Lyall told me that the Indian Government fully appreciated the difficulty I was in about finding a Ruler for the province, and that, unless Abdur Rahman could be brought within negotiable distance, the alternative I had suggested would have to be acted upon.
Lord Lytton, however, was very sanguine about Abdur Rahman, and he warned Mr. Griffin, before he started for Kabul, that the Sirdar"s letter to Ayub Khan indicated possibilities that might have the most important bearing on the solution of the difficult problem to be dealt with in northern Afghanistan. It was Lord Lytton"s wish to place Abdur Rahman on the throne of Kabul, or, at least, to afford him the best opportunity of winning his own way to that position. The difficulty was to get at him, in the first instance, and, in the second, to convince him of our wish and power to help him; while a not unnatural hesitation on the Sirdar"s part to enter Afghanistan without Russia"s permission had to be considered.
Lord Lytton impressed upon Mr. Griffin the necessity for overcoming these difficulties in time to enable us to withdraw from northern Afghanistan in the early autumn at latest; and he desired Sir Oliver St. John (Sir Donald Stewart"s political officer, who was at that time in Calcutta), immediately on his return to Kandahar, to communicate with Abdur Rahman, through his mother, the Viceroy"s willingness to make him Ruler of Kabul and Turkestan, if he would accept the terms offered to him without delay.
The Viceroy communicated his views to the Secretary of State in the following telegram:
"Necessary to find without delay some Native authority to which we can restore northern Afghanistan without risk of immediate anarchy on our evacuation of Kabul not later than next autumn, and if possible earlier. No prospect of finding in the country any man strong enough for this purpose. I therefore advocate early public recognition of Abdur Rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and open deputation of Sirdars with British concurrence to offer him throne of Afghanistan as sole means of saving the country from anarchy. Do you approve?"
Lord Cranbrook"s reply was as follows:
"a.s.suming that Abdur Rahman is acceptable to the country, and that he would be content with northern Afghanistan, it is desirable to support him at Kabul; the more spontaneous any advances to him on the part of the Sirdars, and the less appearance of British influence, the better. But where is he? And how do you propose to learn his wishes and intentions? If invited by Chiefs, every inducement to bring him to Kabul should be then held out. Public recognition should not precede, but follow, his adoption by Sirdars, and his acceptance of the position."
By the end of March authentic intelligence was received that Abdur Rahman had made himself master of Afghan-Turkestan, and was corresponding with the representative Sirdars at Kabul. It seemed, therefore, that the time had arrived when distinct overtures might be made to Abdur Rahman; accordingly, on the 1st April Mr. Griffin addressed to him the following letter:
"It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan."
Abdur Rahman, in his friendly but guarded reply,[5] expressed in general terms his hope of being recognized as Amir. He greatly desired, he wrote, the friendship of the British, and their a.s.sistance in restoring peace and order to Afghanistan; but at the same time, he hinted that his obligations to the Russian Government for the hospitality they had extended to him placed him in some doubt as to the terms upon which our friendship might be accorded to him, and while he expressed a desire for the permanent establishment of Afghanistan, with our a.s.sistance and sympathy, he let it be understood that he wished to consider himself under the protection of Russia as well as of Great Britain.
In a verbal message, however, he added that he was ready to cross the Hindu Kush to discuss matters with our officers, and he begged that he might be furnished with information as to the "nature of our friendship" and "its conditions."
In answer, Mr. Griffin was directed to inform Abdur Rahman that the relations of Afghanistan to the British and Russian Empires was a subject the Government of India must decline to discuss with him, and to explain that their declared determination had been the exclusion of foreign influence and interference from Afghanistan, a cardinal condition "which had at all times and under all circ.u.mstances been deemed essential for the permanent security of Her Majesty"s Indian Empire," a condition, moreover, which had always been accepted by the Government of the Czar, which had repeatedly renewed those a.s.surances, solemnly given to Her Majesty"s Ministers, that "Russia considered Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her influence."[6]
Early in April the Mustaufi (whom, it will be remembered, I had sent to Ghazni to communicate with the Chiefs, and ascertain their ideas and desires as to the future government of Kabul) returned without having achieved much success. He had persuaded some of the leading men to accompany him as far as Maidan, whence a few representatives came on to Kabul as bearers of a doc.u.ment signed by Mahomed Jan, twelve other Sirdars, and 189 influential tribesmen, setting forth their views and wishes; but as these were all based upon the restoration of Yakub Khan, their proposals could not be entertained.
On the 13th April I held a durbar, at which I received this deputation; all the Sirdars, Chiefs, and _maliks_ of Kabul and many Hazaras being present. Mr. Griffin, on the part of the Government, told them that Yakub Khan could not be allowed to return to Afghanistan, but that the names of any Sirdars, approved of by a large proportion of the people for the Amirship, would be laid before the Viceroy; that there was no intention of annexing Afghanistan, and that there would be no occupation of any places except such as were necessary for the safety of our Indian frontier. They were further informed that the British army would be withdrawn as soon as the country had settled down peacefully and an Amir, amicably disposed towards us, had been selected; but that Kandahar would not again be united to Kabul.
The effect produced was good. The deputation was greatly disappointed that Yakub Khan was not to be permitted to return, but all present felt that they had received a definite reply.
[Footnote 1: In reply to a reference made to me on the subject, I represented that, before operations could be undertaken on so extensive a scale as was proposed, it would be necessary to reinforce the Kabul garrison and the several posts on the Kyber line by:
One battery of Horse or Field Artillery.
One Heavy battery.
One Mountain battery.
A detachment of Garrison Artillery.
A brigade of Cavalry.
Three companies of Sappers and Miners.
Two regiments of British Infantry.
Six regiments of Native Infantry.
Drafts sufficient to raise each Infantry regiment at Kabul to 800 men.
This was agreed to; the reinforcements were sent up by degrees, and a second division was formed at Kabul, to the command of which Major-General J. Ross,[*] C.B., was appointed.]
[Note *: Now General Sir John Ross, G.C.B.]
[Footnote 2: As the deportation of Yakub Khan was believed to be one of the chief causes of recent disturbances, and as a powerful party in the country still looked forward to having him back as their Ruler, I was directed to make it clear to his adherents that the ex-Amir would never be allowed to return to Afghanistan, and that his abdication must be, as he himself at the time wished it to be, considered irrevocable. In support of this decision, I was informed that the unanimous verdict of guilty of murder, recorded against Yakub Khan by Colonel Macgregor"s Commission, was substantially endorsed by the Chief Justice of Calcutta and the Advocate-General; and that, although other authorities who had considered the evidence did not quite go so far as these two high legal functionaries, the general conclusion come to was that, if the Amir did not connive at the ma.s.sacre of the Mission, he made no attempt whatever to interpose on its behalf, and that his whole conduct on that occasion betrayed a culpable indifference to the fate of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his companions, and a total disregard of the solemn obligation which he had contracted with the British Government.]
[Footnote 3: I had released the Mustaufi from confinement when the general amnesty was published on the 26th December, and he had subsequently been usefully employed a.s.sisting the political officers in revenue matters. I did not suppose that he had any great love for the British, but he was anxious to see us out of the country, and was wise enough to know that no armed opposition could effect his purpose, and that it could only be accomplished by the establishment of a stable government, under a Ruler that we could accept.]
[Footnote 4: Now Colonel Sir West Ridgeway, K.C.B.]
[Footnote 5: Abdur Rahman"s letter is given in the Appendix.] (See Appendix VIII.)
[Footnote 6: This letter from the Foreign Secretary to Mr. Griffin is given in full in the Appendix. (Appendix IX.)]
CHAPTER LIX.
1880
Jenkins attacked near Charasia--Sir Donald Stewart reaches Kabul --Difficulties with Abdur Rahman--Abdur Rahman proclaimed Amir
Sir Donald Stewart"s division, which, I have mentioned, it had been decided should be sent to Kabul to take part in the pacification of northern Afghanistan, left Kandahar[1] on the 30th March, and was expected to arrive at Ghazni about the 21st April. On the 16th I received a letter from Sir Donald, dated six days before, asking me to send supplies to meet him. I, therefore, that same day despatched a small column, under the command of Major General Ross, C.B., with the articles of food required; and as I thought it likely that my object in sending this force might be misunderstood, the deputation which attended the durbar was told to explain matters to the Chiefs at Maidan, and a.s.sure them that the advance would be peaceful unless hostilities should be provoked by their own action. Notwithstanding this precaution, I thought it quite possible the column would be opposed, for the news concerning Abdur Rahman"s advent was causing considerable excitement; and whilst the soldiers and a proportion of the tribesmen were disposed to welcome him as a deliverer, those from Wardak and Logar resented his appearance on the scene as putting an end to their hopes of having Yakub Khan reinstated.
With a view, therefore, to prevent the Logaris from joining any attack which might be made on General Ross, I sent a party, 1,200 strong, under Colonel Jenkins, in the direction of Charasia.
On the 22nd April Ross reached Sar-i-top, forty-one miles from Ghazni; Sir Donald Stewart having arrived that same day at the latter place, heliographic communication was at once opened with him, and the welcome news was signalled that Sir Donald had fought an engagement at Ahmedkhel on the 19th, and had been entirely successful. On receipt of this intelligence I ordered a Royal salute to be fired in honour of the victory, the announcement of which I hoped might have a quieting effect on the excitement which prevailed around Kabul.
In this I was disappointed. On the evening of the 24th, Jenkins, who was encamped at Charasia, heard that he was about to be attacked by the Logaris, under Mahomed Hasan Khan. At once striking his tents, and collecting his baggage in a sheltered spot, he ordered a party of Cavalry to reconnoitre up the Logar valley, strengthened his piquets, and sent off an express messenger to inform me of the situation.
I immediately despatched Brigadier-General Macpherson to Jenkins"s a.s.sistance. By 9 a.m. he had started, with four Mountain guns and 962 Infantry, followed later by two more guns and a troop of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry; and as a support to Macpherson, Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, with the Cavalry brigade and four Horse Artillery guns, was ordered to take up a position half-way between Kabul and Charasia.
At 1 p.m. on the 25th Macpherson arrived on the high ground beyond the _sang-i-nawishta_ gorge, whence he obtained a good view of Jenkins"s position; and seeing that the enemy formed a complete semicircle round it, he pushed on. Jenkins had stood on the defensive from the early morning, and the Afghans, who had advanced to within a couple of hundred yards, were only kept at bay by the steadiness of his fire.
Macpherson first sent back the baggage to Sherpur, so as to free all hands for action, and then proceeded to attack the left horn of the semicircle. The enemy broke, fell back, and were completely scattered by a well-directed Artillery fire; the surrounding hills were speedily cleared, and the Cavalry and Horse Artillery pursued for four miles.
By four o"clock not a single living Afghan was to be seen; more than 200 had been killed, while our casualties were only four killed and thirty-four wounded.
I came up just as the fight was over; and being sure from the decisive character of the defeat that a retirement could not be misunderstood, I ordered the troops to return to Kabul.
In antic.i.p.ation of Sir Donald Stewart"s arrival, and the consequent necessity for my making over to him, as my senior, the supreme command of the Kabul Field Force, I prepared a report[2] for his information, which explained the general military situation in northern Afghanistan, and contained a statement of economic details which I thought would be of use to the Government, and concerning which an experience of eighteen months in the field enabled me to give an opinion with some confidence.
The strength of the Kabul Field Force at the end of April amounted to nearly 14,000 men and thirty-eight guns, with 12,500 followers;[3]
besides 15,000 men and thirty guns on the Khyber line, under the immediate command of Major-General Bright.
Sir Donald reached Kabul on the 5th May. On the same day we heard that the Beaconsfield Administration had come to an end; that a new Ministry had been formed under Mr. Gladstone; that Lord Lytton had resigned, and was to be succeeded by the Marquis of Ripon; and that the Marquis of Hartington had become Secretary of State for India.
Notwithstanding the pleasure of meeting an old friend in my new Commander, that 5th of May was altogether not a happy day for me.
Lord Lytton"s approaching departure was a source of real sorrow.
Personally, I felt that I was deeply indebted to him for the confidence he had reposed in me, and for the warm support he had invariably accorded me. I had hoped that he would have had the gratification of seeing, while in office, the campaign in which he was so much interested satisfactorily concluded, and with the prospect of permanent results; and I dreaded that a change of Government might mean a reversal of the policy which I believed to be the best for the security of our position in India. Moreover, it was not in human nature to feel absolute satisfaction in yielding up the supreme command I had so greatly delighted in, into the hands of another, even though that other was one for whom I had so great a personal regard, and under whom I had already served in the field.
The amalgamated troops were now styled the Northern Afghanistan Field Force, and I retained the command of the two divisions at Kabul, with Major-General John Ross as second in command; while Major-General Hills was given the brigades from Kandahar, which now became the third division of the Force.
The idea in bringing Stewart away from Kandahar was that he should occupy Ghazni and Kabul; that my divisions should operate in Kohistan and in the direction of Bamian; that General Bright should move against the Ghilzais; and that a column from Kuram should march over the Shutargardan to Kabul. It was hoped that these operations would have the effect of quieting the country, and, by the time they had been carried out, it would be possible to evacuate northern Afghanistan.