In truth, the sympathy of friends with friends is fitting and proper, and the indulgence and kindness of a great Government to a sincere and faithful friend are agreeable and pleasing. I am exceedingly gratified with, and thankful to, the representatives of the ill.u.s.trious British Government for their expression of sympathy and their support of my cause. Your friendly and wise suggestion that none of the ignorant tribes of Afghanistan should oppose the British troops, so that the officers of the British Government should be the better able to support and protect me, is very acceptable and reasonable. Before I received your letter, I had sent orders repeatedly to the Governors of Jalalabad and Lalpura not to let anyone oppose or resist the British troops, and stringent orders have again been issued to the Governor of Jalalabad to use his utmost endeavours and efforts in this respect. The order in question to the address of the Governor of Jalalabad will be shown you to-morrow, and sent by an express courier.]
[Footnote 3: It was a matter of intense gratification to me that the whole time we remained in Afghanistan, nearly two years, not a single complaint was made by an Afghan of any soldier in my force having interfered with the women of the country.]
[Footnote 4: The force was made up as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------BritishOther Ranks.Officers.----------------British.Native.-------------------------------------------------------Divisional, Brigade,and Departmental Staff60F/A, R.H.A.7118G/3, R.A.7137No. 2 Mountain Battery3223Two Gatling guns1349th Lancers (one squadron)41185th Punjab Cavalry732512th Bengal Cavalry632814th Bengal Lancers740767th Foot1868672nd Highlanders2374692nd Highlanders177175th Punjab Infantry86105th Gurkhas757423rd Pioneers667128th Punjab Infantry86367th Company Bengal Sappers393and Miners ---------------------------1922,5583,867-------------------------------------------------------- ]
[Footnote 5: Known as the _sang-i-nawishta_ (inscribed stone).]
[Footnote 6: Shortly after I was settled at Kabul, the following letter, written by Nek Mahomed on the evening of the day he had been with the Amir, to some person whom he wished to acquaint with the state of affairs, was brought to me:
"MY KIND FRIEND,--The truth is that to-day, at sunrise, I went to the camp, the Amir having summoned me. When I arrived, Mulla Shah Mahomed [the Wazir] first said to me, "Go back and tell the people to raise a holy war." I did not feel certain about what he said [or was not satisfied with this], [but] the Amir afterwards told me to go back that very hour and rouse the people to a _ghaza_. I got back to Kabul about 7 o"clock, and am collecting the people.
Salaam."
The letter was not addressed, but it was sealed with Nek Mahomed"s seal, and there was no reason to doubt its authenticity.]
CHAPTER LI.
1879
The Afghan position--The fight at Charasia --Highlanders, Gurkhas, and Punjabis--Defeat of the Afghans --Kabul in sight--Deh-i-Mazang gorge--The enemy give us the slip
The Cavalry having reported that the road through the _sang-i-nawishta_ gorge was impa.s.sable, I started off a party[1]
before it was fully light on the 6th, to work at it and make it practicable for guns. I was preparing to follow with an escort of Cavalry to examine the pa.s.s and the ground beyond, when the growing daylight discovered large numbers of Afghan troops in regular formation crowning the hills that I ought to have been in a position to occupy the preceding evening. No hurry, no confusion was apparent in their movements; positions were taken up and guns placed with such coolness and deliberation that it was evident regularly trained troops were employed. Very soon I received reports of our Cavalry patrols having been fired upon, and of their having been obliged to retire.
Immediate action was imperatively necessary; the Afghans had to be dislodged from their strong position at any cost, or we should have been surrounded by overwhelming numbers. Their occupation of the heights was, I felt, a warning that must not be disregarded, and a menace that could not be brooked.
Behind this range of hills lay the densely-crowded city of Kabul, with the scarcely less crowded suburbs of Chardeh, Deh-i-Afghan, and numberless villages thickly studded over the Kabul valley, all of which were contributing their quota of warriors to a.s.sist the Regular troops in disputing the advance of the British. It did not require much experience of Asiatics to understand that, if the enemy were allowed to remain undisturbed for a single night in the position they had taken up, their numbers would increase to an extraordinary extent.
I now received a report from the rear that the road was blocked, and that the progress of Macpherson"s brigade would certainly be opposed; while, on the crests of the hills to the right and left of my camp, bodies of men began to a.s.semble, who, I surmised (which surmise I afterwards learnt was correct), were only waiting for the sun to go down to make a general attack upon the camp under cover of dusk.
The situation was one of great anxiety. The whole force with me was not more than 4,000 men and eighteen guns. The treacherous Amir and his equally treacherous Ministers had, of course, kept the Afghan Commander fully informed as to the manner in which my troops were perforce divided; the position of every man and every gun with me was known; and I feared that, as soon as we were engaged with the enemy, the opportunity would be taken to attack my weakly-defended camp and to engage Macpherson"s small brigade, enc.u.mbered as it was with its large convoy of stores and ammunition.
The numbers of the enemy were momentarily increasing, so delay would a.s.suredly make matters worse; the only chance of success, therefore, was to take the initiative, and attack the Afghan main position at once. Accordingly, I sent an officer with orders to the troops who were moving towards the gorge not to commence work, but to take up a defensive position until my plans were further developed. I sent another messenger to Macpherson, informing him of my intention to take immediate action, and telling him to keep a good look-out, and push on to Charasia with all possible speed, and at the same time I reinforced him by a squadron of Cavalry.
The Afghan position formed the arc of a circle, extending from the _sang-i-nawishta_ gorge to the heights above Chardeh. Both sides of the gorge were occupied by the enemy, as was a semi-detached hill to the south of it, and sixteen guns were observed in position. The line they had taken up occupied nearly three miles of country; and their main position was the ridge, which, close to the gorge, rose 1,000 feet above the plain, running up at its western extremity to a peak 2,200 feet high. Thence the line stretched along the edge of some lower heights to a rugged hill, the summit of which was about 1,800 feet above Charasia. In front of this formidable position were a succession of sandy hills, forming a series of easily defensible posts, and at the foot of these hills ran a bare stony belt, sloping down to the cultivated land surrounding Charasia and the hamlet of Khairabad.
My movements and reconnaissances up till now having led the enemy to believe that I intended to deliver my attack on their left at the _sang-i-nawishta_, they were seen to be concentrating their forces in that direction. But this position could only have been carried with such damaging loss to us that I determined to make the real attack by an outflanking movement to their right.
The men having made a hasty breakfast, I despatched General Baker in this direction, and placing at his disposal the troops noted below,[2]
I entrusted to him the difficult task of dislodging the enemy, while I continued to distract their attention towards the gorge by making a feint to their left.
Baker"s little column a.s.sembled in a wooded enclosure close to Charasia, where he left his field hospital and reserve ammunition, for the safe guarding of which I sent him the 5th Punjab Infantry, while he was further reinforced by 450 men of the 23rd Pioneers and three Field Artillery guns. I was thus left with only six Horse Artillery guns, 450 Cavalry, and between 600 and 700 Infantry for the protection of the camp, where I was still handicapped by the presence of the Amir and his untrustworthy following.
While Baker advanced to the left, the party near the _sang-i-nawishta_ gorge, commanded by Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, was ordered to threaten the pa.s.s and to prevent the enemy occupying any portion of the Charasia village, to advance within Artillery range of the enemy"s main position above the gorge, and when the outflanking movement had been thoroughly developed and the enemy were in full retreat, but not before, to push the Cavalry through the gorge and pursue.
At about 11.30 a.m. Baker"s leading troops emerged into the open, and were immediately engaged with a crowd of armed Afghans, supported by a considerable body of Regular troops. The General now sent one company of the 72nd, under Captain Hunt, to turn the Afghans off a succession of peaks situated at right angles to the ridge they were occupying on their extreme right. Running along this ridge, and stretching across the Indiki road to the sandhills, the Afghan right wing held a line considerably in advance of their left on the hill above the _sang-i-nawishta_ gorge, and one which could not easily be turned, for the peaks the 72nd were sent to occupy were almost inaccessible, and the fire from them swept the slopes up which our troops must advance.
These peaks, therefore, formed the key of the position, and their defenders had to be dislodged from them at all hazards before anything else could be attempted. The company of the 72nd with much difficulty fought their way up, and gained a footing on the first peak, where they were obliged to pause, until reinforced by two companies of the 5th Gurkhas under Captain Cook, V.C., when they advanced all together, clearing the enemy from each successive point, while the remainder of the 72nd breasted the hill, and, under cover of the Mountain guns, attacked the position in front. But the enemy were obstinate, and the extremely difficult nature of the ground somewhat checked the gallant Highlanders. Seeing their dilemma, Baker despatched two companies of the 5th Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh, and 200 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain Hall, to their a.s.sistance; while the 23rd Pioneers were brought up on the right, in support, and a detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry echeloned in rear, on the left of the line.
The engagement now became hot, and the firing fast and furious.
My readers will, I am sure, be able to realize with what intense excitement and anxiety I watched the proceedings. It was evident to me that little progress could be made so long as the enemy retained possession of the ridge, which the Afghan Commander apparently had just begun to appreciate was the real point of attack, for his troops could now be seen hurrying to this point, and it became more urgently necessary than ever to carry the position before it could be reinforced. At 2 p.m. it was seized; the Highlanders and Gurkhas could no longer be resisted; the Afghans wavered, and then began to retreat, exposed to a cross-fire that effectually prevented their rallying.
The brunt of this affair was borne by the 72nd, admirably led by their company officers, under the skilful direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke and his Adjutant, Lieutenant Murray. I closely watched their movements, and particularly observed one man pushing up the precipitous hillside considerably in advance of everyone else, and apparently utterly regardless of the shower of bullets falling round him. I inquired about him later on, and found that he was a young Irish private of the 72nd, named MacMahon, to whose coolness and daring was in a great measure due the capture of this very strong post. Her Majesty, I am glad to be able to relate, subsequently rewarded this intrepid soldier by bestowing on him the Victoria Cross.
The general advance was now sounded, and gallantly was it responded to. The main position was stormed by the Highlanders, Gurkhas, and Punjab Infantry, each trying hard to be the first to close with its defenders. The enemy fought desperately, charging down on the Gurkhas, by whom, under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh and his Adjutant, Lieutenant Martin, they were repulsed and driven over the crest with heavy loss.
The Afghans now took up a position some 600 yards in the rear of that from which they had just been dislodged, where they made an obstinate stand for half an hour, but they were again forced back on the attacking party being strengthened by the arrival of two companies of the 92nd Highlanders, sent to their a.s.sistance by Major White, who had already successfully engaged the Afghan left above the _sang-i-nawishta_ gorge. As the enemy"s advanced posts on the hill to the south, and directly in front of the gorge, prevented our guns from coming within range of their position on the heights above, these posts had to be disposed of as a preliminary to effective co-operation with Baker; accordingly, about noon the hill was captured by two companies of the 92nd, under Captain Cotton, and half a battery of Field Artillery was advanced to a point whence Major Parry was able to engage the Afghan guns posted above the gorge.
It was at this juncture, when Baker"s troops, having carried the main position, were proceeding to attack that to which the enemy had retreated, that White despatched two companies of the 92nd, under Captain Oxley, by whose timely aid the determined foe were at length driven from this point of vantage also. The troops followed up their success and advanced at the double, while our guns sh.e.l.led the shaken ma.s.ses.
The Afghan right and centre now gave way completely; the enemy broke, and fled down the slopes on the further side in a north-westerly direction, eventually taking refuge in the Chardeh villages.
By 3.45 we were in possession of the whole of the main ridge. The first objective having been thus gained, the troops, pivoting on their right, brought round their left and advanced against the now exposed flanks of the enemy"s left wing, and simultaneously with this movement White advanced from his position by the hill in front of the gorge, and a little after four o"clock had gained possession of the pa.s.s and twelve Afghan guns.
Completely outflanked and enfiladed by Baker"s fire, the left wing of the Afghan force made but little resistance; they rapidly abandoned the height, and retired across the river toward the north-east, pursued by the small body of Cavalry attached to White"s force, under Major Hammond, and a party of the 92nd, under Major Hay.
Baker now paused to allow of the Infantry"s ammunition being replenished, and then advanced along the ridge towards the pa.s.s, which he reached in time to help the Cavalry who were engaged with the enemy"s rear guard at the river; the latter were driven off and forced to retreat; but by this time the growing darkness made further pursuit impossible. We were therefore compelled to rest satisfied with holding the ground in advance by piquets and occupying both ends of the _sang-i-nawishta_ defile, where the troops bivouacked for the night. I was able to supply them with food from Charasia, and they were made as comfortable as they could be under the circ.u.mstances.
While the fighting was taking place on the heights in front of Charasia, the hills on both flanks of my camp were crowded with the enemy, anxiously watching the result; they did not approach within the Cavalry patrols, but one party caused so much annoyance to a picquet by firing into it that it became necessary to dislodge it, a service which was performed in a very daring manner by a few of the 92nd, under Lieutenant Grant and Colour-Sergeant Hector Macdonald, the same non-commissioned officer who had a few days before so distinguished himself in the Hazardarakht defile.
Our casualties were wonderfully few, only 18 killed and 70 wounded,[3]
while the enemy left 300 dead behind them, and as they succeeded in carrying numbers of their killed and wounded off the field, their loss must have been heavy. I subsequently ascertained that we had opposed to us, besides thirteen Regular regiments, between eight and ten thousand Afghans. Ghilzais from Tezin and Hisarak had hurried up in large numbers to join the enemy, but, luckily for us, arrived too late. Of these some returned to their homes when they found the Afghan army had been beaten, but the greater number waited about Kabul to a.s.sist in any further stand that might be made by the Regular troops.
The heliograph, worked by Captain Stratton, of the 22nd Foot, had been of the greatest use during the day, and kept me fully informed of all details. The last message as the sun was sinking behind the hills, confirming my own observations, was a most satisfactory one, to the effect that the whole of the enemy"s position was in our possession, and that our victory was complete.
Throughout the day my friend (!) the Amir, surrounded by his Sirdars, remained seated on a knoll in the centre of the camp watching the progress of the fight with intense eagerness, and questioning everyone who appeared as to his interpretation of what he had observed. So soon as I felt absolutely a.s.sured of our victory, I sent an Aide-de-camp to His Highness to convey the joyful intelligence of our success. It was, without doubt, a trying moment for him, and a terrible disappointment after the plans which I subsequently ascertained he and his adherents at Kabul had carefully laid for our annihilation. But he received the news with Asiatic calmness, and without the smallest sign of mortification, merely requesting my Aide-de-camp to a.s.sure me that, as my enemies were his enemies, he rejoiced at my victory.
Macpherson"s brigade, with its impedimenta, arrived before it was quite dark, so altogether I had reason to feel satisfied with the day"s results. But the fact still remained that not more than twelve miles beyond stood the city of Kabul, with its armed thousands ready to oppose us should an a.s.sault prove necessary. I had besides received information of a further gathering of Ghilzais bent upon another attack on the Shutargardan, and that reinforcements of Regular troops and guns were hastening to Kabul from Ghazni. Prompt action was the one and only means of meeting these threatened difficulties. My troops had had more than enough for one day, and required rest, but needs must when the devil (in the shape of Afghan hordes) drives. I resolved to push on, and issued orders for tents to be struck at once and an advance to be made at break of day.
At the first streak of dawn on the 7th I started, leaving Macpherson to come on with the heavy baggage as quickly as he could. I marched by the _sang-i-nawishta_ defile, where Major White met me and explained to me his part in the victory of the previous day. From my inspection of the ground, I had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that much of the success which attended the operations on this side was due to White"s military instincts and, at one supreme moment, his extreme personal gallantry. It afforded me, therefore, very great pleasure to recommend this officer for the Victoria Cross, an honour of which more than one incident in his subsequent career proved him to be well worthy.
Our rapid advance, following on the defeat of the previous day, had the effect I hoped it would have. On arriving at Beni Hissar, a considerable village, surrounded by orchards and gardens, only two miles south of the far-famed citadel of the Bala Hissar, I sent out Cavalry patrols to reconnoitre, who brought me the pleasing news that the Bala Hissar had been evacuated, and the only part of the city visible seemed to be deserted.
During the day I received visits from some of the chief merchants of Kabul, who each told a different tale regarding the movements of the defeated Afghan army and the intentions of the Afghan Commander. From their conflicting accounts, however, I gathered that, fresh troops having arrived from Kohistan, the remnants of the Charasia army had joined them, and that the combined forces were then occupying the range of hills immediately above Kabul, to the west, and had determined to make another stand.
Having received intelligence that the enemy, if again defeated, intended to retire towards Turkestan, I directed Brigadier-General Ma.s.sy, on the morning of the 8th October, to move out with the Cavalry brigade and place himself across their line of retreat.[4] The brigade started at 11 a.m., and, in order to avoid the city and adjacent heights, made a considerable detour by Siah Sang and Sherpur, the new Afghan cantonment. On reaching the latter place, Ma.s.sy heliographed to me that he had found it deserted, the magazine blown up, and seventy-five guns[5] abandoned inside the enclosure, and that the enemy were now occupying a ridge[6] which seemed to him to be a prolongation of the Shahr-i-Darwaza range above Kabul; then, continuing his march, he crossed a depression in this ridge called the Nanachi Kotal, and wheeling to his left, and skirting the Asmai heights on the western side, he soon came in sight of the Afghan camp, pitched on the slope of the hills about a mile from Deh-i-Mazang.
Brigadier-General Ma.s.sy was informed, in reply to his heliogram, that Baker would be despatched at once to drive the enemy from their position and force them to fall back upon the Cavalry, upon which Ma.s.sy immediately made the arrangements which appeared to him most advisable for blocking, with the limited number of sabres at his disposal, the several roads by which the enemy might attempt to escape.
I could only spare to Baker a very small force (1,044 rifles, two Mountain guns and one Gatling), for Macpherson"s and White"s troops had not yet come up. He started off without a moment"s delay, and, driving the enemy"s scouts before him, worked his way along the Shahr-i-Darwaza heights to the west; but his progress was very slow, owing to the extreme difficulty of the ground, and the day was far spent before he found himself near enough to the enemy to use his Artillery. To his delight, Baker perceived that he commanded the Afghan camp and the rear of their main position; but his satisfaction was considerably allayed when he discovered that between him and them lay a deep gorge[7] with precipitous sides, through which ran the Kabul river, and that before he could attack he would have to descend 1,600 feet, and then climb up the opposite side, which was nearly as high and quite as steep.
Anxious as Baker was that there should be no delay in delivering the a.s.sault, by the time his dispositions were made it had become too dark to attempt it, and most reluctantly he had to postpone the movement till daybreak the next day. He had ascertained that the Kabul river was not fordable for Infantry except at a point which was commanded by the enemy"s camp, and was too far from support to warrant piquets being pushed across at night. Nothing whatever could be seen, but a very slight noise as of stealthy movement in the Afghan camp was heard, and the fear seized Baker that the enemy might escape him. Soon after 11 p.m., therefore, when the rising moon began in a measure to dispel the darkness, Baker sent a strong patrol under a British officer to feel for the enemy. The patrol came into contact with the Afghan scouts on the river-bank, from some of whom, taken prisoners in the struggle, they learned that the enemy had crept away under cover of the night, and the greater number had dispersed to their own homes; but about 800, mounted on Artillery horses, were reported to have accompanied their Commander, Mahomed Jan, and to have escaped in the direction of Bamian.
Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Ma.s.sy, from his point of observation beneath the Asmai heights, had perceived that it was impossible for Baker to carry the enemy"s main position by daylight; he tried to communicate with Baker and ascertain his plans, but the party despatched on this service were unable to get through the villages and woods, which were all held by the enemy, and returned unsuccessful.