The Afghans were evidently much relieved at the leniency of the Proclamation, to which they listened with the greatest attention.
When I had finished reading it, I dismissed the a.s.sembly, with the exception of the Ministers whom I had decided to make prisoners. To them I explained that I felt it to be my duty to place them under restraint, pending investigation into the part they had taken in the ma.s.sacre of the Emba.s.sy.
The following day I made a formal entry into the city, traversing all its main streets, that the people might understand that it and they were at our mercy. The Cavalry brigade headed the procession; I followed with my staff and escort, and five battalions of Infantry brought up the rear; there were no Artillery, for in some places the streets were so narrow and tortuous that two men could hardly ride abreast.
It was scarcely to be expected the citizens would give us a warm welcome; but they were perfectly respectful, and I hoped the martial and workmanlike appearance of the troops would have a salutary effect.
I now appointed Major-General James Hills, V.C., to be Governor of Kabul for the time being, a.s.sociating with him the able and respected Mahomedan gentleman, Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan, as the most likely means of securing for the present order and good government in the city. I further inst.i.tuted two Courts--one political, consisting of Colonel Macgregor, Surgeon-Major Bellew,[3] and Mahomed Hyat Khan, a Mahomedan member of the Punjab Commission, and an excellent Persian and Pushtu scholar, to inquire into the complicated circ.u.mstances which led to the attack on the Residency, and to ascertain, if possible, how far the Amir and his Ministers were implicated. The other, a military Court, with Brigadier-General Ma.s.sy as president, for the trial of those Chiefs and soldiers accused of having taken part in the actual ma.s.sacre.[4]
Up to this time (the middle of October) communication with India had been kept up by way of the Shutargardan, and I had heard nothing of the approach of the Khyber column. It was so very necessary to open up the Khyber route, in view of early snow on the Shutargardan, that I arranged to send a small force towards Jalalabad, and to move the Shutargardan garrison to Kabul, thus breaking off communication with Kuram.
Colonel Money had beaten off another attack made by the tribesmen on his position, but as they still threatened him in considerable numbers, I despatched Brigadier-General Hugh Gough with some troops to enable him to withdraw. This reinforcement arrived at a most opportune moment, when the augmented tribal combination, imagining that the garrison was completely at its mercy, had sent a message to Money offering to spare their lives if they laid down their arms! So sure were the Afghans of their triumph that they had brought 200 of their women to witness it. On Gough"s arrival, Money dispersed the gathering, and his force left the Shutargardan, together with the Head-Quarters and two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, which had been ordered to join me from Sialkot, and afterwards proved a most valuable addition to the Kabul Field Force.
I was sitting in my tent on the morning of the 16th October, when I was startled by a most terrific explosion in the upper part of the Bala Hissar, which was occupied by the 5th Gurkhas, while the 67th Foot were pitched in the garden below. The gunpowder, stored in a detached building, had somehow--we never could discover how--become ignited, and I trembled at the thought of what would be the consequences if the main magazine caught fire, which, with its 250 tons of gunpowder, was dangerously near to the scene of the explosion.
I at once sent orders to the Gurkhas and the 67th to clear out, and not to wait even to bring away their tents, or anything but their ammunition, and I did not breathe freely till they were all safe on Siah Sang. The results of this disaster, as it was, were bad enough, for Captain Shafto, R.A. (a very promising officer), a private of the 67th, the Subadar-Major of the 5th Gurkhas, and nineteen Natives, most of them soldiers, lost their lives.
A second and more violent explosion took place two hours and a half after the first, but there was no loss of life amongst the troops, though several Afghans were killed at a distance of 400 yards from the fort.
There was given on this occasion a very practical exemplification of the good feeling existing between the European soldiers and the Gurkhas. The 72nd and the 5th Gurkhas had been much a.s.sociated from the commencement of the campaign, and a spirit of _camaraderie_ had sprung up between them, resulting in the Highlanders now coming forward and insisting on making over their greatcoats to the little Gurkhas for the night--a very strong proof of their friendship, for at Kabul in October the nights are bitterly cold.
Two telegrams received about this time caused the greatest gratification throughout the force. One was from the Commander-in-Chief, conveying Her Majesty"s expression of "warm satisfaction" at the conduct of the troops; the other was from the Viceroy, expressing his "cordial congratulations" and His Excellency"s "high appreciation of the ability with which the action was directed, and the courage with which it was so successfully carried out." I was informed at the same time by Lord Lytton that, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, I was given the local rank of Lieutenant-General, to enable me to be placed in command of all the troops in eastern Afghanistan, a force of 20,000 men and 46 guns, in two divisions. The first division remained under my own immediate command, and Major-General R. O. Bright, C.B.,[5] was appointed to the command of the other. I was, of course very much pleased at this proof of the confidence reposed in me.
[Footnote 1: Yahia Khan was Yakub Khan"s father-in-law.]
[Footnote 2: At an interview which Major Hastings, the Political Officer, and Mr. Durand, my Political Secretary, had with His Highness at my request on the 23rd October, he said, referring to the subject of the Amirship: "I call G.o.d and the Koran to witness, and everything a Mussulman holds sacred, that my only desire is to be set free, and end my days in liberty. I have conceived an utter aversion for these people. I always treated them well, and you see how they have rewarded me. So long as I was fighting in one place or another, they liked me well enough. Directly I became Amir, and consulted their own good by making peace with you, they turned on me. Now I detest them all, and long to be out of Afghanistan for ever. It is not that I am unable to hold the country; I have held it before and could hold it again, but I have no further wish to rule such a people, and I beg of you to let me go. If the British Government wish me to stay, I will stay, as their servant or as the Amir, if you like to call me so, until my son is of an age to succeed me, or even without that condition; but it will be wholly against my own inclination, and I earnestly beg to be set free."]
[Footnote 3: Dr. Bellew was with the brothers Lumsden at Kandahar in 1857.]
[Footnote 4: My action in endorsing the proceedings of this court, and my treatment of Afghans generally, were so adversely and severely criticized by party newspapers and periodicals, and by members of the Opposition in the House of Commons, that I was called upon for an explanation of my conduct, which was submitted and read in both Houses of Parliament by the Secretary of State for India, Viscount Cranbrook, and the Under-Secretary of State for India, the Hon. E. Stanhope. In the Parliamentary records of February, 1880, can be seen my reply to the accusations, as well as an abstract statement of the executions carried out at Kabul in accordance with the findings of the military Court.]
[Footnote 5: Afterwards General Sir Robert Bright, G.C.B.]
CHAPTER LIII.
1879
Afghans afraid to befriend us--Kabul Russianized --Yakub Khan"s abdication accepted--State treasury taken over
I had given much thought to the question of housing the troops during the winter, which was now fast approaching. Some of the senior officers were in favour of quartering them in the Bala Hissar, as being the place with most prestige attached to it; but the fact that there was not accommodation in it for the whole force, and that, therefore, the troops would have to be separated, as well as the dangerous proximity of the huge store of gunpowder, which could only be got rid of by degrees, decided me to occupy in preference the partly-fortified cantonment of Sherpur, about a mile north-east of the city, and close to the ruins of the old British entrenchment. It was enclosed on three sides by a high and ma.s.sive loop-holed wall, and on the fourth by the Bimaru heights, while it possessed the advantage of having within its walls sufficient shelter in long ranges of brick buildings for the British troops, and good hospital accommodation, and there was ample s.p.a.ce for the erection of huts for the Native soldiers.
The drawback was that the great extent of its perimeter, more than four and a half miles, made it a very difficult place to defend; but, remembering the grievous results of General Elphinstone"s force being scattered in 1841, I thought the advantage of being able to keep my troops together outweighed the disadvantage of having to defend so long a line.
Materials for the Native soldiers" huts were brought from the Bala Hissar, the demolition of which, as an act of retributive justice, I had recommended to the Government of India, as it appeared to me that the destruction of the fortified palace in which the ma.s.sacre had taken place, and which was the symbol of the power of the Afghans and their boasted military strength, would be a more fitting punishment for treachery and insult than any other we could inflict, and a more lasting memorial of our ability to avenge our countrymen than any we could raise. The tidings that their ancient citadel had been levelled to the ground would, I felt sure, spread throughout the length and breadth of Afghanistan, bearing with them a political significance that could hardly be over-estimated.
I now set to work to collect supplies for the winter. A1 _khalsa_, or State grain, we took as our right, the justice of this being recognized both by the Amir and the people, but what was the property of private individuals was purchased at a price the avaricious Afghan could not resist. There had been a good harvest, and supplies were abundant; but the people from the outlying districts were chary of a.s.sisting us, for they knew from experience that all who befriended the British would be sure to suffer when we took our departure.
I had repeated complaints brought to me of the harshness and injustice with which those who had shown themselves well disposed towards us were treated by the Amir on his return from signing the Treaty at Gandamak, and most of the Afghans were so afraid of the Amir"s vengeance when they should again be left to his tender mercies, that they held aloof, except those who, like Wali Mahomed Khan and his following, were in open opposition to Yakub Khan, and some few who were still smarting from recent injury and oppression.
I was frequently asked by the Afghans, when requiring some service to be rendered, "Are you going to remain?" Could I have replied in the affirmative, or could I have said that we should continue to exercise sufficient control over the Government of the country to prevent their being punished for helping us, they would have served us willingly.
Not that I could flatter myself they altogether liked us, but they would have felt it wise in their own interests to meet our requirements; and, besides, the great ma.s.s of the people were heartily sick and tired of a long continuance of oppression and misrule, and were ready to submit (for a time, at least) to any strong and just Government.
Lord Lytton, in the hope of saving from the resentment of the Amir those who had been of use to us in the early part of the war, had expressly stipulated in Article II. of the Gandamak Treaty that "a full and complete amnesty should be published, absolving all Afghans from any responsibility on account of intercourse with the British Forces during the campaign, and that the Amir should guarantee to protect all persons, of whatever degree, from punishment or molestation on that account."
But this stipulation was not adhered to. Yakub Khan more than once spoke to me about it, and declared that it was impossible to control the turbulent spirits in Afghanistan without being supreme, and that this amnesty, had it been published, would have tied his hands with regard to those who had proved themselves his enemies.
His neglect to carry out this Article of the treaty added considerably to my difficulty, as will be seen from the following letter from Asmatula Khan, a Ghilzai Chief, to whom I wrote, asking him to meet me at Kabul.
"I received your kind letter on the 8th of Shawal [28th September], and understood its contents, and also those of the enclosed Proclamation to the people of Kabul. I informed all whom I thought fit of the contents of the Proclamation.
"Some time ago I went to Gandamak to Major Cavagnari. He instructed me to obey the orders of the Amir, and made me over to His Highness. When Major Cavagnari returned to India, the Amir"s officials confiscated my property, and gave the Chiefship to my cousin[1] [or enemy], Bakram Khan.
"The oppression I suffered on your account is beyond description.
They ruined and disgraced every friend and adherent of mine. On the return of Major Cavagnari to Kabul, I sent my Naib [deputy] to him, who informed him of my state. Major Cavagnari sent a message to me to the effect that I should recover my property by force if I could, otherwise I should go to the hills, and not come to Kabul until I heard from him. In the meantime I received news of the murder of the Envoy, and I am still in the hills."
The thought of what might be in store for those who were now aiding me troubled me a good deal. No doubt their help was not disinterested, but they were "friends in need," and I could not be quite indifferent to their future.
I had several interesting conversations with Yakub Khan, and in discussing with him Sher Ali"s reasons for breaking with us, he dwelt on the fact that his father, although he did not get all he wished out of Lord Mayo, was fairly satisfied and content with what had been done for him, but when Saiyad Nur Mahomed returned from Simla in 1873, he became thoroughly disgusted, and at once made overtures to the Russians, with whom constant intercourse had since been kept up.
Yakub Khan"s statements were verified by the fact that we found Kabul much more Russian than English. The Afghan Sirdars and officers were arrayed in Russian pattern uniforms, Russian money was found in the treasury, Russian wares were sold in the bazaars, and although the roads leading to Central Asia were certainly no better than those leading to India, Russia had taken more advantage of them than we had to carry on commercial dealings with Afghanistan.[2]
When I inquired of Yakub Khan what had become of the correspondence which must have been carried on between his father and the Russians, he declared that he had destroyed it all when on his way to Gandamak; nevertheless, a certain number of letters[3] from Generals Kauffmann and Stoliatoff came into my possession, and a draft of the treaty the latter officer brought from Tashkent was made for me from memory by the man who had copied it for Sher Ali, aided by the Afghan official who was told off to be in attendance on Stoliatoff, and who had frequently read the treaty.
In one of my last conversations with Yakub Khan, he advised me "not to lose sight of Herat and Turkestan." On my asking him whether he had any reason to suppose that his representatives in those places meant to give trouble, he replied: "I cannot say what they may do; but, remember, I have warned you." He, no doubt, knew more than he told me, and I think it quite possible that he had some inkling of his brother"s[4] (Ayub Khan"s) intentions, in regard to Kandahar, and he probably foresaw that Abdur Rahman Khan would appear on the scene from the direction of Turkestan.
I duly received an answer to my telegram regarding the abdication of Yakub Khan, in which I was informed that His Highness"s resignation was accepted by Her Majesty"s Government, and I was directed to announce the fact to the people of Afghanistan in the following terms:
"I, General Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby proclaim that the Amir, having by his own free will abdicated, has left Afghanistan without a Government. In consequence of the shameful outrage upon its Envoy and suite, the British Government has been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the capital, and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan.
"The British Government now commands that all Afghan authorities, Chiefs, and Sirdars do continue their functions in maintaining order, referring to me whenever necessary.
"The British Government desire that the people shall be treated with justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings and customs be respected.
"The services of such Sirdars and Chiefs as a.s.sist in preserving order will be duly recognized, but all disturbers of the peace and persons concerned in attacks upon the British authority will meet with condign punishment.
"The British Government, after consultation with the princ.i.p.al Sirdars, tribal Chiefs, and others representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people."
This manifesto was issued on the 28th October, and the same day I informed Yakub Khan that his abdication had been accepted, and acquainted him with the orders pa.s.sed by the British Government in connexion with this fact.[5]
Yakub Khan showed no interest either in the Proclamation, a Persian translation of which was read to him, or the Government"s decision as to himself, and made no comment beyond a formal "_bisyar khub_" ("very good") and an inclination of the head.
I then told Yakub Khan that, as I was now charged with the government of the country, it was necessary that I should take possession of the treasury and all moneys therein. He signified his a.s.sent, but demurred to certain sums being considered as public property, contending that they formed part of his father"s wealth, and that the British Government might as well take from him his _choga_,[6] this also having come from the pockets of the people. "My father was _Padishah_," he said; "there was no distinction between public and private money. However," he went on, "I have given up the crown, and I am not going to dispute about rupees. You may take all I have, down to my clothes; but the money was my father"s, and is mine by right."
I replied that it was necessary that all money in his possession should be given up, but that his private effects should not be touched; that he would be given a receipt for the money, and that, if the Government of India decided it to be his personal property, it should be returned to him.