The superiority of the enemy"s cavalry made it necessary that the garrisons of all essential posts and the guards of important railroad bridges should be strong enough to resist attack from a large force of dismounted cavalry and light artillery, so long as Thomas was compelled to remain on the defensive. The records of that time indicate that Thomas then appreciated, what mature consideration now confirms, that if Hood"s advance had induced him (Thomas) to draw off sufficient troops from garrisons and railroad guards to enable him to give battle on equal terms to Hood at Pulaski or Columbia, a raid by Hood"s cavalry would probably have resulted in the destruction or capture of nearly everything in the rear, not only in Tennessee, but also in Kentucky, except perhaps Nashville and Chattanooga. It was only wise forethought which suggested that such might be the nature of Hood"s plans, especially in view of the season of the year and the condition of the roads, which made aggressive operations of a large army, where all the hard roads were held by the opposing forces, extremely difficult. The official returns, now published in the War Records,( 3) show that the troops were sufficient only for the purpose of garrisons and guards and defensive action in the field until after the arrival of A. J. Smith; and this is true even if Hood"s cavalry force was no larger than that which now appears from Forrest"s report-5000; for Forrest might easily have got a day or two the start of his pursuer at any time, as had often been done on both sides during the war.
It is true that Sherman"s instructions to Thomas appear to have contemplated the possibility, at least, that Thomas might be reduced to the extreme necessity of holding Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur defensively, even during a long siege, and of abandoning all points of less importance than the three named, so that all the garrisons of such minor points and all the railroad guards might be concentrated with the garrisons of these three important strategic points, for their defense during a siege. This must of course have referred to the defensive period of the campaign only, for the moment that Thomas"s reinforcements should enable him to a.s.sume the offensive all the necessities above referred to must have disappeared. It must, I think, be admitted as beyond question that, in view of his daily expectation of the arrival of A. J. Smith"s troops from Missouri, Thomas was perfectly right in not acting upon Sherman"s suggestion of extreme defensive action, and thus abandoning his railroad to destruction.
If, on the other hand, Thomas"s reinforcements had arrived in time to enable him to take the initiative by moving against Hood from Pulaski or Columbia, then he might have drawn quite largely from his garrisons in the rear to reinforce his army in the field, since his "active offensive" operations would have fully occupied Hood"s cavalry, and thus have prevented a raid in Thomas"s rear. But until he was strong enough to advance, unless forced to the extreme necessity of defending Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, and abandoning all else, Thomas could not prudently have reduced his garrisons or guards.
I knew nothing at that time of Sherman"s instructions to Thomas, and little about the actual strength of Thomas"s garrisons and railroad guards. But I was under the impression that some reinforcements must be available from his own department, and felt a little impatient about the long delay in their arrival, and hence telegraphed General Thomas, November 24, suggesting the concentration of R. S. Granger"s troops and those along the railroad. The despatches to me at that time, to be found in the War Records,( 4) fully show the earnest determination of General Thomas to send forward reinforcements as soon as possible, and even in detail, and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches misled me somewhat as to what I might expect.
AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT
Notwithstanding this earnest desire, General Thomas does not appear to have realized the existence of a force available for the purpose he had in view. The railroad guards from Atlanta to Chattanooga or Dalton, withdrawn after Sherman started on his march, and convalescents, men returning from furlough and others going to the front, but failing to reach Sherman"s army in time, all a.s.sembled at Chattanooga, made a surplus force at that point of about 7000 men.( 5) Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the purpose of retrieving the disaster which had befallen the Tennessee military governor"s troops there, under Gillem. But all sent from Chattanooga had been returned by November 21, about the time when Hood"s advance from Florence had become certainly known. Yet it does not appear that General Thomas even inquired what force was available at Chattanooga until November 25, when, in reply to a telegram, he learned that Steedman could raise 5000 men (in fact, 7000), in addition to all necessary garrisons and guards, "to threaten enemy in rear," in case he should "get on Chattanooga railroad." It may then (November 25) have been too late to send those 5000 or 7000 men to the line of Duck River, or perhaps even to Franklin. They were sent to Nashville, reaching there after the battle of Franklin. If they had been ordered to Columbia by rail, via Nashville, as soon as Hood"s advance was known to General Thomas, they must have reached Duck River some time before Hood attempted to cross that stream. This addition to the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps would have raised the infantry in the field to nearly an equality with that of Hood in fact, though not nearly to what Hood"s force was then supposed to be. That increased force would doubtless have made it possible to prevent Hood from crossing Duck River anywhere near Columbia for several days, and perhaps to force him to select some other line of operations, or to content himself with sending his cavalry on another raid. In any case, the arrival of A. J. Smith a few days later would have enabled Thomas to a.s.sume the aggressive before Hood could have struck a serious blow at Thomas"s army in the field. In view of the earnest desire of General Thomas to reinforce the army in the field at Columbia, there does not appear to be any rational explanation of the fact that he did not send those 7000 men from Chattanooga to Columbia. His own report states the fact about those "7000 men belonging to his [General Sherman"s] column," but does not give any reason why they were not used in his "measures to act on the defensive." As General Thomas says: "These men had been organized into brigades, to be made available at such points as they might be needed." At what other point could they possibly be so much needed as that where the two corps were trying to oppose the advance of the enemy long enough for Thomas to get up his other reinforcements?
AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT
General Thomas appears to have been puzzled by doubt whether Hood would aim for Nashville or some point on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and not to have realized that his own plan should have been to concentrate all his available force into one army, so as to move against the enemy with the greatest possible force, no matter what the enemy might do. With the exception of those 7000 men belonging to Sherman"s column, Thomas had for necessary garrisons and railroad guards essentially the same number of men as had been employed in that service all the preceding summer,-no more and no less,-and the necessity for that service had not been very much diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma, which Hood"s advance from Florence had rendered of no further consequence at that time. But the 7000 men available at Chattanooga ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least moved up to Nashville or Franklin, where they could "join the main force," as suggested in my despatch of November 24 to Thomas,( 6) instead of being left in Chattanooga "to threaten enemy in rear."( 7) As suggested in my despatch of November 24, R. S. Granger"s force and others along the railroad south of Duck River, as well as Steedman"s, might have joined the main force at Columbia, if orders had been given in time, thus increasing the army in the field by fully 10,000 men.
If R. S. Granger"s force had been left at Decatur, it would have drawn off from Hood"s invading army at least an equal force to guard his bridges at Florence, or else would have destroyed those bridges and cut off his retreat after the battle of Nashville. This was practically what had been suggested by Sherman in his instructions to Thomas. But the withdrawal of Granger"s troops and their detention at Murfreesboro", instead of sending them to "join the main force," served no good purpose at the time, and prevented their use in the capture of Hood"s defeated and retreating troops. The failure to make this timely concentration was the one great fault in Thomas"s action, instead of his delay in attacking at Nashville, for which he was so much criticized. But Hood"s repulse at Franklin had made this previous mistake a matter of past history, and hence it was lost sight of in view of the imminent danger afterward supposed to exist at Nashville, just as the brilliant victory at Nashville was accepted as demonstrating the wisdom of all that had gone before, even including Sherman"s division of his army between himself and Thomas before his march to the sea. Such is the logic of contemporaneous military history!
In my long conversations with General Grant on the steamer Rhode Island in January, 1865, I explained to him fully the error into which he had been led in respect to Thomas"s action or non-action at Nashville in December, and he seemed to be perfectly satisfied on that point. But he did not ask me anything about what had occurred before the battle of Franklin, and hence I did not tell him anything.
In connection with the action of General Thomas previous to the battle of Franklin, the following instructions from General Sherman on October 31 are important: "You must unite all your men into one army, and abandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat Hood. General Schofield is marching to-day from here... . "( 8) Again, on the same date, he telegraphed: "Bear in mind my instructions as to concentration, and not let Hood catch you in detail."( 9)
Sherman thus gave the most emphatic warning against the mistake which Thomas nevertheless made by failing to concentrate all his own available troops until it was too late to meet Hood"s advance, thus leaving two corps to bear the entire brunt of battle until the crisis of the campaign was pa.s.sed at Franklin.
CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS
The following correspondence relating to the command of an army in the field, to increasing the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, and to the use to be made of R. S. Granger"s troops, and the reason why Thomas should a.s.sume the offensive as soon as possible, is also important, especially as showing that Sherman expected the two corps to be increased to 50,000 men, and that Thomas should command in person:
"Kingston, November 7, 1864, 10 A. M. "Major-General Thomas: Despatch of 12:30 P. M. yesterday received. General Schofield is ent.i.tled to the command [over Stanley] by virtue of a recent decision of the War Department. I would advise you to add to those corps new regiments until they number 25,000 men each. If Beauregard advances from Corinth, it will be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give confidence. Granger should continue all the time to threaten the rear, and as soon as possible some demonstration should be made from the direction of Vicksburg against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Also I want you to a.s.sume the offensive as quick as possible, as I have reason to believe all of Beauregard"s army is not there, but that he has also divided his forces.
"W. T. Sherman, Major-General."(10) On the same day Thomas telegraphed to Sherman in reply to the above: "It is, and always has been, my intention to command the troops with me in person. My object in giving the preference to General Schofield [over Stanley] was merely that he should exercise command should accidental circ.u.mstances prevent my presence."(11)
Sherman and Thomas were equally right-Sherman in saying "It will be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give confidence"; and Thomas in replying, "It is, and always has been, my intention to command the troops with me in person." The proper place for a general-in-chief is with his army in the field, where battles are to be fought, and not in the rear, where there is little to do but to a.s.semble reinforcements, which his chief of staff could do as well as he. Thomas could have reached the army at Columbia by rail in two hours, and at Franklin in one hour; yet he left a subordinate to fight against a superior force, while he remained in Nashville until he had collected there an army superior to that of his adversary. But General Thomas must have had some reason which seemed to him good and sufficient for his absence from the field. He was the last man in the world to shrink from his duty in battle.
Before the above correspondence between General Sherman and General Thomas was known to me I had written the following: "The relations existing between General Thomas and me, and the confidence he had shown in all his despatches, commencing with those received at Pulaski, left little room for hesitation or doubt about doing, in every emergency, what my own judgment dictated, as if I had been in chief command, confident of the approval which he so fully expressed after the events. Yet my experience then, as always, led me to the opinion that it is better for the general-in-chief, in all operations of a critical nature, to be present with the troops in the field, if possible; he must be able to act with more confidence than any subordinate can possibly feel. He was the sole judge as to the necessity of his remaining in Nashville, and no good reason could now be given for questioning the correctness of his judgment. It is only intended as an expression of a general rule for the consideration of military students."
CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS
General Thomas"s orders to General D. S. Stanley upon his being sent to Pulaski, and his subsequent orders to me, dated November 19, to fight the enemy at Pulaski if he advanced against that place, were, as shown in the following despatch from me, quite inapplicable to the then existing situation:
"Pulaski, November 20, 1864. "Major-General Thomas: After full consideration I am of the opinion that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops, at least so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If Hood advances, whether his design be to strike this place or Columbia, he must move via Lawrenceburg on account of the difficulty of crossing Shoal Creek. Under cover of his cavalry, he can probably reach Lawrenceburg without our knowledge, and move his forces a day"s march from that point toward Columbia before we could learn his designs, and thus reach that point ahead of us; or he might move upon this place, and while demonstrating against it throw his forces on to the pike north of us, and thus cut us off from Columbia and from our reinforcements. Lynnville would be free from these objections as a point of concentration for our forces. On the other hand, a force at this point covers the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad to the best advantage; but a brigade in the inclosed works at this place could hold out against any force until relieved, while the main force at Lynnville would be sure of concentrating with the troops in the rear. I respectfully submit these views for your consideration.
"J. M. Schofield, Major-General."
To this General Thomas replied at once:
"Nashville, November 20, 1864. "General Schofield: Your despatch of 2 P. M. this day just received. Two other despatches of to-day were received previous to this one. Do you mean that one brigade in the intrenchments at Pulaski could hold out for a week? The reason I ask is, General Smith cannot get here before next Friday. If one brigade can hold the fortifications of Pulaski for a week or ten days, you are authorized to leave a brigade or a division there, and concentrate the rest of your force at Lynnville preparatory to support Hatch, or fall back on Columbia, whichever may be necessary. Part of Ruger"s troops will start for Columbia to-night, the remainder at two o"clock to-morrow, and the railroad superintendent says he will have them at Columbia by to- morrow night. The very moment Smith"s troops arrive I will start them for Columbia. In any event, all surplus transportation should be sent to Columbia. I have just received General Hatch"s of this P. M., and it seems from it that Hood is advancing. His movements will indicate to you what disposition you should make-whether to concentrate at Columbia or remain at Lynnville. If Hood"s entire army should advance, you must use your own discretion as to holding the fortifications at Pulaski or withdrawing the troops.
"Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General."
General Thomas thus gave me the full freedom of action demanded by the situation in which I was placed, in lieu of his previous embarra.s.sing orders about fighting the enemy at Pulaski.
The following correspondence,(12) with the above, shows the situation as reported by me to General Thomas, and his "plans and wishes" as then explained to me immediately before and after Hood began his advance:
"Thomas to Schofield. "November 24, 1864. "... Have the fords above Columbia as well guarded as you can, and I think you will then have checked the advance of Hood, and we shall have time to get up our reinforcements."
"Schofield to Thomas. "November 24, 1864, 1:39 P. M. "Do you think it important to hold Columbia? My force is not large enough to cover the town and railroad bridge. I can hold a shorter line covering the railroad bridge, leaving the town and railroad depot outside; but in any case the enemy can turn the position by crossing above or below, and render my withdrawal to the north bank very difficult. Please give me your views soon."
"Thomas to Schofield. "November 24, 1864. "If you cannot hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north bank of the river. From the description given I supposed the line was sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it securely and have a reserve. But it is better, of course, to substantially check the enemy than to run the risk of defeat by risking too much. Where is Stanley? Is he with you?"
CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS
"Schofield to Thomas "Columbia, November 24, 1864, 8:30 P. M. "I have examined the ground and considered the situation carefully. My troops are in position on the outer line, covering the railroad depot and bridge, and pretty well intrenched. The line is too long; yet if Hood wishes to fight me on it to-morrow, I am willing. I think he will attack to-morrow, if at all. If he does not, I must prepare to meet any attempt to cross Duck River above or below. For this purpose I am preparing an interior line covering the railroad bridge, which can be held by about seven thousand men, which I propose to occupy, and put the rest of my troops and material on the north bank of the river, ready to move as may be necessary. With the fords guarded, as will then be practicable, I think Hood cannot get the start of me. I think it best not to risk much now; for a few days" delay, if we concentrate rapidly, will make us strong enough to drive Hood back. My theory is that he will operate against the Chattanooga Railroad, and I do not see how we can save it from some damage at least. But if we concentrate Granger"s troops and those along the road promptly, so that they can join the main force, there can be no doubt of the final result. Please inform me whether my proposed arrangements meet with your approval."
"Thomas to Schofield "Nashville, November 24, 1864. "... Can you not cover the pontoon bridge with a bridge-head, and hold it so as to preserve the bridge for crossing whenever we get ready to advance? General Rousseau informed me that the blockhouses protecting the railroad bridge cannot be reached by the enemy"s artillery; therefore the enemy could not get near enough to the bridge to destroy it if the blockhouses are held... ."
As stated in my official report, I did prepare and hold a bridge- head covering both the railroad and the pontoon bridges over Duck River at the same time, for which purpose I floated the pontoons down the river to a point near the railroad bridge, having found that the blockhouses referred to by General Rousseau could not be made available for the protection of the pontoon bridge where it before was-at the crossing of the turnpike. I abandoned that bridge-head on the night of November 27, upon receipt of information leading me to believe that Hood intended to cross Duck River above Columbia.
On November 25 General Thomas telegraphed me, in the following terms, his approval of the dispositions I had made, and the information that he had already ordered the concentration of troops which I suggested in my despatch of the 24th:
"Your cipher despatch of 8:30 P. M. is just received; some difficulty in transmission the cause. Your arrangements are judicious and approved. I gave orders two days ago to make the concentration you suggest, and hope it will be nearly or quite completed to-day. Will telegraph you further this morning."
This despatch was more than twelve hours in transmission.
Again, November 26, I reported the situation at Columbia, and my action, as follows; also suggesting that infantry be sent forward at once:
"The enemy has kept up a strong demonstration with dismounted cavalry since yesterday morning. He now shows a column of infantry on the Mount Pleasant pike, about three miles distant. I cannot yet tell how great the force. I have drawn my force in the interior line, and will fight him there. If you have any infantry available, I think it should be sent forward at once."
Yet no infantry reinforcements were sent, although the "7000 men" at Chattanooga could easily have reached Columbia before that time.
At 8 A. M. the next day General Thomas replied as follows:
"Your despatch of 10 A. M. yesterday received. I will send you all the available infantry force I can raise. I expect some of Smith"s command here to-day, and will send it forward as rapidly as possible. Sent you two regiments of cavalry day before yesterday, two yesterday, and will send another to-day. If you can hold Hood in check until I can get Smith up, we can whip him."
Thus it appears that even as late as November 27 General Thomas had not thought of sending the 7000 men at Chattanooga to "join the main force," although so anxious that I should hold Hood in check until he could get Smith up. He was still relying entirely upon A. J. Smith, whose advance, so surely expected on the 25th, was still expected on the 27th. It seems incredible that General Thomas had not thought of sending Steedman"s troops from Chattanooga, instead of waiting for the uncertain arrival of A. J. Smith.
DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER
On November 27 I received an important despatch from General Thomas, dated November 25. It was written under the apprehension that Hood"s design might be to move upon the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, as I had suggested to Thomas on the 24th, and informed me fully of his plans and instructions to meet such a movement, requesting me to give him my views in reply. In that despatch General Thomas said:
"In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck River, I wish you to keep some cavalry on the south side to observe and delay Hood"s advance on the Chattanooga Railroad as much as possible. I hope to have five regiments of Granger"s troops in Murfreesboro" to-day. Have made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to Murfreesboro" or this side of Duck River also, if the enemy advances. The cavalry on the south side of Duck River should cover the approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at that place, and hold the bridge in case of an advance in force. I have asked General Steedman how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy"s rear, should he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon. About 1000 of Hatch"s cavalry have arrived here from Memphis, dismounted, but they will be mounted here as soon as possible and sent to the front; three regiments should start to-day, making about 1000 men. I have not heard from any of Smith"s troops yet; some of them will surely be here to-day. If Hood moves on the Chattanooga road, I will send Smith to Murfreesboro", as we shall be enabled thereby to concentrate more rapidly. If you can hold Hood on the south side of Duck River, I think we shall be able to drive him back easily after concentrating. Answer, giving your views."
Although that despatch of the 25th was not deciphered so as to be read by me until the 27th, forty-eight hours after it was sent, nevertheless it gave me timely information that Thomas had concentrated all his available troops (except Steedman"s, which he appears to have overlooked until the 25th, and about which I had no knowledge) at Murfreesboro", from which place they could "join the main force," as I had suggested, in a few hours, either by rail or by wagon- road, as circ.u.mstances might indicate. I was also led to infer from Thomas"s language on the 25th-"Some of them [A. J. Smith"s troops] will surely be here to-day"-that on the 27th Smith"s corps was already at Nashville, and that Thomas was only waiting for information respecting the enemy"s designs to select his point of concentration and order all his available troops to join the army in the field at that point. And it was still expected on the 27th that this junction might be effected on the north bank of Duck River, opposite Columbia. Hence I telegraphed General Thomas, November 27, at 12:30 P. M.:
"The enemy has made no real attack, and I am satisfied he does not intend to attack. My information, though not very satisfactory, leads me to believe that Hood intends to cross Duck River above Columbia, and as near it as he can. I shall withdraw to the north bank to-night and endeavor to prevent him from crossing. Wilson is operating mainly on my left, with a portion of his command south of the river. I have no late information from him. I have succeeded in getting your cipher of the 25th translated. I believe your dispositions are wise."
DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER
It appears from his despatch of November 25 that Thomas hoped we might be able to hold the line of Duck River from Columbia as far east as Shelbyville, as well as west to the Tennessee River. Although this proved to be impracticable on account of the enemy"s superiority in cavalry at that time, the point (Murfreesboro") which Thomas had selected for his concentration was far enough to the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain if orders were given in due time.