The Second Council of Orange summarizes the teaching of Tradition on the subject under consideration.(343)
c) The theological argument for our thesis is based on the character of the adoptive sonship resulting from the process of justification.(344) This sonship (_filiatio adoptiva_) is essentially supernatural, and hence can be attained only by strictly supernatural acts, which unaided nature is both morally and physically incapable of performing.(345)
*Thesis III: Even in the state of sanctifying grace man is not able to perform salutary acts, unless aided by actual graces.*
This is likewise _de fide_.
Proof. The faculties of the just man are permanently kept in the supernatural sphere by sanctifying grace and by the habits of faith, hope, and charity. Hence the just man in the performance of salutary acts does not require the same measure of prevenient grace as the unregenerate sinner, who lacks all, or at least some, of the habits mentioned.
The question here at issue, therefore, can only be: Is actual grace (as _gratia excitans s. vocans_, not _elevans_) absolutely necessary to enable a man in the state of sanctifying grace to perform salutary acts? The answer is-Yes, and this teaching is so firmly grounded on Sacred Scripture and Tradition, and so emphatically sanctioned by the Church, that we do not hesitate to follow Perrone in qualifying it as _de fide_.(346) The councils in their teaching on the necessity of grace, a.s.sert that necessity alike for the justified and the unjustified. That of Trent expressly declares: "Whereas Jesus Christ Himself continually infuses His virtue into the justified,-as the head into the members, and the vine into the branches,-and this virtue always precedes and accompanies and follows their good works, which without it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious before G.o.d, we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified...."(347)
a) Our thesis can be easily proved from Holy Scripture. We have already shown that the Bible and Tradition make no distinction between the different stages on the way to salvation, or between different salutary acts, but indiscriminately postulate for all the illuminating grace of the intellect and the strengthening grace of the will. It follows that to perform salutary acts the justified no less than the unjustified need actual grace. Our Saviour"s pithy saying: "Without me you can do nothing,"(348) was not addressed to unbelievers or sinners, but to His Apostles, who were in the state of sanctifying grace.(349)
This interpretation is fully borne out by Tradition. St. Augustine, after laying it down as a general principle that "We can of ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without G.o.d either working that we may will, or co-operating when we will,"(350) says of justified man in particular: "The Heavenly Physician cures our maladies, not only that they may cease to exist, but in order that we may ever afterwards be able to walk aright,-a task to which we should be unequal, even after our healing, were it not for His continued help.... For just as the eye of the body, even when completely sound, is unable to see, unless aided by the brightness of light, so also man, even when fully justified, is unable to lead a holy life, unless he be divinely a.s.sisted by the eternal light of righteousness."(351)
This agrees with the practice of the Church in exhorting all men without exception, saints as well as sinners, to pray: "Precede, we beseech Thee, O Lord, our actions by Thy holy inspiration, and carry them on by Thy gracious a.s.sistance, that every prayer and work of ours may begin always from Thee, and through Thee be happily ended."(352)
b) Some theologians have been led by certain speculative difficulties to deny the necessity of actual grace in the state of justification.
Man in the state of justification, they argue, is endowed with sanctifying grace, the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity, and the infused moral virtues, and consequently possesses all those qualifications which are necessary to enable him to perform salutary acts with the supernatural concurrence of G.o.d. Why should the will, thus supernaturally equipped, require the aid of additional actual graces to enable it to perform strictly supernatural, and therefore salutary, actions?(353)
We reply: The necessity of actual grace in the state of justification is so clearly taught by divine Revelation that no theological theory is tenable which denies it. Besides, the objection we have briefly summarized disregards some very essential considerations, _e.g._ that there remains in man, even after justification, concupiscence, which is accompanied by a certain weakness that requires at least the _gratia sanans sive medicinalis_ to heal it.(354) Furthermore, a quiescent _habitus_ cannot set itself in motion, but must be determined from without; that is to say, in our case, it must be moved by the _gratia excitans_ to elicit supernatural thoughts and to will supernatural acts. Just as a seed cannot sprout without the aid of appropriate stimuli, so sanctifying grace is incapable of bearing fruit unless stimulated by the sunshine and moisture of actual graces. Man may perform purely natural acts even though he be in the supernatural state of grace; hence if any particular act of his is to be truly supernatural and conducive to eternal salvation, G.o.d must lend His special aid.(355)
*Thesis IV: Except by a special privilege of divine grace, man, even though he be in the state of sanctifying grace, is unable to avoid venial sin throughout life.*
This is likewise _de fide_.
Proof. The Pelagians held that man is able to avoid sin, nay to attain to absolute impeccability,(356) without supernatural a.s.sistance. Against this error the Second Council of Mileve (A. D. 416) defined: "It likewise hath pleased [the holy Synod] that whoever holds that the words of the Our Father: "Forgive us our trespa.s.ses," when p.r.o.nounced by saintly men, are p.r.o.nounced in token of humility, but not truthfully, should be anathema."(357) Still more to the point is the following declaration of the Council of Trent: "If any one saith that a man once justified ... is able, during his whole life, to avoid all sins, even those that are venial, except by a special grace from G.o.d, as the Church holds in regard of the Blessed Virgin; let him be anathema."(358)
To obtain a better understanding of this Tridentine definition it will be well to ponder the following considerations:
The Council declares that it is impossible for man, even in the state of sanctifying grace, to avoid all sins during his whole life, except by virtue of a special privilege such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin Mary.(359) A venial sin is one which, because of the unimportance of the precept involved, or in consequence of incomplete consent, does not destroy the state of grace. Such a sin may be either deliberate or semi-deliberate. A semi-deliberate venial sin is one committed in haste or surprise. It is chiefly sins of this kind that the Tridentine Council had in view. For no one would seriously a.s.sert that with the aid of divine grace a saint could not avoid at least all deliberate venial sins for a considerable length of time. The phrase "_in tota vita_" indicates a period of some length, though its limits are rather difficult to determine. Were a man to die immediately after justification, the Tridentine canon would _per accidens_ not apply to him. As the Council says in another place that "men, how holy and just soever, at times fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also called venial,"(360) it is safe practically to limit the period of possible freedom from venial sin to one day. Theoretically, of course, it may be extended much farther.
The phrase "_omnia peccata_" must be interpreted collectively, not distributively, for a sin that could not be avoided would cease to be a sin. For the same reason the term "_non posse_" must be understood of (moral, not physical) disability; in other words, the difficulty of avoiding sin with the aid of ordinary graces for any considerable length of time, is insuperable even for the just. This moral impossibility of avoiding sin can be removed only by a special privilege, such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin Mary. It may incidentally be asked whether this privilege was also granted to other saints, notably St. Joseph and St. John the Baptist. Suarez lays it down as a theological conclusion that no human being has ever been or ever will be able entirely to avoid venial sin except by a special privilege, which must in each case be proved.
Palmieri maintains that the moral impossibility of leading an absolutely sinless life without the special a.s.sistance of grace is taught by indirection in the canons of Mileve (416) and Carthage (418), which declare that no such life has ever been led by mortal man without that a.s.sistance.(361)
a) The Scriptural argument for our thesis was fully developed by the councils just mentioned. The careful student will note, however, that those texts only are strictly conclusive which positively and exclusively refer to venial sins. Thus when St. James says: "In many things we all offend,"(362) he cannot mean that all Christians now and then necessarily commit mortal sin. For St. John expressly declares that "Whosoever abideth in him [Christ], sinneth not."(363)
It follows that not even the just can wholly avoid venial sin. Hence the most devout and pious Christian may truthfully repeat the pet.i.tion of the Lord"s Prayer which says: "Forgive us our trespa.s.ses,(364) as we forgive those who trespa.s.s against us."(365) Profoundly conscious of the sinfulness of the entire human race, the author of the Book of Proverbs exclaims: "Who can say, My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?"(366)
Other Scripture texts commonly cited in confirmation of our thesis lack cogency, because they either deal exclusively with mortal sin or do not refer to sin at all. Thus Prov. XXIV, 16: "A just man shall fall seven times and shall rise again," is meant of temporal adversities.(367) Eccles. VII, 21: "There is no just man upon earth, that doth good and sinneth not,"(368) can scarcely be understood of venial sin, because the sacred writer continues: "For thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast often spoken evil of others."(369) 1 John I, 8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us,"(370) would be a splendid argument for our thesis, could it be shown that the Apostle had in mind only the venial sins committed in the state of justification. This is, however, unlikely, as the term _peccatum_ throughout St. John"s first Epistle(371) is obviously employed in the sense of mortal sin.(372)
b) Tradition is again most effectively voiced by St. Augustine, who writes: "There are three points, as you know, which the Catholic Church chiefly maintains against them [the Pelagians]. One is, that the grace of G.o.d is not given according to our merits.... The second, that no one lives in this corruptible body in righteousness of any degree without sins of any kind. The third, that man is born obnoxious to the first man"s sin...."(373) To Pelagius" objection: "If all men sin, then the just must die in their sins," the holy Doctor replies: "With all his acuteness he [Pelagius] overlooks the circ.u.mstance that even righteous persons pray with good reason: "Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors."...
Even if we cannot live without sin, we may yet die without sin, whilst the sin committed in ignorance or infirmity is blotted out in merciful forgiveness."(374) In another chapter of the same treatise he says: "If ... we could a.s.semble all the afore-mentioned holy men and women, and ask them whether they lived without sin, ... would they not all exclaim with one voice: "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us"?"(375)
c) We come to the theological argument. The moral impossibility of avoiding venial sin for any considerable length of time results partly from the infirmity of human nature (_infirmitas naturae_), partly from G.o.d"s pre-established plan of salvation (_ordo divinae providentiae_).
a) The infirmity of human nature flows from four separate and distinct sources: (1) concupiscence (_fomes peccati_); (2) imperfection of the ethical judgment (_imperfectio iudicii_); (3) inconstancy of the will (_inconstantia voluntatis_); and (4) the weariness caused by continued resistance to temptation. In view of these agencies and their combined attack upon the will, theologians speak of a _necessitas antecedens peccandi_;-not as if the will were predestined to succ.u.mb to any one temptation in particular, but in the sense that it is morally unable to resist the whole series (_suppositione disiuncta_). The will simply grows weaker and weaker, and in course of time fails to resist sin with sufficient energy.
Let us exemplify. The proofsheets of a book are scrutinized by several trained readers, yet in spite of the greatest care and many ingenious devices for the elimination of error, a perfect book, _i.e._ one entirely free from mistakes, is a practical impossibility. How much harder must it be for man to avoid moral lapses throughout his whole life, considering that he cannot choose his own time for meeting temptations, but must keep his mind and will under constant control and be prepared to resist the enemy at any moment.(376)
St. Thomas Aquinas says: "Man cannot avoid all venial sin, because his sensual appet.i.te is depraved. True, reason is able to suppress the individual stirrings of this appet.i.te. In fact, it is on this account that they are voluntary and partake of the nature of sin. But reason is not able to suppress them all [collectively], because, while it tries to resist one, there perhaps arises another, and, furthermore, reason is not always in a condition to exercise the vigilance necessary to avoid such impulses."(377)
It follows that the _necessitas peccandi antecedens_ does not destroy the liberty of the will or the moral imputability of those venial sins which a man actually commits; for it is merely a _necessitas indeterminata_, which refers not to certain particular instances, but to the one or other indeterminately. It follows further that G.o.d does not command the impossible when He insists that we should avoid venial sin, for He does not in each single case command something which is physically or morally impossible,(378) but merely demands a perfection which in itself is not entirely unattainable _hic et nunc_ with the a.s.sistance of ordinary grace.(379)
) The second theological reason for the impossibility of avoiding venial sin for any considerable time is based on the eternal scheme of salvation decreed by Divine Providence. This scheme of salvation must not, of course, be conceived as a divine precept to commit venial sins. It is merely a wise toleration of sin and a just refusal, on the part of the Almighty, to restore the human race to that entirely unmerited state of freedom from concupiscence with which it was endowed in Paradise, and which alone could guarantee the moral possibility of unspotted innocence.
Both factors in their last a.n.a.lysis are based upon the will of G.o.d to exercise those whom He has justified in humility and to safeguard us against pride, which is the deadliest enemy of our salvation.(380) In making this wise decree G.o.d, of course, infallibly foresaw that no man (with the sole exception of those to whom He might grant a special privilege) would _de facto_ be able to pa.s.s through life without committing venial sins. This infallible foreknowledge is based not alone on the _scientia media_, but also on the infirmity of human nature.
Hence Suarez was entirely justified in rejecting the singular opinion of de Vega,(381) that the Tridentine definition does not exclude the possibility of exceptions.(382)
Nevertheless the faithful are wisely warned against both indifference and despondency. "Let no one say that he is without sin, but let us not for this reason love sin. Let us detest sin, brethren. Though we are not without sins, let us hate them; especially let us avoid grievous sins, and venial sins, too, as much as we can."(383)
*Thesis V: No man can persevere in righteousness without special help from G.o.d.*
This proposition is also _de fide_.
Proof. The Semipelagians a.s.serted that man is able by his own power to persevere in righteousness to the end.(384) Against this teaching the Second Council of Orange defined: "Even those who are reborn and holy must implore the help of G.o.d, in order that they may be enabled to attain the good end, or to persevere in the good work."(385) This definition was repeated in substance by the Council of Trent: "If any one saith that the justified either is able without the special help of G.o.d to persevere in the justice received, or that, with that help, he is not able; let him be anathema."(386)
Perfect perseverance is the preservation of baptismal innocence, or, in a less strict sense, of the state of grace, until death. Imperfect perseverance is a temporary continuance in grace, _e.g._ for a month or a year, until the next mortal sin. Imperfect perseverance, according to the Tridentine Council, requires no special divine a.s.sistance (_speciale auxilium_).(387)
Final perseverance is either pa.s.sive or active, according as the justified dies in the state of grace irrespective of his will (as baptized children and insane adults),(388) or actively cooperates with grace whenever the state of grace is imperilled by grievous temptation. The Council of Trent has especially this latter case in view when it speaks of the necessity of a _speciale auxilium_, because the special help extended by G.o.d presupposes cooperation with grace, and man cannot strictly speaking cooperate in a happy death. The Council purposely speaks of an _auxilium_, not a _privilegium_, because a privilege is by its very nature granted to but few, while the special help of grace extends to all the elect. This _auxilium_ is designated as _speciale_, because final perseverance is not conferred with sanctifying grace, nor is it a result of the mere power of perseverance (_posse perseverare_). The state of sanctifying grace simply confers a claim to ordinary graces, while the power of perseverance of itself by no means insures actual perseverance (_actu perseverare_). The power of perseverance is a.s.sured by those merely sufficient graces which are constantly at the command of the righteous. Actual perseverance, on the other hand, implies a series of efficacious graces. G.o.d is under no obligation to bestow more than sufficient grace on any man; consequently, final perseverance is a special grace, or, more correctly, a continuous series of efficacious graces. The Council of Trent is therefore justified in speaking of it as "a great gift."(389)
a) Sacred Scripture represents final perseverance as the fruit of prayer and as a special gift not included in the bare notion of justification.
a) Our Divine Saviour Himself says in His prayer for His disciples, John XVII, 11: "Holy Father, keep them in thy name whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we also are."(390) St. Paul teaches in his Epistle to the Colossians: "Epaphras saluteth you ... who is always solicitous for you in prayers, that you may stand perfect and full in all the will of G.o.d."(391) Hence the necessity of constantly watching and praying: "Watch ye and pray that ye enter not into temptation."(392)
) That perseverance is not included in the bare notion of justification appears from such pa.s.sages as these: Phil. I, 6: "Being confident of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus."(393) 1 Pet. I, 5: "Who, by the power of G.o.d, are kept by faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time."(394)
b) The threads of Tradition run together in the hands of St. Augustine, who has written a special treatise On the Gift of Perseverance.(395)
His main argument is based on the necessity of prayer. "Why," he asks, "is that perseverance asked for from G.o.d, if it is not given by G.o.d? Is it a mocking pet.i.tion inasmuch as that is asked of Him which it is known He does not give, but, although He gives it not, is in man"s power?... Or is not that perseverance, perchance, asked for from Him? He who says this, is not to be rebuked by my arguments, but must be overwhelmed with the prayers of the saints. Is there indeed one among them who do not ask for themselves from G.o.d that they may persevere in Him, when in that very prayer which is called the Lord"s-because the Lord taught it-whenever it is prayed by the saints, scarcely anything else is understood to be prayed for but perseverance?"(396) He then proceeds to show, in accordance with St. Cyprian"s little treatise On the Lord"s Prayer, that the seven pet.i.tions of the "Our Father" are all prayers for perseverance, and concludes as follows: "Truly in this matter let not the Church look for laborious disputations, but consider her own daily prayers. She prays that the unbelieving may believe; therefore G.o.d converts to the faith. She prays that believers may persevere; therefore G.o.d gives perseverance to the end."(397) And again: "For who is there that would groan with a sincere desire to receive what he prays for from the Lord, if he thought that he received it from himself and not from the Lord?"(398)
c) From this teaching flows a corollary of great practical importance, to wit: The grace of final perseverance cannot be merited by good works, but it can be obtained by pious and unremitting prayer.
"This gift of G.o.d," says St. Augustine, speaking of final perseverance, "may be obtained suppliantly [by prayer], but when it has been given, it cannot be lost contumaciously."(399) And again: "Since it is manifest that G.o.d has prepared some things to be given even to those who do not pray for them, such as the beginning of faith, and other things not to be given except to those who pray for them, such as perseverance unto the end, certainly he who thinks that he has this latter from himself, does not pray to obtain it."(400)
Between merit (_meritum_) and prayer (_oratio, preces_) there is this great difference, that merit appeals to G.o.d"s justice, prayer to His mercy. If man were able to merit final perseverance by good works (_meritum de condigno_), G.o.d would be in justice bound to give him this precious grace. But this is plainly incompatible with the Catholic conception of final perseverance.
It may be asked: Is G.o.d determined by the _meritum de congruo_ inherent in all good works to grant the gift of final perseverance as a reward to the righteous? Theologians are at variance on this point. Ripalda(401) thinks that this is the case at least with the more conspicuous good works performed in the state of grace. Suarez modifies this improbable contention somewhat by saying that prayer alone can infallibly guarantee final perseverance.(402) Our prayers are infallibly heard if we address the Father through Jesus Christ, because Christ has promised: "If you ask the Father anything in my name, he will give it you."(403) To insure its being infallibly heard, prayer for perseverance must be made in the state of grace and unremittingly. True, Christ did not make sanctifying grace a necessary condition of efficacious prayer. But, as Suarez points out, prayer cannot be infallibly efficacious unless it proceeds from one who is in the state of grace, because the moral conditions that render it efficacious are found only in that state.(404) As to the second point, if we say that prayer for perseverance must be unremitting, we mean, in the words of the same eminent theologian, that it must continue throughout life and must be made with becoming trustfulness and zeal, especially when there is a duty to be fulfilled or a temptation to be overcome.(405)
READINGS:-Suarez, _De Gratia_, 1. I-II.-*Trica.s.sin, O. Cap., _De Necessaria ad Salutem Gratia_.-Byonius, _De Gratiae Auxiliis_, in Beca.n.u.s, _Theologia Scholastica_, Rouen, 1658.-Scheeben _Natur und Gnade_, Mainz 1861.-IDEM, _Dogmatik_, Vol. III, -- 292-298, Freiburg 1882.-*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 19-29, Gulpen 1885.-Oswald, _Lehre von der Heiligung_, -- 9-11, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.-Tepe, _Inst.i.tutiones Theologicae_, Vol. III, pp.
8-51, Paris 1896.-*Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, -- 396-416, Mainz 1897.-Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Freiburg 1908.-Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 2, Freiburg 1901.
On St. Augustine and his teaching cfr. *J. Ernst, _Werke und Tugenden der Unglaubigen nach Augustinus_, Freiburg 1871.-F.
Worter, _Die Geistesentwicklung des hl. Augustinus bis zu seiner Taufe_, Paderborn 1898.-Wolfsgruber, _Augustinus_, Paderborn 1898.-Boucat, _Theologia Patrum Dogmatico-Scholastico-Positiva_, disp. 3, Paris 1718.-*Zaccaria, _Dissert. de Adiutorio sine quo non_, in the _Thesaurus Theol._, Vol. V, Venice 1762.-O.
Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Geistesfruchte aus der Klosterzelle_, Munchen 1908.-B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 306 sqq., 374 sq.
On the heresy of Pelagianism cfr. *F. Worter, _Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre_, Freiburg 1874.-F. Klasen, _Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus_, Freiburg 1882.-Schwane, _Dogmengeschichte_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., -- 60 sqq., Freiburg 1895.-H. Zimmer, _Pelagius in Irland_, Berlin 1901.-Warfield, _Two Studies in the History of Doctrine_, New York 1897.-Tixeront, _Histoire des Dogmes_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris 1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).-Pohle in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. XI, pp. 604-608.-B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, pp. 357 sqq.