some important issues, but it was clear that striking an agreement would require more involvement from the leaders. With my approval, Condi quietly oversaw a separate channel of talks directly between Abbas and Olmert. The dialogue culminated in a secret proposal from Olmert to Abbas. His offer would have returned the vast majority of the territory in the West Bank and Gaza to the Palestinians, accepted the construction of a tunnel connecting the two Palestinian territories, allowed a limited number of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel, established Jerusalem as a joint capital of both Israel and Palestine, and entrusted control of the holy sites to a panel of nonpolitical elders.
We devised a process to turn the private offer into a public agreement. Olmert would travel to Washington and deposit his proposal with me. Abbas would announce that the plan was in line with Palestinian interests. I would call the leaders together to finalize the deal.
The development represented a realistic hope for peace. But once again, an outside event intervened. Olmert had been under investigation for his financial dealings when he was mayor of Jerusalem. By late summer, his political opponents had enough ammunition to bring him down. He was forced to announce his resignation in September.
Abbas didn"t want to make an agreement with a prime minister on his way out of office. The talks broke off in the final weeks of my administration, after Israeli forces launched an offensive in Gaza in response to Hamas rocket attacks.
While I was disappointed that the Israelis and Palestinians could not finalize an agreement, I was pleased with the progress we had made. Eight years earlier, I had taken office during a raging intifada, with Ya.s.ser Arafat running the Palestinian Authority, Israeli leaders committed to a Greater Israel policy, and Arab nations complaining from the sidelines. By the time I left, the Palestinians had a president and prime minister who rejected terrorism. The Israelis had withdrawn from some settlements and supported a two-state solution. And Arab nations were playing an active role in the peace process.
The struggle in the Holy Land is no longer Palestinian versus Israeli, or Muslim versus Jew. It is between those who seek peace and extremists who promote terror. And there is consensus that democracy is the foundation on which to build a just and lasting peace. Realizing that vision will require courageous leadership from both sides and from the United States.
Jacques Chirac and I didn"t agree on much. The French president opposed removing Saddam Hussein. He called Ya.s.ser Arafat a "man of courage." At one meeting, he told me, "Ukraine is part of Russia."
So it came as quite a surprise when Jacques and I found an area of agreement at our meeting in Paris in early June 2004. Chirac brought up democracy in the Middle East, and I braced myself for another lecture. But he continued: "In this region, there are just two democracies. One is strong, Israel. The other is fragile, Lebanon Lebanon." I didn"t mention that he"d left out a new democracy, Iraq.
He described Lebanon"s suffering under the occupation of Syria Syria, which had tens of thousands of troops in the country, siphoned money from the economy, and strangled attempts to expand democracy. He suggested that we work together to stop Syria from dominating Lebanon. I immediately agreed. We decided to look for an opportunity to introduce a UN resolution.
In August 2004, Lebanese President Emile Lahoud Emile Lahoud, a Syrian puppet, gave us our opening. He announced he would extend his term in office, a violation of the Lebanese const.i.tution. Chirac and I cosponsored UN Resolution 1559, which protested Lahoud"s decision and demanded that Syria withdraw its forces. It pa.s.sed on September 2, 2004.
For six months, Syria responded with defiance. Then, on February 14, 2005, a huge car bomb in Beirut destroyed the motorcade of Rafiq Hariri Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon"s pro-independence former prime minister. All the evidence pointed to a Syrian plot. We recalled our amba.s.sador from Damascus and supported a UN investigation.
A week after Hariri"s murder, Chirac and I had dinner in Brussels. We issued a joint statement calling the car bombing a "terrorist act" and reiterated our support for a "sovereign, independent, and democratic Lebanon." Chirac and I rallied Arab nations to pressure Syrian President Basher a.s.sad Basher a.s.sad to comply with the UN resolution. On the one-month anniversary of Hariri"s murder, nearly a million Lebanese people-a quarter of the nation"s population-turned out at Martyrs" Square in Beirut to protest Syria"s occupation. People began to speak of a Cedar Revolution, named for the tree in the middle of Lebanon"s flag. to comply with the UN resolution. On the one-month anniversary of Hariri"s murder, nearly a million Lebanese people-a quarter of the nation"s population-turned out at Martyrs" Square in Beirut to protest Syria"s occupation. People began to speak of a Cedar Revolution, named for the tree in the middle of Lebanon"s flag.
The Syrians got the message. Under the combined pressure of the international community and the Lebanese people, Syrian occupation troops began to withdraw in late March. By the end of April, they were gone. "People used to be afraid to say anything here," one Lebanese citizen told a reporter. "People seemed to be opening up more today, and feeling more comfortable to speak their mind."
That spring, the anti-Syrian March 14 Movement won a majority of seats in the parliament. Fouad Siniora Fouad Siniora, a close adviser to the slain Hariri, was named prime minister.
The Cedar Revolution marked one of the most important successes of the freedom agenda. It took place in a multi-religious country with a Muslim majority. It happened with strong diplomatic pressure from the free world and with no American military involvement. The people of Lebanon achieved their independence for the simplest of reasons: They wanted to be free.
The triumph of democracy in Lebanon came two months after the free elections in Iraq and the election of President Abbas in the Palestinian Territories. Never before had three Arab societies made so much progress toward democracy. Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine had the potential to serve as the foundation of a free and peaceful region.
"It"s strange for me to say it, but this process of change has started because of the American invasion of Iraq," Lebanese political leader Walid Jumblatt Walid Jumblatt said. "I was cynical about Iraq. But when I saw the Iraqi people voting three weeks ago, eight million of them, it was the start of a new Arab world. The Syrian people, the Egyptian people, all say that something is changing. The Berlin Wall has fallen. We can see it." said. "I was cynical about Iraq. But when I saw the Iraqi people voting three weeks ago, eight million of them, it was the start of a new Arab world. The Syrian people, the Egyptian people, all say that something is changing. The Berlin Wall has fallen. We can see it."
He wasn"t the only one who observed the trend or recognized its consequences. The rising tide of democracy in the Middle East in 2005 jolted the extremists. In 2006, they fought back.
On July 12, 2006, Laura and I stopped in Germany on our way to the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia. German Chancellor Angela Merkel Angela Merkel and her husband, Professor and her husband, Professor Joachim Sauer Joachim Sauer, had invited us to the town of Stralsund, which was in Angela"s home district. Laura and I were fascinated by Angela"s description of growing up in communist East Germany. She told us her childhood was happy, but her mother constantly warned her not to mention their family discussions in public. The secret police, the Stasi, were everywhere. Laura and I thought of Angela at Camp David when we watched The Lives of Others The Lives of Others, a movie depicting life under the Stasi. It was hard to believe that less than twenty years had pa.s.sed since tens of millions of Europeans lived like that. It was a reminder of how dramatically freedom could change a society.
In addition to serving as a staunch advocate for freedom, Angela was trustworthy, engaging, and warm. She quickly became one of my closest friends on the world stage.
With Angela Merkel at a pig roast near her hometown in former East Germany. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper While we were on our way to Germany, Hezbollah Hezbollah terrorists in southern terrorists in southern Lebanon Lebanon launched a raid across the Israeli border, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, and touched off another foreign policy crisis. Israel responded by attacking Hezbollah targets in southern launched a raid across the Israeli border, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, and touched off another foreign policy crisis. Israel responded by attacking Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and Lebanon and bombing the Beirut Airport, a transit point for weapons. Hezbollah retaliated by lobbing rockets at Israeli towns, killing or wounding hundreds of civilians. bombing the Beirut Airport, a transit point for weapons. Hezbollah retaliated by lobbing rockets at Israeli towns, killing or wounding hundreds of civilians.
Like Hamas, Hezbollah had a legitimate political party and a terrorist wing armed and funded by Iran Iran and supported by and supported by Syria Syria. Hezbollah was behind the bombing of the American Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, the murder of a U.S. Navy diver aboard a hijacked TWA flight in 1985, the attacks on the Israeli emba.s.sy and a Jewish community center in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, and the bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996.
Now Hezbollah was taking on Israel directly. All the G-8 leaders at the summit had the same initial reaction: Hezbollah had instigated the conflict, and Israel had a right to defend itself. We issued a joint statement that read, "These extremist elements and those that support them cannot be allowed to plunge the Middle East into chaos and provoke a wider conflict."
The Israelis had a chance to deliver a major blow against Hezbollah and Hezbollah and their sponsors in Iran and Syria. Unfortunately, they mishandled their opportunity. The Israeli bombing campaign struck targets of questionable military value, including sites in northern Lebanon far from Hezbollah"s base. The damage was broadcast on television for all to see. To compound matters, Prime Minister Olmert announced that Syria would not be a target. I thought it was a mistake. Removing the threat of retaliation let Syria off the hook and emboldened them to continue their support for Hezbollah. their sponsors in Iran and Syria. Unfortunately, they mishandled their opportunity. The Israeli bombing campaign struck targets of questionable military value, including sites in northern Lebanon far from Hezbollah"s base. The damage was broadcast on television for all to see. To compound matters, Prime Minister Olmert announced that Syria would not be a target. I thought it was a mistake. Removing the threat of retaliation let Syria off the hook and emboldened them to continue their support for Hezbollah.
As the violence continued into its second week, many of the G-8 leaders who started out supportive of Israel called for a ceasefire. I didn"t join. A ceasefire might provide short-term relief, but it wouldn"t resolve the root cause of the conflict. If a well-armed Hezbollah continued to threaten Israel from southern Lebanon, it would be only a matter of time before the fighting flared again. I wanted to buy time for Israel to weaken Hezbollah"s forces. I also wanted to send a message to Iran Iran and and Syria Syria: They would not be allowed to use terrorist organizations as proxy armies to attack democracies with impunity.
Unfortunately, Israel made matters worse. In the third week of the conflict, Israeli bombers destroyed an apartment complex in the Lebanese city of Qana. Twenty-eight civilians were killed, more than half of them children. Prime Minister Siniora was furious. Arab leaders viciously condemned the bombing, the carnage of which played around the clock on Middle Eastern TV. I started to worry that Israel"s offensive might topple Prime Minister Siniora"s democratic government.
I called a National Security Council meeting to discuss our strategy. The disagreement within the team was heated. "We need to let the Israelis finish off Hezbollah," d.i.c.k Cheney d.i.c.k Cheney said. "If you do that," Condi replied, "America will be dead in the Middle East." She recommended we seek a UN resolution calling for a ceasefire and deploying a multinational peacekeeping force. said. "If you do that," Condi replied, "America will be dead in the Middle East." She recommended we seek a UN resolution calling for a ceasefire and deploying a multinational peacekeeping force.
Neither choice was ideal. In the short run, I wanted to see Hezbollah and their backers badly damaged. In the long run, our strategy was to isolate Iran and Syria as a way to reduce their influence and encourage change from within. If America continued to back the Israeli offensive, we would have to veto one UN resolution after the next. Ultimately, instead of isolating Iran and Syria, we would isolate ourselves.
I decided that the long-run benefits of keeping the pressure on Syria and Iran outweighed the short-run gains of striking further blows against Hezbollah. I sent Condi to the UN, where she negotiated Resolution 1701, which called for an immediate end to the violence, the disarmament of Hezbollah and other militias in Lebanon, an embargo on weapons shipments, and the deployment of a robust international security force to southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government, Hezbollah, and Israel all accepted the resolution. The ceasefire took effect on the morning of August 14.
Israel"s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon was another defining moment in the ideological struggle. While it remains fragile and still faces pressure from Syria, Lebanon"s young democracy emerged stronger for having endured the test. The result for Israel was mixed. Its military campaign weakened Hezbollah and helped secure its border. At the same time, the Israelis" shaky military performance cost them international credibility.
As the instigators of the conflict, Hezbollah-along with Syria Syria and and Iran Iran-bore responsibility for the bloodshed. The Lebanese people knew it. In the most telling a.n.a.lysis of the war, Hezbollah chief Ha.s.san Nasrallah Ha.s.san Nasrallah apologized to the Lebanese people two weeks after the ceasefire. "Had we known that the capture of the soldiers would have led to this," he said, "we would definitely not have done it." apologized to the Lebanese people two weeks after the ceasefire. "Had we known that the capture of the soldiers would have led to this," he said, "we would definitely not have done it."
When Condi took her first trip to Europe as secretary of state in early 2005, she told me she expected our disagreements over Iraq to be the main issue. A week later, she reported back with a surprising message from the allies she"d met. "They"re not talking about Iraq," she said. "They"re all worried about Iran."
By the time I took office, the theocratic regime in Iran had presented a challenge to American presidents for more than twenty years. Governed by radical clerics who seized power in the 1979 revolution, Iran was one of the world"s leading state sponsors of terror. At the same time, Iran was a relatively modern society with a budding freedom movement.
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group came forward with evidence that the regime was building a covert uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, along with a secret heavy water production plant in Arak-two telltale signs of a nuclear weapons program. The Iranians acknowledged the enrichment but claimed it was for electricity production only. If that was true, why was the regime hiding it? And why did Iran need to enrich uranium when it didn"t have an operable nuclear power plant? All of a sudden, there weren"t so many complaints about including Iran in the axis of evil.
In October 2003, seven months after we removed Saddam Hussein from power, Iran pledged to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing. In return, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France agreed to provide financial and diplomatic benefits, such as technology and trade cooperation. The Europeans had done their part, and we had done ours. The agreement was a positive step toward our ultimate goal of stopping Iranian enrichment and preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
In June 2005, everything changed. Iran held a presidential election. The process was suspicious, to say the least. The Council of Guardians, a handful of senior Islamic clerics, decided who was on the ballot. The clerics used the Basij Corps, a militia-like unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, to manage turnout and influence the vote. Tehran Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner. Not surprisingly, he had strong support from the Basij. was declared the winner. Not surprisingly, he had strong support from the Basij.
Ahmadinejad steered Iran in an aggressive new direction. The regime became more repressive at home, more belligerent in Iraq, and more proactive in destabilizing Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and Afghanistan. Ahmadinejad called Israel "a stinking corpse" that should be "wiped off the map." He dismissed the Holocaust as a "myth." He used a United Nations speech to predict that the hidden imam would reappear to save the world. I started to worry we were dealing with more than just a dangerous leader. This guy could be nuts.
As one of his first acts, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would resume uranium conversion. He claimed it was part of Iran"s civilian nuclear power program, but the world recognized the move as a step toward enrichment for a weapon. Vladimir Putin Vladimir Putin-with my support-offered to provide fuel enriched in Russia for Iran"s civilian reactors, once it built some, so that Iran would not need its own enrichment facilities. Ahmadinejad rejected the proposal. The Europeans also offered to support an Iranian civilian nuclear program nuclear program in exchange for halting its suspect nuclear activities. Ahmadinejad rejected that, too. There was only one logical explanation: Iran was enriching uranium to use in a bomb. in exchange for halting its suspect nuclear activities. Ahmadinejad rejected that, too. There was only one logical explanation: Iran was enriching uranium to use in a bomb.
I faced a major decision point. America could not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. The theocratic regime would be able to dominate the Middle East, blackmail the world, pa.s.s nuclear weapons technology to its terrorist proxies, or use the bomb against Israel. I thought about the problem in terms of two ticking clocks. One measured Iran"s progress toward the bomb; the other tracked the ability of the reformers to instigate change. My objective was to slow the first clock and speed the second.
I had three options to consider. Some in Washington suggested that America should negotiate directly with Iran. I believed talking to Ahmadinejad would legitimize him and his views and dispirit Iran"s freedom movement, slowing the change clock. I also doubted that America could make much progress in one-on-one talks with the regime. Bilateral negotiations with a tyrant rarely turn out well for a democracy. Because they are subjected to little accountability, totalitarian regimes face no pressure to honor their word. They are free to break agreements and then make new demands. A democracy has a choice: give in or provoke a confrontation.
The second option was multilateral diplomacy conducted with both carrots and sticks. We could join the Europeans in offering Iran a package of incentives in return for abandoning its suspect nuclear activities. If the regime refused to cooperate, the coalition would then impose tough sanctions on Iran individually and through the UN. The sanctions would make it harder for Iran to obtain technology needed for a weapon, slowing the bomb clock. They would also make it harder for Ahmadinejad to fulfill his economic promises, which would strengthen the country"s reform movement.
The final option was a military strike on Iran"s nuclear facilities. This goal would be to stop the bomb clock, at least temporarily. It was uncertain what the impact on the reform clock would be. Some thought destroying the regime"s prized project would embolden the opposition; others worried that a foreign military operation would stir up Iranian nationalism and unite the people against us. I directed the Pentagon to study what would be necessary for a strike. Military action would always be on the table, but it would be my last resort.
I discussed the options with the national security team extensively in the spring of 2006. I consulted closely with Vladimir Putin Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel Angela Merkel, and Tony Blair Tony Blair. They a.s.sured me they would support strong sanctions if Iran did not change its behavior. In May, Condi announced that we would join the Europeans in negotiating with Iran, but only if the regime verifiably suspended its enrichment. She then worked with the UN Security Council to set a deadline for Iran"s response: August 31. The summer pa.s.sed, and the answer never came.
The next challenge was to develop effective sanctions. There wasn"t much America could do on our own. We had sanctioned Iran heavily for decades. I directed the Treasury Department to work with its European counterparts to make it harder for Iranian banks and businesses to move money. We also designated the Quds Force of Iran"s Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, which allowed us to freeze their a.s.sets. Our partners in the diplomatic coalition imposed new sanctions of their own. And we worked with the UN Security Council to pa.s.s Resolutions 1737 and 1747, which banned Iranian arms exports, froze key Iranian a.s.sets, and prohibited any country from providing Iran with nuclear weaponsrelated equipment.
Persuading the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese to agree on the sanctions was a diplomatic achievement. But every member faced the temptation to split off and take commercial advantage. I frequently reminded our partners about the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran. In October 2007, a reporter asked me about Iran at a press conference. "I"ve told people that if you"re interested in avoiding World War Three," I said, "it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon."
My reference to World War III produced near hysteria. Protestors showed up outside my speeches with signs that read, "Keep Us Out of Iran." Journalists auth.o.r.ed breathless, gossip-laden stories portraying America on the brink of war. They all missed the point. I wasn"t looking to start a war. I was trying to hold our coalition together to avoidone.
In November 2007, the intelligence community produced a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran"s nuclear program. It confirmed that, as we suspected, Iran had operated a secret nuclear weapons program in defiance of its treaty obligations. It also reported that, in 2003, Iran had suspended its covert effort to design a warhead-considered by some to be the least challenging part of building a weapon. Despite the fact that Iran was testing missiles that could be used as a delivery system and had announced its resumption of uranium enrichment, the NIE opened with an eye-popping declaration: "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."
The NIE"s conclusion was so stunning that I felt certain it would immediately leak to the press. As much as I disliked the idea, I decided to decla.s.sify the key findings so that we could shape the news stories with the facts. The backlash was immediate. Ahmadinejad hailed the NIE as "a great victory." Momentum for new sanctions faded among the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese. As New York Times New York Times journalist journalist David Sanger David Sanger rightly put it, "The new intelligence estimate relieved the international pressure on Iran-the same pressure that the doc.u.ment itself claimed had successfully forced the country to suspend its weapons ambitions." rightly put it, "The new intelligence estimate relieved the international pressure on Iran-the same pressure that the doc.u.ment itself claimed had successfully forced the country to suspend its weapons ambitions."
In January 2008, I took a trip to the Middle East, where I tried to rea.s.sure leaders that we remained committed to dealing with Iran. Israel and our Arab allies found themselves in a rare moment of unity. Both were deeply concerned about Iran and furious with the United States over the NIE. In Saudi Arabia, I met with King Abdullah King Abdullah and members of the Sudairi Seven, the influential full brothers of the late King Fahd. and members of the Sudairi Seven, the influential full brothers of the late King Fahd.
"Your Majesty, may I begin the meeting?" I asked. "I"m confident every one of you believes I wrote the NIE as a way to avoid taking action against Iran."
No one said a word. The Saudis were too polite to confirm their suspicion aloud.
"You have to understand our system," I said. "The NIE was produced independently by our intelligence community. I am as angry about it as you are."
The NIE didn"t just undermine diplomacy. It also tied my hands on the military side. There were many reasons I was concerned about undertaking a military strike on Iran, including its uncertain effectiveness and the serious problems it would create for Iraq"s fragile young democracy. But after the NIE, how could I possibly explain using the military to destroy the nuclear facilities of a country the intelligence community said had no active nuclear weapons program?
I don"t know why the NIE was written the way it was. I wondered if the intelligence community was trying so hard to avoid repeating its mistake on Iraq that it had underestimated the threat from Iran. I certainly hoped intelligence a.n.a.lysts weren"t trying to influence policy. Whatever the explanation, the NIE had a big impact-and not a good one.
I spent much of 2008 working to rebuild the diplomatic coalition against Iran. In March, we were able to get another round of UN sanctions, which banned countries from trading with Iran in dual-use technologies that could be employed in a nuclear weapons program nuclear weapons program. We also expanded our missile defense shield, including a new system based in Poland and the Czech Republic to protect Europe from an Iranian launch.
At the same time, I worked to speed the reform clock by meeting with Iranian dissidents, calling for the release of political prisoners, funding Iranian civil-society activists, and using radio and Internet technology to broadcast pro-freedom messages into Iran. We also explored a wide variety of intelligence programs and financial measures that could slow the pace or increase the cost of Iran"s nuclear weapons program.
I regret that I ended my presidency with the Iranian issue unresolved. I did hand my successor an Iranian regime more isolated from the world and more heavily sanctioned than it had ever been. I was confident that the success of the surge and the emergence of a free Iraq on Iran"s border would inspire Iranian dissidents and help catalyze change. I was pleased to see the Iranian freedom movement express itself in nationwide demonstrations after Ahmadinejad"s fraudulent reelection in June 2009. In the faces of those brave protesters, I believe we saw the future of Iran. If America and the world stand with them while keeping the pressure on the Iranian regime, I am hopeful the government and its policies will change. But one thing is for certain: The United States should never allow Iran to threaten the world with a nuclear bomb.
Iran was not the only nation endangering the freedom agenda by seeking nuclear weapons. In the spring of 2007, I received a highly cla.s.sified report from a foreign intelligence partner. We pored over photographs of a suspicious, well-hidden building in the eastern desert of Syria Syria.
The structure bore a striking resemblance to the nuclear facility at Yongbyon, North Korea North Korea. We concluded that the structure contained a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. Since North Korea was the only country that had built a reactor of that model in the past thirty-five years, our strong suspicion was that we had just caught Syria red-handed trying to develop a nuclear weapons capability with North Korean help.
That was certainly the conclusion of Prime Minister Olmert. "George, I"m asking you to bomb the compound," he said in a phone call shortly after I received the report.
"Thank you for raising this matter," I told the prime minister. "Give me some time to look at the intelligence and I"ll give you an answer."
I convened the national security team for a series of intense discussions. As a military matter, the bombing mission would be straightforward. The Air Force could destroy the target, no sweat. But bombing a sovereign country with no warning or announced justification would create severe blowback.
A second option would be a covert raid. We studied the idea seriously, but the CIA CIA and the military concluded that it would be too risky to slip a team into and out of Syria with enough explosives to blow up the facility. and the military concluded that it would be too risky to slip a team into and out of Syria with enough explosives to blow up the facility.
The third option was to brief our allies on the intelligence, jointly expose the facility, and demand that Syria shutter and dismantle it under the supervision of the IAEA. With the regime"s duplicity exposed, we could use our leverage to press Syria to end its support for terror and meddling in Lebanon and Iraq. If Syria refused to dismantle the facility, we would have a clear public rationale for military action.
Before I made a decision, I asked CIA Director Mike Hayden Mike Hayden to conduct an intelligence a.s.sessment. to conduct an intelligence a.s.sessment.
He explained that the a.n.a.lysts had high confidence that the plant housed a nuclear reactor. But because they could not confirm the location of the facilities necessary to turn the plutonium into a weapon, they had only low confidence of a Syrian nuclear weapons program.
Mike"s report clarified my decision. "I cannot justify an attack on a sovereign nation unless my intelligence agencies stand up and say it"s a weapons program," I said to Olmert. I told him I had decided on the diplomatic option backed by the threat of force. "I believe the strategy protects your interests and your state, and makes it more likely we can achieve our interests as well."
The prime minister was disappointed. "This is something that hits at the very serious nerves of this country," he said. He told me the threat of a nuclear weapons program in Syria was an "existential" issue for Israel, and he worried diplomacy would bog down and fail. "I must be honest and sincere with you. Your strategy is very disturbing to me." That was the end of the call.
On September 6, 2007, the facility was destroyed.
The experience was revealing on multiple fronts. It confirmed Syria"s intention to develop nuclear weapons. It also provided another reminder that intelligence is not an exact science. While I was told that our a.n.a.lysts had only low confidence that the facility was part of a nuclear weapons program nuclear weapons program, surveillance after the bombing showed Syrian officials meticulously covering up the remains of the building. If the facility was really just an innocent research lab, Syrian President a.s.sad would have been screaming at the Israelis on the floor of the United Nations. That was one judgment I could make with high confidence.
Prime Minister Olmert"s execution of the strike made up for the confidence I had lost in the Israelis during the Lebanon war. I suggested to Ehud that we let some time go by and then reveal the operation as a way to isolate the Syrian regime. Olmert told me he wanted total secrecy. He wanted to avoid anything that might back Syria into a corner and force a.s.sad to retaliate. This was his operation, and I felt an obligation to respect his wishes. I kept quiet, even though I thought we were missing an opportunity.
Finally, the bombing demonstrated Israel"s willingness to act alone. Prime Minister Olmert hadn"t asked for a green light, and I hadn"t given one. He had done what he believed was necessary to protect Israel.
One of the most influential books I read during my presidency was Aquariums of Pyongyang Aquariums of Pyongyang by the by the North Korean North Korean dissident dissident Kang Chol-hwan Kang Chol-hwan. The memoir, recommended by my friend Henry Kissinger Henry Kissinger, tells the story of Kang"s ten-year detention and abuse in a North Korean gulag. I invited Kang to the Oval Office, where he recounted the wrenching suffering in his homeland, including terrible famines and persecution.
Kang"s story stirred up my deep disgust for the tyrant who had destroyed so many lives, Kim Jong-il Kim Jong-il. Early in the administration, Don Rumsfeld showed me satellite photos of the Korean Peninsula at night. The south was alive with lights, while the north was pure black. I read intelligence reports that malnutrition had left the average North Korean three inches shorter than the average South Korean. When I took office in 2001, an estimated one million North Koreans had died of starvation in the preceding six years.
Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il Kim Jong-il cultivated his appet.i.te for fine cognac, luxury Mercedes, and foreign films. He built a cult of personality that required North Koreans to worship him as a G.o.dlike leader. His propaganda machine claimed that he could control the weather, had written six renowned operas, and had scored five holes in one during his first round of golf. cultivated his appet.i.te for fine cognac, luxury Mercedes, and foreign films. He built a cult of personality that required North Koreans to worship him as a G.o.dlike leader. His propaganda machine claimed that he could control the weather, had written six renowned operas, and had scored five holes in one during his first round of golf.
Kim also maintained a nuclear weapons program and a ballistic missile capability that threatened two U.S. allies-South Korea and j.a.pan-and could potentially reach America"s West Coast. Proliferation was a serious concern, as the Syrian reactor incident suggested. In a country desperate for hard currency, nuclear materials and weapons systems made for attractive exports.
Our approach to North Korea was the topic of one of my first National Security Council meetings, the day before a visit by President Kim Dae-jung Kim Dae-jung of South Korea. The previous administration had negotiated the Agreed Framework, which gave Kim Jong-il economic benefits in exchange for freezing his nuclear weapons program. Evidently, he wasn"t satisfied. In 1998, the regime fired a Taepodong missile over j.a.pan. In 1999, its ships fired on South Korean vessels in the Yellow Sea. A month after I took office, the regime threatened to restart long-range missile tests if we did not continue negotiations on normalizing relations. of South Korea. The previous administration had negotiated the Agreed Framework, which gave Kim Jong-il economic benefits in exchange for freezing his nuclear weapons program. Evidently, he wasn"t satisfied. In 1998, the regime fired a Taepodong missile over j.a.pan. In 1999, its ships fired on South Korean vessels in the Yellow Sea. A month after I took office, the regime threatened to restart long-range missile tests if we did not continue negotiations on normalizing relations.
I told my national security team that dealing with Kim Jong-il reminded me of raising children. When Barbara and Jenna were little and wanted attention, they would throw their food on the floor. Laura and I would rush over and pick it up. The next time they wanted attention, they"d throw the food again. "The United States is through picking up his food," I said.
The next year, intelligence reports indicated that North Korea was likely operating a secret highly enriched uranium program-a second path to a nuclear bomb. It was a startling revelation. Kim had cheated on the Agreed Framework. I made a decision: The United States was done negotiating with North Korea on a bilateral basis. Instead, we would rally China China, South Korea, Russia, and j.a.pan to present a united front against the regime.
The key to multilateral diplomacy with North Korea was China, which had close ties to its fellow communist nation. The challenge was that China and the United States had different interests on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese wanted stability; we wanted freedom. They were worried about refugees flowing across the border; we were worried about starvation and human rights. But there was one area where we agreed: It was not in either of our interests to let Kim Jong-il Kim Jong-il have a nuclear weapon. have a nuclear weapon.
In October 2002, I invited President Jiang Zemin Jiang Zemin of China to the ranch in Crawford. I brought up North Korea. "This is a threat not only to the United States, but also to China," I said. I urged him to join us in confronting Kim diplomatically. "The United States and China have different kinds of influence over North Korea. Ours is mostly negative, while yours is positive. If we combine together, we would make an impressive team." of China to the ranch in Crawford. I brought up North Korea. "This is a threat not only to the United States, but also to China," I said. I urged him to join us in confronting Kim diplomatically. "The United States and China have different kinds of influence over North Korea. Ours is mostly negative, while yours is positive. If we combine together, we would make an impressive team."
President Jiang was respectful, but he told me North Korea was my problem, not his. "Exercising influence over North Korea is very complicated," he said.
After a few months with no progress, I tried a different argument. In January 2003, I told President Jiang that if North Korea"s nuclear weapons program continued, I would not be able to stop j.a.pan-China"s historic rival in Asia-from developing its own nuclear weapons. "You and I are in a position to work together to make certain that a nuclear arms race does not begin," I said. In February, I went one step further. I told President Jiang that if we could not solve the problem diplomatically, I would have to consider a military strike against North Korea.
The first meeting of the Six-Party Talks Six-Party Talks took place six months later in Beijing. For the first time, North Korean officials sat down at the table and saw representatives of China, j.a.pan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States looking back at them. Progress was gradual. I spent hours on the phone with our partners, reminding them of the stakes and the need to maintain a united front. took place six months later in Beijing. For the first time, North Korean officials sat down at the table and saw representatives of China, j.a.pan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States looking back at them. Progress was gradual. I spent hours on the phone with our partners, reminding them of the stakes and the need to maintain a united front.
In September 2005, our patience was rewarded. The North Koreans agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons and return to their commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. I was skeptical. Kim Jong-il Kim Jong-il had violated his commitments in the past. If he did so again, he would be breaking his word not just to the United States, but to all his neighbors, including had violated his commitments in the past. If he did so again, he would be breaking his word not just to the United States, but to all his neighbors, including China China.
On the Fourth of July 2006, Kim Jong-il threw his food on the floor. He fired a barrage of missiles into the Sea of j.a.pan. The test was a military failure, but the provocation was real. My theory was that Kim saw the world focused on Iran and was craving attention. He also wanted to test the coalition to see how much he could get away with.
I called President Hu Jintao Hu Jintao of China, told him Kim Jong-il had insulted China, and urged him to condemn the launch publicly. He released a statement reiterating his commitment to "peace and stability" and opposing "any actions that might intensify the situation." His words were mild, but they were a step in the right direction. of China, told him Kim Jong-il had insulted China, and urged him to condemn the launch publicly. He released a statement reiterating his commitment to "peace and stability" and opposing "any actions that might intensify the situation." His words were mild, but they were a step in the right direction.