A momentous question-upon the answer to which depended, among other things, the fate of Greece during the War-confronted the Allies as soon as they realized that their Balkan campaign had come to an untimely beginning.
The dispatch of troops to Macedonia originally was based on the agreement that M. Venizelos would get Greece to join. Once M. Venizelos failed to do so, the plan fell to the ground. Again, the object of the expedition was to rescue Servia; and Servia being already conquered, the expedition had no longer any purpose. Such were the views of the British Government, and similar views were held in France by many, including M. Delca.s.se, who resigned when Bulgaria"s "defection" sounded the knell of his Balkan policy. But other French statesmen, with M. Briand at their head, saw in Macedonia a field which promised great glory and gain, if only the n.o.ble British nation could be brought to understand that there were interests and sentiments at stake higher than agreements.[1]
The process involved some talking: "I have had my interview with Briand and Gallieni," wrote Lord Kitchener to the Prime Minister. "As regards Salonica it is very difficult to get in a word; they were both full of the necessity of pushing in troops, and would not think of coming out. They simply sweep all military difficulties and dangers aside, and go on political lines-such as saving a remnant of Serbs, bringing Greece in, and inducing Rumania to join." [2]
Other conferences followed, at all of which the French spoke so loudly that the n.o.ble British nation could not possibly help hearing-la n.o.ble nation britannique n"est pas restee sourde. The truth is, France was set on what {77} M. Delca.s.se now called the mirage balkanique, partly from considerations of a domestic nature, chiefly for reasons connected with the future balance of power in the Near East-and England could not leave her there alone. So the "nous resterons" policy prevailed; and the continued presence of Franco-British forces on Greek soil led, as it was bound to do, to abnormal relations with the Greek Government.
The wish of the Allies was to obtain from Greece full licence for the safe accommodation and the operations of their troops; while it was the earnest endeavour of Greece not to let her complaisance towards one group of belligerents compromise her in the eyes of the other. The little kingdom found itself between two clashing forces: the one triumphant on land, the other dominating the sea. But of the two the German peril was the more imminent. The Kaiser"s legions were at Monastir-any act that might be construed as a breach of neutrality would bring them in a month to Athens.
M. Skouloudis-a stately octogenarian who, after refusing three times the Premiership, had a.s.sumed power in this crisis at the King"s insistent desire because, as he said, he considered it his duty so to do-took up the only att.i.tude that could have been expected in the circ.u.mstances: the att.i.tude that was dictated by the instinct of self-preservation.
Unlike M. Venizelos, whose mind revolved constantly about war at all hazards: unlike other statesmen who regarded war as an eventuality to be accepted or declined according as conditions might be favourable or unfavourable, M. Skouloudis seemed resolutely to eliminate war from his thoughts.
On taking office he gave the Entente Powers "most categorical a.s.surances of a steady determination to carry on the policy of neutrality in the form of most sincere benevolence towards them. The new Ministry," he added, "adopts M. Zaimis"s repeated declarations of Greece"s friendly att.i.tude towards the Allied armies at Salonica, and is sufficiently sensible of her true interests and of her debt to them not to deviate for the whole world from this course, and hopes that the friendly sentiments of those Powers towards Greece will never be influenced by false {78} and malicious rumours deliberately put into circulation with the object of cooling the good relations between them." To Servia also he expressed "in the most categorical terms sentiments of sincere friendship and a steady determination to continue affording her every facility and support consistent with our vital interests." [3]
But at the same time, when told by the Servian Minister that a Servian army might probably, pressed by the enemy, enter Greek territory, he replied that he wished and hoped such a thing would not happen-that Greece might not find herself under the very unpleasant necessity of applying the Hague Rules regarding the disarmament of a belligerent taking refuge in neutral territory. And he repeated this statement to the French Minister, adding, in answer to a question. What would Greece do if the Allied forces retired into Greek territory? that it would be necessary to apply the Hague Rules, but that he hoped very much the contingency would not present itself. On being reminded of the a.s.surances given by his predecessor that no material pressure would ever be exerted on the Allied forces, he replied that the h.e.l.lenic Government nowise proposed to go back on those a.s.surances, and hoped that the Powers, taking into consideration the irreproachable att.i.tude of Greece, would be pleased to relieve her of complications and find a solution safeguarding all interests concerned.[4]
The solution he hinted at was that the Allies should re-embark; in which case Greece was prepared to protect the parting guests "even by her own forces, so as to afford them the most absolute security." [5]
But, as nothing was farther from their thoughts, his explanation did not satisfy the Allies. M. Skouloudis was therefore obliged to give their representatives again and again to understand that in no case would the h.e.l.lenic Government think of exerting the least pressure, and that, if he had alluded to the Rules regarding neutrality, he had done so because such ought to be the official language of a State which was and wished to remain neutral. But from the very first he had clearly indicated that Greece did not mean to apply those Rules: she would confine {79} herself to a mere reminder of international principles without in any way seeking to enforce respect for them. Greece being and wishing to remain neutral, could not speak officially as if she were not, nor trumpet abroad the a.s.surances which she had not ceased giving the Entente Powers. Surely they must perceive the most delicate position in which Greece stood between the two belligerent groups, and, given that they did not dispute, nor could dispute, her right to remain neutral, it was reasonable and just that they should accept the natural consequences and not demand from her impossibilities.[6]
The Entente Powers could not, of course, deny the reasonableness of this plea; but neither could they ignore the inconveniences to themselves that would arise from its frank recognition. Between their base at Salonica and the troops which had advanced to Krivolak interposed several Greek army corps; at Salonica also Greek camps lay among the Franco-British camps scattered round the town: these conditions impeded organized operations. General Sarrail, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, had nothing but praise for the courtesy of the Greek authorities, both civil and military. Yet not a day pa.s.sed without incidents. He complained that obstacles were placed in his action through a mult.i.tude of secondary details: the Munic.i.p.ality claimed duties; the Railway Service did not a.s.sist as liberally as could be wished in the work of getting off the stores which arrived at the port. It was necessary that the Greek troops should be moved out of the Allies" way and leave them in full control: privileges which no State could voluntarily grant and remain neutral; which no army could forgo and work efficiently. So the General, while confessing that "we often place them in a difficult position by demanding permissions which their virtual neutrality cannot allow them to give," impressed on the Entente Governments the need of taking strong measures with the Greeks.[6]
Germany would have proceeded to deeds without wasting words-beyond a casual "Necessity knows no law." But nations fighting for n.o.ble ideals could not imitate Germany"s cynicism. A case had to be made out to {80} justify coercion. It was. Greece did not really wish to remain neutral. Misled by a Germanophile Court, she only waited for a chance of joining the enemy-of stabbing the Allies in the back. When this amazing theory-widely popularized by the French and English Press-was hinted to M. Rallis by "Our Special Correspondent," on 18 November, the Greek Minister could hardly credit his collocutor"s sanity: "It is mad!" he cried out. "It is senseless to imagine such a thing-when you could have the guns of your fleet levelled on our cities!" The answer, however-an answer the conclusiveness of which a glance at the map is enough to demonstrate to the dimmest intelligence-fell upon deliberately deaf ears. The very journal which in one page recorded it, in another wrote: "Bulgaria has gone; Greece is trembling in the balance. Only a display of overwhelming force on our part can hold her steady and prevent the accession of another 500,000 men to the enemy"s strength."
That the publicists who argued thus and who, to give to their argument greater cogency, generously added to the Greek army some 200,000 men, were persuaded by their own reasoning, it is hard to believe without libelling human sense. Apart from the ocular refutation supplied by the map, what had Greece to gain by siding with the enemies of the Entente? That she would lose all her islands, have her coast towns pulverized and her population starved, was certain. What she could get in return, it needed a very robust imagination to suggest. The only countries at whose cost the h.e.l.lenic Kingdom could possibly compensate itself for these inevitable sacrifices were Turkey and Bulgaria; and those countries were Germany"s allies. A moment"s reflection raises a number of equally unanswerable questions: If the Greeks wanted to join Germany, why did they not do so when the Kaiser invited them at the very beginning of the War? Why did they not resist the landing of the Allies? Why did they not attack them when they had them at their mercy: 60,000 French and British, with the Germans and the Bulgars in front of them, and 150,000 Greeks between them and Salonica?[8]
{81}
In this connexion the evidence of an eminent English soldier and an eminent French statesman who visited Athens at that time to study the situation on the spot may be cited. To each King Constantine and M. Skouloudis, in the course of lengthy interviews, declared that the Allied forces had nothing to fear in Greece. Each was convinced of their sincerity, and of the true motives of their att.i.tude: "They both," reported Lord Kitchener, "seem very determined to stick to their neutrality." Likewise General Dousmanis, Chief of the General Staff, and Colonel Metaxas, who were represented to the Entente publics as Germanophile pedants, satisfied Lord Kitchener of their genuine concern about the British sphere in the East, and startled him by pressing upon him a plan of action "almost exactly the same as detailed in my telegrams, and based their conclusions on the same argument almost word for word. They emphatically stated that there was no other way of preventing the accomplishment of the German project." [9] M. Denys Cochin even went so far as to publish to the whole world that the suspicions entertained against King Constantine had no other source than party rancour.[10]
For the rest, a striking proof that the Entente Powers themselves did not believe the story of the Greek Government"s hostile intentions is afforded by the fact that, instead of demanding, they deprecated the disbandment of the Greek army. When Lord Kitchener saw M. Skouloudis, the latter said that the Allies" mistrust might well force Greece to consider whether it would not be better for her to demobilize, leaving to them all responsibility for the consequences. Lord Kitchener, in the presence of the British Minister, replied that, "as to some partial demobilization, it was for Greece to decide according to her interests, but he did not think a general demobilization advisable." And again, a little later on, when {82} M. Skouloudis, irritated by a fresh exhibition of mistrust, told the French Minister that, in face of such a state of things, nothing was left for his unhappy country but to order at once a general demobilization, and let the Entente Powers do what they liked to her, M. Guillemin cried out, "Ah, no. I am decidedly against demobilization." Naturally: "the Greek Army," said Sir Thomas Cuninghame, the British Military Attache, to General Moschopoulos. Military Governor of Salonica, "saves and secures the flanks and rear of the Allies." [11]
However, the story served the purpose of supplying a pretext for pressure. All ships carrying foodstuffs and other commodities were held up. In addition, Milo-an island not far from Athens-was occupied, and the Allied Fleet was ordered to be ready, in case things should be pushed to extremes, to open war on Greek commerce, to destroy the Greek Fleet, and to bombard Athens, en respectant les monuments anciens.[12]
Fortunately, the occasion for extreme measures, by which even the ancient ruins might have suffered, did not arise. General Sarrail, who at first urged that the naval demonstration against Athens should be proceeded with immediately, on second thoughts, prompted by nervousness as to the safety of his troops, deprecated such action. At the same time, M. Skouloudis, alarmed by the blockade-Greece never has more than a very limited food reserve-invited the Allies to state their demands, saying that he would accede to them if it was possible to do so.[13]
Whereupon the Allies, "ever animated by the most benevolent intentions towards Greece, and anxious that the equivocal situation in which events had placed her towards them should come to an end and their relations be re-established on a basis of mutual and lasting confidence," demanded first of all a formal a.s.surance that in no circ.u.mstances would the Greek troops attempt to disarm or intern the retiring Allied troops, but that the policy of benevolent neutrality promised would be maintained with all its consequences. They disavowed any wish or intention to compel the h.e.l.lenic Government to {83} partic.i.p.ate in the European War from which it had declared that it meant to hold aloof. But it was a vital necessity for them not to let it in any way hinder the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or compromise the security of their troops throughout the field of their operations. They therefore must be a.s.sured that they will obtain, according to the promise already given by M. Zaimis, all the facilities which they might require, notably in the port of Salonica and on the roads and railways. It was understood that the Entente Powers would restore in full at the end of the War all the parts of Greek territory which they might be obliged to occupy during the hostilities, and that they would duly pay indemnities for all damage caused by the occupation.[14]
M. Skouloudis, after thanking the Entente Powers for the benevolent intentions with which they declared themselves to be animated towards Greece, willingly repeated the a.s.surances he had so many times already given, that the Greek troops would in no circ.u.mstances seek to disarm or intern the Allied troops, and that the Greek Government in its relations with the Entente Powers would in everything hold fast to its policy of benevolent neutrality. He once more noted the reiterated disavowal by the Allied Governments of any wish or intention to force Greece into the War, and on his part disavowed any wish or intention to hinder in any way the freedom of their movements on land or sea, or to compromise in any way the security of their troops. The h.e.l.lenic Government had always kept the promises made by M. Zaimis to the very utmost of its ability, and had no difficulty in renewing the a.s.surance that the Allied Governments would continue to receive all the facilities their troops might require in the port of Salonica, and on the roads and railways.[15]
These prefatory amenities led on 10 December to a detailed Agreement, the Greek Government promising to move its troops out of the way and "not to oppose by force the construction of defensive works or the occupation of fortified points," but reserving to itself the right to protest {84} against such operations "energetically and seriously, not as a mere form"-a right which the Allies easily conceded[16]-and emphatically declaring that "should the Allied troops by their movements bring the war into Greek territory, the Greek troops would withdraw so as to leave the field free to the two parties to settle their differences."
The Entente Ministers expressed their satisfaction, and M. Skouloudis expressed the hope that their Governments, convinced at last of the Greek Government"s sincerity, would not only drop coercion, but comply with its request for financial and commercial facilities. They promised that all difficulties would disappear as soon as the military authorities on the spot had given effect to the agreement; and the French Minister repeated his Government"s declaration that it would be happy to accord Greece all financial and commercial facilities as soon as the situation cleared.[17]
[1] Journal Officiel, pp. 61, 70, 75-8.
[2] Sir George Arthur"s Life of Lord Kitchener. Vol. III. p. 261.
[3] White Book, Nos. 47, 48, 49.
[4] Skouloudis"s Apantesis, pp. 43-5.
[5] White Book, No. 52.
[6] White Book, No. 51.
[7] Sarrail, pp. 311-12; Life of Kitchener, Vol. III, p. 198.
[8] Those were the figures on 17 Nov.-Life of Kitchener, Vol. III, p. 199. I have only seen an answer to the second of the above questions: it is from M. Venizelos, and it is: "absent-mindedness": "Why did not the General Staff do this, since it was to Germany"s interest that the Anglo-French should not land? Because, immersed in politics, it no longer took account of military matters!"-Orations, p. 140.
[9] Life of Kitchener, Vol. III, pp. 202-3.
[10] See interview with M. Denys Cochin at Messina, in the Daily Mail, 29 Nov., 1915. Cp. Le Temps, 25 Nov.
[11] Skouloudis, Apantesis, pp. 4-5; Semeioseis, p. 46.
[12] Journal Officiel, pp. 71-2.
[13] Life of Kitchener, Vol. III, p. 199-203.
[14] Communication by the Entente Ministers, Athens, 10/23 Nov., 1915.
[15] Skouloudis to Entente Ministers, Athens, 11/24 Nov., 1915.
[16] "Le Gouvernement Grec se reservait de protester; nous nous reservions de ne pas repondre. (Rires)." M. Briand in the Journal Officiel, p. 72.
[17] White Book, No. 54.
{85}
CHAPTER VIII
The situation did not clear-how could it? Of all diplomatic fictions that of "benevolence" is perhaps the most incompatible with the grim realities of war.
General Sarrail had from the outset been empowered to take any measures which he might judge necessary at his discretion. But fear of the Greek army for a time compelled him to temper vigour with caution.
That fear decreased in proportion as the Allied contingents in Macedonia increased; and hence a series of acts which show how the General used his discretion.
First, he judged it necessary to blow up the bridge of Demir-Hissar. He blew it up-thus completely cutting off the Greek forces in Eastern Macedonia, and, incidentally, letting the enemy know that no offensive across the Struma was contemplated by the Allies. Next, he judged it necessary to seize the Fort of Kara-Burnu which commands the entrance to Salonica Harbour. He seized it-despite a solemn engagement to the contrary.[1] Then he judged it necessary to occupy the town of Florina. He occupied it. An appreciation of the efficacy or expediency of these measures-beyond a pa.s.sing allusion to the obvious blunder committed by the destruction of the Demir-Hissar bridge-would be out of place here. For our present purpose their interest lies in the light they throw upon the conditions, apart from the purely military difficulties, created by the intrusion of foreign troops on neutral soil.
Afloat the Allies were not less vigorous than ash.o.r.e. They judged it necessary to occupy Corfu, in order to accommodate the remnants of the Servian army that had escaped across Albania. They occupied Corfu. They judged it necessary to occupy Castellorizo, an islet off the coast of Asia Minor. They occupied Castellorizo. They {86} judged it necessary to occupy Suda Bay in Crete and Argostoli Bay in Cephalonia. They occupied them.
It is worthy of note that the occupation of Castellorizo was prepared by a local revolt stirred up by the French Consular and Naval authorities,[2] and that the occupation of Corfu const.i.tuted a flagrant violation of international pacts (Treaties of London, 14 Nov., 1863, and 29 March, 1864) to which the Entente Powers were signatories, and by virtue of which the perpetual neutrality of the island was guaranteed as strictly as that of Belgium-a circ.u.mstance that afforded the Central Powers an opportunity to protest against Anglo-French contempt for the sanct.i.ty of treaties.[3]
Among other arbitrary proceedings may be mentioned numerous arrests and deportations of enemy subjects and Consuls, and even the execution of some Greek subjects, by the Allied military and naval authorities.[4]
Against each of these encroachments upon its sovereignty the Greek Government protested with ever-deepening bitterness. The Entente Governments accepted its protests and disregarded them: International Law is the will of the stronger. Besides, says M. Briand, "we were there in a country where force is more effective than anywhere else." [5] From this utterance, which was received by the French Chamber with applause, we get a glimpse into the workings of the official Entente mind, and more than a glimpse of the guiding principles of Entente policy in Greece during that period.
The reason for that policy publicly alleged was, as we have seen, the Allies" need to do their own fighting in {87} peace and security. Their real aim, M. Skouloudis believed, was to draw Greece gradually into the War. In so believing he interpreted correctly the French Government"s views as the French Government itself had expounded them to the British Government: "To bring Greece in." [6] With that as one of its objects the Salonica expedition had been persisted in; and as Greece persisted in standing out, the question resolved itself into one of continuous pressure.