A commission is to be appointed to investigate the administration of justice with a view to the ultimate extinction of extraterritorial rights now enjoyed by foreigners. The powers also agreed to abandon not later than January 1, 1923, their existing postal agencies in China, provided an efficient Chinese postal service be maintained. The system of foreign post offices in China has been the subject of great abuses, as through these agencies goods of various kinds, including opium and other drugs, have been smuggled into China. The powers further made a general promise to aid the Chinese Government in the unification of railways into a general system under Chinese control.
They also agreed to restore to China all radio stations other than those regulated by treaty or maintained by foreign governments within their legation limits.
In the treaty relating to the open door, the Contracting Powers other than China pledged themselves to the following principles:
"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarra.s.sed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."
China on her part accepted fully the principle of the open door, and pledged herself for the first time to respect it. Pledges to respect the open door in China have been made by foreign powers upon various occasions in the past and broken as often as made. The expression "equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations" is not new. It occurs in the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance of 1902, in the Root-Takahira agreement of 1908, and in numerous other doc.u.ments. In recent years, however, the United States has been the only power which has tried to preserve the open door in China. Most of the other powers have regarded the Chinese situation as hopeless, and have believed that the only solution was to let foreign powers come in and divide and rule the territory of the empire. In view of the new treaty the open door is no longer merely an American policy, but an international policy, and responsibility for its enforcement rests not on the United States alone but on all nine parties to the treaty.
The agenda or program of the Conference offered as one of the subjects to be considered the status of existing commitments in China. When Secretary Hughes brought this subject up before the Far Eastern Committee, j.a.pan entered an emphatic objection to its consideration, and the matter was dropped immediately without argument. The treaty, therefore, is not retroactive, for it recognizes the status quo in Manchuria and to a less extent in other parts of China. The saving clause of the new agreement is, however, a resolution providing for the establishment of an international board of reference, to which questions arising in regard to the open door may be referred.
Will j.a.pan respect the pledges she has made and live up to the spirit of her promises? If she does, the Washington Conference will prove to be a great success. If, on the contrary, j.a.pan does not intend to live up to her pledges or intends to fulfill them only in part, her position in Asia has been greatly strengthened. She is more firmly intrenched in Manchuria than ever. She holds the Maritime Province of Siberia under a promise to get out, which she has repeatedly made and repeatedly broken, as was plainly stated by Secretary Hughes before the full Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, and repeated at a plenary session of the Conference. His statement was one of the most remarkable, by reason of its directness and unvarnished truth, in the history of American diplomacy. After reviewing the correspondence between the two governments and the reiterated a.s.surances of j.a.pan of her intention to withdraw from Siberia, a.s.surances which so far had not been carried out, Mr. Hughes expressed his gratification at the renewal of these a.s.surances before the Conference in plenary session. Unless j.a.pan is utterly devoid of moral shame, she will have to make good her word this time.
When the treaties drafted by the Conference were submitted by the President to the Senate, they encountered serious opposition, but were finally ratified. The Republican leaders, particularly Senator Lodge, were twitted with charges of inconsistency in advocating certain features of these treaties when they had violently opposed the League of Nations. The Four-Power Treaty is much more of an entangling alliance than the Covenant of the League, and the Naval Treaty deprives Congress for a period of fifteen years of its const.i.tutional right to determine the size of the navy and to provide for the defense of Guam and the Philippines. In fact, there were very few objections raised to the League of Nations which could not with equal force be applied to the Four-Power and Naval Treaties. The Four-Power Treaty was the main object of attack, and Senators Lodge and Underwood were greatly embarra.s.sed in attempting to explain its meaning. Its "baffling brevity" demanded explanations, but no satisfactory explanations were forthcoming. They talked in general terms about the tremendous importance of the treaty, but they dared not state the real fact that the treaty was drafted by Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato as the most convenient method of terminating the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance without making it appear to the j.a.panese public that their government had surrendered the alliance without due compensation. According to an a.s.sociated Press Dispatch from Tokio, January 31, 1922, Baron Uchida, the j.a.panese Minister of Foreign Affairs, replying to interpolations in the House of Peers, said: "The Four-Power Treaty was not intended to abrogate the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance, but rather to widen and extend it." The real _quid pro quo_ for the termination of the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance was the agreement of the United States not to construct naval bases or new fortifications in Guam and the Philippines, and the clause terminating the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance might just as well have been attached to the Naval Treaty, but this would not have satisfied j.a.panese public opinion. Great Britain and j.a.pan were permitted to terminate their alliance in any way that they might deem best. After the Four-Power Treaty was accepted by the American delegates, they feared that it would look too much as if the United States had merely been drawn into the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance. It was decided, therefore, at the eleventh hour to give the agreement a more general character by inviting France to adhere to it. France agreed to sign, although she resented not having been consulted during the negotiation of the treaty.
The achievements of the Conference, although falling far short of the extravagant claims made by the President and the American delegates, are undoubtedly of great importance. The actual sc.r.a.pping of millions of dollars" worth of ships in commission or in process of construction gives the world an object lesson such as it has never had before. One of the most significant results of the Conference was the development of a complete accord between England and the United States, made possible by the settlement of the Irish question and furthered by the tact and gracious bearing of Mr. Balfour. One of the unfortunate results was the increased isolation of France, due to the failure of her delegates to grasp the essential elements of the situation and to play any but a negative role. The success of the Conference was due largely to Secretary Hughes who, though handicapped at every point by fear of the Senate and by the unfortunate commitments of President Harding during the last campaign, may be said on the whole to have played his hand reasonably well.
Meanwhile we are still drifting, so far as a general European policy is concerned. President Harding"s idea of holding aloof from "Europe"s league," as he prefers to designate the League of Nations, and of having a little league of our own in the Pacific, will not work. The world"s problems cannot be segregated in this way. Europe"s league includes all of the princ.i.p.al American nations except the United States and Mexico, while our Pacific league includes the two leading European powers. As soon as the American people realize--and there are indications that they are already waking up to the reality--that the depression in domestic industry and foreign commerce is due to conditions in Europe and that prosperity will not return until we take a hand in the solution of European problems, there will be a general demand for a constructive policy and America will no longer hesitate to rea.s.sume the leadership which she renounced in the referendum of 1920, but which the rest of the world is ready to accord to her again.