The New Haven Gazette, (Number 51)
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1788.
_Observations on the New Federal Const.i.tution._
In order to form a good Const.i.tution of Government, the legislature should be properly organized, and be vested with plenary powers for all the purposes for which the government was inst.i.tuted, to be exercised for the public good as occasion may require.
The greatest security that a people can have for the enjoyment of their rights and liberties, is that no laws can be made to bind them nor any taxes imposed upon them, without their consent by representatives of their own chusing, who will partic.i.p.ate with them in the public burthens and benefits; this was the great point contended for in our controversy with Great Britain, and this will be fully secured to us by the new const.i.tution. The rights of the people will be secured by a representation in proportion to their numbers in one branch of the legislature, and the rights of the particular states by their equal representation in the other branch.
The President and Vice-President as well as the members of Congress will be eligible for fixed periods, and may be re-elected as often as the electors shall think fit, which will be a great security for their fidelity in office, and give greater stability and energy to government than an exclusion by rotation, and will be an operative and effectual security against arbitrary government, either monarchical or aristocratic.
The immediate security of the civil and domestic rights of the people will be in the government of the particular states. And as the different states have different local interests and customs which can be best regulated by their own laws, it should not be expedient to admit the federal government to interfere with them, any farther than may be necessary for the good of the whole. The great end of the federal government is to protect the several states in the enjoyment of those rights, against foreign invasion, and to preserve peace and a beneficial intercourse among themselves; and to regulate and protect our commerce with foreign nations.
These were not sufficiently provided for by the former articles of confederation, which was the occasion of calling the late Convention to make amendments. This they have done by forming a new const.i.tution containing the powers vested in the federal government, under the former, with such additional powers as they deemed necessary to attain the ends the states had in view, in their appointment. And to carry those powers into effect, they thought it necessary to make some alterations in the organization of the government: this they supposed to be warranted by their commission.
The powers vested in the federal government are clearly defined, so that each state still retain its sovereignty in what concerns its own internal government, and a right to exercise every power of a sovereign state not particularly delegated to the government of the United States. The new powers vested in the United States, are, to regulate commerce; provide for a uniform practice respecting naturalization, bankruptcies, and organizing, arming and training the militia; and for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States; and for promoting the progress of science in the mode therein pointed out. There are some other matters which Congress has power under the present confederation to require to be done by the particular states, which they will be authorized to carry into effect themselves under the new const.i.tution; these powers appear to be necessary for the common benefit of the states, and could not be effectually provided for by the particular states.
The objects of expenditure will be the same under the new const.i.tution, as under the old; nor need the administration of government be more expensive; the number of members of Congress will be the same, nor will it be necessary to increase the number of officers in the executive department or their salaries; the supreme executive will be in a single person, who must have an honourable support; which perhaps will not exceed the present allowance to the President of Congress, and the expence of supporting a committee of the states in the recess of Congress.
It is not probable that Congress will have occasion to sit longer than two or three months in a year, after the first session, which may perhaps be something longer. Nor will it be necessary for the Senate to sit longer than the other branch. The appointment of officers may be made during the session of Congress, and trials on impeachment will not often occur, and will require but little time to attend to them. The security against keeping up armies in time of peace will be greater under the new const.i.tution than under the present, because it can"t be done without the concurrence of two branches of the legislature, nor can any appropriation of money for that purpose be in force more than two years; whereas there is no restriction under the present confederation.
The liberty of the press can be in no danger, because that is not put under the direction of the new government.
If the federal government keeps within its proper jurisdiction, it will be the interest of the state legislatures to support it, and they will be a powerful and effectual check to its interfering with their jurisdiction.
But the objects of federal government will be so obvious that there will be no great danger of any interference.
The princ.i.p.al sources of revenue will be imposts on goods imported, and sale of the western lands, which will probably be sufficient to pay the debts and expences of the United States while peace continues; but if there should be occasion to resort to direct taxation, each state"s quota will be ascertained according to a rule which has been approved by the legislatures of eleven of the states, and should any state neglect to furnish its quota, Congress may raise it in the same manner that the state ought to have done; and what remedy more easy and equitable could be devised, to obtain the supplies from a delinquent state?
Some object, that the representation will be too small; but the states have not thought fit to keep half the number of representatives in Congress that they are ent.i.tled to under the present confederation; and of what advantage can it be to have a large a.s.sembly to transact the few general matters that will come under the direction of Congress.-The regulating of time, place and manner of elections seems to be as well secured as possible; the legislature of each state may do it, and if they neglect to do it in the best manner, it may be done by Congress;-and what motive can either have to injure the people in the exercise of that right?
The qualifications of the electors are to remain as fixed by the const.i.tutions and laws of the several states.
It is by some objected, that the executive is blended with the legislature, and that those powers ought to be entirely distinct and unconnected, but is not this a gross error in politics? The united wisdom and various interests of a nation should be combined in framing the laws.
But the execution of them should not be in the whole legislature; that would be too troublesome and expensive; but it will not thence follow that the executive should have no voice or influence in legislation. The executive in Great Britain is one branch of the legislature, and has a negative on all laws; perhaps that is an extreme not to be imitated by a republic, but the partial negative vested in the President by the new Const.i.tution on the acts of Congress and the subsequent revision, may be very useful to prevent laws being pa.s.sed without mature deliberation.
The Vice-President while he acts as President of the Senate will have nothing to do in the executive department; his being elected by all the states will incline him to regard the interests of the whole, and when the members of the senate are equally divided on any question, who so proper to give a casting vote as one who represents all the states?
The power of the President to grant pardons extends only to offences committed against the United States, which can"t be productive of much mischief, especially as those on Impeachment are excepted, which will exclude offenders from office.
It was thought necessary in order to carry into effect the laws of the Union, to promote justice, and preserve harmony among the states, to extend the judicial powers of the United States to the enumerated cases, under such regulations and with such exceptions as shall be provided by law, which will doubtless reduce them to cases of such magnitude and importance as cannot safely be trusted to the final decision of the courts of particular states; and the const.i.tution does not make it necessary that any inferior tribunals should be inst.i.tuted, but it may be done if found necessary; "tis probable that the courts of particular states will be authorized by the laws of the union, as has been heretofore done in cases of piracy, &c., and the Supreme Court may have a circuit to make trials as convenient, and as little expensive as possible to the parties; nor is there anything in the const.i.tution to deprive them of trial by jury in cases where that mode of trial has been heretofore used. All cases in the courts of common law between citizens of the same state, except those claiming lands under grants of different states, must be finally decided by courts of the state to which they belong, so that it is not probable that more than one citizen to a thousand will ever have a cause that can come before a federal court.
Every department and officer of the federal government will be subject to the regulation and control of the laws, and the people will have all possible securities against oppression. Upon the whole, the const.i.tution appears to be well framed to secure the rights and liberties of the people and for preserving the governments of the individual states, and if well administered, to restore and secure public and private credit, and to give respectability to the states both abroad and at home. Perhaps a more perfect one could not be formed on mere speculation; and if upon experience it shall be found deficient, it provides an easy and peaceable mode to make amendments. Is it not much better to adopt it than to continue in present circ.u.mstances? Its being agreed to by all the states present in Convention, is a circ.u.mstance in its favour, so far as any respect is due to their opinions.
A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN.
THE LETTERS OF CATO, WRITTEN BY GEORGE CLINTON.
Printed In The New York Journal, September-January, 1787-8.
Note.
These letters were commonly ascribed to the pen of George Clinton in the press of the day, and that this ascription was right seems to be proved by the following letter. Though signed by Hamilton, it is in the handwriting of John Lamb, a leading anti-federalist of New York, and is in the George Clinton MSS. in the New York State Library. It thus seems apparent that it is a copy secured in some way by Hamilton"s political opponents:
OCTOBER 18, 1787.
_Dear Sir_:
Since my last the chief of the state party has declared his opposition to the government proposed, both in private conversation and in print. That you may judge of the _reason_ and _fairness_ of his views, I send you the two essays, with a reply by Caesar. On further consideration it was concluded to abandon this personal form, and to take up the principles of the whole subject. These will be sent you as published, and might with advantage be republished in your gazettes.
A. HAMILTON.
This copy, so obtained, seems to have been the basis of the following note in the _New York Journal_:
"A writer in the state of New-York, under the signature of _Cesar_, came forward against the patriotic _Cato_ and endeavoured to frighten him from starting any objections and threatened that "_Cato_ would be followed by _Cesar_ in all his marches;" but we find that as soon as ever _Cato_ came freely to discuss the merit of the const.i.tution _Cesar_ retreated and disappeared: and since that a publication under the signature of Publius ... has appeared in that state."
Another evidence in confirmation is, that the last of this series was printed on January 3, 1788, and the New York a.s.sembly met on the 9th of the same month, after which Governor Clinton was probably too occupied to write more, though no conclusion was announced in the last essay, and it is probable no such termination was intended. Following these are the two essays of _Caesar_ mentioned above.
Cato, I.
The New York Journal, (Number 2134)
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1787.
For the New York Journal.
TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
The Convention, who sat at Philadelphia, have at last delivered to Congress that system of general government, which they have declared best calculated to promote your safety and happiness as citizens of the United States. This system, though not handed to you formally by the authority of government, has obtained an introduction through divers channels; and the minds of you all, to whose observation it has come, have no doubt been contemplating it; and alternate joy, hope, or fear have preponderated, as it conformed to, or differed from, your various ideas of just government.
Government, to an American, is the science of his political safety; this then is a moment to you the most important-and that in various points-to your reputation as members of a great nation-to your immediate safety, and to that of your posterity. In your private concerns and affairs of life you deliberate with caution, and act with prudence; your public concerns require a caution and prudence, in a ratio suited to the difference and dignity of the subject. The disposal of your reputation, and of your lives and property, is more momentous than a contract for a farm, or the sale of a bale of goods; in the former, if you are negligent or inactive, the ambitious and despotic will entrap you in their toils, and bind you with the cord of power from which you, and your posterity may never be freed; and if the possibility should exist, it carries along with it consequences that will make your community totter to its center: in the latter, it is the mere loss of a little property, which more circ.u.mspection or a.s.siduity may repair.
Without directly engaging as an advocate for this new form of national government, or as an opponent-let me conjure you to consider this a very important crisis of your safety and character. You have already, in common with the rest of your countrymen, the citizens of the other states, given to the world astonishing evidence of your greatness-you have fought under peculiar circ.u.mstances, and were successful against a powerful nation on a speculative question, you have established an original compact between you and your governors, a fact heretofore unknown in the formation of the governments of the world; your experience has informed you, that there are defects in the federal system, and, to the astonishment of mankind, your legislatures have concerted measures for an alteration, with as much ease as an individual would make a disposition of his ordinary domestic affairs: this alteration now lies before you, for your consideration; but beware how you determine-do not, because you admit that something must be done, adopt anything-teach the members of that convention that ye are capable of a supervision of their conduct. The same medium that gave you this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is now open, can make amendments, or give you another, if it is required. Your fate, and that of your posterity, depends on your present conduct; do not give the latter reason to curse you, nor yourselves cause of reprehension; as individuals you are ambitious of leaving behind you a good name, and it is the reflection that you have done right in this life, that blunts the sharpness of death; the same principles would be a consolation to you, as patriots, in the hour of dissolution, that you would leave to your children a fair political inheritance, untouched by the vultures of power, which you had acquired by an _unshaken perseverance_ in the cause of liberty; but how miserable the alternative-you would deprecate the ruin you had brought upon yourselves, be the curse of posterity, and the scorn and scoff of nations.