"Personal and secret. I strongly recommend that a force be sent from this to Kandahar. Stewart has organized a very complete one consisting of nine regiments of Infantry, three of Cavalry, and three Mountain batteries. This will suffice to overcome all opposition _en route_; it will have the best possible effect on the country, and will be ready to go anywhere on reaching Kandahar, being fully equipped in all respects. He proposes sending me in command.
"I am sure that but few Bombay regiments are able to cope with Afghans, and once the Kabul Field Force leaves this country, the chance of sending a thoroughly reliable and well-equipped column will be lost. The movement of the remainder of the Kabul troops towards India should be simultaneous with the advance of my division towards Kandahar, it being most desirable to limit the area of our responsibilities as soon as possible; at the same time, it is imperative that we should now show our strength throughout Afghanistan. The withdrawal, under existing circ.u.mstances, of the whole force from Kabul to India would certainly be misunderstood, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. You need have no fears about my division. It can take care of itself, and will reach Kandahar under the month. I will answer for the loyalty and good feeling of the Native portion, and would propose to inform them that, as soon as matters have been satisfactorily settled at Kandahar, they will be sent straight back to India.
Show this to Lyall."
Exaggerated reports of the Maiwand affair being rife in the Kabul bazaars, which were daily becoming crowded with armed Afghans from Abdur Rahman"s camp, and the prospect of troops having to leave at once for Kandahar, made it more than ever necessary to bring the negotiations with the new Amir to a speedy conclusion. It was accordingly arranged that Mr. Griffin should meet him at Zimma, about sixteen miles from Kabul. This interview had the happiest results, and must have been extremely gratifying to Mr. Griffin, whom we all heartily congratulated on the successful ending to the very delicate and difficult negotiations which he had carried on with so much skill and patience.
In taking leave of His Highness, Mr. Griffin invited him to come to the British camp the following day to be received by Sir Donald Stewart. Abdur Rahman himself was quite willing to come, and some of his supporters were in favour of his doing so, but others vehemently opposed the idea, and "swore by their faith they would leave him if he persisted." After a stormy meeting with his Chiefs, the Amir wrote to Mr. Griffin as follows: "If you really wish me to come to you, irrespective of the opinion of the people, I am quite ready to do so. Please write and let me know your wishes. I am in the hands of ignorant fools, who do not know their own interests, good or bad. What can I do? I am most anxious to meet you."
Upon receipt of this note Stewart decided that it would be impolitic to press for an interview, for instead of strengthening the Amir, as had been the intention, it was evident it would have the opposite effect, so the meeting was given up.
On the morning of the 3rd August the telegram arrived from Lord Ripon, which I had been so anxiously expecting, authorizing the despatch of a force to Kandahar, and directing that I should be placed in command.
I heard afterwards that my message to the Adjutant-General was received at Simla at a most opportune moment. Lyall took it without delay to Lord Ripon, who from the first had been in favour of a force being sent from Kabul, but had refrained from ordering the movement in deference to the views held by some members of his Council, whose longer experience of India, His Excellency considered, ent.i.tled their opinions to be treated with respect.
I set to work at once to organize the column which I was to have the great honour of commanding. In this most congenial duty I received every possible a.s.sistance and encouragement from Stewart; he gave me carte-blanche, and I should only have had myself to blame if every unit had not been as efficiently equipped as circ.u.mstances would admit.
I wished that the force should be composed, as far as possible, of those who had served with me throughout the campaign; but as some of the regiments (more especially Native corps) had been away from their homes for two years, and had had more than their share of fighting, besides having suffered heavy losses in action and through sickness, I considered it right to consult their commanders before detailing the troops. With the exception of three, who thought that their regiments had been long enough away from India, all, to my great delight, eagerly responded to my call, and I took upon myself to promise the men that they should not be left to garrison Kandahar, but should be sent back to India as soon as the fighting ceased.
When the several regiments were decided upon, every man not likely to stand the strain of prolonged forced marches was weeded out, and the scale of baggage, tents, and impedimenta was reduced to a minimum.[7]
I had no fear as to the officers and men ably and cheerfully performing their part of the task; we had been long enough together to enable us thoroughly to understand and trust each other, and I felt that I could depend upon each and all to respond heartily to whatever call I might make upon them.
The question of supplies was my greatest anxiety, and I had many consultations with my experienced Commissariat officer, Major Badc.o.c.k, before I could feel satisfied in this respect.
The transport, as I have already recorded, was in good order; it was fortunate that the soldiers had been practised in loading, leading, and tending the animals, for the Afghan drivers deserted to a man a march or two from Kabul, and the Hazaras followed their example on reaching their own country. Sir Donald Stewart"s account of the troubles he had encountered during his march from Kandahar was not very encouraging, and I should have been glad if I could have taken a larger amount of supplies;[8] but on this point I had to be guided by the number of animals that could be allotted to the column, which was necessarily limited, as carriage had to be provided simultaneously for the withdrawal of the rest of the army of occupation.
The strength of the force placed at my disposal consisted of 9,986 men of all ranks and eighteen guns, divided into three brigades of Infantry, one brigade of Cavalry, and three batteries of Mountain Artillery. There were, besides, over 8,000 followers[9] and 2,300 horses and gun-mules.
It was designated the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force.
Major-General J. Ross, C.B., was given the command of the Infantry division, his three Brigadier-Generals being Herbert Macpherson, T.D.
Baker, and Charles Macgregor. Brigadier-General Hugh Gough commanded the Cavalry brigade; Colonel Alured Johnson the Artillery; while Colonel ae. Perkins held the position of Commanding Royal Engineer; Deputy-Surgeon-General J. Hanbury that of Princ.i.p.al Medical Officer; and Lieutenant-Colonel E.F. Chapman, Chief of the Staff.
From the detail of the force given below,[10] it will be seen that there was no wheeled Artillery, and that the number of guns was not in proportion to the strength of the other branches. This was my own doing; I was pressed to take more and heavier guns, but, after due consideration, I decided that I would only have Mountain batteries. We could not tell how long the Kandahar garrison would be able to hold out, so that our first object must be to reach that place with the least possible delay, and wheeled Artillery would, in a country where there were practically no roads, have only prevented our moving as rapidly as we might otherwise have done.
For the equipment of the force, inclusive of carriage for footsore soldiers[11] and followers, and allowing ten per cent. spare, more than 8,000[12] animals were required.
Fortunately, it turned out that a fair amount of Indian corn in the ear was almost everywhere procurable, which was so nutritious that a large majority of the Cavalry horses and transport animals reached Kandahar in excellent condition.
Throughout the march great difficulties were experienced in procuring food, but they were always overcome, with the able a.s.sistance of Major Hastings and his political staff,[13] and by means of the admirable arrangements made by the Commissariat[14] and Transport[15] officers, who were quite untiring, and after the longest march, and with the prospect of having to start again at an early hour the following morning, had often to work far into the night.
The want of fuel was our chief drawback. We had on many occasions to purchase houses and pull them to pieces for the sake of the wood to be got out of them, and frequently there was nothing to cook with save tiny roots of southernwood, which had to be dug out and collected after a long day"s march before the men could prepare their food and satisfy their hunger.
One day"s corn was carried by each animal in addition to the ordinary load, and as far as Ghazni grain was tolerably plentiful; beyond that we had to depend for forage on the crops still standing. At the end of the day"s march, certain fields were told off to the several brigades; from these all that was required was cut and carried away, the fields were then measured and a.s.sessed, and compensation was awarded by the political officers, who also adjusted all claims on account of wrecked houses, and fruit, vegetables, etc., brought in for the troops.
On Sunday, the 8th August, the force moved into camp by brigades, my Head-Quarters being with the first and third Infantry brigades at Beni Hissar, on the way to the Logar valley, which route I had chosen instead of the slightly shorter line by Maidan, on account of the greater facility it afforded for supplies.
Sir Donald Stewart paid us a farewell visit in the afternoon, and at 6 a.m. the following morning we began the march to Kandahar.
[Footnote 1: Sirdar Sher Ali had been appointed Governor of Kandahar by the Amir Yakub Khan after the treaty of Gandamak, and had since a.s.sisted Sir Donald Stewart in the civil administration of the province.]
[Footnote 2: Local Native levies.]
[Footnote 3:
_Killed_ _Missing_ British officers 20 9 " troops 290 48 Native " 624 118 --- --- 934 175 Total, 1,109
Of the regimental followers 331 were killed and 7 were missing; 455 transport followers and drivers were reported as killed or missing, but a number of these, being Afghans, probably joined the enemy.
A large quant.i.ty of arms and ammunition was lost, including over 1,000 rifles and carbines, and 600 or 700 swords and bayonets.
201 horses were killed, and 1,676 camels, 355 ponies, 24 mules, 291 donkeys, and 79 bullocks, were not forthcoming.]
[Footnote 4: Afterwards General Sir Robert Phayre, G.C.B.]
[Footnote 5: General Phayre reported on the 28th July that there were only seven Native regiments in Baluchistan, three of which were required for the lines of communication, leaving only four available for Field Service; and that a battalion of British Infantry and a battery of Field Artillery required for his column were a long way off, being still in Sind.]
[Footnote 6: Now General Sir George Greaves, G.C.B., G.C.M.C.]
[Footnote 7:
Each British soldier was allowed for kit and camp-equipage, including great-coat and waterproof sheet 30 lbs.
Each Native soldier 20 "
Each public and private follower 10 "
Each European officer 1 mule.
Every eight officers for mess 1 "
Each staff-officer for office purposes 80 lbs.
Each Native officer 30 "]
[Footnote 8: The amount of supplies taken with the force was as follows:
FOR BRITISH TROOPS.
Bread-stuff 5 days.
Preserved vegetables 15 "
Tea, sugar, salt, and rum 30 "
FOR NATIVE TROOPS AND FOLLOWERS.
Flour 5 days _Dal_ and salt 30 "
Rum for spirit-drinking men 8 "
Sheep, ten days" supply for British troops and four issues for Native troops, with 20 per cent. spare. Nearly 5,000 sheep were purchased on the march. N.B.--There are no horned cattle in Afghanistan, except those used for the plough or transport.
In addition to the above, a small reserve of lime-juice, pea-soup, and tinned meat was taken; these proved most useful, and might have been increased with advantage had carriage been available.
I gave strict orders that the reserve of bread-stuff, flour, and sheep was never to be used without my sanction, and that wherever possible food for the day"s consumption was to be purchased. We had occasionally to trench upon the reserve, but we nearly made it up at other places, and we arrived at Kandahar with three days" supplies in hand.]