CONFEDERATION AND THE PARTIES
We are to consider now the long-vexed question of the connection of Mr. Brown with the coalition of 1864. Ought he to have entered the coalition government? Having entered it, was he justified in leaving it in 1865? Holton and Dorion told him that by his action in 1864, he had sacrificed his own party interests to those of John A. Macdonald; that Macdonald was in serious political difficulty, and had been defeated in the legislature; that he seized upon Brown"s suggestion merely as a means of keeping himself in office; that for the sake of office he accepted the idea of confederation, after having voted against it in Brown"s committee. A most wise and faithful friend, Alexander Mackenzie, thought that Reformers should accept no representation in the cabinet, but that they should give confederation an outside support. That Macdonald and his party were immensely benefitted by Brown"s action, there can be no doubt. For several years they had either been in Opposition, or in office under a most precarious tenure, depending entirely upon a majority from Lower Canada. By Brown"s action they were suddenly invested with an overwhelming majority, and they had an interrupted lease of power for the nine years between the coalition and the Pacific Scandal.
Admitting that the interest of the country warranted this sacrifice of the interests of the Liberal party, we have still to consider whether it was wise for Mr. Brown to enter the ministry, and especially to enter it on the conditions that existed. The Lower Canadian Liberals were not represented, partly because Dorion and Holton held back, and partly because of the prejudice of Tache and Cartier against the Rouges; and this exclusion was a serious defect in a ministry supposed to be formed on a broad and patriotic basis. The result was, that while the Liberals were in a majority in the legislature, they had only three representatives in a ministry of twelve. Such a government, with its dominant Conservative section led by a master in the handling of political combinations, was bound to lose its character of a coalition, and become Conservative out and out.
A broader question is involved than that of the mere party advantage obtained by Macdonald and his party in the retention of power and patronage. There was grave danger to the essential principles of Liberalism, of which Brown was the appointed guardian. Holton put this in a remarkable way during the debate on confederation. It was at the time when Macdonald had moved the previous question, when the coalition government was hurrying the debate to a conclusion, in the face of indignant protests and demands that the scheme should be submitted to the people. Holton told Brown that he had destroyed the Liberal party. Henceforth its members would be known as those who once ranged themselves together, in Upper and Lower Canada, under the Liberal banner. Then followed this remarkable appeal to his old friend: "Most of us remember--those of us who have been for a few years in public life in this country must remember--a very striking speech delivered by the honourable member for South Oxford in Toronto in the session of 1856 or 1857, in which he described the path of the attorney-general [Macdonald] as studded all along by the gravestones of his slaughtered colleagues. Well, there are not wanting those who think they can descry, in the not very remote distance, a yawning grave waiting for the n.o.blest victim of them all. And I very much fear that unless the honourable gentleman has the courage to a.s.sert his own original strength--and he has great strength--and to discard the blandishments and the sweets of office, and to plant himself where he stood formerly, in the affections and confidence of the people of this country, as the foremost defender of the rights of the people, as the foremost champion of the privileges of a free parliament--unless he hastens to do that, I very much fear that he too may fall a victim, the n.o.blest victim of them all, to the arts, if not the arms of the fell destroyer."
There was a little humorous exaggeration in the personal references to Macdonald, for Holton and he were on friendly terms. But there was also matter for serious thought in his words. Though Macdonald had outgrown the fossil Toryism that opposed responsible government, he was essentially Conservative; and there was something not democratic in his habit of dealing with individuals rather than with people in the ma.s.s, and of accomplishing his ends by private letters and interviews, and by other forms of personal influence, rather than by the public advocacy of causes. a.s.sociation with him was injurious to men of essentially Liberal and democratic tendencies, and subordination was fatal, if not to their usefulness, at least to their Liberal ideals. Macdougall and Howland remained in the ministry until confederation was achieved, and found reasons for remaining there afterwards. At the Reform convention of 1867, when the relation of the Liberal party to the so-called coalition was considered, they defended their position with skill and force, but the a.s.sociation of one with Macdonald was very brief, and of the other very unhappy. Mr. Howland was not a very keen politician, and a year after confederation was accomplished he accepted the position of lieutenant-governor of Ontario. Mr. Macdougall had an unsatisfactory career as a minister, with an unhappy termination. He was clearly out of his element. Mr.
Tilley was described as a Liberal, but there was nothing to distinguish him from his Conservative colleagues in his methods or his utterances, and he became the champion of the essentially Conservative policy of protection.
But the most notable example of the truth of Holton"s words and the soundness of his advice was Joseph Howe. Howe was in Nova Scotia "the foremost defender of the rights of people, the foremost champion of the privileges of free parliaments." He had opposed the inclusion of Nova Scotia on the solid ground that it was accomplished by arbitrary means. At length he bowed to the inevitable. In ceasing to encourage a useless and dangerous agitation he stood on patriotic ground. But in an evil hour he was persuaded to seal his submission by joining the Macdonald government, and thenceforth his influence was at an end. His biographer says that Howe"s four years in Sir John Macdonald"s cabinet are the least glorious of his whole career. "Howe had been accustomed all his life to lead and control events. He found himself a member of a government of which Sir John Macdonald was the supreme head, and of a cast of mind totally different from his own. Sir John Macdonald was a shrewd political manager, an opportunist whose unfailing judgment led him unerringly to pursue the course most likely to succeed each hour, each day, each year. Howe had the genius of a bold Reformer, a courageous and creative type of mind, who thought in continents, dreamed dreams and conceived great ideas. Sir John Macdonald busied himself with what concerned the immediate interests of the hour in which he was then living, and yet Sir John Macdonald was a leader who permitted no insubordination. Sir Georges Cartier, a man not to be named in the same breath with Howe as a statesman, was, nevertheless, a thousand times of more moment and concern with his band of Bleu followers in the House of Commons, than a dozen Howes, and the consequence is that we find for four years the great old man playing second fiddle to his inferiors, and cutting a far from heroic figure in the arena."[18] What Holton said by way of warning to Brown was realized in the case of Howe. He was "the n.o.blest victim of them all."
From the point of view of Liberalism and of his influence as a public man, Brown did not leave the ministry a moment too soon; and there is much to be said in favour of Mackenzie"s view that he ought to have refused to enter the coalition at all, and confined himself to giving his general support to confederation. By this means he would not have been responsible for the methods by which the new const.i.tution was brought into effect, methods that were in many respects repugnant to those essential principles of Liberalism of which Brown had been one of the foremost champions. At almost every stage in the proceedings there was a violation of those rights of self-government which had been so hardly won by Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The Quebec conference was a meeting of persons who had been chosen to administer the affairs of the various British provinces under their established const.i.tutions, not to make a new const.i.tution. Its deliberations were secret. It proceeded, without a mandate from the people, to create a new governing body, whose powers were obtained at the expense of those of the provinces. With the same lack of popular authority, it declared that the provinces should have only those powers which were expressly designated, and that the reserve of power should be in the central governing body. Had this body been created for the Canadas alone, this proceeding might have been justified, for they were already joined in a legislative union, though by practice and consent some features of federalism prevailed. But Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were separate, self-governing communities, and it was for them, not for the Quebec conference, to say what powers they would grant and what powers they would retain. Again the people of Canada had declared that the second chamber should be elected, not appointed by the Crown. The Quebec conference, without consulting the people of Canada, reverted to the discarded system of nomination, and added the senate to the vast body of patronage at the disposal of the federal government. The const.i.tution adopted by this body was not, except in the case of New Brunswick, submitted to the people, and it can hardly be said that it was freely debated in the parliament of Canada, for it was declared that it was in the nature of a treaty, and must be accepted or rejected as a whole. In the midst of this debate the people of New Brunswick pa.s.sed upon the scheme in a general election, and condemned it in the most decisive and explicit way. The British government was then induced to bring pressure to bear upon the province; and while it was contended that this pressure was only in the form of friendly advice it was otherwise interpreted by the governor, who strained his powers to compel the ministry to act in direct contravention of its mandate from the people, and when it resisted, forced it out of office. It is true that in a subsequent election this decision was reversed; but that is not a justification for the means adopted to bring about this result. It is no exaggeration to say that Nova Scotia was forced into the union against the express desire of a large majority of its people. There are arguments by which these proceedings may be defended, but they are not arguments that lie in the mouth of a Liberal. And if we say that the confederation, in spite of these taints in its origin, has worked well and has solved the difficulties of Canada, we use an argument which might justify the forcible annexation of a country by a powerful neighbour.
Again, there was much force in Dorion"s contention that the new const.i.tution was an illiberal const.i.tution, increasing those powers of the executive which were already too large. To the inordinate strength of the executive, under the delusive name of the Crown, may be traced many of the worst evils of Canadian politics: the abuse of the prerogative of dissolution, the delay in holding bye-elections, the gerrymandering of the const.i.tuencies by a parliament registering the decree of a government. To these powers of the government the Confederation Act added that of filling one branch of the legislature with its own nominees. By the power of disallowance, by the equivocal language used in regard to education, and in regard to the creation of new provinces, pretexts were furnished for federal interference in local affairs. But for the resolute opposition of Mowat and his colleagues, the subordination of the provinces to the central authority would have gone very far towards realizing Macdonald"s ideal of a legislative union; and recent events have shown that the danger of centralization is by no means at an end.
It was a true, liberal and patriotic impulse that induced Brown to offer his aid in breaking the dead-lock of 1864. He desired that Upper Canada should be fairly represented in parliament, and should have freedom to manage its local affairs. He desired that the Maritime Provinces and the North-West should, in the course of time, be brought in on similar terms of freedom. But by joining the coalition he became a partic.i.p.ant in a different course of procedure; and if we give him a large, perhaps the largest share, of the credit for the ultimate benefits of confederation, we cannot divest him of responsibility for the methods by which it was brought about, so long, at least, as he remained a member of the government.
In the year and a half that elapsed between his withdrawal from the government and the first general election under the new const.i.tution, he had a somewhat difficult part to play. He had to aid in the work of carrying confederation, and at the same time to aid in the work of re-organizing the Liberal party, which had been temporarily divided and weakened by the new issue introduced into politics. In the Reform convention of 1867 the att.i.tude of the party towards confederation was considered. It was resolved that "while the new const.i.tution contained obvious defects, it was, on the whole, based upon equitable principles and should be accepted with the determination to work it loyally and patiently, and to provide such amendments as experience from year to year may prove to be expedient." It was declared that coalitions of opposing political parties for ordinary administrative purposes resulted in corruption, extravagance and the abandonment of principle; that the coalition of 1864 could be justified only on the ground of imperious necessity, as the only available means of obtaining just representation for Upper Canada, and should come to an end when that object was attained; and that the temporary alliance of the Reform and Conservative parties should cease. Howland and Macdougall, who had decided to remain in the ministry, strove to maintain that it was a true coalition, and that the old issues that divided the parties were at an end; and their bearing before a hostile audience was tactful and courageous. But Brown and his friends carried all before them.
Brown argued strongly against the proposal to turn the coalition formed for confederation into a coalition for ordinary administrative purposes; and in a pa.s.sage of unusual fervour he asked whether his Reform friends were to be subjected to the humiliation of following in the train of John A. Macdonald.
It is difficult to understand how so chimerical a notion as a non-party government led by Macdonald could have been entertained by practical politicians. A permanent position in a Macdonald ministry would have been out of the question for Brown, not only because of his standing as a public man, but because of his control of the _Globe_, which under such an arrangement would have been reduced to the position of an organ of the Conservative government. There were also all the elements of a powerful Liberal party, which soon after confederation rallied its forces and overthrew Sir John Macdonald"s government at Ottawa, and the coalition government he had established at Toronto. Giving Macdougall every credit for good intentions, it must be admitted that he committed an error in casting in his political fortunes with Sir John Macdonald, and that both he and Joseph Howe would have found more freedom, more scope for their energies and a wider field of usefulness, in fighting by the side of Mackenzie and Blake.
FOOTNOTES:
[18] Longley"s _Joseph Howe_, "Makers of Canada" series, pp. 228, 229.
CHAPTER XXI
CANADA AND THE GREAT WEST
Very soon after his arrival in Canada, Mr. Brown became deeply interested in the North-West Territories. He was thrown into contact with men who knew the value of the country and desired to see it opened for settlement. One of these was Robert Baldwin Sullivan, who, during the struggle for responsible government, wrote a series of brilliant letters over the signature of "Legion" advocating that principle, and who was for a time provincial secretary in the Baldwin-Lafontaine government. In 1847, Mr. Sullivan delivered, in the Mechanics" Inst.i.tute, Toronto, an address on the North-West Territories, which was published in full in the _Globe_. The Oregon settlement had recently been made, and the great westward trek of the Americans was in progress. Sullivan uttered the warning that the Americans would occupy and become masters of the British western territory, and outflank Canada, unless steps were taken to settle and develop it by British subjects. There was at this time much misconception of the character of the country, and one is surprised by the very accurate knowledge shown by Mr. Sullivan in regard to the resources of the country, its coal measures as well as its wheat fields.
Mr. Brown also obtained much information and a.s.sistance from Mr.
Isbester, a "native of the country, who by his energy, ability and intelligence had raised himself from the position of a successful scholar at one of the schools of the settlement to that of a graduate of one of the British universities, and to a teacher of considerable rank. This gentleman had succeeded in inducing prominent members of the House of Commons to interest themselves in the subject of appeals which, through him, were constantly being made against the injustice and persecution which the colonists of the Red River Settlement were suffering."[19]
Mr. Brown said that his attention was first drawn to the subject by a deputation sent to England by the people of the Red River Settlement to complain that the country was ill-governed by the Hudson"s Bay Company, and to pray that the territory might be thrown open for settlement. "The movement," said Mr. Brown, "was well received by the most prominent statesmen of Britain. The absurdity of so vast a country remaining in the hands of a trading company was readily admitted; and I well remember that Mr. Gladstone then made an excellent speech in the Commons, as he has recently done, admitting that the charter of the company was not valid, and that the matter should be dealt with by legislation. But the difficulty that constantly presented itself was what should be done with the territory were the charter broken up; what government should replace that of the company. The idea struck Mr. Isbester, a most able and enlightened member of the Red River deputation to London, that this difficulty would be met at once were Canada to step in and claim the right to the territory. Through a mutual friend, I was communicated with on the subject, and agreed to have the question thoroughly agitated before the expiry of the company"s charter in 1859. I have since given the subject some study, and have on various occasions brought it before the public." Mr. Brown referred to the matter in his maiden speech in parliament in 1851, and in 1854 and again in 1856 he gave notice of motion for a committee of inquiry, but was interrupted by other business. In 1852, the _Globe_ contained an article so remarkable in its knowledge of the country that it may be reproduced here in part.
"It is a remarkable circ.u.mstance that so little attention has been paid in Canada to the immense tract of country lying to the north of our boundary line, and known as the Hudson"s Bay Company"s Territory.
There can be no question that the injurious and demoralizing sway of that company over a region of four millions of square miles, will, ere long, be brought to an end, and that the destinies of this immense country will be united with our own. It is unpardonable that civilization should be excluded from half a continent, on at best but a doubtful right of ownership, for the benefit of two hundred and thirty-two shareholders.
"Our present purpose is not, however, with the validity of the Hudson"s Bay Company"s claim to the country north of the Canadian line--but to call attention to the value of that region, and the vast commercial importance to the country and especially to this section, which must, ere long, attach to it. The too general impression entertained is, that the territory in question is a frozen wilderness, incapable of cultivation and utterly unfit for colonization. This impression was undoubtedly set afloat, and has been maintained, for its own very evident purposes. So long as that opinion could be kept up, their charter was not likely to be disturbed. But light has been breaking in on the subject in spite of their efforts to keep it out.
In a recent work by Mr. Edward Fitzgerald, it is stated that "there is not a more favourable situation on the face of the earth for the employment of agricultural industry than the locality of the Red River." Mr. Fitzgerald a.s.serts that there are five hundred thousand square miles of soil, a great part of which is favourable for settlement and agriculture, and all so well supplied with game as to give great facility for colonization. Here is a field for Canadian enterprise.
"The distance between Fort William and the Red River Settlement is about five hundred miles, and there is said to be water communication by river and lake all the way. But westward, beyond the Red River Settlement, there is said to be a magnificent country, through which the Saskatchewan River extends, and is navigable for boats and canoes through a course of one thousand four hundred miles.
"Much has been said of the extreme cold of the country, as indicated by the thermometer. It is well known, however, that it is not the degree but the character of the cold which renders it obnoxious to men, and the climate of this country is quite as agreeable, if not more so, than the best part of Canada. The height of the lat.i.tude gives no clue whatever to the degree of cold or to the nature of the climate.
"Let any one look at the map, and if he can fancy the tenth part that is affirmed of the wide region of country stretching westward to the Rocky Mountains, he may form some idea of the profitable commerce which will soon pa.s.s through Lake Superior. Independent of the hope that the high road to the Pacific may yet take this direction, there is a field for enterprise presented, sufficient to satiate the warmest imagination."
It was not, however, until the year 1856 that public attention was aroused to the importance of the subject. In the autumn of that year there was a series of letters in the _Globe_ signed "Huron," drawing attention to the importance of the western country, attacking the administration of the Hudson"s Bay Company, and suggesting that the inhabitants, unless relieved, might seek to place the country under American government. In December 1856, there was a meeting of the Toronto Board of Trade at which addresses were delivered by Alan McDonnell and Captain Kennedy. Captain Kennedy said that he had lived for a quarter of a century in the territory in question, had eight or nine years before the meeting endeavoured to call attention to the country through the newspapers and had written a letter to Lord Elgin.
He declared that the most important work before Canada was the settlement of two hundred and seventy-nine million acres of land lying west of the Lakes. The Board of Trade pa.s.sed a resolution declaring that the claim of the Hudson"s Bay Company to the exclusive right to trade in the country was injurious to the rights of the people of the territory and of British North America. The Board also pet.i.tioned the legislature to ascertain the rights of the Hudson"s Bay Company, and to protect the interests of Canada. A few days afterwards the _Globe_ said that the time had come to act, and thenceforward it carried on a vigorous campaign for the opening up of the territory to settlement and the establishment of communication with Canada.
During the year 1856, Mr. Brown addressed many meetings on the subject of the working of the union. He opposed the separation of the Canadas, proposed by some as a measure of relief for the grievances of Upper Canada. This would bring Canada back to the day of small things; he advocated expansion to the westward. William Macdougall, then a member of the _Globe_ staff, was also an enthusiastic advocate of the union of the North-West Territories with Canada. In an article reviewing the events of the year 1856, the _Globe_ said: "This year will be remembered as that in which the public mind was first aroused to the necessity of uniting to Canada the great tract of British American territory lying to the north-west, then in the occupation of a great trading monopoly. The year 1856 has only seen the birth of this movement. Let us hope that 1857 will see it crowned with success."
In January 1857, a convention of Reformers in Toronto adopted a platform including free trade, uniform legislation for both provinces, representation by population, national and non-sectarian education, and the incorporation of the Hudson Bay Territory. It was resolved "that the country known as the Hudson Bay Territory ought no longer to be cut off from civilization, that it is the duty of the legislature and executive of Canada to open negotiations with the imperial government for the incorporation of the said territory as Canadian soil."
The _Globe"s_ proposals at this early date provoked the merriment of some of its contemporaries. The Niagara _Mail_, January 1857, said: "The Toronto _Globe_ comes out with a new and remarkable platform, one of the planks of which is the annexation of the frozen regions of the Hudson Bay Territory to Canada. Lord have mercy on us! Canada has already a stiff reputation for cold in the world, but it is unfeeling in the _Globe_ to want to make it deserve the reproach." The _Globe_ advised its contemporary not to commit itself hastily against the annexation of the North-West, "for it will a.s.suredly be one of the strongest planks in our platform."
Another sceptic was the Montreal _Transcript_, which declared that the fertile spots in the territory were small and separated by immense distances, and described the Red River region as an oasis in the midst of a desert, "a vast treeless prairie on which scarcely a shrub is to be seen." The climate was unfavourable to the growth of grain. The summer, though warm enough, was too short in duration, so that even the few fertile spots could "with difficulty mature a small potato or cabbage." The subject seemed to be constantly in Brown"s mind, and he referred to it frequently in public addresses. After the general election of 1857-8 a banquet was given at Belleville to celebrate the return of Mr. Wallbridge for Hastings. Mr. Brown there referred to a proposal to dissolve the union. He was for giving the union a fair trial. "Who can look at the map of this continent and mark the vast portion of it acknowledging British sovereignty, without feeling that union and not separation ought to be the foremost principle with British American statesmen? Who that examines the condition of the several provinces which const.i.tute British America, can fail to feel that with the people of Canada must mainly rest the n.o.ble task, at no distant date, of consolidating these provinces, aye, and of redeeming to civilization and peopling with new life the vast territories to our north, now so unworthily held by the Hudson"s Bay Company. Who cannot see that Providence has entrusted to us the building up of a great northern people, fit to cope with our neighbours of the United States, and to advance step by step with them in the march of civilization?
Sir, it is my fervent aspiration and belief that some here to-night may live to see the day when the British American flag shall proudly wave from Labrador to Vancouver Island and from our own Niagara to the sh.o.r.es of Hudson Bay. Look abroad over the world and tell me what country possesses the advantages, if she but uses them aright, for achieving such a future, as Canada enjoys--a fertile soil, a healthful climate, a hardy and frugal people, with great mineral resources, n.o.ble rivers, boundless forests. We have within our grasp all the elements of prosperity. We are free from the thousand time-honoured evils and abuses that afflict and r.e.t.a.r.d the nations of the Old World.
Not even our neighbours of the United States occupy an equal position of advantage, for we have not the canker-worm of domestic slavery to blight our tree of liberty. And greater than these, we are but commencing our career as a people, our inst.i.tutions have yet to be established. We are free to look abroad over the earth and study the lessons of wisdom taught by the history of older countries, and choose those systems and those laws and customs that experience has shown best for advancing the moral and material interests of the human family."[20]
As a member of the coalition of 1864, Brown had an opportunity to promote his long-cherished object of adding the North-West Territories to Canada. There had been some communication between the British and Canadian governments, and in November 1864, the latter government said that Canada was anxious to secure the settlement of the West and the establishment of local governments. As the Hudson"s Bay Company worked under an English charter, it was for that government to extinguish its rights and give Canada a clear t.i.tle. Canada would then annex, govern and open up communication with the territory. When Brown accompanied Macdonald, Cartier and Galt to England in 1865, this matter was taken up, and an agreement was arrived at which was reported to the Canadian legislature in the second session of 1865. The committee said that calling to mind the vital importance to Canada of having that great and fertile country open to Canadian enterprise and the tide of emigration into it directed through Canadian channels, remembering the danger of large grants of land pa.s.sing into the hands of mere money corporations, and the risk that the recent discoveries of gold on the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains might throw into the country large ma.s.ses of settlers unaccustomed to British inst.i.tutions, they arrived at the conclusion that the quickest solution of the question would be the best for Canada. They therefore proposed that the whole territory east of the Rockies and north of the American or Canadian line should be made over to Canada, subject to the rights of the Hudson"s Bay Company; and that the compensation to be made by Canada to the company should be met by a loan guaranteed by the British government. To this, the imperial government consented.
The subsequent history of the acquisition of the West need not be told here. In this case, as in others, Brown was a pioneer in a work which others finished. But his services were generously acknowledged by Sir John Macdonald, who said in the House of Commons in 1875: "From the first time that he had entered parliament, the people of Canada looked forward to a western extension of territory, and from the time he was first a minister, in 1854, the question was brought up time and again, and pressed with great ability and force by the Hon. George Brown, who was then a prominent man in opposition to the government."
FOOTNOTES:
[19] Gunn and Tuttle"s _History of Manitoba_, p. 303.
[20] Toronto _Globe_, January 25th, 1858.
CHAPTER XXII
THE RECIPROCITY TREATY OF 1874
Mr. Brown"s position in regard to reciprocity has already been described. He set a high value upon the American market for Canadian products, and as early as 1863 he had urged the government of that day to prepare for the renewal of the treaty. He resigned from the coalition ministry, because, to use his own words, "I felt very strongly that though we in Canada derived great advantage from the treaty of 1854, the American people derived still greater advantage from it. I had no objection to that, and was quite ready to renew the old treaty, or even to extend it largely on fair terms of reciprocity.
But I was not willing to ask for a renewal as a favour to Canada; I was not willing to offer special inducements for renewal without fair concessions in return; I was not willing that the ca.n.a.ls and inland waters of Canada should be made the joint property of the United States and Canada and be maintained at their joint expense; I was not willing that the custom and excise duty of Canada should be a.s.similated to the prohibitory rates of the United States; and very especially was I unwilling that any such arrangement should be entered into with the United States, dependent on the frail tenure of reciprocal legislation, repealable at any moment at the caprice of either party." Unless a fair treaty for a definite term of years could be obtained, he thought it better that each country should take its own course and that Canada should seek new channels of trade.
The negotiations of 1866 failed, mainly because under the American offer, "the most important provisions of the expiring treaty, relating to the free interchange of the products of the two countries, were entirely set aside, and the duties proposed to be levied were almost prohibitory in their character." The free-list offered by the United States reads like a diplomatic joke: "burr-millstones, rags, fire-wood, grindstones, plaster and gypsum." The real bar in this and subsequent negotiations, was the unwillingness of the Americans to enter into any kind of arrangement for extended trade. They did not want to break in upon their system of protection, and they did not set a high value on access to the Canadian market. In most of the negotiations, the Americans are found trying to drive the best possible bargain in regard to the Canadian fisheries and ca.n.a.ls, and fighting shy of reciprocity in trade. They considered that a free exchange of natural products would be far more beneficial to Canada than to the United States. As time went on, they began to perceive the advantages of the Canadian market for American manufactures. But when this was apparent, Canadian feeling, which had hitherto been unanimous for reciprocity, began to show a cleavage, which was sharply defined in the discussion preceding the election of 1891. Reciprocity in manufactures was opposed, because of the compet.i.tion to which it would expose Canadian industries, and because it was difficult to arrange it without a.s.similating the duties of the two countries and discriminating against British imports into Canada.
In earlier years, however, even the inclusion of manufactures in the treaty of reciprocity was an inducement by which the Americans set little store. The rejected offer made by Canada in 1869, about the exact terms of which doubt exists, included a list of manufactures. In 1871 the American government declined to consider an offer to renew the treaty of 1854 in return for access to the deep sea fisheries of Canada. The Brown Treaty of 1874, which contained a list of manufactures, was rejected at Washington, while in Canada it was criticized as striking a blow at the infant manufactures of the country.
The Brown mission of 1874 was a direct result of the Treaty of Washington. Under that treaty there was to be an arbitration to determine the value of the American use of the Canadian insh.o.r.e fisheries for twelve years, in excess of the value of the concessions made by the United States. Before the fall of the Macdonald government, Mr. Rothery, registrar of the High Court of Admiralty in England, arrived in Canada as the agent of the British government to prepare the Canadian case for arbitration. In pa.s.sing through Toronto Mr. Rothery spoke to several public men with a view to acquiring information as to the value of the fisheries. Mr. Brown availed himself of that opportunity to suggest to him that a treaty of reciprocity in trade would be a far better compensation to Canada than a cash payment. Mr. Rothery carried this proposal to Washington, where it was received with some favour.
Meantime the Mackenzie government had been moving in the matter, and in February 1874, Mr. Brown was informed that there was a movement at Washington for the renewal of the old reciprocity treaty, and was asked to make an unofficial visit to that city and estimate the chances of success. On February 12th, he wrote: "We know as yet of but few men who are bitterly against us. I saw General Butler, at his request, on the subject, and I understand he will support us. Charles Sumner is heart and hand with us, and is most kind to me personally."
On February 14th, he expressed his belief that if a bill for the renewal of the reciprocity treaty could be submitted to congress at once, it would be carried.