DEFINITIONS
DEFINITION I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of G.o.d, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.)
DEFINITION II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.
DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
Explanation.--I say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is pa.s.sive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.
DEFINITION IV. By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
Explanation.--I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (ideatum).
DEFINITION V. Duration is the indefinite continuance of existing.
Explanation.--I say indefinite, because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.
DEFINITION VI. Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.
DEFINITION VII. By particular things, I mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular thing.
AXIOMS
I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pa.s.s that this or that man does or does not exist.
II. Man thinks.
III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of the pa.s.sions, do not take place, unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes of thought.
N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
xiii.
PROPOSITIONS
PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of G.o.d, or G.o.d is a thinking thing.
Proof.--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of G.o.d (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). G.o.d therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of G.o.d, which express G.o.d"s eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
vi.). In other words, G.o.d is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.
Note.--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the infinite attributes of G.o.d, as we were desirous of showing.
PROP. II. Extension is an attribute of G.o.d, or G.o.d is an extended thing.
Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last.
PROP. III. In G.o.d there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.
Proof.--G.o.d (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all that is in the power of G.o.d necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. x.x.xv.).
Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and in G.o.d alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)
Note.--The mult.i.tude understand by the power of G.o.d the free will of G.o.d, and the right over all things that exist, which latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For it is said that G.o.d has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of G.o.d is very often likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted (Pt. i., Prop. x.x.xii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that G.o.d acts by the same necessity, as that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit), that G.o.d understands himself, so also does it follow by the same necessity, that G.o.d performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We further showed (Part i., Prop. x.x.xiv.), that G.o.d"s power is identical with G.o.d"s essence in action; therefore it is as impossible for us to conceive G.o.d as not acting, as to conceive him as non--existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to G.o.d is not only human (as showing that G.o.d is conceived by the mult.i.tude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same ground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning, unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of G.o.d with the human power and right of kings.
PROP. IV. The idea of G.o.d, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
Proof.--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of G.o.d and his modifications (Part i., Prop. x.x.x.).
Now G.o.d is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.). Therefore the idea of G.o.d, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.
PROP. V. The actual being of ideas owns G.o.d as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of G.o.d and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but G.o.d himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this Part. We there drew the conclusion, that G.o.d can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of ideas owns for cause G.o.d, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of G.o.d, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore (Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute of G.o.d, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of ideas owns G.o.d as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by G.o.d, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute.
Proof.--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by G.o.d, only in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any other. Q.E.D.
Corollary.--Hence the actual being of things, which are not modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from the attribute of thought.
PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause, whereof it is an effect.
Corollary.--Hence G.o.d"s power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action--that is, whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of G.o.d in the world of extension (formaliter), follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of G.o.d in the world of thought (objective).
Note.--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as const.i.tuting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that G.o.d, G.o.d"s intellect, and the things understood by G.o.d are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in G.o.d, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following in either case.
I said that G.o.d is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves G.o.d is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly.
PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of G.o.d, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of G.o.d.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood more clearly from the preceding note.
Corollary.--Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of G.o.d, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of G.o.d exists; and when particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of G.o.d, but also in so far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.
Note.--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to ill.u.s.trate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by G.o.d, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity.
Proof.--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes (by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus (by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by G.o.d, in so far only as he is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another individual idea, or G.o.d, in so far as he is considered as modified by that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea G.o.d is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.