Proof.--The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one"s own true interest. Now, while we determined what reason prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind"s eternity, which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage and high--mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q.E.D.
Note.--The general belief of the mult.i.tude seems to be different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so far as they may obey their l.u.s.ts, and that they cede their rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is, for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after death, that they are induced to live according to the divine commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry them.
If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their l.u.s.ts, and desiring to obey fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth refuting.
PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our l.u.s.ts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our l.u.s.ts.
Proof.--Blessedness consists in love towards G.o.d (V. x.x.xvi and note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
x.x.xii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active; therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand (V. x.x.xii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power has it over the emotions, and (V. x.x.xviii.) so much the less is it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessedness, so has it the power of controlling l.u.s.ts. And, since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in blessedness, because he has controlled his l.u.s.ts, but, contrariwise, his power of controlling his l.u.s.ts arises from this blessedness itself. Q.E.D.
Note.--I have thus completed all I wished to set forth touching the mind"s power over the emotions and the mind"s freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how much he surpa.s.ses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his l.u.s.ts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various ways by external causes without ever gaining the true acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were unwitting of himself, and of G.o.d, and of things, and as soon as he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.
Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of G.o.d, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit.
If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.
End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza
[1] "Affectiones"
[2] "Forma"
[3] "Animata"
[4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]
[5] Conscientiae morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.
[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men whom we regard without any particular emotion.
[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read, "an internal cause." "Honor" = Gloria.
[8] See previous endnote.
[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.
"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."
[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.
[11] Gloria.
[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."
[13] Honestas
[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I have translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to "quod", "quo" (= whereby) and "quodque" (= and that).
[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground that the cla.s.sical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be obtained without doing violence to Spinoza"s scholarship.
[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus----emotions.