"Please present my kindest remembrances to my old comrades, and favor me with an early reply. Yours very truly,
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General.
"Major-General Sherman, Com"d"g, etc., Savannah, Ga."
On my pa.s.sage through Washington in January, 1865, Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, confirmed the view I had taken of the situation, and gave reasons for it before unknown to me, by telling me it was regarded by the administration as an absolute financial necessity that the war be ended in the campaign then about to begin. It is, perhaps, not strange that General Thomas had not thought of this; but it does seem remarkable that he had proposed to let a broken and dispirited enemy have several months in which to recuperate before annoying him any further.
The expectation and instructions of General Grant and General Sherman were that General Thomas should, as soon as he was ready to take the offensive, pursue Hood into the Gulf States. General Thomas appears to have forgotten that part of his instructions. As soon as he had driven Hood across the river, he proposed to go into winter quarters, and "hold the line of the Tennessee" till some time the next spring. If General Sherman had confided to General Thomas, as he did to General Grant, his ulterior purpose to march from Savannah toward Richmond, for which reason he wanted Hood kept out of his way, Thomas would have perceived the necessity of pressing the pursuit of Hood into the Gulf States. But if Thomas supposed, as he might naturally have done, that Sherman had only shifted his base with a view to further operations in Georgia and the Gulf States, under the plan of the last autumn, with which Thomas was perfectly familiar, he may well have seen no necessity for his pressing the pursuit beyond the Tennessee River in midwinter.
Some of our military operations in the Civil War remind me of the spirit of "fair play" shown by our old doctors in the West in the days of malarial fever. When the poison had fully developed its power, and threatened the destruction of its victim, the good doctor would come in and attack the enemy with heroic doses of quinine. In a few days medical science would prevail. Then the fair-minded physician would retire, and give the worsted malaria a chance to recuperate and "come to time" for another attack; and so on indefinitely until either the man or the malaria-often the man- finally got "knocked out." It was not until after much study and some practice of the art of war that I conceived for myself the idea of giving the enemy of my youth, which still clung to me, no chance to recover after I once got him down. He has never got the better of me since.
THOMAS"S ATt.i.tUDE TOWARD THE WAR
Had Thomas"s plan been carried out, he would have been ready, with a fine army splendidly equipped and supplied, to start from the Tennessee River to invade the Gulf States, as had been done the year before, just about the time the plans actually adopted resulted in the surrender of all the Confederate armies. In Thomas"s mind war seems to have become the normal condition of the country. He had apparently as yet no thought of its termination. The campaign from the Tennessee River as a base had then become, like the "autumn manoeuvers" of an European army, a regular operation to be commenced at the proper time every year. In his general order of December 29, he said the enemy, "unless he is mad, must forever relinquish all hope of bringing Tennessee again within the lines of the accursed rebellion"; but the possible termination of that rebellion appeared to be a contingency too remote to be taken into account in planning future military operations.
[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 39.]
[( 2) See Vol. XLV, part I, p. 37.]
[( 3) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 50.]
[( 4) I did not see General Thomas after this letter was written.]
CHAPTER XIV Hood"s Motive in Attempting the Impossible at Nashville-Diversity of Opinions Concerning that Battle-No Orders on Record for the Battle of December 16-That Battle due to the Spontaneous Action of Subordinate Commanders-Statements in the Reports of the Corps Commanders-Explanation of the Absence of Orders-The Phraseology of General Thomas"s Report.
The official records, Hood"s statement, and Sherman"s estimate, made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood"s infantry force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper"s) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood"s infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half greater then mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond"s brigade, which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to a.s.sist in holding the line of Duck River.
HOOD"S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE
It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own strength in infantry and in cavalry-an opportunity such as had never before been presented to any Confederate general. That he thought his chance a very brilliant one is not remarkable. If he could cut off my retreat or force me to a pitched battle, he had full reason to hope for the most decisive results. This fact should be given full weight in connection with the question why Hood did not avoid intrenched positions and make a raid into Kentucky, which he could easily have done at that time, because Thomas was not yet ready to meet him in the open field. The moral effect of such a raid would, of course, have been very great; but it must have proved disastrous in the end, for the reason that Thomas would in a short time have had in Hood"s rear a far superior force to cut off his retreat and force him to a decisive battle; whereas if Hood could defeat and seriously cripple, if not destroy, the only organized army in the field then opposed to him, he could afterward attend to Thomas"s scattered detachments in succession, or invade Kentucky, as he might think expedient. As Hood was operating in the country of his own friends, he did not lack full and accurate information of the strength and movements of his adversary. Indeed, we were also fully informed in due time of all of Hood"s movements, but overestimated his strength because we did not have friends residing in his camps.
But the defeat of Hood at Franklin, and Thomas"s concentration of troops at Nashville, completely reversed the situation. When Hood recovered from the blow received at Franklin sufficiently to make any further move, he found himself confronted no longer by an inferior force, but by one of more than twice his own strength in infantry, and not far, if at all, inferior to him in cavalry. The artillery in the field is not specially considered in any of these estimates, because it was ample in quant.i.ty and efficient in quality on both sides, and need not be compared. This formidable army was now in Hood"s immediate front at Nashville, while the important strategic points of Murfreesboro" and Chattanooga were strongly garrisoned and fortified, and the railroads strongly guarded. It had become too late for Hood to attempt a raid into Kentucky. Thomas would have been close upon his rear with an army at least twice as strong, with all the important points in Tennessee still securely held. But successful operations against Nashville were far less possible to Hood than an invasion of Kentucky. While no commander could possibly think of destroying his own army by a.s.saulting a fortified place in which the garrison was more than double his own strength, or indulge the hope of any valuable results from a less than half investment of such a place, so bold a commander as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only thing he could possibly do except retreat across the Tennessee River, and thus abandon his cause as lost. It was this view of the situation by General Grant and the authorities in Washington that caused such intense anxiety on account of the delay of General Thomas in attacking Hood at Nashville. It was perfectly evident that Thomas could beat Hood whenever he chose to attack him, and that Hood must be fully aware of that fact. Hence it was naturally apprehended that Hood would either make a raid into Kentucky or else retreat across the Tennessee River without suffering any further damage. To those who were watching Hood closely at Nashville, and especially to those who understood his character, there seemed no ground for either apprehension. All his operations indicated a serious attempt to besiege Nashville, though it was impossible to imagine what he could hope to accomplish, unless it was to wait in the most convenient place while his adversary, with all the great resources of the country at his back, got ready to crush him.
HOOD"S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE
As stated in his report, Thomas estimated Hood"s strength as being at least equal to his own, and with all the deliberation of his nature, he insisted upon making the full preparations which he considered essential to success not only in battle, but in pursuit of a defeated enemy. From his point of view, Thomas was unquestionably right in his action. How he came to make so great an overestimate of the Confederate strength, in view of the means of information in his possession and the estimate General Sherman had given him before he started for Savannah, it is difficult to conjecture. But the fact is now beyond question that Thomas made all those elaborate preparations to attack an enemy of less than half his own strength, under the belief that his adversary was at least equal in strength to himself. That Hood then knew his own exact strength is a matter of course, and that he did not underestimate the strength of his adversary is almost equally certain. During the two weeks in which his army lay in front of Nashville, if not before, he must have ascertained very closely the strength of the Union forces in his front. Hence Hood"s "siege" of Nashville for two weeks could not be regarded otherwise than as a stupendous farce, were it not for the desperate bravery with which he thus kept up the appearance of still fighting for a lost cause rather than be the first to admit by his own action that it was indeed lost. It is now well known that the feeling among the Southern people and that of some of the highest officers of the Confederate government made it impossible for any officer of their army to admit in any public way the failure of the Confederacy until after the enforced surrender of Lee"s army in Virginia. Indeed, it required much moral courage on the part of General Johnston voluntarily to enter into a capitulation even after the capture of Lee.
This is unquestionably the explanation of Hood"s desperate act in waiting in front of Nashville and inviting the destruction or capture of his army. The crushing blow he there received was like a death-blow delivered by a giant full of strength and vigor upon a gladiator already beaten and reduced in strength nearly to exhaustion. Sherman was not very far wrong when he said that "the battle of Nashville was fought at Franklin." The gladiator had been reduced to less than one third of his former strength by a long series of combats with a more powerful antagonist all the past summer, and finally by his unexpected repulse at Franklin. It required only one or two more blows from the powerful enemy at Nashville to complete his destruction. Any estimate of the battle of Nashville which fails to take into account the foregoing facts must be essentially erroneous, and it is not doing any honor to the great soldier who fought that battle to compare it with his previous achievements when he heroically met and defeated superior numbers of fresh and vigorous troops.
A wide diversity of opinion has always existed among military men in respect to the battle of Nashville, ranging all the way from the view taken in historical accounts heretofore published to the opinion expressed by General Sherman, in language intended of course to be hyperbolical, namely that "the battle of Nashville was fought at Franklin." The truth is to be found somewhere between these two extremes. But the exact truth respecting that battle can perhaps hardly yet be told. I will, however, state such facts of my own knowledge and experience, and make such references to data to be found in the voluminous records, as it seems to me may a.s.sist the future historian, together with such comments as I deem appropriate upon the information now available. As will be explained hereafter, some important doc.u.ments which originally formed part of the records have disappeared therefrom. Their influence upon historical opinion, if ever recovered, may now only be suggested.
NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16
It must be observed as a very notable fact that the official records, replete with orders and instructions issued every day, and almost every hour, contain no record whatever of any written order or instructions from General Thomas, given after the close of operations on December 15, for the operations which actually took place the next day. The only indications in the records, so far as I have been able to discover, that any orders were given by General Thomas, either orally or in writing, on the night of December 15, are the following "orders of the day" for the Fourth Army Corps, issued by General Wood after a personal interview with General Thomas that night; the order in writing from General Thomas to General Wilson, December 15; and the despatch from General Wilson to myself, dated December 16, 10:10 A. M. They are as follows:
"Headquarters Fourth Army Corps, "Near Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864, 11:20 P. M.
"Orders of the day for the Fourth Army Corps for to-morrow, December 16, 1864: "If the enemy is in their front at daylight to-morrow morning, division commanders will advance at that time, attack, and carry whatever may be before them. If the enemy retreats to-night, we will follow them. General Elliott, commanding Second Division, will cross to the east of the Franklin pike, then move southward parallel to it. He will deploy two regiments, connect with skirmishers, and the rest of his division will move by flank. General Kimball will follow, then General Beatty. The batteries attached to each division to-day will accompany them to-morrow. Ten ambulances and five ammunition-wagons will follow each division.
"By the order of Brigadier-General Wood: "J. S. Fullerton, "Lieutenant-Colonel and a.s.sistant Adjutant-General."
"Headquarters, Department of the c.u.mberland, "Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864.
"Major-General J. H. Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi.
"General: I am directed by the major general commanding to say to you that you will remain in your present position until it is satisfactorily known whether the enemy will fight or retreat. In case he retreats, you will move your command on the Hillsborough pike across the Harpeth, and then take the most direct road or roads to the Franklin pike, and endeavor to capture or destroy the enemy"s trains in their rear.
"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully your obedient servant,
"Robt. H. Ramsey, a.s.sistant Adjutant-General."
Both of these orders indicate a not unnatural state of doubt as to whether the enemy would "fight or retreat." The former directs what is to be done by the Fourth Corps in either case, while the latter directs what shall be done in case the enemy retreats, but says nothing about what shall be done if he does not retreat.
"Hdqrs. Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. of the Mississippi, "In the Field, December 16, 1864, 10:10 A. M.
"Major-General Schofield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps.
"General: The regiment sent to the Granny White pike reports it strongly picketed toward us, with troops moving to our left. This is probably Chalmers" division. I have heard nothing from Johnson this morning; but, from what General Croxton reports, there is no doubt that Chalmers crossed the Hardin pike, moving toward Brentwood. The country on the left of the Hillsboro" pike, toward the enemy"s left, is too difficult for cavalry operations. It seems to me if I was on the other flank of the army I might do more to annoy the enemy, unless it is intended that I shall push out as directed last night.
"Very respectfully, "J. H. Wilson, Brevet Major-General."
"(Indors.e.m.e.nt.) "Respectfully forwarded to Major-General Thomas.
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General."
NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16
This last, while showing that General Wilson had not received at 10:10 A. M. on the 16th any orders from General Thomas later than that above quoted, appears to indicate that he had received some previous order, referred to in the words "unless it is intended that I shall push out as directed last night"; for the order above quoted from the records did not indicate any intention that he should "push out" unless the enemy was in retreat.
An order in writing, as heretofore stated, was received by me very soon after dark on the 15th. It has disappeared from the official records, both those of General Thomas and mine. If any other orders were issued by General Thomas, I have no personal knowledge of the fact.
In my judgment, whatever orders were issued by General Thomas on the night of December 15 or in the morning of the 16th are essential to truthful history; and I am sure they must have been more creditable to General Thomas, though they may have been based upon erroneous foresight of the enemy"s action, which is necessarily very common in war, than the absence from the records of any orders from him to govern the operations of the army the next day, and the fact, which appears from the records, that some of the troops at least did not receive any orders from General Thomas, at any time, upon which they could act on December 16.
It seems at least strange that this absence of orders given in the night of the 15th or morning of the 16th should have pa.s.sed without comment, especially in view of the very full orders issued on the 14th and in the night of the 16th.
It will also be observed that General Thomas, in his official report of the battle of Nashville, dated January 20, 1865, makes no mention of any orders issued in the night of December 15 or morning of the 16th. He simply says in that regard: "The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark, whilst preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow"; but does not say what those preparations were. Then, after describing what had been done in the forenoon of the 16th, he says: "As soon as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that the movement against the enemy"s left flank should be continued"; but no sub-report mentions the receipt of any such directions. The report then proceeds to give a graphic and, I believe, nearly accurate though brief description of what followed.
It may also be observed that in my official report of the battle of Nashville, dated December 31, 1864, the following appears: "In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of the enemy on the following day." This report was, of course, before General Thomas when he wrote his own, and had necessarily been read by him and doubtless by some of his staff officers; yet no reference was made in his report to the subject referred to in the words above quoted from mine. These facts from the records may perhaps be accepted as sufficient indication of the general purport of whatever orders were issued in the night of the 15th, after the close of that day"s operations, and sufficient evidence that no orders of a general character were given by General Thomas, either oral or written, on the 16th until after he had "visited the different commands."
NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16
The report of General Steedman, dated January 27, 1865, says: "December 16, at 6 A. M., in obedience to the orders of Major- General Thomas, my command moved on the enemy"s works." It is not stated whether these orders were oral or written. No copy of them appears in the records, nor any mention of a personal interview with General Thomas or any of his staff. (Steedman was the man who published a falsehood about an alleged telegram from me to Grant about Thomas. See page 296.)
General T. J. Wood"s report, dated January 5, 1865, after describing the operations of the morning of December 16, says: "After the dispositions above recounted had been made, the commanding general joined me near our most advanced position on the Franklin pike, examined the positions of the troops, approved the same, and ordered that the enemy should be vigorously pressed and unceasingly hara.s.sed by our fire. He further directed that I should be constantly on the alert for any opening for a more decisive effort, but for the time to bide events. The general plan of the battle for the preceding day-namely, to outflank and turn his left-was still to be acted on. Before leaving me, the commanding general desired me to confer with Major-General Steedman, whose command had moved out that morning from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and arrange a military connection between his right and my left." This appears from General Wood"s report to have occurred a short time before noon, and seems to have been the first information given to any of the corps commanders of the general plan of operations for December 16. General Wood"s report does not suggest that even he, who had visited the commanding general the night before, had been given any information about any such general plan; and that statement of Wood"s, "the general plan of the battle for the preceding day- namely, to outflank and turn his left-was still to be acted on," was written many days after the battle, and then did not say that General Thomas had at any time so ordered.
In the report of General A. J. Smith, dated January 10, 1865, occurs the following: "About 3 P. M. (December 10) General McArthur sent word that he could carry the hill on his right by a.s.sault. Major- General Thomas being present the matter was referred to him, and I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from General Schofield, to whom he had sent... . General McArthur, not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would use the night to strengthen his works, directed the first brigade (Colonel W. L. McMillen, 95th Ohio Infantry, commanding) to storm the hill on which was the left of the enemy"s line," etc. This statement, which appears to be nowhere dissented from, seems to show that very nearly the hour of the day-not very long after 3 P. M.-when was initiated by General McArthur the general attack which resulted in the brilliant and final success of the day; that this initial movement was not made in pursuance of any orders or directions from General Thomas, but, on the contrary, during a period in which General Thomas had requested General Smith to "delay the movement."
General Wilson"s report, dated December 21, says: "About 4:30 P. M. the enemy, pressed in front, flank, and rear, broke in disorder. Croxton"s brigade, which had been held in reserve on the Hillsboro" pike, as soon as the success of these dispositions had become apparent was ordered to march rapidly across the country to the Granny White pike, and beyond the right flank of Hammond"s brigade; but owing to the lateness of the hour and heaviness of the road over which he was compelled to move, he secured but few prisoners." This report also seems to be silent in respect to any order from General Thomas.
There was another good reason why the cavalry secured but few prisoners at that time: There were very few left to secure behind that part of the line, the infantry having captured nearly all of them.
STATEMENTS IN THE REPORTS OF CORPS COMMANDERS
My own official report, dated December 31, gave the following account of the operations of December 16, to the accuracy of which no exception was taken by General Thomas. The only order therein mentioned as coming from General Thomas was that received in the night of the 15th, "for the pursuit of the enemy on the following day."
"In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of the enemy on the following day. Our operations during the 15th had swung the right and right center forward so that the general direction of the line was nearly perpendicular to that before the attack; only the right was in contact with the enemy, and was therefore much exposed. Apprehensive that the enemy, instead of retreating during the night, would ma.s.s and attack our right in the morning, I requested that a division of infantry be sent to reinforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major- General Smith"s command. In response to this order, General Smith sent five regiments and a battery (about 1600 men), which were put in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the enemy still held his position in our front, of which the hill in front of General Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable breastworks during the night. He had also increased the force on his left during the night, and continued to ma.s.s troops there during the early part of the day. During the morning, therefore, our operations were limited to preparations for defense and co-operation with the cavalry, which was operating to strike the Granny White pike in rear of the enemy. About noon, the troops on my left (Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his left a considerable force to strengthen his right and center, when I ordered General c.o.x to advance in conjunction with the cavalry, and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the enemy"s intrenched line, and overlooking the Granny White pike. The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or energy which I had expected, yet probably with as much as I had reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General c.o.x"s line and the great distance and rough ground over which the attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by General Wilson"s cavalry (dismounted), whose gallantry and energy on that and other occasions which came under my observation cannot be too greatly praised.
"Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right, the salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by General Smith"s troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch"s division; and the fortified hill in front of General c.o.x, which const.i.tuted the extreme flank of the enemy"s intrenched line, was attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle"s brigade of General c.o.x"s division, the latter capturing eight pieces of artillery and 200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost simultaneously, resulted in a complete rout of the enemy. The cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the Granny White pike, and such of his troops as were not captured on the line could only escape by climbing the Brentwood Hills. It is believed all of the artillery along the left and center of the enemy"s line fell into our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and into the Brentwood Hills, when darkness compelled them to desist, and they bivouacked for the night."