Ethics

Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is in G.o.d, in so far only as he has the idea of the object.

Proof.--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its idea is in G.o.d (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge, therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object will be in G.o.d, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.

Q.E.D.

PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man--in other words, substance does not const.i.tute the actual being[2] of man.

[2] "Forma"

Proof.--The being of substance involves necessary existence (Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and, consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (II. Ax. i.). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is not that which const.i.tutes the actual being of man. Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is const.i.tuted by certain modifications of the attributes of G.o.d.

For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to the essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is something which is in G.o.d, and which without G.o.d can neither be nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.), or a mode which expresses G.o.d"s nature in a certain conditioned manner.

Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be conceived without G.o.d. All men agree that G.o.d is the one and only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, G.o.d is not only the cause of things in respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum esse).

At the same time many a.s.sert, that that, without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of G.o.d appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created things can be or be conceived without G.o.d; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of G.o.d, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely.

However, I pa.s.s over this point. My intention her was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individual things cannot be or be conceived without G.o.d, yet G.o.d does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived." (II. Def. ii.)

PROP. XI. The first element, which const.i.tutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.

Proof.--The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.) is const.i.tuted by certain modes of the attributes of G.o.d, namely (by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.

Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).

Therefore an idea is the first element const.i.tuting the human mind. But not the idea of a non--existent thing, for then (II.

viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an absurdity. Therefore the first element, which const.i.tutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually existing. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of G.o.d; thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the a.s.sertion, that G.o.d has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he const.i.tutes the essence of the human mind; and when we say that G.o.d has this or that idea, not only in so far as he const.i.tutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of another thing, we a.s.sert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.

Note.--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to p.r.o.nounce on my statements, till they have read to the end.

PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pa.s.s in the object of the idea, which const.i.tutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea const.i.tuting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind.

Proof.--Whatsoever comes to pa.s.s in the object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in G.o.d (II. ix. Coroll.), in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he const.i.tutes the mind of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object const.i.tuting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is necessarily in G.o.d, in so far as he const.i.tutes the essence of the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the mind perceives it.

Note.--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly to be understood from II. vii., which see.

PROP. XIII. The object of the idea const.i.tuting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.

Proof.--If indeed the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in G.o.d (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his const.i.tuting our mind, but in virtue of his const.i.tuting the mind of something else; that is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of the idea const.i.tuting the human mind is the body, and the body as it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other object of the idea const.i.tuting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.

x.x.xvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but (I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to other individual things, all of which, though in different degrees, are animated.[3] For of everything there is necessarily an idea in G.o.d, of which G.o.d is the cause, in the same way as there is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we have a.s.serted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be a.s.serted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.

[3] "Animata"

Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs from other things, and wherein it surpa.s.ses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance, that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following propositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies.

AXIOM I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

AXIOM II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly, sometimes more quickly.

LEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance.

Proof.--The first part of this proposition is, I take it, self--evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought out still more clearly from I. xv, note.

LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects.

Proof.--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).

Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.

LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which other body has been determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which (Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely (II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in motion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self--evident.

For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion, I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is at rest. If it afterwards comes to pa.s.s that A is in motion, this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at rest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything concerning it, except that it is in motion. If A is subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result of A"s previous motion, for such motion can only have led to continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external cause determining A to a state of rest.

Axiom I.--All modes, wherein one body is affected by another body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected and the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be moved in different modes, according to the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.

Axiom II.--When a body in motion impinges on another body at rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line of motion of incidence and the same plane.

So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies, which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and rest, quickness and slowness. We now pa.s.s on to compound bodies.

Definition.--When any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that together they compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.

Axiom III.--In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies, they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved from their position; consequently the individual will, with greater or less difficulty, be brought to a.s.sume another form.

Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies, are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small superficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion among one another, are called fluid.

LEMMA IV. If from a body or individual, compounded of several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before, without any change in its actuality (forma).

Proof.--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of substance: that which const.i.tutes the actuality (formam) of an individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will (by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore, will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance and in respect of mode. Q.E.D.

LEMMA V. If the parts composing an individual become greater or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be changed.

Proof.--The same as for the last Lemma.

LEMMA VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction, for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its own nature without any change of its actuality.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the individual is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we spoke of as its actual being.

LEMMA VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication with other parts as before.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the definition of an individual prefixed to Lemma iv.