Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too highly of a beloved object. Contrariwise, disparagement may be defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object. Cf. III. xxvi. note.
XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another"s good fortune, and to rejoice in another"s evil fortune.
Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be thus defined:
XXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another"s good fortune, and pain at another"s evil fortune.
Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and x.x.xii. These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in itself or accidentally. I now pa.s.s on to other emotions, which are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.
XXV. Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man"s contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
XXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man"s contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.
Explanation--Self--complacency is opposed to humility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:
XXVII. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind.
Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth in III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. Concerning the free decision of the mind see II. x.x.xv. note. This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are called right, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on education. Parents, by reprobating the former cla.s.s of actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and also by persuading to and praising the latter cla.s.s, have brought it about, that the former should be a.s.sociated with pain and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some consider honourable others consider disgraceful. According as each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given action or glories therein.
XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one"s self from self--love.
Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, for the latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or property of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, love of self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to think too highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary.
For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred; I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals, venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self--abas.e.m.e.nt, for as from self--complacency springs pride, so from humility springs self--abas.e.m.e.nt, which I will accordingly thus define:
XXIX. Self--abas.e.m.e.nt is thinking too meanly of one"s self by reason of pain.
Explanation--We are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. x.x.x. note), who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people"s faults, who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men"s virtues, and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.
However, these emotions, humility and self--abas.e.m.e.nt, are extremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence those, who are believed to be most self--abased and humble, are generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.
x.x.x. Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
[11] Gloria.
x.x.xI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. x.x.x. But we should here remark the difference which exists between shame and modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.
I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of those which I refer to desire.
x.x.xII. Regret is the desire or appet.i.te to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.
Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are by that very fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake, is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotions springing from desire.
x.x.xIII. Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire.
Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees others running away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another"s emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.
x.x.xii. and note.
x.x.xIV. Thankfulness or Grat.i.tude is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. x.x.xix.
note and xl.
x.x.xV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
Cf. III. xxvii. note.
x.x.xVI. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate, III. x.x.xix.
x.x.xVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us. (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)
x.x.xVIII. Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.
Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a pa.s.sive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his anger and revenge.
x.x.xIX. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. x.x.xix. note.
XL. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
XLI. Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.
Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring.
XLII. Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species of cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the evil. I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I say wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments him: whence it comes to pa.s.s that he knows not, which he may avert of the two. On this subject, see III. x.x.xix. note, and III. lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
note.
XLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.
XLIV. Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.
Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions (cf. III. xxvii. and x.x.xi.) are fostered and strengthened; therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, so long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time necessarily bound by this. "The best men," says Cicero, "are especially led by honour. Even philosophers, when they write a book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.
XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.
XLVI. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
XLVIII. l.u.s.t is desire and love in the matter of s.e.xual intercourse.
Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still called l.u.s.t. These last five emotions (as I have shown in III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a species of ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.
Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, and chast.i.ty indicate rather a power than a pa.s.sivity of the mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking, or s.e.xual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another man"s expense. An ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more p.r.o.ne to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death, cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain avaricious; so, also, if a l.u.s.tful man is downcast, because he cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention, cease to be l.u.s.tful. In fact, these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the appet.i.te and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will speak presently.
The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pa.s.s over in silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them. However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS