_Now_ (in the train on my way back to Alexandria) I must have one more try at K. about these Gurkhas! My official cable and letter asking for the Gurkha Brigade have fallen upon stony ground. No notice of any sort has been vouchsafed to my modest request. Has _any_ action been taken upon them? Possibly the matter has been referred to Maxwell for opinion?
If so, he has said nothing about it, which does not promise well. c.o.x has heard nothing from Cairo; only no end of camp rumours. Most likely K. is vexed with me for asking for these troops at all, and thinks I am already forgetting his warning not to put him in the cart by asking for too many things. France must not be made jealous and Egypt ditto, I suppose. I cannot possibly repeat my official cable and my demi-official letter. The whole is _most_ disappointing. Here is c.o.x and here are his men, absolutely wasted and frightfully keen to come. There are the Dardanelles short-handed; there is the New Zealand Division short of a Brigade. If surplus and deficit had the same common denominator, say "K." or "G.S." they would wipe themselves out to the instant simplification of the problem. As it is, they are kept on separate sheets of paper;
too many troops too few troops Maxwell Hamilton
Have just finished dictating a letter to K., giving him an account of my inspection of the Indian troops and of how "they made my mouth water, especially the 6th Gurkhas." I ask him if I could not anyway have _them_ "as a sort of escort to the Mountain Battery," and go on to say, "The desert is drying up, c.o.x tells me; such water as there is is becoming more and more brackish and undrinkable; and no other serious raid, in his opinion, will be possible this summer." I might have added that once we open the ball at the Dardanelles the old Turks must dance to our tune, and draw in their troops for the defence of Constantinople but it does not do to be too instructive to one"s Grandmother. So there it is: I have done the best I can.
_4th April, 1915. Alexandria._ Busy day in office. Things beginning to hum. A marvellous case of "two great minds." K. has proffered his advice upon the tactical problem, and how it should be dealt with, and, as I have just cabled in answer, "No need to send you my plan as you have got it in one, even down to details, only I have not sh.e.l.ls enough to cut through barbed wire with my field guns or howitzers." I say also, "I should much like to have some hint as to my future supply of gun and rifle ammunition. The Naval Division has only 430 rounds per rifle and the 29th Division only 500 rounds which means running it fine."
What might seem, to a civilian, a marvellous case of coincidence or telepathy were he ever to compare my completed plan with K."s cabled suggestion is really one more instance of the ident.i.ty of procedure born of a common doctrine between two soldiers who have worked a great deal together. Given the same facts the odds are in favour of these facts being seen eye to eye by each.
Forgot to note that McMahon answered my letter of the 31st personally, on the telephone, saying he had no objection to my cabling K. or spreading any reports I liked through my Intelligence, but that he is not keeper of the _Egyptian Gazette_ and must not quarrel with it as Egypt is not at war! No wonder he prefers the telephone to the telegram I begged him to send me if he makes these sort of answers. Egypt is in the war area and, if it were not, McMahon can do anything he likes. The _Gazette_ continues to publish full details of our actions and my only hope is that the Turks will not be able to believe in folly so incredible.
_5th April, 1915. Alexandria._ Motored after early breakfast to French Headquarters at the Victoria College. Here I was met by d"Amade and an escort of Cuira.s.siers, and, getting on to my Australian horse, trotted off to parade.
Coming on to the ground, the French trumpeters blew a lively fanfare which was followed by a roll of drums. Never was so picturesque a parade, the verdict of one who can let his mind rove back through the military pageants of India, Russia, j.a.pan, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, China, Canada, U.S.A., Australia, and New Zealand. Yes, Alexandria has seen some pretty shows in its time; Cleopatra had an eye to effect and so, too, had the great Napoleon. But I doubt whether the townsfolk have ever seen anything to equal the _coup d"oeil_ engineered by d"Amade. Under an Eastern sun the colours of the French uniforms, gaudy in themselves, ran riot, and the troops had surely been posted by one who was an artist in more than soldiering. Where the yellow sand was broken by a number of small conical knolls with here and there a group, and here and there a line, of waving palms, there, on the knolls, were cl.u.s.tered the Mountain Batteries and the Batteries of Mitrailleuses. The Horse, Foot and Guns were drawn up, Infantry in front, Cavalry in rear, and the Field Artillery--the famous 75s--at right angles.
Infantry of the Line in grey; Zouaves in blue and red; Senegalese wore dark blue and the Foreign Legion blue-grey. The Cavalry rode Arabs and barbs mostly white stallions; they wore pale blue tunics and bright scarlet breeches.
I rode down the lines of Infantry first and then galloped through the heavy sand to the right of the Cavalry and inspected them, by d"Amade"s request, at a trot, winding up with the six Batteries of Artillery. On reaching the Saluting Base, I was introduced to the French Minister whilst d"Amade presented colours to two Regiments (175th Regiment de marche d"Afrique and the 4th Colonial Regiment) making a short and eloquent speech.
He then took command of the parade and marched past me at the head of his forces. Were all the Houris of Paradise waving lily hands on the one side, and were these French soldiers on the other side, I would give my cold shoulder to the Houris.
The Cavalry swung along at the trot to the cadence of the trumpets and to the clink-clank and glitter of steel. The beautiful, high-stepping barbs; the trembling of the earth beneath their hoofs; the banner streaming; the swordsmen of France sweeping past the saluting base; breaking into the gallop; sounding the charge; charging; _ventre a terre_; out into the desert where, in an instant, they were s.n.a.t.c.hed from our sight and changed into a pillar of dust!
High, high soared our hopes. Jerusalem--Constantinople? No limit to what these soldiers may achieve. The thought pa.s.sed through the ma.s.sed spectators and set enthusiasm coursing through their veins. Loudly they cheered; hats off; and hurrah for the Infantry! Hurrah, hurrah for the Cavalry!! Hurrah, hurrah, hurrah for the 75s!!!
At the end I said a few farewell words to the French Minister and then galloped off with d"Amade. The bystanders gave us, too, the warmest greetings, the bulk of them (French and Greek) calling out "d"Amade!"
and the Britishers also shouting all sorts of things at the pitch of their voices.
Almost lost my temper with Woodward, my new A.G., and this was the thusness thereof:--
Time presses: K. prods us from the rear: the Admiral from the front. To their eyes we seem to be dallying amidst the fleshpots of Egypt whereas, really, we are struggling like drowning mariners in a sea of chaos; chaos in the offices; chaos on the ships; chaos in the camps; chaos along the wharves; chaos half seas over rolling down the Seven Sisters Road. The powers of Maxwell as C.-in-C., Egypt; of the Sultan and McMahon, High Commissioner of Egypt, and of myself, C.-in-C., M.E.F., not to speak of the powers of our police civil and military, have all to be defined and wheeled into line. We cannot go rushing off into s.p.a.ce leaving Pandemonium behind us as our Base! I know these things from a very long experience. Braithwaite believes in the principle as a student and ex-teacher of students. And yet that call to the front!
We"ve _got_ to tackle the landing scheme on the spot and quick. Luckily the problems at Alexandria are _all_ non-tactical; pure A.G. and Q.M.G.
Staff questions; whereas, at present, the problems awaiting me at the Dardanelles are mainly tactical; G.S. questions. So I am going to treat G.H.Q. as Solomon threatened to treat the baby; i.e., leave the Administrative Staff here until they knock their pidgin more or less into shape and send off the G.S. to pluck _their_ pidgin at the Straits.
The Q. people have still to commandeer offices for Woodward"s men, three quarters of whom stay here permanently to do the casualty work; they have to formulate a local code of discipline; take up buildings for base hospitals and arrange for their personnel and equipment; outline their schemes for getting sick and wounded back from the front; finish up the loading of the ships, etc., etc., etc., _ad infinitum_. Whilst the Q.
Staff are thus pulling their full weight, the G. Staff will sail off quickly and put their heads together with the Admiral and his Staff. As to myself, I"m off: I cannot afford to lose more time in getting into touch with the sailors, and the scene of action.
All was well until the Commander-in-Chief said he was going, but that moment arose the good old trouble--the trouble which muddled our start for the Relief of Chitral and ruined the Tirah Campaign. Everyone wants to rush off to the excitement of the firing line--(a spasm usually cured by the first hard fight), and to leave the hum-drum business of the Base and Line of Communication to shift for itself. Braithwaite, of all people, was good natured enough to plead for the Administration. He came to tell me that it might tend towards goodwill amongst the charmed circle of G.H.Q. if even now, at the eleventh hour, I would sweeten Woodward by bringing him along. I said, yes, if he, Braithwaite, would stand surety that he, Woodward, had fixed up his base hospitals and third echelon, but if not, no! Next came Woodward himself. With great pertinacity he represented that his subordinates could do all that had to be done at the base. He says he speaks for the Q.M.G., as well as for the Director General of Medical Services, and that they all want to accompany me on my reconnaissance of the coasts of the Peninsula. I was a little sharp with him. These heads of Departments think they must be sitting in the C.-in-C."s pocket lest they lose caste. But I say the Departments must be where their work lies, or else the C.-in-C. will lose caste, and luckily he can still put his own Staff where he will.
Finally, I agreed to take with me the a.s.sistant to the Director of Medical Services to advise his own Chief as to the local bearings of his scheme for clearing out the sick and wounded; the others stay here until they get their several shows into working order, and with that my A.G.
had fain to be content.
D"Amade and two or three Frenchmen are dining with me to-night. Sir John Maxwell has just arrived.
_6th April, 1915. Alexandria._ Started out at 9.15 with d"Amade and Sir John to review the Mounted troops of the 29th Division. We first saw them march down the road in column of route. What a contrast between these solid looking men on their magnificent weight-carrying horses and our wiry little Allies on their barbs and Arabs. The R.H.A. were superb.
After seeing the troops I motored to Mex Camp and inspected the 86th and 87th Infantry Brigades. There was a strong wind blowing which tried to spoil the show, but could not--that Infantry was too superb! Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Napoleon; not one of them had the handling of legionaries like these. The Fusilier Brigade were the heavier. If we don"t win, I won"t be able to put it on the men.
Maxwell left at 4 p.m. for Cairo. I have pressed him hard about c.o.x"s Indian Brigade and told him of my conversation with c.o.x himself and of how keen all ranks of the Brigade are to come. No use. He expects, so he says, a big attack on the Ca.n.a.l any moment; he has heard nothing from K.; the fact that K. has ignored my direct appeal to him shows he would not approve, etc., etc., etc. All this is just the line I myself would probably take--I admit it--if asked by another General to part with my troops. The arrangement whereby I have to sponge on Maxwell for men if I want them is a detestable arrangement. At the last he consented to cable K. direct on the point himself and then he is to let me know. Two things are quite certain; the Brigade are not wanted in Egypt. Old campaigners versed in Egyptian war lore tell me that the drying up of the wells must put the lid on to any move across the desert until the winter rains, and, apart from this, how in the name of the beard of their own false prophet can the Turks attack Egypt whilst we are at the gates of Constantinople?
But if the Brigade are not wanted on the Ca.n.a.l, we are bound to be the better for them at the Dardanelles, whatever course matters there may take. Concentration is the cue! The German or j.a.panese General Staffs would tumble to these truths and act upon them presto. K. sees them too, but nothing can overcome his pa.s.sion for playing off one Commander against another, whereby K. of K. keeps all reins in his hands and remains sole arbiter between them.
Birdwood has just turned up. We"re off to-morrow evening.
"Phoned Maxwell last thing telling him to be sure not to forget to jog K."s elbow about c.o.x and his Gurkhas.
_7th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." 10 p.m._ D"Amade looked in to say good-bye.
On my way down to the harbour I overhauled the a.s.syrian Jewish Refugee Mule Corps at the Wardian Camp. Their Commander, author of that thrilling shocker, "The Man-killers of Tsavo," finds a.s.syrians and mules rather a mouthful and is going to tabloid bipeds and quadrupeds into "The Zion Corps." The mules look very fit; so do the a.s.syrians and, although I did not notice that their cohorts were gleaming with purple or gold, they may help us to those habiliments: they may, in fact, serve as ground bait to entice the big Jew journalists and bankers towards our cause; the former will lend us the colour, the latter the coin. Anyway, so far as I can, I mean to give the chosen people a chance.
Got aboard at 5.15, but owing to some hitch in the arrangements for filling up our tanks with fresh water, we are held up and won"t get off until to-morrow morning.
If there drops a gnat into the ointment of the General, be sure there are ten thousand flies stinking the ointment of the troops.
_8th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian."_ Sailing free to the Northwards. A fine day and a smooth sea. What would not Richard Coeur de Lion or Napoleon have given for the _Arcadian_ to take them to St. Jean d"Acre and Jerusalem?
As we were clearing harbour a letter was brought out to us by a launch:
"UNION CLUB, "ALEXANDRIA.
"The following telephone received from General Maxwell, Cairo:--Your message re c.o.x, I will do my best to meet your wishes. Will you in your turn a.s.sist me in getting the seaplanes arriving here in _Ganges_? I have wired to Admiral de Robeck, I want them badly, so please help me if you can.
"_Forwarded by_ ADMIRAL ROBINSON."
Cutlet for cutlet! I wish it had occurred to me sooner to do a deal with some aeroplanes. But, then I have none. No matter: I should have promised him de Robeck"s! South Africa repeats itself! Egypt and Mudros are not one but two. Maxwell and I are co-equal allies; _not_ a combine under a Boss!
CHAPTER IV
CLEARING FOR ACTION
_9th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian."_ Isles of the Aegean; one more lovely than the other; weather warm; wireless off; a great ship steaming fast towards a great adventure--why do I walk up and down the deck feeling a ton"s weight of trouble weighing down upon my shoulders? Never till to-day has solicitude become painful. This is the fault of Birdwood, Hunter-Weston and Paris. I read their "appreciations of the situation"
some days ago, but until to-day I have not had the unbroken hour needed to digest them. Birdwood begins by excusing himself in advance against any charge of vacillation. At our first meeting he said he was convinced our best plan would be to go for the South of the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Now he has, in fact, very much shifted his ground under the influence of a new consideration, "(which I only learned after leaving Lemnos) that the Turks now have guns or howitzers on the Asiatic side which could actually command our transports should they anchor off Morto Bay." "As I told you," he says, "after thinking it out thoroughly, I was convinced our best plan would be to go for the South of the Gallipoli Peninsula,"
but now he continues, he finds his Staff "all seem to be keen on a landing somewhere between Saros Bay and Enos. For this I have no use, as though I think we should doubtless be able to effect a landing there pretty easily, yet I do not see that we shall be any "forrarder" by doing so. We might put ourselves in front of the Bulair Lines, but there would be far less object in attacking them and working South-west with the Navy only partially able to help us, than by working up from the other end with the Navy on either flank."
Birdwood himself rather inclines towards a landing on the Asiatic side, for preference somewhere South of Tenedos. The attractive part of his idea is that if we did this the Turks must withdraw most of their mobile artillery from the Peninsula to meet us, which would give the Navy just the opportunity they require for mine-sweeping and so forcing the Narrows forthwith. They know they can give the superst.i.tion of old Forts being stronger than new ships its quietus if only they can clear a pa.s.sage through the minefield. There are forts and forts, ships and ships, no doubt. But from what we have done already the sailors know that our ships here can knock out those forts here. But first they must tackle the light guns which protect the minefield from the sweepers.
Birdwood seems to think we might dominate the Peninsula from the country round Chunuk. In his P.S. he suggests that anyway, if we are beaten off in our attempt to land on the Peninsula we may have this Asiatic scheme in our mind as a second string. Disembarkation plans already made would "probably be suitable _anywhere_ with very slight modifications. We might perhaps even think of this--if we try the other first and can"t pull it off?"
In my answer, I say I am still for taking the shortest, most direct route to my objective, the Narrows.
First, because "I have no roving commission to conquer Asia Minor." My instructions deny me the whole of that country when they lay down as a principle that "The occupation of the Asiatic side by military forces is to be strongly deprecated."