Some days later, it is true, M. Delca.s.se affirmed that he had overcome Russia"s repugnance;[21] but, though it is probable that Russia, yielding to pressure, would have accepted the partic.i.p.ation of Greek troops, she made no secret of her satisfaction at not having had to do so: "We heartily consent to your receiving large compensations in Asia Minor," said the Russian Minister at Athens, in the presence of his British colleague, to a high official of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs. "But as to Constantinople, we prefer that you should not come there; it would afterwards be painful for you and disagreeable for everybody to turn you out." [22]
M. Venizelos knew these views perfectly well, and did not covet Constantinople: what he coveted, so far as material gains went, were the large compensations in Asia Minor.[23] There lay the chief objective of his strategy, and its net outcome was to widen the breach between him and those elements in the country which still believed that the policy of Greece must be governed by the solid necessities of the Balkan situation, not by nebulous visions of Imperialist expansion.
[1] Psycha to Venizelos, Bucharest, 23 Oct./6 Nov.; Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Bordeaux, Petersburg, 24 Oct./7 Nov., 1914.
[2] Romanos, Bordeaux, 19 Nov., 1914.
[3] He explained, three years afterwards, that at the time of making his offer of 18 Aug., 1914, he bore in mind "the impossibility of going to Servia"s a.s.sistance on account of the danger from Bulgaria."-Orations, p. 93. But precisely similar was the objection to going against Turkey without a guarantee of Bulgarian neutrality: only the Bulgars, in the one case, would have been on Greece"s left flank and in the other on the right. The truth seems to be that the vision of M. Venizelos lacked the penetration which, in matters of this sort, can only come from long study and reflection.
[4] First Memorandum, 11/24 Jan., in the Nea h.e.l.las, 21 March (O.S.), 1915.
[5] Gennadius, London, 10 Aug. (O.S.), 1914.
[6] Orations, p. 43.
[7] Second Memorandum, 17/30 Jan., in the Nea h.e.l.las, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
[8] See his own statement in the Nea h.e.l.las, 22 March (O.S.), 1915.
[9] Dragoumis, Petrograd, 16 Feb., 1915.
[10] Dardanelles Commission, First Report, pp. 14-5, 31-3; Final Report, pp. 6-8.
[11] Deville, pp. 163, 215.
[12] Orations, pp. 103, 104.
[13] Dardanelles Commission, Supplement to First Report, p. 3.
[14] Orations, pp. 105-6.
[15] See Extracts from the Crown Council Minutes, in the Balkan Review, Dec., 1920, pp. 384-5, which supplement M. Venizelos"s very meagre account of these proceedings in Orations, pp. 107-8.
[16] Orations, pp. 266-7.
[17] Ibid, pp. 267-8.
[18] Venizelos to Greek Legations, London, Paris, Petrograd, 20 Feb./5 March, 1915.
[19] Orations, p. 267.
[20] Gennadius, London, 21 Feb.; Sicilianos, Paris, 22 Feb.; Dragoumis, Petrograd, 22 Feb. (O.S.), 1915.
[21] White Book, No. 37.
[22] "Conversation with M. Demidoff," Politis, Athens. 25 Feb./10 March, 1915.
[23] Orations, pp. 108, 113-14.
{33}
CHAPTER IV
Immediately after the resignation of M. Venizelos it was decided to dissolve the Chamber and to have General Elections, in which for the first time the territories conquered in 1912-13 would partic.i.p.ate. Meanwhile, the King called upon M. Gounaris, a statesman of considerable ability, though with none of the versatility of mind and audacity of character which distinguished his predecessor, to carry on the Government and to preside over the elections. Under ordinary circ.u.mstances these would have taken place at once. But owing to the need of preparing electoral lists for the new provinces, they were delayed till 13 June, and owing to a serious illness of King Constantine which supervened-causing intense anxiety throughout the nation and bringing political life to a standstill-two more months pa.s.sed before the new Parliament met. The interval proved fruitful in developments of far-reaching importance.
On its accession to power, the new Government issued a communique, announcing that it would pursue the policy adopted at the beginning of the War: a policy of neutrality qualified by a recognition of the obligations imposed by the Servian Alliance, and a determination to serve the interests of Greece without endangering her territorial integrity.[1] And as the Entente representatives at Athens expressed a certain disappointment at not finding in the communique any allusion to the Entente Powers,[2] M. Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in order to remove all uneasiness on that score, instructed the Greek representatives in London, Paris, and Petrograd to a.s.sure the respective Governments categorically that the new Ministry did not intend to depart in any way from the pro-Entente att.i.tude dictated by hereditary sentiments and interests alike. The only {34} difference between the Venizelos and the Gounaris Cabinets-the difference which brought about the recent crisis and the change of Government-was one regarding the danger of immediate action, but did not affect the basis of Greek policy.[3]
That, by all the evidence available, was the truth. M. Gounaris thought as M. Venizelos thought, as King Constantine thought, as, indeed, every Greek capable of forming an opinion on international affairs thought-namely that, if Greece were to fight at all, interest and sentiment alike impelled her to fight on the side of the Entente.[4] The only question was whether she should enter the field then, and if so, on what conditions.
M. Venizelos persisted in declaring that the Dardanelles expedition presented "a great, a unique opportunity," which he prayed, "G.o.d grant that Greece may not miss." [5] His successors had no wish to miss the opportunity-if such it was. But neither had they any wish to leap in the dark. M. Gounaris and his colleagues lacked the Cretan"s infinite capacity for taking chances. Even in war, where chance plays so great a part, little is gained except by calculation: the enterprise which is not carefully meditated upon in all its details is rarely crowned with success.
And so when, on 12 April, the representatives of the Entente signified to M. Gounaris their readiness to give Greece, in return for her co-operation against Turkey, the "territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin," suggested {35} to his predecessor, M. Gounaris tried to ascertain exactly the form of the co-operation demanded and the extent of the "territorial acquisitions in the vilayet of Aidin" offered. The British Minister replied as to the first point that, having no instructions, he was unable to give any details; and as for the second, that it referred to the "very important concessions on the Asia Minor coast" mentioned in Sir Edward Grey"s communication of January. On being further pressed, he said it meant "Smyrna and a substantial portion of the hinterland"-a definition with which his Russian and French colleagues were inclined to concur, though both said that they had no instructions on the subject. Then M. Gounaris asked whether their Excellencies had transmitted to their respective Governments M. Venizelos"s interpretation of Sir Edward Grey"s offer regarding its geographical limits. The British Minister replied that he had no official knowledge of that interpretation; he had only heard of it semi-officially and had transmitted it to his Government, but had received no answer. The Russian Minister replied that he had transmitted nothing on the subject to his Government, as he had been informed of it in but a vague way by the late Cabinet. The French Minister stated that the subject had never been mentioned to him, and consequently he had not been in a position to make any communication to his Government.[6] Thus the grandiose Asiatic dominion of which M. Venizelos spoke so eloquently dwindled to "Smyrna and a substantial portion of the hinterland."
However, the King, the General Staff, and the Cabinet went on with their work, and were joined by Prince George, King Constantine"s brother, who had come from Paris to Athens for the express purpose of discussing with the Government the question of entering the war against Turkey on the basis of guarantees to be determined by negotiations of which Paris might be the centre. In that order of ideas, they had already indicated as the best guarantee the simultaneous entry of Bulgaria, who, according to news from the Entente capitals, was on the point of joining. But this condition having proved {36} unrealisable-Bulgaria refusing to be bought except, if at all, at a price of Greek territory which Greece would on no account pay-they dropped it and set about considering by what other combinations they could come in without compromising their country"s vital interests. The upshot of their deliberations was a proposal, dated 14 April, to the following effect:
If the Allies would give a formal undertaking to guarantee during the War, and for a certain period after its termination, the integrity of her territories, Greece would join them with all her military and naval forces in a war against Turkey, the definite objective of which would be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; for, unless the Ottoman Empire disappeared, the Greek hold on Smyrna would not be very firm. It was further stipulated that the Allies should define the territorial compensations as well as the facilities regarding money and war material which they would accord Greece in order to enable her to do her part of belligerent efficiently. On these conditions Greece would a.s.sume the obligation to enter the field as soon as the Allies were ready to combine their forces with hers. All military details were to be settled between the respective Staffs and embodied in a joint Military Convention, with this sole reservation that, if Bulgaria continued to stand out, the Greek Army"s sphere of action could not be placed outside European Turkey. In an explanatory Note added a few days later, at the instance of the General Staff, stress was laid upon the ambiguous att.i.tude of Bulgaria, on account of which the opinion was expressed that the Allies should be prepared to contribute forces which, combined with the Greek, would equal the united Turkish and Bulgarian forces, and that the sphere of Greek action should be limited to the west of the Gallipoli Peninsula; but it was agreed that, if the Allies wished it, they should have the military a.s.sistance of Greece on the Gallipoli Peninsula too, provided that they landed their own troops first.[7]
Of these proposals, which were not put forward as final, but rather as a basis of discussion, the Entente Powers did not condescend to take any notice. Only unofficially {37} the Greek Minister in Paris, on approaching M. Delca.s.se, was told that, since the h.e.l.lenic Government viewed the Dardanelles enterprise in a different light from them, an understanding seemed impossible and discussion useless; for the rest, that enterprise, for which England had desired the co-operation of the Greeks, was now carried on without them, and the situation was no longer the same as it was some days before. Alarmed by this snub, and anxious to dissipate any misunderstandings and doubts as to its dispositions towards the Entente, the h.e.l.lenic Government a.s.sured M. Delca.s.se that it continued always animated by the same desire to co-operate and would like to make new proposals, but before doing so it wished to know what proposals would be acceptable. M. Delca.s.se replied that he could not even semi-officially say what proposals would be acceptable.[8] But M. Guillemin, his former collaborator and later French Minister at Athens, then on a flying visit there, advised M. Zographos to abandon all conditions and take pot luck with the Allies.
This notion succeeded to the extent that Greece proposed to offer to enter the war against Turkey with her naval forces only, reserving her army for her own protection against Bulgaria.[9] The Entente Powers intimated through M. Delca.s.se that they would accept such an offer, provided it was made without any conditions.[10] Before deciding, Greece wanted to be a.s.sured that the integrity of her territory during the War and in the treaty of peace would be respected, that all the necessary money and material would be forthcoming, and that the compensations in Asia Minor allotted to her would represent approximately the area indicated by M. Venizelos. If it was found that on these three points the h.e.l.lenic Government interpreted the intentions of the Entente Powers correctly, it would immediately submit a Note in which the three points would be mentioned as going of their own accord, so that the official reply of the Entente might cover, not only the offer, but also its interpretation thus formulated.[11] {38} M. Delca.s.se refused to listen to any points: Greece, he insisted irritably, should enter the alliance without conditions, coupling her offer simply with "hopes to have the benefit of full solidarity with her allies, whence results a guarantee of her territorial integrity," and "entrusting the full protection of her vital interests to the three Entente Powers." The formula was not incompatible with the best construction which one chose to put upon it; and Prince George-who had returned to Paris directly after the first offer and acted as a personal representative of King Constantine, together with the official representative of the h.e.l.lenic Government-warmly advocated its adoption, pleading that, if Greece did come in without delay and without conditions, she might safely trust the Allies.[12]
Whether Prince George"s plea sprang from blind faith or from far-sighted fear, is a question upon which the sequel may throw some light; for the present enough to state that it produced no effect. In a matter concerning the integrity of national territory acquired so dearly, King Constantine felt that he could not afford to allow any ambiguity or uncertainty: he was willing to waive the other two points, but not that. He therefore begged his brother to see M. Poincare and solicit in his name the President"s help to secure that indispensable a.s.surance. "The essential thing," he said, "is that the Entente Powers should give us a solemn promise that they will respect and make others respect, until the re-establishment of peace, our territorial integrity, and that they will not permit any damage to it by the future Peace Treaty. Remark to him that Greece has the right to be astonished that friendly Powers ready to accept her as an ally decline to explain themselves clearly with her." [13] What was in the King"s mind may be seen from the President"s answer: The Powers did not wish to give a formal pledge in as many words lest the Bulgars should be stirred to {39} hostile action on realizing that Cavalla was lost to them.[14]
Prince George, in reporting M. Poincare"s reply, added that the fear of any damage being inflicted on Greek territorial integrity by the future Peace Treaty was completely devoid of foundation; that, having himself expressed this fear, he had been answered: "How can you imagine that we could dispose of any part whatever of the territory of an allied State without its consent?" [15]
These fair words failed to rea.s.sure the h.e.l.lenic Government, which, after mature reflection, concluded that the formula suggested by M. Delca.s.se did not sufficiently safeguard Greece against combinations likely to affect her territorial integrity. Its misgivings, which sprang in the first instance from the refusal of an explicit promise, were strengthened by the reason given by M. Poincare for that refusal. Consequently, it regretted that the Entente Powers did not see their way to come to an understanding for a collaboration which both sides desired, and repeated the a.s.surance of a most benevolent neutrality towards them.[16]
The Greek position was plain: Greece made proposals which const.i.tuted a break with the policy pursued deliberately since the beginning of the War-proposals for an active partnership, and in return put forward conditions which ultimately narrowed down to a mere pledge that she should not, as the end of it all, find herself robbed of Cavalla. There were certain things she could do and, therefore, wished to do. There were certain things she could not do, and must be a.s.sured that she would not be made to do them. The Entente Powers, on the other hand, would bind themselves to nothing: which is preferable, they said in effect, the elaborate letter of a bargaining bond, or the spirit of spontaneous co-operation; a legal obligation or the natural union of hearts? What Greece needs, rather than rigid clauses with a seal and a signature, is the steady, unwavering sympathy of her friends. If you come with us in a courageous forward campaign for the {40} liberation of the world and righteousness, how could we fail to be with you in every single question affecting compensations or the integrity of your territories? That"s all very fine, said the Greeks. But--
The mistrust of the Greeks was only too well founded. Although Bulgaria received arms from Austria and allowed the free pa.s.sage of German munitions which enabled Turkey to carry on the defence of Gallipoli, the Entente Powers, satisfied with her Premier"s explanations and professions of sympathy, would not give up the hope of seeing her on their side. Indeed, they were more hopeful than ever; M. Poincare told Prince George he would not be surprised to see that happen "in two or three days," [17] and the British Minister at Sofia, being less hopeful and giving proofs of perspicacity, was replaced.
About the same time it came to the knowledge of the Entente Governments that the Greek General Staff had resumed its efforts to induce the Servian military authorities to concert measures for their mutual safety, pointing out that, the moment Bulgarian troops crossed the Servian frontier, it would be too late. Whereupon both Servia and Greece were sternly warned against wounding Bulgarian susceptibilities-and threatened with the displeasure of the Powers, who wanted to maintain between the Balkan States good fellowship-by the unhappy project which was once more to the fore. And ere the end of May both States learnt that their territories were actually on offer to Bulgaria.
They received the intelligence as might have been expected. The Servian Premier, after consulting with the King, the Crown Prince, the Cabinet, and all prominent statesmen, informed the representatives of the Entente that Servia, in spite of her desire to meet the wishes of her friends and allies, could not agree to put herself in their hands: the Const.i.tution forbade the cession of territory without the sanction of the National a.s.sembly. He asked them to understand that this decision was final, and that no future Servian Government could be counted upon to {41} give a different answer, seeing that the present Government embraced every political party.[18]
Not less uncompromising was the att.i.tude of Greece. When the news reached Athens from Paris, the h.e.l.lenic Government could hardly believe it: "It is so contrary to the principles of justice and liberty proclaimed by the Entente Powers-it seems to us absolutely impossible to despoil a neutral State, and one, too, whose friendly neutrality has been so consistently useful to the Allies, in order to buy with its territories the help of a people which has. .h.i.therto done all it could to help the enemies of the Entente. By what right, and on what ground could they mutilate our country? The opinions once expressed by M. Venizelos, and since abandoned even by their author, do not const.i.tute a sufficient ground for spoliation. The whole thing is an unthinkable outrage: it shows that our fears were justified and our demand for a guarantee was absolutely indispensable." [19]
France, through M. Delca.s.se, and England, through Lord Crewe, sought to dispel these fears by formally disclaiming any intention to press upon Greece a mutilation to which she objected, and explaining that the eventual cession of Cavalla was only envisaged on condition that she should consent of her own accord. M. Zographos, however, who had done his best to bring Greece in on reasonable terms, convinced of his failure, resigned; and after his departure the Gounaris Government would permit itself no further discussion upon the subject of intervention.
During the lull that ensued, the Greek General Staff once more, in June, approached the Servian Government with detailed suggestions for a common plan against Bulgaria, dwelling on the necessity of a preliminary concentration of sufficient Servian troops along the Graeco-Serbo-Bulgarian frontier to counterbalance the Bulgarian advantage in rapidity of mobilization. These steps proved as barren as all the preceding: while Servia would not try to conjure the Bulgarian peril by the sacrifices which the Entente recommended, she could not provide against it by entering into arrangements with Greece which the Entente disapproved.
{42}
Matters came to a head on 3 August, when the British Minister at Sofia made to the Bulgarian Government a formal offer of Cavalla and an undefined portion of its hinterland, as well as of Servian territory in Macedonia, stating that Great Britain would bring pressure to bear on those countries, and make the cession to them of any compensations elsewhere conditional on their consent to this transaction.
The shock lost nothing of its intensity by being long antic.i.p.ated. M. Pa.s.sitch, the Servian Premier, in an interview with the Greek Minister at Nish, expressed his profound dismay at the corner into which Servia was driven; much as she resented this proposal, the fact that she was entirely dependent on the Entente-whose high-handed methods he did not fail to criticize-forced her to give it consideration.
If Servia had been dismayed, Greece was enraged. M. Gounaris addressed a strongly-worded remonstrance to the British Minister at Athens, reminding him that in May his Government had protested against the offer of Greek territory to Bulgaria, and that both Lord Crewe and M. Delca.s.se had disavowed any intention to bring the least pressure to bear upon Greece, who had thus the right to count on her independence being respected. The Entente Powers, he went on, thought they could promise Bulgaria an agreement in which their own will took the place of Greece"s consent, with the idea of exacting her acceptance afterwards. But they were greatly mistaken. The h.e.l.lenic Government, voicing the unanimous sentiments of the people as well as its own judgment, repelled with indignation the idea of making the national heritage an object of a bargain; and while thanking the Entente Powers for the courtesy which inspired their notification, it protested in the most energetic and solemn manner against the injury which they proposed to inflict upon the independence and integrity of Greece in defiance of international law.