) The theory under consideration is inadmissible also from the philosophical point of view. A quality does not "flow" or tend to revert to nothingness. On the contrary, its very nature demands that it remain constant until destroyed by its opposite or by some positive cause. It is impossible to conceive a quality that would of itself revert to nothingness without the intervention of a destructive cause. Billuart merely beats the air when he says: "_Potest dici qualitas incompleta habens se per modum pa.s.sionis transeuntis._"(77) What would Aristotle have said if he had been told of a thing that was half p???? and half p?s?e??, and consequently neither the one nor the other? Actual grace is transitory; it pa.s.ses away with the act which it inspires, and consequently may be said to "flow." But this very fact proves that it is not a dead quality, but a _modus vitalis supernaturalis_. In the dispensation of His grace, G.o.d employs no fluent qualities or non-vital ent.i.ties, but He Himself is the immediate cause of the supernatural elevation of the human soul and its faculties. St. Thomas is perfectly consistent, therefore, when he defines actual grace as a vital act of the soul.(78)
5. PREVENIENT AND COoPERATING GRACE.-The vital acts of the soul are either spontaneous impulses or free acts of the will. Grace may precede free-will or cooperate with it. If it precedes the free determination of the will it is called prevenient; if it accompanies (or coincides with) that determination and merely cooperates with the will, it is called cooperating grace.
Prevenient grace, regarded as a divine call to penance, is often styled _gratia vocans sive excitans_, and if it is received with a willing heart, _gratia adiuvans_. Both species are distinctly mentioned in Holy Scripture. Cfr. Eph. V, 14: "Wherefore he saith: Rise thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead: and Christ shall enlighten thee." 2 Tim. I, 9: "Who hath delivered us and called us by his holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the times of the world." Rom. VIII, 26: "Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity." Rom. VIII, 30: "And whom he predestinated, them he also called. And whom he called, them he also justified. And whom he justified, them he also glorified." Apoc. III, 20: "Behold I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear my voice, and open to me the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me."
St. Augustine says: "Forasmuch as our turning away from G.o.d is our own act and deed, and this is [our] depraved will; but that we turn to G.o.d, this we cannot do except He rouse and help us, and this is [our] good will,-what have we that we have not received?"(79)
An equivalent division is that into _gratia operans_ and _cooperans_, respectively-names which are also founded on Scripture. Cfr. Phil. II, 13: "For it is G.o.d who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will." Mark XVI, 20: "But they going forth preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."
St. Augustine describes the respective functions of these graces as follows: "He [G.o.d] begins His influence by working in us that we may have the will, and He completes it by working with us when we have the will."(80)
A third division of the same grace is that into _praeveniens_ and _subsequens_. It is likewise distinctly Scriptural,(81) and its two members coincide materially with _gratia vocans_ and _adiuvans_, as can be seen by comparing the usage of St. Augustine with that of the Tridentine Council. "G.o.d"s mercy," says the holy Doctor, "prevents [_i.e._ precedes]
the unwilling to make him willing; it follows the willing lest he will in vain."(82) And the Council of Trent declares that "in adults the beginning of justification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of G.o.d, through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their part, they are called."(83)
If we conceive a continuous series of supernatural graces, each may be called either prevenient or subsequent, according as it is regarded either as a cause or as an effect. St. Thomas explains this as follows: "As grace is divided into working and cooperating grace, according to its diverse effects, so it may also be divided into prevenient and subsequent grace, according to the meaning attached to the term grace [_i.e._, either habitual or actual]. The effects which grace works in us are five: (1) It heals the soul; (2) moves it to will that which is good; (3) enables man efficaciously to perform the good deeds which he wills; (4) helps him to persevere in his good resolves; and (5) a.s.sists him in attaining to the state of glory. In so far as it produces the first of these effects, grace is called prevenient in respect of the second; and in so far as it produces the second, it is called subsequent in respect of the first. And as each effect is posterior to one and prior to another, so grace may be called prevenient or subsequent according as we regard it in its relations to different effects."(84)
Among so many prevenient graces there must be one which is preceded by none other (_simpliciter praeveniens_), and this is preeminently the _gratia vocans s. excitans_.
There is a fourth and last division, mentioned by the Council of Trent, which is also based on the relation of grace to free-will. "Jesus Christ Himself," says the holy Synod, "continually infuses His virtue into the justified, and this virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works."(85) The opposition here lies between _gratia antecedens_, which is a spontaneous movement of the soul, and _gratia concomitans_, which cooperates with free-will after it has given its consent. This terminology may be applied to the good works of sinners and saints alike.
For the sinner no less than the just man receives two different kinds of graces-(1) such as precede the free determination of the will and (2) such as accompany his free acts.
Thus it can be readily seen that the fundamental division of actual grace, considered in its relation to free-will, is that into prevenient and cooperating grace. All other divisions are based on a difference of function rather than of nature.(86)
a) The existence of prevenient grace (_gratia praeveniens s. excitans s.
vocans_) may be inferred from the fact that the process of justification begins with the illumination of the intellect, which is by nature unfree, _i.e._ devoid of the power of choosing between good and evil. That there are also graces which consist in spontaneous, indeliberate motions of the will,(87) is clearly taught by the Council of Trent,(88) and evidenced by certain Biblical metaphors. Thus G.o.d is described as knocking at the gate (Apoc. III, 20), as drawing men to Him (John VI, 44), and men are said to harden their hearts against His voice (Ps. XCIV, 8), etc. Cfr. Jer. XVII, 23: "But they did not hear, nor incline their ear: but hardened their neck, that they might not hear me, and might not receive instruction."
The Catholic tradition is voiced by St. Augustine, who says: "The will itself can in no wise be moved, unless it meets with something which delights or attracts the mind; but it is not in the power of man to bring this about."(89) St. Prosper enumerates a long list of spontaneous emotions which he calls supernatural graces of the will.(90)
Prevenient grace is aptly characterized by the Patristic formula: "_Gratia est in n.o.bis, sed sine n.o.bis_," that is, grace, as a vital act, is in the soul, but as a salutary act it proceeds, not from the free will, but from G.o.d. In other words, though the salutary acts of grace derive their vitality from the human will, they are mere _actus hominis_ (????s??), not _actus humani_ (????s??).(91) "G.o.d," explains St. Augustine, "does many good things in man, which man does not do; but man does none which G.o.d does not cause man to do."(92) And again: "[G.o.d] operates without us, in order that we may become willing; but when we once will so as to act, He cooperates with us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without Him either working that we may will, or cooperating when we will."(93) St. Bernard employs similar language.(94)
b) Cooperating grace (_gratia cooperans s. adiuvans s. subsequens_) differs from prevenient grace in this, that it supposes a deliberate act of consent on the part of the will (????s??, not ????s??). St. Gregory the Great tersely explains the distinction as follows: "The divine goodness first effects something in us without our cooperation [_gratia praeveniens_], and then, as the will freely consents, cooperates with us in performing the good which we desire [_gratia cooperans_]."(95) That such free and consequently meritorious acts are attributable to grace is emphasized by the Tridentine Council: "So great is the bounty [of G.o.d]
towards all men that He will have the things which are His own gifts to be their merits."(96) Such free salutary acts are not only graces in the general sense, but real actual graces, in as far as they produce other salutary acts, and their existence is as certain as the fact that many men freely follow the call of grace, work out their salvation, and attain to the beatific vision. It is only in this way, in fact, that Heaven is peopled with Saints.
a) St. Augustine embodies all these considerations in the following pa.s.sage: "It is certain that we keep the commandments when we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we may will so much as is sufficient to make us act in willing. It is certain that we will whenever we like, but it is He who makes us will what is good, of whom it is said (Prov. VIII, 35): "The will is prepared by the Lord," and of whom it is said (Ps. x.x.xVI, 32): "The steps of a [good] man are ordered by the Lord, and his way doth He will," and of whom it is said (Phil. II, 13): "It is G.o.d who worketh in you, even to will." It is certain that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He who causes us to act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers to our will, who has said (Ezech. x.x.xVI, 27): "I will cause you to walk in my commandments, and to keep my judgments, and do them." When He says: "I will cause you ... to do them," what else does He say in fact than (Ezech. XI, 19): "I will take away the stony heart out of their flesh," from which used to rise your inability to act, and (Ezech. x.x.xVI, 26): "I will give you a heart of flesh," in order that you may act."(97)
) The manner in which grace and free-will cooperate is a profound philosophical and theological problem. A salutary act derives its supernatural character from G.o.d, its vitality from the human will. How do these two factors conjointly produce one and the same act? The unity of the act would be destroyed if G.o.d and the free-will of man in each case performed, either two separate acts, or each half of the same act. To preserve the unity of a supernatural act two conditions are required: (1) the divine power of grace must be transformed into the vital strength of the will and (2) the created will, which by its own power can perform at most a naturally good act, must be equipped with the supernatural power of grace. These conditions are met (a) by the supernatural elevation of the will (_elevatio externa_), and (b) by the supernatural concurrence of G.o.d (_concursus supernaturalis ad actum secundum_). The supernatural elevation of the will is accomplished in this wise: G.o.d, by employing the illuminating and strengthening grace, works on the _potentia obdientialis_, and thus raises the will above its purely natural powers and const.i.tutes it a supernatural faculty _in actu primo_ for the free performance of a salutary act. The divine concursus supervenes to enable the will to perform the _actus secundus_ or salutary act proper. This special divine concurrence, in contradistinction to the natural concursus whereby G.o.d supports the created universe,(98) is a strictly supernatural and gratuitous gift. Consequently, G.o.d and the human will jointly perform one and the same salutary act-G.o.d as the princ.i.p.al, the will as the instrumental cause.(99)
6. EFFICACIOUS GRACE AND MERELY SUFFICIENT GRACE.-By efficacious grace (_gratia efficax_) we understand that divine a.s.sistance which with infallible certainty includes the free salutary act. Whether the certainty of its operation results from the physical nature of this particular grace, or from G.o.d"s infallible foreknowledge (_scientia media_), is a question in dispute between Thomists and Molinists.(100)
Merely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_) is that divine a.s.sistance whereby G.o.d communicates to the human will full power to perform a salutary act (_posse_) but not the action itself (_agere_).
The division of grace into efficacious and merely sufficient is not identical with that into prevenient and cooperating. Cooperating grace does not _ex vi notionis_ include with infallible certainty the salutary act. It may indeed be efficacious, but in matter of fact frequently fails to attain its object because the will offers resistance.
a) The existence of efficacious graces is as certain as that there is a Heaven filled with Saints. G.o.d would be neither omnipotent nor infinitely wise if all His graces were frustrated by the free-will of man. St.
Augustine repeatedly expresses his belief in the existence of efficacious graces. Thus he writes in his treatise on Grace and Free-Will: "It is certain that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He [G.o.d] who causes us to act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers to the will."(101) And in another treatise: "[Adam] had received the ability (_posse_) if he would [_gratia sufficiens_], but he had not the will to exercise that ability [_gratia efficax_]; for if he had possessed that will, he would have persevered."(102)
b) Before demonstrating the existence of sufficient grace it is necessary, in view of certain heretical errors, carefully to define the term.
a) Actual grace may be regarded either in its intrinsic energy or power (_virtus_, _potestas agendi_) or in its extrinsic efficacy (_efficientia_, _efficacitas_). All graces are efficacious considered in their intrinsic energy, because all confer the physical and moral power necessary to perform the salutary act for the sake of which they are bestowed. From this point of view, therefore, and _in actu primo_, there is no real but a purely logical distinction between efficacious and merely sufficient grace. If we look to the final result, however, we find that this differs according as the will either freely cooperates with grace or refuses its cooperation. If the will cooperates, grace becomes truly efficacious; if the will resists, grace remains "merely sufficient." In other words, merely sufficient grace confers full power to act, but is rendered ineffective by the resistance of the will.
The inefficacy of merely sufficient grace, therefore, is owing to the resistance of the will and not to any lack of intrinsic power. This is a truth to which all Catholic systems of grace must conform.
Merely sufficient grace may be subdivided into _gratia proxime sufficiens_ and _gratia remote sufficiens_.
Proximately sufficient grace (also called _gratia operationis_) confers upon the will full power to act forthwith, while remotely sufficient grace (also termed _gratia orationis_) confers only the grace of prayer, which in its turn brings down full power to perform other salutary acts.
The _gratia orationis_ plays a most important role in the divine economy of grace. G.o.d has not obliged Himself to give man immediately all the graces he needs. It is His will, in many instances, as when we are besieged by temptations, that we pet.i.tion Him for further a.s.sistance. "G.o.d does not enjoin impossibilities," says St. Augustine, "but in His injunctions He counsels you both to do what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do."(103)
Hence, though grace may sometimes remain ineffective (_gratia inefficax_ = _gratia vere et mere sufficiens_), it is never insufficient (_insufficiens_), that is to say, never too weak to accomplish its purpose.
Calvinism and Jansenism, while retaining the name, have eliminated sufficient grace from their doctrinal systems.
Jansenius (+ 1638) admits a kind of "sufficient grace," which he calls _gratia parva_, but it is really insufficient because no action can result from it unless it is supplemented by another and more powerful grace.(104) This heretic denounced sufficient grace in the Catholic sense as a monstrous conception and a means of peopling h.e.l.l with reprobates.(105) Some of his followers even went so far as to a.s.sert that "in our present state sufficient grace is pernicious rather than useful to us, and we have reason to pray: From sufficient grace, O Lord, deliver us!"(106)
) It is an article of faith that there is a merely sufficient grace and that it is truly sufficient even when frustrated by the resistance of the will. The last-mentioned point is emphasized by the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529): "This also we believe, according to the Catholic faith, that all baptized persons, through the grace received in Baptism, and with the help and cooperation of Christ, are able and in duty bound, if they will faithfully do their share, to comply with all the conditions necessary for salvation."(107) The existence of sufficient grace was formally defined by the Council of Trent as follows: "If any one saith that man"s free-will, moved and excited by G.o.d, ... no wise cooperates towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it would, ... let him be anathema."(108)
This dogma can be convincingly demonstrated both from Sacred Scripture and Tradition.
(1) G.o.d Himself complains through the mouth of the prophet Isaias: "What is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to it? Was it that I looked that it should bring forth grapes, and it hath brought forth wild grapes?"(109) This complaint clearly applies to the Jews. Yahweh did for the Jewish nation whatever it behooved Him to do lavishly (_gratia vere sufficiens_), but His kindness was unrequited (_gratia mere sufficiens_). In the Book of Proverbs He addresses the sinner in these terms: "I called, and you refused: I stretched out my hand, and there was none that regarded."(110) What does this signify if not the complete sufficiency of grace? The proffered grace remained inefficacious simply because the sinner rejected it of his own free will.
Upbraiding the wicked cities of Corozain and Bethsaida, our Lord exclaims: "If in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the miracles that have been wrought in you, they had long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes."(111) The omniscient G.o.d-man here a.s.serts the existence of graces which remained inefficacious in Corozain and Bethsaida, though had they been given to the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, they would have proved effective. The conclusion evidently is: these graces remained ineffective, not because they were unequal to the purpose for which they were conferred, but simply and solely because they were rejected by those whom G.o.d intended to benefit.(112)
(2) Though they did not employ the name, the Fathers were thoroughly familiar with the notion of sufficient grace.
Thus St. Irenaeus comments on our Lord"s lamentation over the fate of the Holy City: "When He says: (Matth. XXIII, 37): "How often would I have gathered together thy children, ... and thou wouldest not," He manifests the ancient liberty of man, because G.o.d hath made him free from the beginning.... For G.o.d does not employ force, but always has a good intention. And for this reason He gives good counsel to all.... And those who do it [_gratia efficax_] will receive glory and honor, because they have done good, though they were free not to do it; but those who do not do good will experience the just judgment of G.o.d, because they have not done good [_gratia inefficax_], though they were able to do it [_gratia vere et mere sufficiens_]."(113) St. Augustine is in perfect agreement with ecclesiastical tradition, and the Jansenists had no right whatever to claim him for their teaching. "The grace of G.o.d," he expressly says in one place, "a.s.sists the will of men. If in any case men are not a.s.sisted by it, the reason lies with themselves, not G.o.d."(114) And again: "No one is guilty because he has not received; but he who does not do what he ought to do, is truly guilty. It is his duty to act if he has received a free will and amply sufficient power to act."(115)
READINGS:-St. Thomas, _Summa Theologica_, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1; qu.
111, art. 1-5.-J. Scheeben, _Natur und Gnade_, Mainz 1861.-M. Glossner, _Lehre des hl. Thomas vom Wesen der Gnade_, Mainz 1871.-Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 1-16, Gulpen 1885.-Oswald, _Die Lehre von der Heiligung_, 3rd ed., -- 1-3, Paderborn 1885.-S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 1, sect. 2; disp. 3, sect. 1-5, Freiburg 1901.-Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, pp. 3 sqq., Mainz 1897.-B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol.
II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 234 sqq.
Chapter II. The Properties Of Actual Grace
Actual grace has three essential properties: (1) necessity, (2) gratuity, and (3) universality. The most important of these is necessity.
Section 1. The Necessity Of Actual Grace
In treating of the necessity of actual grace we must avoid two extremes.
The first is that mere nature is absolutely incapable of doing any thing good. This error was held by the early Protestants and the followers of Baius and Jansenius. The second is that nature is able to perform supernatural acts by its own power. This was taught by the Pelagians and Semipelagians.
Between these two extremes Catholic theology keeps the golden mean. It defends the capacity of human nature against Protestants and Jansenists, and upholds its incapacity and impotence against Pelagians and Semipelagians. Thus our present Section naturally falls into three Articles.