53.
Do we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests herself in the preservation of those admirable works, which we attribute to her? If it is she, who governs the world, we find her as active in destroying, as in forming; in exterminating, as in producing. Does she not every moment destroy, by thousands, the very men, to whose preservation and welfare we suppose her continually attentive? Every moment she loses sight of her beloved creature. Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes she annihilates his harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields, sometimes she desolates them by a burning drought. She arms all nature against man.
She arms man himself against his own species, and commonly terminates his existence in anguish. Is this then what is called preserving the universe?
If we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of Providence towards the human race and all sensible beings, we should find, that far from resembling a tender and careful mother, she resembles rather those unnatural mothers, who instantly forgetting the unfortunates of their licentious love, abandon their infants, as soon as they are born, and who, content with having borne them, expose them, helpless, to the caprice of fortune.
The Hottentots, in this respect are much wiser than other nations, who treat them as barbarians, and refuse to worship G.o.d; because, they say, _if he often does good, he often does evil_. Is not this manner of reasoning more just and conformable to experience, than that of many men, who are determined to see, in their G.o.d, nothing but goodness, wisdom, and foresight, and who refuse to see that the innumerable evils, of which this world is the theatre, must come from the same hand, which they kiss with delight?
54.
Common sense teaches, that we cannot, and ought not, to judge of a cause, but by its effects. A cause can be reputed constantly good, only when it constantly produces good. A cause, which produces both good and evil, is sometimes good, and sometimes evil. But the logic of theology destroys all this. According to that, the phenomena of nature, or the effects we behold in this world, prove to us the existence of a cause infinitely good; and this cause is G.o.d. Although this world is full of evils; although disorder often reigns in it; although men incessantly repine at their hard fate; we must be convinced, that these effects are owing to a beneficent and immutable cause; and many people believe it, or feign believe.
Every thing that pa.s.ses in the world, proves to us, in the clearest manner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can judge of the intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the means, which he employs to attain his proposed object. The object of G.o.d, is the happiness of a man. Yet, a like necessity governs the fate of all sensible beings, who are born only to suffer much, enjoy little, and die. The cup of man is filled with joy and bitterness; good is every where attended with evil; order gives place to disorder; generation is followed by destruction.
If you say, that the designs of G.o.d are mysterious and that his ways are impenetrable; I answer, that, in this case, it is impossible to judge whether G.o.d be intelligent.
55.
You pretend, that G.o.d is immutable! What then produces a continual instability in this world, which you make his empire? Is there a state, subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions, than that of this unknown monarch? How can we attribute to an immutable G.o.d, sufficiently powerful to give solidity to his works, a government, in which every thing is in continual vicissitude? If I imagine I see a G.o.d of uniform character in all the effects favourable to my species, what kind of a G.o.d can I see in their continual misfortunes? You tell me, it is our sins, which compel him to punish. I answer, that G.o.d, according to yourselves, is then not immutable, since the sins of men force him to change his conduct towards them. Can a being, who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, be constantly the same?
56.
The universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings in it enjoy and suffer; that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and sometimes in a disagreeable manner. These effects are necessary; they result necessarily from causes, which act only according to their properties. These effects necessarily please, or displease, by a consequence of nature. This same nature compels me to avoid, avert, and resist some things, and to seek, desire, and procure others. In a world, where every thing is necessary, a G.o.d, who remedies nothing, who leaves things to run in their necessary course,--is he any thing but destiny, or necessity personified? It is a deaf and useless G.o.d, who can effect no change in general laws, to which he is himself subject. Of what importance is the infinite power of a being, who will do but very little in my favour? Where is the infinite goodness of a being, indifferent to happiness? Of what service is the favour of a being, who, is able to do an infinite good, does not do even a finite one?
57.
When we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under the government of a good G.o.d, we are told, by way of consolation, that the present world is only a pa.s.sage, designed to conduct man to a happier one. The divines a.s.sure us, that the earth we inhabit, is a state of trial. In short, they shut our mouths, by saying, that G.o.d could communicate to his creatures neither impossibility nor infinite happiness, which are reserved for himself alone. Can such answers be satisfactory? 1st. The existence of another life is guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man, who, by supposing it, have only realized the desire they have of surviving themselves, in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more durable happiness. 2ndly. How can we conceive that a G.o.d, who knows every thing, and must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures, should want so many experiments, in order to be sure of their dispositions? 3rdly. According to the calculations of their chronologists, our earth has existed six or seven thousand years. During that time, nations have experienced calamities. History exhibits the human species at all times tormented and ravaged by tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; by wars, inundations, famines, plagues, etc. Are such long trials then likely to inspire us with very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity?
Do such numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of the future state, his goodness is preparing for us? 4thly. If G.o.d is so kindly disposed, as he is a.s.serted to be, without giving men infinite happiness, could he not at least have communicated the degree of happiness, of which finite beings are susceptible here below? To be happy, must we have an _infinite_ or _divine_ happiness? 5thly. If G.o.d could not make men happier than they are here below, what will become of the hope of a _paradise_, where it is pretended, that the elect will for ever enjoy ineffable bliss? If G.o.d neither could nor would avert evil from the earth, the only residence we can know, what reason have we to presume, that he can or will avert evil from another world, of which we have no idea? Epicurus observed: "either G.o.d would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or he can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he has both the power and will. If he has the will, and not the power, this shews weakness, which is contrary to the nature of G.o.d. If he has the power, and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary to his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent and malignant, and consequently cannot be G.o.d. If he be both willing and able (which alone is consonant to the nature of G.o.d) whence comes evil, or why does he not prevent it?" Reflecting minds are still waiting for a reasonable solution of these difficulties; and our divines tell us, that they will be removed only in a future life.
58.
We are told of a pretended _scale of beings_. It is supposed, that G.o.d has divided his creatures into different cla.s.ses, in which each enjoys the degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible. According to this romantic arrangement, from the oyster to the celestial angels, all beings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to their nature. Experience explicitly contradicts this sublime reverie. In this world, all sensible beings suffer and live in the midst of dangers. Man cannot walk without hurting, tormenting, or killing a mult.i.tude of sensible beings, which are in his way; while he himself is exposed, at every step, to a mult.i.tude of evils, foreseen or unforeseen, which may lead him to destruction. During the whole course of his life, he is exposed to pains; he is not sure, a moment, of his existence, to which he is so strongly attached, and which he regards as the greatest gift of the Divinity.
59.
The world, it will be said, has all the perfection, of which it is susceptible: since it is not G.o.d who made it, it must have great qualities and great defects. But we answer, that, as the world must necessarily have great defects, it would have been more conformable to the nature of a good G.o.d, not to have created a world, which he could not make completely happy. If G.o.d was supremely happy, before the creation of the world, and could have continued to be supremely happy, without creating the world, why did he not remain at rest? Why must man suffer? Why must man exist? Of what importance is his existence to G.o.d? Nothing, or something? If man"s existence is not useful or necessary to G.o.d, why did G.o.d make man? If man"s existence is necessary to G.o.d"s glory, he had need of man; he was deficient in something before man existed. We can pardon an unskilful workman for making an imperfect work; because he must work, well or ill, upon penalty of starving. This workman is excusable, but G.o.d is not.
According to you, he is self-sufficient; if so, why does he make men? He has, you say, every thing requisite to make man happy. Why then does he not do it? Confess, that your G.o.d has more malice than goodness, unless you admit, that G.o.d, was necessitated to do what he has done, without being able to do it otherwise. Yet, you a.s.sure us, that G.o.d is free. You say also, that he is immutable, although it was in _Time_ that he began and ceased to exercise his power, like the inconstant beings of this world. O theologians! Vain are your efforts to free your G.o.d from defects.
This perfect G.o.d has always some human imperfections.
60.
"Is not G.o.d master of his favours? Can he not give them? Can he not take them away? It does not belong to his creatures to require reasons for his conduct. He can dispose of the works of his own hands as he pleases.
Absolute sovereign of mortals, he distributes happiness or misery, according to his good pleasure." Such are the solutions given by theologians to console us for the evils which G.o.d inflicts upon us.
We reply, that a G.o.d, who is infinitely good, cannot be _master of his favours_, but would by his nature be obliged to bestow them upon his creatures; that a being, truly beneficent, cannot refrain from doing good; that a being, truly generous, does not take back what he has given; and that every man, who does so, dispenses with grat.i.tude, and has no right to complain of finding ungrateful men.
How can the odd and capricious conduct, which theologians ascribe to G.o.d, be reconciled with religion, which supposes a covenant, or mutual engagements between G.o.d and men? If G.o.d owes nothing to his creatures, they, on their part, can owe nothing to their G.o.d. All religion is founded upon the happiness that men think they have a right to expect from the Deity, who is supposed to say to them: _Love me, adore me, obey me: and I will make you happy_. Men, on their part, say to him: _Make us happy, be faithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you, and obey your laws_. By neglecting the happiness of his creatures, distributing his favours according to his caprice, and retracting his gifts, does not G.o.d break the covenant, which serves as the basis of all religion? Cicero has justly observed, that _if G.o.d is not agreeable to man, he cannot be his G.o.d_. Goodness const.i.tutes deity; this goodness can be manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys; as soon as he is unhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the divinity. An infinite goodness can be neither limited, partial, nor exclusive. If G.o.d be infinitely good, he owes happiness to all his creatures. The unhappiness of a single being would suffice to annihilate unbounded goodness. Under an infinitely good and powerful G.o.d, is it possible to conceive that a single man should suffer? One animal, or mite, that suffers, furnishes invincible arguments against divine providence and its infinite goodness.
61.
According to theology, the afflictions and evils of this life are chastis.e.m.e.nts, which guilty men incur from the hand of G.o.d. But why are men guilty? If G.o.d is omnipotent, does it cost him more to say: "Let every thing in the world be in order; let all my subjects be good, innocent, and fortunate," than to say: "Let every thing exist"? Was it more difficult for this G.o.d to do his work well, than badly? Religion tells us of a h.e.l.l; that is, a frightful abode, where, notwithstanding his goodness, G.o.d reserves infinite torments for the majority of men. Thus after having rendered mortals very unhappy in this world, religion tells them, that G.o.d can render them still more unhappy in another! The theologian gets over this, by saying, that the goodness of G.o.d will then give place to his justice. But a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty, is not an infinite goodness. Besides, can a G.o.d, who, after having been infinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutable being? Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodness, in a G.o.d filled with implacable fury?
62.
Divine justice, as stated by our divines, is undoubtedly a quality very proper to cherish in us the love of the Divinity. According to the ideas of modern theology, it is evident, that G.o.d has created the majority of men, with the sole view of putting them in a fair way to incur eternal punishment. Would it not have been more conformable to goodness, reason, and equity, to have created only stones or plants, and not to have created sensible beings; than to have formed men, whose conduct in this world might subject them to endless punishment in the other? A G.o.d perfidious and malicious enough to create a single man, and then to abandon him to the danger of being d.a.m.ned, cannot be regarded as a perfect being; but as an unreasonable, unjust, and ill-natured. Very far from composing a perfect G.o.d, theologians have formed the most imperfect of beings.
According to theological notions, G.o.d would resemble a tyrant, who, having put out the eyes of the greater part of his slaves, should shut them up in a dungeon, where, for his amus.e.m.e.nt, he would, incognito, observe their conduct through a trap-door, in order to punish with rigour all those, who, while walking about, should hit against each other; but who would magnificently reward the few whom he had not deprived of sight, in avoiding to run against their comrades. Such are the ideas, which the dogma of gratuitous predestination gives us of the divinity!
Although men are continually repeating that their G.o.d is infinitely good; yet it is evident, that in reality, they can believe nothing of the kind. How can we love what we do not know? How can we love a being, whose character is only fit to throw us into inquietude and trouble? How can we love a being, of whom all that is said tends to render him an object of utter detestation?
63.
Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion and superst.i.tion. They say, that the latter is only a base and inordinate fear of the Deity; but that the truly religious man has confidence in his G.o.d, and loves him sincerely; whereas, the superst.i.tious man sees in him only an enemy, has no confidence in him, and represents him to himself as a distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his benefits, lavish of his chastis.e.m.e.nts. But, in reality, does not all religion give us the same ideas of G.o.d? At the same time that we are told, that G.o.d is infinitely good, are we not also told, that he is very easily provoked, that he grants his favours to a few people only, and that he furiously chastises those, to whom he has not been pleased to grant favours?
64.