This Yakub Khan at first declined to accept, with some show of temper.
Eventually he came round, and said, "Yes, give me a receipt, so that no one may say hereafter that I carried off State money to which I had no right. It can be easily made sure that I have no money when I go."[7]
Spite of all his shortcomings, I could not help feeling sorry for the self-deposed Ruler, and before leaving him I explained that he would be treated with the same consideration that had always been accorded to him, that Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan[8] should have a tent next to his, and that it should be the Nawab"s care to look after his comfort in every way, and that I should be glad to see him whenever he wished for an interview. That same day, under instructions, I issued the following further manifesto:
"In my Proclamation of yesterday I announced that His Highness the Amir had of his own free will abdicated, and that for the present the government of Afghanistan would be carried on under my supervision. I now proclaim that, in order to provide for the cost of administration, I have taken possession of the State treasury, and that, until the British Government shall declare its will as to the permanent arrangements to be made for the future good government of the country, the collection of revenue and the expenditure of public money will be regulated by me. All persons concerned are hereby informed that they must obey without dispute or delay such orders as may be issued by me in regard to the payment of taxes and other connected matters; and I give plain warning that anyone resisting or obstructing the execution of such orders will be treated with the utmost severity as an enemy to the British Government."
[Footnote 1: In Pushtu the word _tarbur_ signifies a cousin to any degree, and is not unfrequently used as "enemy," the inference being that in Afghanistan a cousin is necessarily an enemy.]
[Footnote 2: As I reported at the time, the magnitude of Sher Ali"s military preparations was, in my opinion, a fact of peculiar significance. He had raised and equipped with arms of precision sixteen regiments of Cavalry and sixty-eight of Infantry, while his Artillery amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and breech-loading small arms. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other articles of military equipment, were stored in proportionate quant.i.ties. Upon the construction of the Sherpur cantonment Sher Ali had expended an astonishing amount of labour and money. The size and cost of this work may be judged from the fact that the main line of rampart, with barrack accommodation, extended to a length of nearly two miles under the western and southern slopes of the Bimaru hills, while the original design was to carry the wall entirely round the hills, a distance of four and a half miles, and the foundations were laid for a considerable portion of this length. All these military preparations must have been going on for some years, and were quite unnecessary, except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with ourselves. Sher Ali had refused during this time to accept the subsidy we had agreed to pay him, and it is difficult to understand how their entire cost could have been met from the Afghan treasury, the annual gross revenue of the country at that time amounting only to about 80 lakhs of rupees.]
[Footnote 3: These letters, as well as my report to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, with an account of my conversation with Yakub Khan, are given in the Appendix.]
[Footnote 4: Sirdar Ayub Khan was Governor of Herat in 1879.]
[Footnote 5: There were present at the interview, besides myself, Colonel Macgregor, Major Hastings, Surgeon-Major Bellew, Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan, and Mr. H.M. Durand.]
[Footnote 6: A kind of mantle worn by Afghans.]
[Footnote 7: As Yakub Khan refused under one pretext or another to deliver up any money, Major Moriarty, the officer in charge of the Kabul Field Force treasure-chest, and Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, accompanied by an escort, searched a house in the city in which a portion of Yakub Khan"s money was said to be concealed. Upwards of eight and a half lakhs of rupees, and a certain amount of jewellery and gold coins, tillas and Russian five-rouble pieces, in all amounting to nine and a half lakhs, were found. This sum was subsequently refunded to the Afghan Government.]
[Footnote 8: The Nawab had been made a K.C.S.I.]
CHAPTER LIV.
1879
The amnesty Proclamation--Strength of the Kabul Field Force --Yakub Khan despatched to India
On the 1st November my Head-Quarters and the 1st division moved into Sherpur, which the Engineers had prepared for winter quarters, and where stores of provisions and forage were a.s.suming satisfactory proportions. The same day Brigadier-General Macpherson left Kabul with a brigade of about 1,800 men and four guns to join hands with the troops which I had lately heard were advancing from the Khyber, and had reached Gandamak. I joined Macpherson the following morning at Butkhak, about eleven miles from Kabul, where our first post towards the Khyber had already been established. It was very important that our communication with India should be by a route good enough for wheeled carriages; I was therefore anxious to see for myself if it were not possible to avoid the Khurd-Kabul Pa.s.s, which was said to be very difficult. I had, besides, a strong wish to visit this pa.s.s, as being the scene of Sir Robert Sale"s fight with the tribesmen in 1841, and of the beginning of the ma.s.sacre of General Elphinstone"s unfortunate troops in 1842.[1] The Afghan Commander-in-Chief, Daud Shah, and several Ghilzai Chiefs, accompanied me; from them I learned that an easier road did exist, running more to the east, and crossing over the Lataband mountain. Personal inspection of the two lines proved that Daud Shah"s estimate of their respective difficulties was correct; the Lataband route was comparatively easy, there was no defile as on the Khurd-Kabul side, and the kotal, 8,000 feet above the sea, was reached by a gradual ascent from Butkhak. However, I found the Khurd-Kabul much less difficult than I had imagined it to be; it might have been made pa.s.sable for carts, but there was no object in using it, as the Lataband route possessed the additional advantage of being some miles shorter; accordingly I decided upon adopting the latter as the line of communication with India.
Macpherson reported that the country beyond Khurd-Kabul was fairly settled, and that, on the 7th, he had been able to open communication with Brigadier-General Charles Gough, commanding Bright"s leading brigade. I was thus again brought into communication with India, and in a position to clear my hospitals of those amongst the sick and wounded who were not progressing favourably, and could not soon be fit for duty.
By this time the Inquiry Commission had completed its difficult task of trying to sift the truth concerning the fate of Cavagnari and his companions from the ma.s.s of falsehood with which it was enveloped. The progress had been slow, particularly when examination touched on the part Yakub Khan had played in the tragedy; witnesses were afraid to give evidence openly until they were convinced that he would not be re-established in a position to avenge himself. The whole matter had been gone into most fully, and a careful perusal of the proceedings satisfied me that the Amir could not have been ignorant that an attack on the Residency was contemplated. He may not have foreseen or desired the ma.s.sacre of the Emba.s.sy, but there was no room for doubt as to his having connived at a demonstration against it, which, had it not ended so fatally, might have served him in good stead as a proof of his inability to guarantee the safety of foreigners, and thus obtain the withdrawal of the Mission.
It was impossible, under these circ.u.mstances, that Yakub Khan could ever be reinstated as Ruler of Kabul, and his remaining in his present equivocal position was irksome to himself and most embarra.s.sing to me.
I therefore recommended that he should be deported to India, to be dealt with as the Government might decide after reviewing the information elicited by the political Court of Inquiry, which to me appeared to tell so weightily against the ex-Amir, that, in my opinion, I was no longer justified in treating as rebels to his authority Afghans who, it was now evident, had only carried out his secret, if not his expressed, wishes when opposing our advance on Kabul. I decided, therefore, to proclaim a free and complete amnesty[2] to all persons not concerned, directly or indirectly, in the attack on the Residency, or who were not found hereafter in possession of property belonging to our countrymen or their escort, on the condition that they surrendered their arms and returned to their homes.
At Daud Shah"s suggestion, I sent three influential Sirdars to the Logar, Kohistan, and Maidan valleys, to superintend the collection of the amount of forage which was to be levied from those districts; and in order to lessen the consumption at Kabul, I sent away all elephants,[3] spare bullocks, and sick transport animals. In furtherance of the same object, as soon as Macpherson returned, I sent Baker with a brigade into the Maidan district, about twenty miles from Kabul, on the Ghazni road, where the troops could more easily be fed, as it was the district from which a large proportion of our supplies was expected, and I also despatched to India all time-expired men and invalids who were no longer fit for service.[4]
Towards the end of November, Mr. Luke, the officer in charge of the telegraph department, who had done admirable work throughout the campaign, reported that communication was established with India. As, however, cutting the telegraph-wires was a favourite amus.e.m.e.nt of the tribesmen, a heliograph was arranged at suitable stations between Landi Kotal and Kabul, which was worked with fair success to the end of the war. Had we then possessed the more perfect heliographic apparatus which is now available, it would have made us, in that land of bright sun, almost independent of the telegraph, so far as connexion with Landi Kotal was concerned.
Hearing that Baker was experiencing difficulty in collecting his supplies, I joined him at Maidan to satisfy myself how matters stood.
The headmen in the neighbourhood refused to deliver the _khalsa_ grain they had been ordered to furnish, and, a.s.sisted by a body of Ghilzais from Ghazni and Wardak, they attacked our Cavalry charged with collecting it, and murdered our agent, Sirdar Mahomed Hussein Khan.
For these offences I destroyed the chief _malik"s_ fort and confiscated his store of grain, after which there was no more trouble, and supplies came in freely. I returned to Kabul, and Baker, with his brigade, followed me on the 1st December.
That same day Yakub Khan was despatched by double marches to India, careful precautions having been taken to prevent his being rescued on the way. When saying good-bye to him, he thanked me warmly for the kindness and consideration he had received, and a.s.sured me that he left his wives and children in my hands in the fullest confidence that they would be well treated and cared for.
A week later I sent off the two Sirdars, Yahia Khan and Zakariah Khan, as well as the Wazir, whose guilt had been clearly proved, and whose powerful influence, I had every reason to believe, was being used to stir up the country against us. The Mustaufi I allowed to remain; he had been less prominent than the others in opposing us, and, besides, I had an idea that he might prove useful to me in the administration of the country.
[Footnote 1: A most thrilling account of Elphinstone"s retreat through this pa.s.s is given in Kaye"s "History of the War in Afghanistan," vol.
ii., p. 229.]
[Footnote 2: The amnesty Proclamation ran as follows:
"KABUL, "_12th November, 1879._
"To all whom it may concern. On the 12th October a Proclamation was issued in which I offered a reward for the surrender of any person who had fought against the British troops since the 3rd September, and had thereby become a rebel against the Amir Yakub Khan. I have now received information which tends to show that some, at least, of those who shared in the opposition encountered by the British troops during their advance on Kabul, were led to do so by the belief that the Amir was a prisoner in my camp, and had called upon the soldiery and people of Kabul to rise on his behalf. Such persons, although enemies to the British Government, were not rebels against their own Sovereign, and the great British Government does not seek for vengeance against enemies who no longer resist. It may be that few only of those who took up arms were thus led away by the statements of evil-minded men, but rather than punish the innocent with the guilty, I am willing to believe that all were alike deceived. On behalf of the British Government, therefore, I proclaim a free and complete amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September, provided that they now give up any arms in their possession and return to their homes. The offer of a reward for the surrender of such persons is now withdrawn, and they will not for the future be molested in any way on account of their opposition to the British advance; but it must be clearly understood that the benefits of this amnesty do not extend to anyone, whether soldier or civilian, who was concerned directly or indirectly in the attack upon the Residency, or who may hereafter be found in possession of any property belonging to members of the Emba.s.sy. To such persons no mercy will be shown. Further, I hold out no promise of pardon to those who, well knowing the Amir"s position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of Kabul to take up arms against the British troops. They have been guilty of wilful rebellion against the Amir"s authority, and they will be considered and treated as rebels wherever found."]
[Footnote 3: There was a slight fall of snow on the 11th November, followed by severe frost, and the elephants were beginning to suffer from the cold. Three of them succ.u.mbed on the Lataband Kotal, much to the annoyance of the olfactory nerves of all pa.s.sers-by. It was impossible to bury the huge carca.s.ses, as the ground was all rock, and there was not wood enough to burn them. So intense was the cold that the ink froze in my pen, and I was obliged to keep my inkstand under my pillow at night.]
[Footnote 4: This party marched towards India on the 14th November, followed by a second convoy of sickly men on the 27th idem. On this latter date the strength of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, Kabul Field Force, and the Reserve at Peshawar was as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------British Force.Native Force.Total.----------------+-----------------Officers.Rank &BritishTroops.File.Officers.--------------------+---------+------+---------+-------+------1st Division, atand around Kabul ..1002,783715,0608,0142nd Division, onthe Khyber line ...902,3851188,59011,183---------+------+---------+-------+------1905,16818913,65019,197Reserve at Peshawar551,952494,6546,710---------+------+---------+-------+------2457,12023818,30425,907---------------------------------------------------------------
Total:-- 483 British officers.
7,120 British troops.
18,304 Native troops.
Grand total:-- 25,907 with 60 guns, 24 with 1st Division, and 36 with 2nd Division and the Reserve.]
CHAPTER LV.
1879
Political situation at Kabul--Serious trouble ahead --Macpherson attacks the Kohistanis--Combined movements --The uncertainty of war--The fight in the Chardeh valley --Forced to retire--Padre Adams earns the V.C.
--Macpherson"s column arrives --The captured guns recovered--Melancholy reflections
The general political situation, as it developed itself in the early part of December, and the causes which appeared to me to have contributed to produce it, may be briefly summarized as follows. After the outbreak in the previous September and the ma.s.sacre of our Envoy, the advance of the British force was too rapid to give the Afghans, as a nation, time to oppose us. At Charasia, the troops, aided by large numbers of the disaffected townspeople, were conspicuously beaten in the open field; their organization as an armed body was at an end, and their leaders all sought personal safety in flight.
It appears probable that at this period the general expectation amongst the Afghans was that the British Government would exact a heavy retribution from the nation and city, and that, after vengeance had been satisfied, the army would be withdrawn.
Thirty-seven years before, a British ma.s.sacre had been followed by a temporary occupation of the city of Kabul, and just as the troops of Pollock and Nott, on that occasion, had sacked and destroyed the great bazaar and then retired, so in 1879 the people believed that some signal punishment would again be succeeded by the withdrawal of our troops. Thus a period of doubt and expectation ensued after the battle of Charasia; the Afghans were waiting on events, and the time had not arrived for a general movement.
This pause, however, was marked by certain occurrences which doubtless touched the national pride to the quick, and which were also susceptible of being used by the enemies of the British Government to excite into vivid fanaticism the religious sentiment, which has ever formed a prominent trait in the Afghan character.
The prolonged occupation by foreign troops of the fortified cantonment which had been prepared by the late Amir Sher Ali for his own army; the capture of the large park of Artillery, and of the vast munitions of war, which had raised the military strength of the Afghans to a standard unequalled among Asiatic nations; the destruction of their historic fortress, the residence of their Kings; and, lastly, the deportation to India of their Amir and his princ.i.p.al Ministers, were all circ.u.mstances which united to increase to a high pitch the antipathy naturally felt towards a foreign invader.
The temper of the people being in this inflammable condition, it was clear that only disunion and jealousy amongst their Chiefs prevented their combining against us, and that if any impetus could be given to their religious sentiment strong enough to unite the discordant elements in a common cause, a powerful movement would be initiated, having for its object our annihilation or expulsion from their country.