"One Jelaladin Ghilzai, who says he is in Sir Louis Cavagnari"s secret service, has arrived in hot haste from Kabul, and solemnly states that yesterday morning the Residency was attacked by three regiments who had mutinied for their pay, they having guns, and being joined by a portion of six other regiments. The Emba.s.sy and escort were defending themselves when he left about noon yesterday. I hope to receive further news."
I was paralyzed for the moment, but was roused by my wife calling out, "What is it? Is it bad news from Kabul?" She had divined my fears about Cavagnari, and had been as anxious about him as I had been myself. I replied, "Yes, very bad, if true. I hope it is not." But I felt it was. I woke my A.D.C., and sent him off at once to the Viceroy with the telegram. The evil tidings spread rapidly. I was no sooner dressed than Mr. Alfred Lyall arrived. We talked matters over, I despatched a telegram[2] to Captain Conolly, and we then went off to Lord Lytton.
Early as it was, I found the Council a.s.sembled. The gravity of the situation was thoroughly appreciated, and it was unanimously decided that, should the disastrous report prove to be true, troops must proceed to Kabul with the least possible delay to avenge or, if happily incorrect or exaggerated, to support the Mission.
Sir Samuel Browne"s force had been broken up, Sir Donald Stewart was in far off Kandahar, and his troops had, all but a small number, left on their return march to India; the Kuram force was, therefore, the only one in a position to reach Kabul quickly, and I was ordered to proceed at once to Kuram and resume my command.
As a preliminary measure, Brigadier-General Ma.s.sy, who had been placed in temporary command during my absence, was directed to move troops to the Shutargardan, where they were to entrench themselves and await orders, while Stewart was directed to stop all regiments on their way back to India, and himself hold fast at Kandahar.
During the day further telegrams were received confirming the truth of the first report, and telling of the Mission having been overwhelmed and every member of it cruelly ma.s.sacred; and later Captain Conolly telegraphed that messengers had arrived from the Amir bringing two letters addressed to me giving his version of what had occurred.
During the few hours I remained at Simla I was busily engaged in discussing with Sir Frederick Haines the formation of the Kabul Field Force,[3] as my new command was designated, and the many important matters which had to be considered. More troops had to be hurried up, for it would be necessary to hold Kuram in strength while I moved on to Kabul, and, as communication by the Shutargardan could not be depended upon after December, on account of snow, the Khyber route would have to be opened out.
At the commencement of the last year"s campaign my anxiety had been so largely increased by having been given officers totally inexperienced in war to fill the higher posts in the Kuram column, that I did not hesitate to press upon the Commander-in-Chief, now that I had a far more difficult operation to carry through, the importance of my senior officers being tried men on whom I could implicitly rely; and I succeeded in getting for the command of my two Infantry brigades Herbert Macpherson[4] and T. D. Baker,[5] the Viceroy"s Military Secretary, both of whom had seen a good deal of service, while the former had already commanded a brigade in the field.
To the command of the Artillery and Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel B.
Gordon and Brigadier-General Ma.s.sy were appointed, neither of whom had much experience of war. Gordon had served in Central India during the Mutiny, and Ma.s.sy by his pluck as a subaltern of Infantry in the Crimea had gained for himself the _sobriquet_ of "Redan" Ma.s.sy. But he had not served with Cavalry in the field, and from my slight acquaintance with him I could not say whether he possessed the very exceptional qualities required in a Cavalry Commander.
My staff had proved themselves so capable and reliable that I had no wish to make any change; it was, however, materially strengthened by the addition of Colonel MacGregor,[6] as "Chief of the Staff," with Captain Combe,[7] 10th Hussars, and Lieutenant Manners Smith[8] as Deputy-a.s.sistant Quartermaster-Generals.
Mr. H.M. Durand[9] was attached to me as Political Secretary, and Major Hastings as Political Officer, in place of Colonel Waterfield, who was _hors de combat_ from a broken leg. Hugh Gough, with the rank of Brigadier-General, and Major Mark Heathcote as his a.s.sistant, were placed in charge of the lines of communication.
Before leaving Simla I paid a farewell visit to Lord Lytton. I found him in a state of deep distress and depression. To a man of his affectionate disposition, the fate of Cavagnari, for whom he had a great personal regard, was a real grief. But on public grounds he felt still more strongly the collapse of the Mission and the consequent heavy blow to the policy he had so much at heart, viz., the rectification of our defective frontier, and the rendering India secure against foreign aggression--a policy which, though scouted at the time by a party which later became all-powerful, has since been justified by the action of successive Governments, Liberal and Conservative alike, until at the present moment our frontier is gradually becoming what Lord Lytton, with his clear foresightedness and intelligent appreciation of our responsibilities and India"s requirements, would then have made it.
In answer to my request for instructions as to the line I should take about our future relations with the Afghans, Lord Lytton said: "You can tell them we shall never again altogether withdraw from Afghanistan, and that those who help you will be befriended and protected by the British Government."
While I was with Lord Lytton, a telegram[10] was brought in from Captain Conolly, reporting the details of the attack upon the Emba.s.sy, as given to him by the messenger who had been entrusted by the Amir to deliver the two letters addressed to me. In this telegram Conolly solicited instructions as to what he was to communicate to the Amir in reply to His Highness"s request for aid, and inquired whether he was at liberty to make terms with one Badshah Khan, an influential Ghilzai Chief, who had come to Alikhel to offer his services.
The following telegram was sent in reply by the Foreign Secretary:
"Your telegram 6th. Reply to the Amir at once from the Viceroy that a strong British force under General Roberts will march speedily on Kabul to his relief, from the Shutargardan, and that he should use all his resources to co-operate with, and facilitate, the advance of the troops through his country. Your proposal to subsidize Badshah Khan and accept his services is approved. Roberts will send detailed instructions."
Late in the afternoon of the same day (September 6th) I left Simla, accompanied by my wife as far as Umballa, where I found my staff waiting for me. She saw us off in the train, bidding us a cheery good-bye and good luck, but I am afraid the return journey must have been a sad one for her.
Thought for the immediate future filled my mind as we sped on our way to the front, and not a few difficulties connected with the proposed advance on Kabul presented themselves to me. My chief causes for anxiety were the insufficiency of transport, and the great extent of the lines of communication which would have to be guarded. It would be necessary to hold the country in strength from Thal to the Shutargardan, a distance of 115 miles, until such time as the Khyber route could be opened, and I felt that the force at my disposal (7,500 men and 22 guns) was none too large for the work before it, considering that I should have to provide a garrison for the Shutargardan, if not for other posts between that place and Kabul.
My Commissariat arrangements, too, caused me many misgivings, increased by the fact that Major Badc.o.c.k, my chief Commissariat Officer, and Major Collett, my a.s.sistant Quartermaster-General, who had afforded such valuable aid in Kuram, thinking the war was at an end, had taken leave to England. My doubts vanished, however, and my spirits rose at the sight of my brave troops, and the enthusiastic welcome they gave me as I rode through Kuram on the 12th September on my way to Alikhel. A splendid spirit pervaded the whole force; the men"s hearts were on fire with eager desire to press on to Kabul, and be led against the miscreants who had foully ma.s.sacred our countrymen, and I felt a.s.sured that whatever it was possible for dauntless courage, unselfish devotion, and firm determination to achieve, would be achieved by my gallant soldiers.
On reaching Alikhel, Captain Conolly handed to me the Amir"s letters,[11] to which I replied at once, and the next day, under instructions from the Government of India, I wrote to His Highness that, in conformity with his own special request that an English officer should be deputed as Envoy to his Court, and on condition that he would himself be responsible for the protection and honourable treatment of such an Envoy, Major Cavagnari and three British officers had been allowed to go to Kabul, all of whom within six weeks had been ruthlessly murdered by his troops and subjects; that his inability to carry out the treaty engagements, and his powerlessness to establish his authority, even in his own capital, having thus become apparent, an English army would now advance on Kabul with the double object of consolidating his Government, should he himself loyally do his best to fulfil the terms of the treaty, and of exacting retribution from the murderers of the British Mission. But that, although His Highness laid great stress in his letter of the 4th September on the sincerity of his friendship, my Government had been informed that emissaries had been despatched from Kabul to rouse the country people and tribes against us, and as this action appeared inconsistent with friendly intentions, I considered it necessary for His Highness to send a confidential representative to confer with me and explain his object.
I had little doubt as to the truth of the report that the Amir was using every effort to incite the Ghilzais and other tribes to oppose us, and I was confirmed in my conviction by a Native gentleman, Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan,[12] at one time our agent at Kabul, who told me that, although he did not believe that Yakub Khan had actually planned the ma.s.sacre of the Emba.s.sy, he had certainly taken no steps to prevent it, and that he, Ghulam Hussein Khan, was convinced that the Amir was now playing us false. It was, therefore, a relief to find awaiting me at Alikhel several of the leading men from the neighbouring districts, to whom I had telegraphed, before leaving Simla, asking them to meet me.
These men were profuse in their proffers of a.s.sistance, and, although I did not place a great deal of faith in their promises, I came to the conclusion that, notwithstanding Yakub Khan"s treacherous efforts to stir up the tribes, if I could only push on rapidly with a fairly strong force, I need not antic.i.p.ate any opposition that I could not overcome. Everything depended on speed, but rapidity of movement depended on the condition of the transport service, and my inspection of the animals, as I pa.s.sed through Kuram, was not calculated to raise hopes of being able to make a very quick advance; for, owing to continuous hard work and the want of a staff of trained transport attendants, the numbers of animals had steadily diminished, and those that remained were for the most part sickly and out of condition.
On the 16th of September I issued a Proclamation,[13] copies of which I caused to be sent to the people of Kabul, Ghazni, and all the neighbouring tribes; this, I hoped, would facilitate our advance, and rea.s.sure those who had taken no part in the attack on the Residency.
I also wrote a letter[14] to the _maliks_ of the Logar valley, whose territory we must enter directly we had crossed the Shutargardan, and whose co-operation I was most anxious to obtain. On the 18th I again wrote[15] to the Amir, enclosing copies of these two doc.u.ments, and informing him that I was still awaiting a reply to my first letter and the arrival of His Highness"s confidential representative; that I hoped he would soon issue the necessary orders for the furtherance of our plans and that he might rest a.s.sured of the support of the British Government.
On the 19th September matters had so far progressed that I was able to tell the Viceroy that Brigadier-General Baker was entrenched with his brigade on the Shutargardan, and engaged in improving the road to Kushi, the first halting-place in the Logar valley; that supplies were being collected by means of local transport; that I was bringing up reserve ammunition and treasure from the rear on Artillery waggons; and that every possible effort was being made to render the force mobile.
On the 20th I received the Amir"s reply. He expressed regret that he was unable to come to Alikhel himself, but intimated that he was sending two confidential agents, his Mustaufi (Finance Minister), Habibulla Khan, and his Wazir (Prime Minister), Shah Mahomed Khan, who accordingly arrived the next day.
At each interview I had with these gentlemen during the three days they remained in my camp, they impressed upon me that the Amir was inclined to be most friendly, and that his only wish was to be guided by the advice of the British Government. But, notwithstanding these plausible a.s.surances, I soon discovered that Yakub Khan"s real object in sending these two high officials was to stop the advance of the force, and induce me to leave the punishment of the troops who had committed the ma.s.sacre in the hands of the Afghan authorities, or else to delay us long enough to give time for the whole country to rise against us.
As the conversations which were carried on at the meetings with the Afghan agents are interesting, and have an important bearing on the subsequent proceedings, I give in the Appendix* the notes taken at the time by my Political Secretary.
(*Appendix V.)
I was anxious to keep one of the Amir"s representatives with me, but neither of them was willing to remain, so I felt bound to let them both depart, taking with them the following letter to the Amir:
TO HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KABUL.
_Camp, Alikhel, 25th September, 1879._
(After compliments.) I have received Your Highness"s two letters of the 19th and 20th September (1st and 2nd Shawal), delivered to me by the hands of Your Highness"s two confidential representatives, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Mahomed.
I am much obliged to Your Highness for sending me two such well-known men, and of such character as the Mustaufi and the Wazir. They have informed me of Your Highness"s wishes, and I quite understand all they have told me. It is unfortunate that the season is so late, and that winter will soon be here; but there is yet time for a British army to reach Kabul before the great cold sets in.
The Viceroy of India is much concerned that there should have been any delay in promptly acceding to Your Highness"s request for advice and a.s.sistance, as conveyed in Your Highness"s letters of the 3rd and 4th instant. It was His Excellency"s earnest wish that troops should march on Kabul at once, so as to ensure Your Highness"s personal safety and aid Your Highness in restoring peace and order at your capital.
Unfortunately, the want of transport, and the necessity for collecting a certain amount of supplies, have caused a few weeks"
delay; it is, however, a source of gratification and happiness to the Viceroy to learn that Your Highness"s safety is not at present endangered, and His Excellency trusts Your Highness will be able to keep everything quiet in your kingdom, until such time as British troops may reach Kabul.
I am glad to be able to inform Your Highness that news reached me yesterday of the departure of a considerable force from Kandahar under the command of a brave and distinguished officer, and that a large body of troops, under command of General Bright, were advancing rapidly from Peshawar to Jalalabad and onwards _via_ Gandamak to Kabul. My own force will, I hope, be in a state to march before long. As Your Highness is aware, the Shutargardan has been occupied for some days. Meanwhile regiments of Cavalry and Infantry and batteries of Artillery have reached Kuram to replace those I am taking on with me, and to reinforce my own column should a necessity for more troops arise--a contingency I do not in the least expect.
The Viceroy of India, in His Excellency"s anxiety for Your Highness"s welfare and safety, issued orders that each of the three armies, now advancing from Kandahar, Kuram, and the Khyber, should be strong enough to overcome any opposition Your Highness"s enemies could possibly offer. That each is strong enough there can be no doubt.
I understand that there is no one at Kelat-i-Ghilzai or Ghazni to stop the progress of the troops _en route_ from Kandahar. There is no reason, therefore, why they should not reach Kabul in a very short time.
The Khyber tribes, having understood and appreciated the Treaty of peace made by Your Highness with the British Government in May last, have unanimously agreed to a.s.sist the troops from Peshawar in every way, and are now eager to keep the road through the Khyber safe, and to place all their transport animals at the disposal of the British Commander, who will thus be enabled to concentrate his force rapidly at Kabul. Through the kindness of Your Highness I have experienced much less difficulty than I could have expected, and I may now reasonably hope to be with Your Highness at least as soon as either the Kandahar or Khyber column.
I look forward with great pleasure to the meeting with Your Highness, and trust that you will continue your kind a.s.sistance to obtain for me supplies and transport.
I have carefully considered Your Highness"s proposal that you yourself should be permitted to administer just punishment to the mutinous troops and others who shared in the treacherous and cruel attack on the British Envoy and his small escort, and thus save Her Majesty"s troops the trouble, hardship, and privation which must necessarily be encountered by an advance on Kabul at this season of the year. I thank Your Highness most cordially, on the part of the Viceroy and Government of India, for this further proof of Your Highness"s friendly feelings. Under ordinary circ.u.mstances such an offer would be gratefully and willingly accepted, but after what has recently occurred, I feel sure that the great British nation would not rest satisfied unless a British army marched to Kabul and there a.s.sisted Your Highness to inflict such punishments as so terrible and dastardly an act deserves.
I have forwarded Your Highness"s letters in original to the Viceroy; a copy of this, my reply, will be submitted by to-day"s post for His Excellency"s consideration. Meanwhile I have permitted Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Mahomed to take their leave and rejoin Your Highness.
I delayed my own departure from Alikhel until a sufficiency of supplies had been collected at Kushi, and everything was ready for as rapid an advance on Kabul as my limited transport would admit of; for, so long as I remained behind, the people of Afghanistan could not be sure of my intentions, and no doubt hoped that the Amir"s remonstrances would have the desired effect, and prevent our doing more than occupying the Shutargardan, or making a demonstration toward Kushi. My crossing the pa.s.s would, I knew, be the signal for all those determined on opposition to a.s.semble; it was politic, therefore, to remain behind until the last moment.
When all arrangements were complete, so far as was possible with the means at my disposal, I issued the following Field Force Order:
"The Government of India having decided that a force shall proceed with all possible despatch to Kabul, in response to His Highness the Amir"s appeal for aid, and with the object of avenging the dastardly murder of the British representative and his escort, Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure that the troops under his command will respond to the call with a determination to prove themselves worthy of the high reputation they have maintained during the recent campaign.
"The Major-General need address no words of exhortation to soldiers whose courage and fort.i.tude have been so well proved. The Afghan tribes are numerous, but without organization; the regular army is undisciplined, and whatever may be the disparity in numbers, such foes can never be formidable to British troops. The dictates of humanity require that a distinction should be made between the peaceable inhabitants of Afghanistan and the treacherous murderers for whom a just retribution is in store, and Sir Frederick Roberts desires to impress upon all ranks the necessity for treating the unoffending population with justice, forbearance, and clemency.
"The future comfort and well-being of the force depend largely on the friendliness of our relations with the districts from which supplies must be drawn; prompt payment is enjoined for all articles purchased by departments and individuals, and all disputes must be at once referred to a political officer for decision.
"The Major-General confidently looks forward to the successful accomplishment of the object of the expedition, and the establishment of order and a settled Government in Afghanistan."