Poles of G.S. wagons will be removed before slinging and made fast to the body of the wagon. Poles of carts, limbers, and limbered wagons will not be removed; these vehicles should be so placed in the boats that they can be landed pole leading.
_Ammunition._
7. The G.O.C. 9th Corps will depute an officer to arrange, in consultation with the P.M.L.O., for the storing of reserve ammunition in convenient localities near the beach. Guards for these stores may be found from the beach fatigue parties.
_Water._
8. The strictest economy must be exercised with regard to drinking water. Under arrangements already made by G.H.Q., receptacles filled with water will be landed as early as possible from the ships carrying the mule corps, and will be conveyed to the troops as transport becomes available. Waterproof tanks (2,300 gallon capacity) and lift and force pumps will be available on the _Prah_--R.E. Storeship--in Kephalos Harbour, and will be forwarded by D.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., on request of G.O.C.
Corps.
_Transport._
9. Transport to supplement that in possession of units will be provided for the 9th Corps and the A.N.Z. Corps by the Indian Mule Corps. The amount of transport for each formation has been calculated to carry rations, water, and S.A.A., making one or two trips a day, according to the antic.i.p.ated distance of the various units from the beach.
This transport will be handed over, as it is landed, by an officer appointed by the D.S.T., to transport officers of Brigades and divisional troops for allotment as circ.u.mstances may require.
Senior transport officers of Divisions will be ordered to report to the following representatives of the D.S.T. immediately on landing:--
At Anzac: Lieutenant-Colonel Streidinger, A.D.T.
At "A" Beach: Major Badc.o.c.k, D.A.D.T.
_Supplies._
10. A supply depot has been formed at Anzac, and it is in charge of Major Izod, A.S.C. A supply depot will be formed by D.S.T. at "A" Beach as soon as supplies can be landed, and will be in charge of Major Huskisson, A.S.C. Senior supply officers of Divisions will be ordered to place themselves in communication with the officer in charge of the nearest supply depot and to keep him informed of their daily requirements. Supplies will, so far as possible, be handed over to them in bulk at the depot. Owing to the difficulty in landing sufficient animals in the first instance it is possible that only half rations may be available on the third and fourth days after the operations begin.
All units should be specially ordered to husband their rations.
_Medical._
11. Arrangements have been made to establish on the beach at Anzac two casualty clearing stations, which will be embarked by I.G.C., and two at "A" Beach, which will be embarked under orders of G.O.C. 9th Corps (_see_ paragraph 1). Medical officers will be appointed by G.H.Q. to control these units, and to take charge of the arrangements for evacuation of the wounded from the beach.
(_Signed_) C. F. ASPINALL, _Lieutenant-Colonel,
For Major-General, C.G.S., Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._
APPENDIX IV
INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GENERAL H. DE LISLE, C.B., D.S.O.
1. The operations of the northern wing of the Army have only been partially successful.
(_a_) The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, with the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of 10th Division attached, has greatly extended the area occupied, and now holds a position under the Chunuk Bair Ridge, which the G.O.C. considers a favourable one from which to launch the final attack on the ridge. The necessity for reorganization after the recent operations, and for establishing a satisfactory system of forwarding water, ammunition and supplies, will involve a delay of some days before the attack on the main ridge can be made.
(_b_) The 9th Army Corps, less the 13th Division and 29th Brigade, but with the 53rd and 54th Divisions attached, holds the Yilghin Burnu hills, and a line northwards from the easternmost of these two hills roughly straight across the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova to the highest point of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Attacks by the 11th Division against the Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur from the north-west have been made without any success. In the course of the operations the 9th Corps became very much disorganized, and since August 11th the work of reorganization and consolidation has been proceeding.
2. At present the enemy has shown no great strength north of an east and west line through Anafarta Sagir. He has a force operating on and near the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the strength of which cannot yet be accurately estimated. From present indications this appears to be a detachment which is known to have guarded the coast from Ejelmer Bay to Suvla Bay; it does not appear to have been reinforced to any extent. Across the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova there appear to be no more than snipers. In the region Anafarta Sagir--Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Biyuk Anafarta Valley the enemy has developed considerable strength--his intention being, no doubt, to protect the right of his main force which opposes the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and to prevent our advance on the Anafarta gap.
3. The General Commanding has decided to strike as quickly and in as great strength as possible against the enemy"s on the line Ismail Oglu Tepe--Anafarta Sagir with the objects, first, of driving in this flank and preparing a further enveloping advance; and, secondly, by clearing the Anafarta spur to deny to the enemy the gun positions and facilities for observation therefrom, which would otherwise endanger Suvla Bay. He considers it imperative to effect this with the least possible delay. In his view the left flank of this advance will require comparatively little protection, at all events in the first instance, in view of the difficulty which the enemy may be expected to find in throwing any considerable force round our left over the high and difficult country north of Anafarta Sagir. It appears that the double purpose of defeating the enemy and securing Suvla Bay as a port for the northern wing of the Army can best be served by an attack on the enemy"s right on the Anafarta spur, made with all the strength at our command, while leaving a comparatively small force as left flank guard to clear the enemy"s snipers out of the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and to occupy and press back his detachment in the Ejelmer Bay region.
4. You will have at your disposal the following troops:--
11th Division, 10th Division (less 29th Brigade), 53rd Division, 54th Division,
and there is on its way from Egypt to join you the 2nd Mounted Division (5,000 men dismounted), which should be available by August 18th. The 10th, 11th and 53rd Divisions are considerably depleted, and the _moral_ of the latter at present leaves much to be desired. There are at present ash.o.r.e, belonging to the above two F.A. Brigades (three batteries of which are awaiting horses to bring them up from Anzac) and two Heavy Batteries. In addition, two Highland Mountain Batteries, attached to the 9th Corps, are ash.o.r.e, and the 1/4th Lowland Brigade (two batteries 5-inch howitzers) are at your disposal when they can be brought up from Anzac. It has only been possible to land a bare minimum of horses owing to difficulties in respect of water and the landing of forage.
Three further F.A. Brigades and the 57th Brigade (two batteries) 4.5-inch howitzers are at Mudros ready to be brought up as soon as it is possible to land them. These Brigades will probably have to be landed without any horses in the first instance, and taken into position by the artillery horses already ash.o.r.e.
5. For the purpose of an early attack in accordance with the plan indicated in paragraph 3, the A. and N.Z. Army Corps will probably not be able to co-operate directly with more than one Infantry Brigade, and it is possible that it may be able to do no more than swing up its left into line with the right of your advance. It is improbable that the 8th Corps and the C.E.O. will be in a position to do more than undertake vigorous demonstrations.
6. With the above in view, you will proceed at once to Suvla Bay and take over command of the 9th Corps. Your immediate and most urgent concern will be to complete the reorganization of the Corps and to prepare as large a force as possible for the offensive against Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur, bearing in mind that time is of vital importance. You will then consider and report at the earliest moment:--
(_a_) What force you consider that you will be able to employ for this purpose.
(_b_) The date on which you will be ready to undertake the offensive.
(_c_) The method by which you purpose to carry out your task.
(_Signed_) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
_Major-General, Chief of the General Staff,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force._