When the Overseas despatches first reached the United States the newspapers printed them in a spirit of fairness. They gave the other side, and in the beginning they were more or less accurate. But when international relations between the two countries became critical the news began to be distorted in Berlin. At each crisis, as at the time of the sinking of the _Arabic_, the _Ancona_, the _Suss.e.x_ and other ships, the German censorship prevented the American correspondents from sending the news as they gathered it in Germany and subst.i.tuted "news"
which the Krupp interests and the Imperial Foreign Office desired the American people to believe. December, 1916, when the German General Staff began to plan for an unrestricted submarine warfare, especial use was made of the "Overseas News Agency" to work up sentiment here against President Wilson. Desperate efforts were made to keep the United States from breaking diplomatic relations. In December and January last records of the news despatches in the American newspapers from Berlin show that the Overseas agency was more active than all American correspondents in Berlin. Secretary of State Zimmermann, Under-secretaries von dem Busche and von Stumm gave frequent interviews to the so-called "representatives of the Overseas News Agency." It was all part of a specific Krupp plan, supported by the Hamburg-American and the North German Lloyd steamship companies, to divide opinion in the United States so that President Wilson would not be supported if he broke diplomatic relations.
Germany, as I have pointed out, has been conducting a two-faced propaganda. While working in the United States through her agents and reservists to create the impression that Germany was friendly, the Government laboured to prepare the German people for war. The policy was to make the American people believe Germany would never do anything to bring the United States into the war, but to convince the German public that America was not neutral and that President Wilson was scheming against the German race. Germany was Ja.n.u.s-headed. Head No. 1 said:
"America, you are a great nation. We want your friendship and neutrality. We have close business and blood relations, and these should not be broken. Germany is not the barbaric nation her enemies picture her."
Head No. 2, turned toward the German people, said:
"Germans, President Wilson is anti-German. He wants to prevent us from starting an unlimited submarine war. America has never been neutral, because Washington permits the ammunition factories to supply the Allies. These factories are killing your relatives. We have millions of German-Americans who will support us. It will not be long until Mexico will declare war on the United States, and our reservists will fight for Mexico. Don"t be afraid if Wilson breaks diplomatic relations."
The German press invasion of America began at the beginning of the war.
Dr. Dernburg was the first envoy. He was sent to New York by the same Foreign Office officials and the same Krupp interests which control the Overseas agency. Having failed here, he returned to Berlin. There was only one thing to save German propaganda in America. That was to mobolise the Sayville and Tuckerton wireless stations, and Germany did it immediately.
At the beginning of the war, when the British censors refused the American correspondents in Germany the right of telegraphing to the United States via England, the Berlin Government granted permission to the United Press, The a.s.sociated Press and the _Chicago Daily News_ to send wireless news via Sayville. At first this news was edited by the correspondents of these a.s.sociations and newspapers in Berlin. Later, when the individual correspondents began to demand more s.p.a.ce on the wireless, the news sent jointly to these papers was cut down. This unofficial league of American papers was called the "War-Union." The news which this union sent was German, but it was written by trained American writers. When the Government saw the value of this service to the United States it began to send wireless news of its own. Then the Krupp interests appeared, and the Overseas News Agency was organised.
At that moment the Krupp invasion of the United States began and contributed 800,000 marks annually to this branch of propaganda alone.
Dr. Hammann, for ten years chief of the Berlin Foreign Office propaganda department, was selected as president of the Overseas News Agency. The Krupp interests, which had been subscribing 400,000 marks annually to this agency, subscribed the same amount to the reorganised company. Then, believing that another agency could be organised, subscribed 400,000 marks more to the Transocean News Agency. Because there was so much bitterness and rivalry between the officials of the two concerns, the Government stepped in and informed the Overseas News Agency that it could send only "political news," while the Trans-ocean was authorised to send "economic and social news" via Sayville and Tuckerton.
This news, however, was not solely for the United States. Krupp"s eyes were on Mexico and South America, so agents were appointed in Washington and New York to send the Krupp-bred wireless news from New York by cable to South America and Mexico. Obviously the same news which was sent to the United States could not be telegraphed to Mexico and South America, because Germany had a different policy toward these countries. The United States was on record against an unlimited submarine warfare. Mexico and South America were not. Brazil, which has a big German population, was considered an un-annexed German colony. News to Brazil, therefore, had to be coloured differently than news to New York. Some of the colouring was done in Berlin; some in New York by Krupp"s agents here. As a result of Germany"s anti-United States propaganda in South America and Mexico, these countries did not follow President Wilson when he broke diplomatic relations with Berlin.
While public sentiment might have been against Germany, it was, to a certain degree, antagonistic to the United States.
Obviously, Germany had to have friends in this country to a.s.sist her, or what was being done would be traced too directly to the German Government. So Germany financed willing German-Americans in their propaganda schemes. And because no German could cross the ocean except with a falsified neutral pa.s.sport, Germany had to depend upon German-Americans with American pa.s.sports to bring information over.
These German-Americans, co-operating with some of the Americans in Berlin, kept informing the Foreign Office, the army and navy as well as influential Reichstag members that the real power behind the government over here was not the press and public opinion but the nine million Americans who were directly or indirectly related to Germany. During this time the Government felt so sure that it could rely upon the so-called German-Americans that the Government considered them as a German a.s.set whenever there was a submarine crisis.
When Henry Morgenthau, former American Amba.s.sador to Turkey, pa.s.sed through Berlin, en route to the United States, he conferred with Zimmermann, who was then Under Secretary of State. During the course of one of their conversations Zimmermann said the United States would never go to war with Germany, "because the German-Americans would revolt." That was one of Zimmermann"s hobbies. Zimmermann told other American officials and foreign correspondents that President Wilson would not be able to bring the United States to the brink of war, because the "German-Americans were too powerful."
But Zimmermann was not making these statements upon his own authority.
He was being kept minutely advised about conditions here through the German spy system and by German-American envoys, who came to Berlin to report on progress the German-Americans were making here in politics and in Congress.
Zimmermann was so "dead sure" he was right in expecting a large portion of Americans to be disloyal that one time during a conversation with Amba.s.sador Gerard he said that he believed Wilson was only bluffing in his submarine notes. When Zimmermann was Under Secretary of State I used to see him very often. His conversation would contain questions like these:
"Well, how is your English President? Why doesn"t your President do something against England?"
Zimmermann was always in close touch with the work of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed when they were in this country. He was one of the chief supports of the little group of intriguers in Berlin who directed German propaganda here. Zimmermann was the man who kept Baron Mumm von Schwarzenstein, former Amba.s.sador to Tokyo, in the Foreign Office in Berlin as chief of foreign propaganda and intrigue in America and China. Mumm had been here as Minister Extra-ordinary several years ago and knew how Germany"s methods could be used to the best purpose, namely, to divide American sentiment. Then, when Zimmermann succeeded Jagow he ousted Mumm because Mumm had become unpopular with higher Government authorities.
One day in Berlin, just before the recall of the former German military and naval attaches in Washington, I asked Zimmermann whether Germany sanctioned what these men had been doing. He replied that Germany approved everything they had done "because they had done nothing more than try to keep America out of the war; to prevent American goods reaching the Allies and to persuade Germans and those of German descent not to work in ammunition factories." The same week I overheard in a Berlin cafe two reserve naval officers discuss plans for destroying Allied ships sailing from American ports. One of these men was an escaped officer of an interned liner at Newport News. He had escaped to Germany by way of Italy. That afternoon when I saw Amba.s.sador Gerard I told him of the conversation of these two men, and also what Zimmermann had said. The Amba.s.sador had just received instructions from Washington about Boy-Ed and von Papen.
Gerard was furious.
"Go tell Zimmermann," he said, "for G.o.d"s sake to leave America alone.
If he keeps this up he"ll drag us into the war. The United States won"t stand this sort of thing indefinitely."
That evening I went back to the Foreign Office and saw Zimmermann for a few minutes. I asked him why it was that Germany, which was at peace with the United States, was doing everything within her power to make war.
"Why, Germany is not doing anything to make you go to war," he replied.
"Your President seems to want war. Germany is not responsible for what the German-Americans are doing. They are your citizens, not ours.
Germany must not be held responsible for what those people do."
Had it not been for the fact that the American Government was fully advised about Zimmermann"s intrigues in the United States this remark might be accepted on its face. The United States knew that Germany was having direct negotiations with German-Americans in the United States.
Men came to Germany with letters of introduction from leading German-Americans here, with the expressed purpose of trying to get Germany to stop its propaganda here. What they did do was to a.s.sure Germany that the German-Americans would never permit the United States to be drawn into the war. Because of their high recommendations from Germans here some of them had audiences with the Kaiser.
Germany had been supporting financially some Americans, as the State Department has proof of checks which have been given to American citizens for propaganda and spy work.
I know personally of one instance where General Director Heinicken, of the North German-Lloyd, gave an American in Berlin $1,000 for his reports on American conditions. The name cannot be mentioned because there are no records to prove the transaction, although the man receiving this money came to me and asked me to transmit $250 to his mother through the United Press office. I refused.
When Zimmermann began to realise that Germany"s threatening propaganda in the United States and Germany"s plots against American property were not succeeding in frightening the United States away from war, he began to look forward to the event of war. He saw, as most Germans did, that it would be a long time before the United States could get forces to Europe in a sufficient number to have a decisive effect upon the war.
He began to plan with the General Staff and the Navy to league Mexico against America for two purposes. One, Germany figured that a war with Mexico would keep the United States army and navy busy over here.
Further, Zimmermann often said to callers that if the United States went to war with Mexico it would not be possible for American factories to send so much ammunition and so many supplies to the Allies.
German eyes turned to Mexico. As soon as President Wilson recognised Carranza as President, Germany followed with a formal recognition.
Zubaran Capmany, who had been Mexican representative in Washington, was sent to Berlin as Carranza"s Minister. Immediately upon his arrival Zimmermann began negotiations with him. Reports of the negotiations were sent to Washington. The State Department was warned that unless the United States solved the "Mexican problem" immediately Germany would prepare to attack us through Mexico. German reservists were tipped off to be ready to go to Mexico upon a moment"s notice. Count von Bernstorff and the German Consuls in the United States were instructed, and Bernstorff, who was acting as the general director of German interests in North and South America, was told to inform the German officials in the Latin-American countries. At the same time German financial interests began to purchase banks, farms and mines in Mexico.
CHAPTER V
THE DOWNFALL OF VON TIRPITZ AND VON FALKENHAYN
After the sinking of the _Arabic_ the German Foreign Office intimated to the United States Government and to the American correspondents that methods of submarine warfare would be altered and that ships would be warned before they were torpedoed. But when the Navy heard that the Foreign Office was inclined to listen to Mr. Wilson"s protests it made no attempt to conceal its opposition. Gottlieb von Jagow, the Secretary of State, although he was an intimate friend of the Kaiser and an officer in the German Army, was at heart a pacifist. Every time an opportunity presented itself he tried to mobilise the peace forces of the world to make peace. From time to time, the German financiers and propaganda leaders in the United States, as well as influential Germans in the neutral European countries, sent out peace "feelers."
Von Jagow realised that the sooner peace was made, the better it would be for Germany and the easier it would be for the Foreign Office to defeat the military party at home. He saw that the more victories the army had and the more victories it could announce to the people the more l.u.s.tful the General Staff would be for a war of exhaustion. Army leaders have always had more confidence in their ability to defeat the world than the Foreign Office. The army looked at the map of Europe and saw so many hundred thousand square miles of territory under occupation. The Foreign Office saw Germany in its relation to the world. Von Jagow knew that every new square mile of territory gained was being paid for, not only by the cost of German blood, but by the more terrible cost of public opinion and German influence abroad. But Germany was under martial law and the Foreign Office had nothing to say about military plans. The Foreign Office also had little to say about naval warfare. The Navy was building submarines as fast as it could and the number of ships lost encouraged the people to believe that the more intensified the submarine war became, the quicker the war would end in Germany"s favour. So the Navy kept sinking ships and relying upon the Foreign Office to make excuses and keep America out of the war.
The repeated violations of the pledges made by the Foreign Office to the United States aroused American public opinion to white heat, and justly so, because the people here did not understand that the real submarine crisis was not between President Wilson and Berlin but between Admiral von Tirpitz and Secretary von Jagow and their followers. President Wilson was at the limit of his patience with Germany and the German people, who were becoming impatient over the long drawn out proceedings, began to accept the inspired thinking of the Navy and to believe that Wilson was working for the defeat of Germany by interfering with submarine activities.
On February 22nd, 1916, in one of my despatches I said: "The patient att.i.tude toward America displayed during the _Lusitania_ negotiations, it is plain to-day, no longer exists because of the popular feeling that America has already hindered so many of Germany"s plans." At that time it appeared to observers in Berlin that unless President Wilson could show more patience than the German Government the next submarine accident would bring about a break in relations. Commenting on this despatch the _Indianapolis News_ the next day said:
"In this country the people feel that all the patience has been shown by their government. We believe that history will sustain that view.
Almost ten months ago more than 100 American citizens were deliberately done to death by the German Government, for it is understood that the submarine commander acted under instructions, and that Germany refuses to disavow on the ground that the murderous act was the act of the German Government. Yet, after all this time, the _Lusitania_ case is still unsettled. The administration has, with marvellous self-restraint, recognised that public opinion in Germany was not normal, and for that reason it has done everything in its power to smooth the way to a settlement by making it as easy as possible for the Imperial Government to meet our just demands. Indeed, the President has gone so far as to expose himself to severe criticism at home. We believe that he would have been sustained if he had, immediately after the sinking of the _Lusitania_, broken off diplomatic relations.
"But he has stood out against public opinion in his own country, waited ten months for an answer, and done everything that he could in honour due to soften the feeling here. Yet just on the eve of a settlement that would have been unsatisfactory to many of our people, Germany announced the policy that we had condemned as illegal, and that plainly is illegal. The trouble in Berlin is an utter inability to see anything wrong in the attack on the _Lusitania_, or to appreciate the sense of horror that was stirred in this country by it. The idea seems to be that the policy of frightfulness could be extended to the high seas without in any way shocking the American people. Nothing has come from Berlin that indicates any feeling of guilt on the part of the German people or their Government.
"In the United States, on the contrary, the act is regarded as one of the blackest crimes of history. And yet, in spite of that feeling, we have waited patiently for ten months in the hope that the German Government would do justice, and clear its name of reproach. Yet now we are told that it is Germany that has shown a "patient att.i.tude," the implication or insinuation being that our long suffering administration has been unreasonable and impatient. That will not be the verdict of history, as it is not the verdict of our own people. We have made every allowance for the conditions existing in Germany, and have resolutely refused to take advantage of her distress. We doubt whether there is any other government in the world that would have shown the patience and moderation, under like provocation, that have been shown by the American Government in these _Lusitania_ negotiations."
I sent the editorial to von Jagow, who returned it the next day with the brief comment on one of his calling cards: "With many thanks."
About this time Count Reventlow and the other naval writers began to refer to everything President Wilson did as a "bluff." When Col. E. M.
House came to Berlin early in 1916, he tried to impress the officials with the fact that Mr. Wilson was not only not bluffing, but that the American people would support him in whatever he did in dealing with the German Government. Mr. Gerard tried too to impress the Foreign Office but because he could only deal with that branch of the Government, he could not change the Navy"s impression, which was that Wilson would never take a definite stand against Germany. On the 8th of February, the _London Times_ printed the following despatch which I had sent to the United States:
"Mr. Gerard has been accused of not being forceful enough in dealing with the Berlin Foreign Office. In Berlin he has been criticised for just the opposite. It has been stated frequently that he was too aggressive. The Amba.s.sador"s position was that he must carry out Mr.
Wilson"s ideas. So he tried for days and weeks to impress officials with the seriousness of the situation. At the critical point in the negotiations various unofficial diplomats began to arrive and they seriously interfered with negotiations. One of these was a politician who through his credentials from Mr. Bryan met many high officials, and informed them that President Wilson was writing his notes for "home consumption." Mr. Gerard, however, appealed to Washington to know what was meant by the moves of this American with authority from Mr. Bryan.
This was the beginning of the reason for Secretary Bryan"s resigning.