Two months before Operation Starlite and the largest increases of American troops committed to the war, Lyndon Johnson expressed serious doubts to his intimates about whether America could win. Referring to the enemy, he told Senator Birch Bayh, "They hope they will wear us out. And I really believe they"ll last longer than we do."2 Americans have a tolerance for loss, but only to a point. As the number of grieving families pa.s.sed the 10,000 mark, and then the 15,000 mark, public protest against the war began in earnest and steadily increased.3 By the time the blood debt hit 30,000 lives, popular opposition widened and support for the war began to melt away. The American crossover point had been reached, a goal the communists long kept in mind. In our case, obviously, it was not a question of losing men faster than we could replace them but a question of losing men faster than we were willing to replace them. Like the French public before it, the American public finally had enough.
Credibility with the American public was difficult to obtain when the administrations kept changing the reasons why Americans were being asked to sacrifice their sons. Hugh M. Arnold"s examination of the official justification of the war found that there were a total of twenty-two separate American rationales: From 1949 to 1962, the emphasis was on resisting communist aggression; from 1962 to 1968, it was on counterinsurgency; after 1968, it was on preserving the integrity of American commitments. The Pentagon Papers have shown us that, according to McNaughton, as early 1965 70 percent of the reason was preserving the integrity of American commitments.4 This argument might have washed in 1965, but it was unconvincing by 1968.
With no credible collateral to offer American families for their losses, the Johnson administration"s position on the war became very slippery and, when the violence of the 1968 Tet Offensive horrifically added to the debt, that position became untenable. In the two-anda-half years between Starlite and the Tet Offensive the Vietnamese communists learned how to fight the Americans. They learned to deal with American fire power in the same manner in which they dealt with that of the French. They used "grab-them-by-the-belt" tactics-that is, when engaged they moved in as close as they could to their enemy in order to negate the effects of supporting arms, which would endanger American troops when employed too close to American lines. And they quickly learned ways around our highly vaunted technical advances, one at a time. They also knew that they could never defeat the United States militarily, nor her South Vietnamese ally as long as it had American backing. As with the French, they didn"t have to. Their goal was merely to not lose while they increased the number of coffins flowing toward America. That strategy hit dead center on America"s weakest strategic underpinning, the morale of her population.
Bloodshed among the South Vietnamese climbed to enormous proportions. It is estimated by one scholar that between 1965 and 1974 there were more than 1.1 million civilian war casualties in South Vietnam, of which more than three hundred thousand were deaths. With a population of approximately seventeen million, this represents deaths of about 1.8 percent of the population. The same percentage applied to the United States would have resulted in approximately 3,600,000 dead. The greater number of civilian casualties were caused by the intense and impersonal weaponry of the U.S. military and the ARVN.5 Nearly every South Vietnamese family was touched negatively by the war. It is fair to say that the Vietnamese peasant cared as little for the ideology of the North as he did for that of the South. But the VC worked on popular non-ideological support and tried very hard to pacify the people in their favor.
The U.S. military and ARVN continued to expend lives and treasure on a search-and-destroy policy that was too much search and too little destroy. So while the American government tried to explain away the blood debt to the American and Vietnamese peoples with the debased coinage of body count, the VC and NVA justified theirs to their fellow Vietnamese with the sounder currency of nationalism. It is one of the great tragedies of America and of Vietnam that American policymakers were not more familiar with Vietnam"s long history of dealing with foreign invaders. America"s enemy, at least after 1965, consistently and successfully portrayed the war as the result of American colonialism and painted the South Vietnamese as American puppets. Many Vietnamese who had no use for ideology of any shading found their traditional xenophobia fueled by a lengthening list of grievances over the war"s death and destruction.
The Marines and Army got into it early about pacification vis-a-vis conventional warfare in Vietnam. The Marines, who had decades of experience with the former, argued pa.s.sionately in favor of pacification, along with its siblings, population control and counterinsurgency. The difference was inst.i.tutional. The U.S. Army of the era was trained to fight ma.s.ses of Soviet tanks on the central German plain, or to resist a Korea-style invasion. U.S. Army General Samuel "Hanging Sam" Williams, one of the early progenitors of the ARVN, trained it in this fashion.6 U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers, in his book On Strategy: A Critical a.n.a.lysis of the Vietnam War, describes the four pages in the U.S. Army Field Service Regulations, 1939 edition, regarding guerrilla war.7 Four pages! The Marines had an entire book devoted to insurgency warfare, the Small Wars Manual.8 Generals Krulak and Walt, and other senior officers, got their training as young officers under Marines who had fought insurrections led by Aguinaldo in the Philippines, Sandino in Nicaragua, and Charlemagne in Haiti. They understood that Vietnam was more political war than military. The U.S. Army"s inst.i.tutional memory on insurrection was generally confined to their 19th century campaigns against Native American tribes. General Phil Sheridan"s infamous, "The only good Indian is a dead Indian" reflected the search-and-destroy philosophy of that era.
A pacification process worthy of the name with a concomitant reform within the South Vietnamese government might have saved the effort. By leaving the enemy main-force units to rot in the mountains and jungles, and by dealing with the majority of the population that resides on the coastal plain, perhaps some real political progress could have been made. Such a plan would certainly have reduced both American and Vietnamese civilian casualties and prolonged public support for the war. But Army General Westmoreland was the boss, and he had the support of the President and even an increasingly doubtful Robert McNamara. President Johnson himself had been a lukewarm supporter of pacification. The President was an impatient man, anxious to get the war won and over with. His ear was bent toward those who promised victory on the World War II model. CIA Director John McCone remarked about his first meeting with the President on the subject of Vietnam, "Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social reforms, he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being "do-gooders ...""9 Nonetheless, by the 1966 war conference in Honolulu, Westmoreland was told to place more emphasis on pacification. The deputy amba.s.sador to Vietnam, William J. Porter, commented at the conference that the watchword in Washington was to be pacification."10 Presidents Johnson of the United States and Thieu of South Vietnam issued the "Honolulu Declaration" on February 8, 1966. It restated and confirmed this policy.
Despite these words from the top, General Westmoreland did little to change his large-unit philosophy. The general nearly doubled his requirements for battalion-size operations in the coming months, which severely reduced the a.s.sets available for pacification. He told General Walt that pacification did not have universal application within Vietnam and certainly not if it was "to the detriment of our primary responsibility for destroying main force enemy units."11 So the meat grinder operations continued and the casualty lists grew and grew until the United States was forced into a humiliating withdrawal from the country.
The noted military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "...even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date."12 Will this be the case with Vietnam?
Consider the following: The West has won the Cold War, of which the Vietnam War was an important part. In the 1960s more than 60 percent of the world"s population lived under governments that were, or claimed to be, communist. By 2000, except for Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and China, these governments are gone. Vietnam and China seem to be moving haltingly toward market economies, which can only flourish in liberal political surroundings. Cuba"s government will arguably change after the pa.s.sing of Fidel Castro. North Korea remains a wild card, as do several totalitarian but non-communist regimes, such as Syria, Iran, Libya, and Belorus. It is beyond the scope of this book to determine the effect that economic loss to the Soviet Union in support of their client state, Vietnam, had on its own downfall. Suffice to say that the Evil Empire is dead.
The a.s.sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was born behind the American bulwark in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. It has grown from five member countries in 1967 to a total of nine nations, including Vietnam, which joined in 1995. It includes such economic tigers as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand as well as struggling nations such as Vietnam and Myamar. For those nations for which data is available, per capita income is an average of two hundred thirty times higher than it was during the 1960s, and life expectancy at birth has risen from an average of fifty-six years to sixty-nine years.13 One of the first things that an American veteran of the war notices upon returning to Vietnam is the Pepsi Cola logo that entirely covers the shuttle buses that tourists take from the airplane to the terminal. Then there are the billboards. The first two on the way to Hanoi in 1997 were for BMW and MasterCard, hardly socialist icons. In the cities one sees signs for Hewlitt-Packard, Compaq, and Kodak. Whole city blocks are devoted to shops that sell j.a.panese and Korean appliances. The farmers now own land, and individuals own businesses. There are golf courses, high-rise office buildings, and luxury beach resorts. Everyone wants to be a capitalist. All the flight attendants on Vietnam Airlines speak excellent English and one other Asian language. Many Vietnamese in the cities, including small children, seem to want to say "h.e.l.lo" in English. Other differences that a veteran will notice are the absences. Except for the occasional gate guards at military installations there are no armed men afoot. There is no barbed wire, no sandbags, no parachute flares at night, and no sounds of helicopters. There is scant evidence of the war even at the former American fire bases. All one can find at Con Thien, Khe Sanh, Gio Linh, and other battlefields and bases is the occasional sandbag shred sticking up from the ground and some shallow indentations where fighting holes once were. Indeed, in 1997, the author noted a farmer at Con Thien plowing with a water buffalo where the minefield had been.
Vietnam is at peace, it is unified, and is unlikely to be a threat to the region or the world. U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, returning from a trip to Vietnam, announced in March 2000 that the prospects of a military alliance between Vietnam and the United States were good.14 No one can tell what Vietnam"s future will bring but if she moves fully into the family of nations perhaps the blood debt will finally be paid.
EPILOGUE.
On August 18, 2000, a small group of former Marines, led by Capt Ed Garr approached the town of Chulai by bus. Buildings along the route were festooned with bunting and banners commemorating the thirty-fifth anniversary of Operation Starlite, which the Vietnamese call the Battle of Van Tuong.
Following a tour of the battlefield they gathered for lunch at a local hotel and met with former members of the Ba Gia Regiment. The conversations ranged from the battle itself, to fighting the French, to tactics used against the Americans, to how the Vietnamese identified and buried their dead. The next morning the veterans from both sides gathered at the memorial cemetery near the battlefield. The Marines presented a wreath in honor of the fallen Viet Cong as a military band played and an honor guard presented arms. There were speeches by national, provincial, and military dignitaries. At the conclusion dozens of children released hundreds of balloons into the air.
Once more, the former enemies had lunch together, shook hands all around, and then said their farewells amidst promises to meet again.
Also by Otto J. Lehrack.
No Shining Armor:.
The Marines at War in Vietnam.
APPENDIX 1.
MEDAL OF HONOR CITATIONS.
The President of the United States in the name of Congress takes pride in presenting the Medal of Honor posthumously to: LANCE CORPORAL JOE C. PAUL UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.
CITATION.
For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Fire Team Leader with Company H, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, during Operation STARLITE near Chu Lai in the Republic of Vietnam on 18 August 1965. In violent battle, Corporal Paul"s platoon sustained five casualties as it was temporarily pinned down by devastating mortar, recoilless rifle, automatic weapons and rifle fire delivered by insurgent communist (Viet Cong) forces in well-trenched positions. The wounded Marines were unable to move from their perilously exposed positions forward of the remainder of their platoon, and were suddenly subjected to a barrage of white phosphorous rifle grenades. Corporal Paul, fully aware that his tactics would almost certainly result in serious injury or death to himself, chose to disregard his own safety and boldly dashed across the fire-swept rice paddies, placed himself between his wounded comrades and the enemy, and delivered effective suppressive fire with his automatic weapon in order to divert the attack long enough to allow the casualties to be evacuated. Although critically wounded during the course of the battle, he resolutely remained in his exposed position and continued to fire his rifle until he collapsed and was evacuated. By his fort.i.tude and gallant spirit of self-sacrifice in the face of almost certain death, he saved the lives of several of his fellow Marines. His heroic action served to inspire all who observed him and reflect the highest credit upon himself, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the cause of freedom.
The President of the United States in the name of the Congress takes pleasure in presenting the Medal of Honor to: CORPORAL ROBERT E. O"MALLEY UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action against the communist (Viet Cong) forces at the risk of his own life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Squad Leader in Company "I", Third Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division (Reinforced), near An Cu"ong 2, South Vietnam, on 18 August 1965. While leading his squad in the a.s.sault against a strongly entrenched enemy force, his unit came under intense small arms fire. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Corporal O"Malley raced across an open rice paddy to a trench line where the enemy forces were located. Jumping into the trench, he attacked the Viet Cong with his rifle and grenades, and singly killed eight of the enemy. He then led his squad to the a.s.sistance of an adjacent Marine unit, which was suffering heaving casualties. Continuing to press forward, he reloaded his weapon and fired with telling effect into the enemy emplacement. He personally a.s.sisted in the evacuation of several wounded Marines, and again regrouping the remnants of his squad, he returned to the point of the heaviest fighting. Ordered to an evacuation point by an officer, Corporal O"Malley gathered his besieged and badly wounded squad and boldly led them under fire to a helicopter for withdrawal. Although three times wounded in this encounter, and facing imminent death from a fanatic and determined enemy, he steadfastly refused evacuation and continued to cover his squad"s boarding of the helicopters while, from an exposed position, he delivered fire against the enemy until his wounded men were evacuated. Only then, with his last mission accomplished, did he permit himself to be removed from the battlefield. By his valor, leadership, and courageous efforts in behalf of his comrades, he served as an inspiration to all who observed him, and reflected the highest credit upon the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service
APPENDIX 2.
GLOSSARY.
105mm howitzer. The most common artillery piece used by the U.S. and the ARVN during the Vietnam War.
107mm howtar. A hybrid artillery piece consisting of a 4.2" mortar mounted on a howitzer cha.s.sis.
1st Sergeant. Pay grade E-8. The senior NCO in a company or aircraft squadron.
3.5-inch rocket launcher. Designed as a tank killer, this shoulder-fired, crew-served weapon, was commonly used as a bunker-buster in Vietnam. It fired a high-explosive ant.i.tank round or a white phosphorus round.
57mm recoilless rifle. An anti-tank weapon used by the VC and NVA.
60mm mortar. The smallest of the mortars used by the VC and NVA. Marine rifle companies also had three of these a.s.signed to them later in the war in Vietnam.
81mm mortar. The standard general-support, organic mortar in a Marine battalion. The VC and NVA also used this mortar and the Chinese/Soviet 82mm mortar.
A4 Skyhawk. An attack aircraft used by the U.S. Marines and the U.S. Navy in Vietnam.
Adm. Admiral.
AK47. An automatic rifle used by the VC and NVA in the war, although not many were used in Starlite.
Alpha command group. The primary command group consisting of the commanding officer and key staff members.
Amphibious Squadron (Phibron). A groupment of ships in a naval task force designed to land Marines onto a hostile sh.o.r.e.
Amtrac. Amphibian tractor. Lightly armored tracked vehicle designed to carry troops and/or cargo from ship to beach as well as inland.
APA. Amphibious Attack transport ship. A troop ship that carried Marines to an objective area.
ARVN. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam. p.r.o.nounced to rhyme with "marvin." Our South Vietnamese allies.
AR. In the context of Operation Starlite, an M14 rifle that had been modified to fire on full automatic.
BAR. Browning Automatic Rifle. Used heavily by the United States in World War II and Korea. In the Vietnam War it was used by the VC and NVA.
Battalion Landing Team (BLT). A Marine infantry battalion with attached support units, e.g., artillery and engineer units.
Bo Doi. Literally Vietnamese for "infantry," this term has been expanded to mean something like "freedom fighter."
Bravo command group. The secondary command group of a unit. It is usually composed of the executive officer and lesser staff members.
BriGen. Brigadier general.
Bronze Star Medal. The American fourth highest decoration for valor.
Capt. Captain.
Chicom. For Chinese Communist. It referred to the type of hand grenade, made in China, that was used by the VC and NVA.
CinCPac. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. The senior U.S. military command in the Pacific rim.
CO. Commanding officer.
Col. Colonel.
Command-detonated mine. An explosive device detonated on command by electrical means.
Commodore. An honorific denoting the senior U.S. Navy captain of a flotilla of two or more ships.
Corporal (Cpl). Third lowest Marine rank.
CP. Command Post. The field headquarters of a military unit.
C-rations. The most commonly consumed food ration of the Vietnam era.
DASC. Direct air support center. A Marine organization that controls air operations from the ground.
D-day. The day an operation begins.
F4 Phantom. A fighter/attack aircraft used by the Marines, Navy, and Air Force in the Vietnam War. It was crewed by two men.
Five-paragraph order. A combat order orally given to Marines for an operation.
Flame tank. A regular tank cha.s.sis carrying a napalm gun rather than a standard 90mm gun.
FO. Artillery or mortar forward observer.
Fragmentary order or frag order. An abbreviated version of the five-paragraph order.
Gen. General.
Gunny. Short for gunnery sergeant.
GySgt. Gunnery sergeant, E-7.
H-34. A Sikorsky medium helicopter used by the Marines in the earliest years of the Vietnam War.
Han tu. Vietnamese for "blood debt." It can also mean revenge or hatred.
H-hour. The hour at which an operation, usually an amphibious landing, is to begin.
HMM. Abbreviation for Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron.
Hootch. American slang for Vietnamese house.
HQ. Headquarters.
Huey. Generic term for what the U.S. Army called the Bell HU-1E Iroquois and the Marines called the UH-1E helicopter. A light-attack and pa.s.senger helicopter.
III MAF. III Marine Amphibious Force. At the time of Starlite it was commanded by LtGen Lewis W. Walt.
JATO. For jet-a.s.sisted takeoff. Rockets attached to the wings of aircraft to permit them to take off on short runways.