PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.
Proof.--This proposition is self--evident. For whatsoever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.) cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.
PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.
Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind"s conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.
Note.--Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in G.o.d and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of G.o.d, as we showed in II. xlv. and note, which see.
PROP. x.x.x. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of G.o.d, and knows that it is in G.o.d, and is conceived through G.o.d.
Proof.--Eternity is the very essence of G.o.d, in so far as this involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the essence of G.o.d as real ent.i.ties, or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of G.o.d; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of G.o.d, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. x.x.xI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.
Proof.--The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of G.o.d, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of G.o.d (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.
Note.--In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of G.o.d; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premisses are plain.
PROP. x.x.xII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of G.o.d as cause.
Proof.--From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions, xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. x.x.x.) the idea also of G.o.d as cause. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of G.o.d. From this kind of knowledge arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of G.o.d as cause, that is (Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of G.o.d; not in so far as we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the intellectual love of G.o.d.
PROP. x.x.xIII. The intellectual love of G.o.d, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.
Proof.--The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. x.x.xi. I.
Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises therefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.--Although this love towards G.o.d has (by the foregoing Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of G.o.d as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, a.s.suredly blessedness must consist in the mind being endowed with perfection itself.
PROP. x.x.xIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to pa.s.sions.
Proof.--Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).
Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination, in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body; therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures, subject to emotions which are attributable to pa.s.sions. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that no love save intellectual love is eternal.
Note.--If we look to men"s general opinion, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death.
PROP. x.x.xV. G.o.d loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.
Proof.--G.o.d is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
Def. vi.), the nature of G.o.d rejoices in infinite perfection; and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause: now this is what we have (in V. x.x.xii. Coroll.) described as intellectual love.
PROP. x.x.xVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards G.o.d is that very love of G.o.d whereby G.o.d loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards G.o.d is part of the infinite love wherewith G.o.d loves himself.
Proof.--This love of the mind must be referred to the activities of the mind (V. x.x.xii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself accompanied by the idea of G.o.d as cause (V. x.x.xii. and Coroll.); that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity whereby G.o.d, in so far as he can be explained through the human mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself; therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of the infinite love wherewith G.o.d loves himself. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that G.o.d, in so far as he loves himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of G.o.d towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards G.o.d are identical.
Note.--From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in the constant and eternal love towards G.o.d, or in G.o.d"s love towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred to G.o.d or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. x.x.x.) is not really distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to G.o.d, it is (V. x.x.xv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term, accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).
Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is G.o.d (I.
xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from the divine nature and constantly depends on G.o.d. I have thought it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.), is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which I have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence and existence on G.o.d, yet that demonstration, though legitimate and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on G.o.d.
PROP. x.x.xVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.
Proof.--This intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through the nature of G.o.d as an eternal truth (V. x.x.xiii. and xxix.).
If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true; consequently, that, which should be able to take away this love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.--The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.
PROP. x.x.xVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.
Proof.--The mind"s essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.); therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently (by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in other words, evil (IV. x.x.x.). Thus, in proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.--Hence we understand that point which I touched on in IV. x.x.xix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part; namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the mind"s clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and, consequently, in proportion as the mind loves G.o.d more. Again, since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of little importance when compared with the part which endures. But I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.
PROP. x.x.xIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.
Proof.--He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which are evil (IV. x.x.xviii.)--that is (IV. x.x.x.), by those emotions which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he possesses the power of arranging and a.s.sociating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of G.o.d; whence it will come to pa.s.s that (V. xv.) he will be affected with love towards G.o.d, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or const.i.tute the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. x.x.xiii.), such a man will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.--Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great knowledge of themselves and of G.o.d, and whereof the greatest or chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.
For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness, if we have been able to live through the whole period of life with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely conscious of itself, or of G.o.d, or of things; whereas, he, who has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of G.o.d, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into something else capable of very many activities, and referable to a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of G.o.d, and of things; and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the last Proposition.
PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less pa.s.sive; and, vice versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.
Proof.--In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less pa.s.sive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more perfect. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that the part of the mind which endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.
For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.); the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
xxi.), through which only we are said to be pa.s.sive (III. iii.
and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.
Note.--Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to infinity; so that all taken together at once const.i.tute the eternal and infinite intellect of G.o.d.
PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed to be attributable to courage and high--mindedness.