Caryae. This frontier town was apparently (near Arachova) on the road from Thyrea (in the direction of the Argolid) to Sparta (Thuc. v. 55; Paus. III. x. 7; Livy, x.x.xiv. 26, but see Leake, "Morea," iii. 30; "Peloponn." p. 342).
Sellasia, probably rightly placed "half an hour above Vourlia"
(Baedeker, "Greece," p. 269). The famous battle of Sellasia, in the spring of B.C. 221, in which the united Macedonians under Antigonus and the Achaeans finally broke the power of Sparta, was fought in the little valley where the stream Gorgylus joins the river Oenus and the Khan of Krevatas now stands. For a plan, see "Dict. of Anc. Geog." s.v.
(26) "Perioeci."
(27) Diodorus (xv. 64) gives more details; he makes the invaders converge upon Sellasia by four separate routes. See Leake, "Morea," iii. 29 foll.
By all accounts Ischolaus made a mistake in not advancing to meet them on the difficult ground above Oeum. Had he done so, not a man, it is believed, would have scaled the pa.s.ses there. But for the present, wishing to turn the help of the men of Oeum to good account, he waited down in the village; and so the invading Arcadians scaled the heights in a body. At this crisis Ischolaus and his men, as long as they fought face to face with their foes, held the superiority; but, presently, when the enemy, from rear and flank, and even from the dwelling-houses up which they scaled, rained blows and missiles upon them, then and there Ischolaus met his end, and every man besides, save only one or two who, failing to be recognised, effected their escape.
After these achievements the Arcadians marched to join the Thebans at Caryae, and the Thebans, hearing what wonders the Arcadians had performed, commenced their descent with far greater confidence. Their first exploit was to burn and ravage the district of Sellasia, but finding themselves ere long in the flat land within the sacred enclosure of Apollo, they encamped for the night, and the next day continued their march along the Eurotas. When they came to the bridge they made no attempt to cross it to attack the city, for they caught sight of the heavy infantry in the temple of Alea (28) ready to meet them. So, keeping the Eurotas on their right, they tramped along, burning and pillaging homesteads stocked with numerous stores. The feelings of the citizens may well be imagined. The women who had never set eyes upon a foe (29) could scarcely contain themselves as they beheld the cloud of smoke. The Spartan warriors, inhabiting a city without fortifications, posted at intervals, here one and there another, were in truth what they appeared to be--the veriest handful. And these kept watch and ward. The authorities pa.s.sed a resolution to announce to the helots that whosoever among them chose to take arms and join a regiment should have his freedom guaranteed to him by solemn pledges in return for a.s.sistance in the common war. (30) More than six thousand helots, it is said, enrolled themselves, so that a new terror was excited by the very incorporation of these men, whose numbers seemed to be excessive. But when it was found that the mercenaries from Orchomenus remained faithful, and reinforcements came to Lacedaemon from Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, and Pellene, and some other states, the dread of these new levies was speedily diminished.
(28) See Pausanias, III. xix. 7.
(29) See Plutarch, "Ages." x.x.xi. 3 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 38); Aristot.
"Pol." ii. 9-10.
(30) See below, VII. ii. 2.
The enemy in his advance came to Amyclae. (31) Here he crossed the Eurotas. The Thebans wherever they encamped at once formed a stockade of the fruit-trees they had felled, as thickly piled as possible, and so kept ever on their guard. The Arcadians did nothing of the sort.
They left their camping-ground and took themselves off to attack the homesteads and loot. On the third or fourth day after their arrival the cavalry advanced, squadron by squadron, as far as the racecourse, (32) within the sacred enclosure of Gaiaochos. These consisted of the entire Theban cavalry and the Eleians, with as many of the Phocian or Thessalian or Locrian cavalry as were present. The cavalry of the Lacedaemonians, looking a mere handful, were drawn up to meet them. They had posted an ambuscade chosen from their heavy infantry, the younger men, about three hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndarids (33); and while the cavalry charged, out rushed the three hundred at the same instant at full pace. The enemy did not wait to receive the double charge, but swerved, and at sight of that many also of the infantry took to headlong flight. But the pursuers presently paused; the Theban army remained motionless; and both parties returned to their camps. And now the hope, the confidence strengthened that an attack upon the city itself would never come; nor did it. The invading army broke up from their ground, and marched off on the road to Helos and Gytheum. (34) The unwalled cities were consigned to the flames, but Gytheum, where the Lacedaemonians had their naval a.r.s.enal, was subjected to a.s.sault for three days. Certain of the provincials (35) also joined in this attack, and shared the campaign with the Thebans and their friends.
(31) For this ancient (Achaean) town, see Paus. III. ii. 6; Polyb. v.
19. It lay only twenty stades (a little more than two miles) from the city of Sparta.
(32) Or, "hippodrome." See Paus. III. ii. 6.
(33) Paus. III. xvi. 2.
(34) See Baedeker"s "Greece," p. 279. Was Gytheum taken? See Grote, "H. G." x. 305; Curt. "H. G." Eng. trans. iv. 431.
(35) "Perioeci." See above, III. iii. 6; VI. v. 25; below, VII. ii. 2; Grote, "H. G." x. 301. It is a pity that the historian should hurry us off to Athens just at this point. The style here is suggestive of notes ({upomnemata}) unexpanded.
The news of these proceedings set the Athenians deeply pondering what they ought to do concerning the Lacedaemonians, and they held an a.s.sembly in accordance with a resolution of the senate. It chanced that the amba.s.sadors of the Lacedaemonians and the allies still faithful to Lacedaemon were present. The Lacedaemonian amba.s.sadors were Aracus, Ocyllus, Pharax, Etymocles, and Olontheus, and from the nature of the case they all used, roughly speaking, similar arguments. They reminded the Athenians how they had often in old days stood happily together, shoulder to shoulder, in more than one great crisis. They (the Lacedaemonians), on their side, had helped to expel the tyrant from Athens, and the Athenians, when Lacedaemon was besieged by the Messenians, had heartily leant her a helping hand. (36) Then they fell to enumerating all the blessings that marked the season when the two states shared a common policy, hinting how in common they had warred against the barbarians, and more boldly recalling how the Athenians with the full consent and advice of the Lacedaemonians were chosen by united h.e.l.las leaders of the common navy (37) and guardians of all the common treasure, while they themselves were selected by all the h.e.l.lenes as confessedly the rightful leaders on land; and this also not without the full consent and concurrence of the Athenians.
(36) In reference (1) to the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Herod.
v. 64); (2) the "third" Messenian war (Thuc. i. 102).
(37) See "Revenues," v. 6.
One of the speakers ventured on a remark somewhat to this strain: "If you and we, sirs, can only agree, there is hope to-day that the old saying may be fulfilled, and Thebes be "taken and t.i.thed."" (38) The Athenians, however, were not in the humour to listen to that style of argument. A sort of suppressed murmur ran through the a.s.sembly which seemed to say, "That language may be well enough now; but when they were well off they pressed hard enough on us." But of all the pleas put forward by the Lacedaemonians, the weightiest appeared to be this: that when they had reduced the Athenians by war, and the Thebans wished to wipe Athens off the face of the earth, they (the Lacedaemonians) themselves had opposed the measure. (39) If that was the argument of most weight, the reasoning which was the most commonly urged was to the effect that "the solemn oaths necessitated the aid demanded. Sparta had done no wrong to justify this invasion on the part of the Arcadians and their allies. All she had done was to a.s.sist the men of Tegea when (40) the Mantineans had marched against that township contrary to their solemn oaths." Again, for the second time, at these expressions a confused din ran through the a.s.sembly, half the audience maintaining that the Mantineans were justified in supporting Proxenus and his friends, who were put to death by the party with Stasippus; the other half that they were wrong in bringing an armed force against the men of Tegea.
(38) Or, "the Thebans be decimated"; for the phrase see above, "h.e.l.l."
VI. iii. 20.
(39) See "h.e.l.l." II. ii. 19; and "h.e.l.l." III. v. 8.
(40) Lit. "because," {oti}.
Whilst these distinctions were being drawn by the a.s.sembly itself, Cleiteles the Corinthian got up and spoke as follows: "I daresay, men of Athens, there is a double answer to the question, Who began the wrongdoing? But take the case of ourselves. Since peace began, no one can accuse us either of wantonly attacking any city, or of seizing the wealth of any, or of ravaging a foreign territory. In spite of which the Thebans have come into our country and cut down our fruit-trees, burnt to the ground our houses, filched and torn to pieces our cattle and our goods. How then, I put it to you, will you not be acting contrary to your solemn oaths if you refuse your aid to us, who are so manifestly the victims of wrongdoings? Yes; and when I say solemn oaths, I speak of oaths and undertakings which you yourselves took great pains to exact from all of us." At that point a murmur of applause greeted Cleiteles, the Athenians feeling the truth and justice of the speaker"s language.
He sat down, and then Procles of Phlius got up and spoke as follows: "What would happen, men of Athens, if the Lacedaemonians were well out of the way? The answer to that question is obvious. You would be the first object of Theban invasion. Clearly; for they must feel that you and you alone stand in the path between them and empire over h.e.l.las. If this be so, I do not consider that you are more supporting Lacedaemon by a campaign in her behalf than you are helping yourselves. For imagine the Thebans, your own sworn foes and next-door neighbours, masters of h.e.l.las! You will find it a painful and onerous exchange indeed for the distant antagonism of Sparta. As a mere matter of self-interest, now is the time to help yourselves, while you may still reckon upon allies, instead of waiting until they are lost, and you are forced to fight a life-and-death battle with the Thebans single-handed. But the fear suggests itself, that should the Lacedaemonians escape now, they will live to cause you trouble at some future date. Lay this maxim to heart, then, that it is not the potential greatness of those we benefit, but of those we injure, which causes apprehension. And this other also, that it behoves individuals and states alike so to better their position (41) while yet in the zenith of their strength that, in the day of weakness, when it comes, they may find some succour and support in what their former labours have achieved. (42) To you now, at this time, a heaven-sent opportunity is presented. In return for a.s.sistance to the Lacedaemonians in their need, you may win their sincere, unhesitating friendship for all time. Yes, I say it deliberately, for the acceptance of these benefits at your hands will not be in the presence of one or two chance witnesses. The all-seeing G.o.ds, in whose sight to-morrow is even as to-day, will be cognisant of these things. The knowledge of them will be jointly attested by allies and enemies; nay, by h.e.l.lenes and barbarians alike, since to not one of them is what we are doing a matter of unconcern. If, then, in the presence of these witnesses, the Lacedaemonians should prove base towards you, no one will ever again be eager in their cause. But our hope, our expectation should rather be that they will prove themselves good men and not base; since they beyond all others would seem persistently to have cherished a high endeavour, reaching forth after true praise, and holding aloof from ugly deeds.
(41) Lit. "to acquire some good."
(42) Or, "for what," etc.
"But there are further considerations which it were well you should lay to heart. If danger were ever again to visit h.e.l.las from the barbarian world outside, in whom would you place your confidence if not in the Lacedaemonians? Whom would you choose to stand at your right hand in battle if not these, whose soldiers at Thermopylae to a man preferred to fall at their posts rather than save their lives by giving the barbarian free pa.s.sage into h.e.l.las? Is it not right, then, considering for what thing"s sake they displayed that bravery in your companionship, considering also the good hope there is that they will prove the like again--is it not just that you and we should lend them all countenance and goodwill? Nay, even for us their allies" sake, who are present, it would be worth your while to manifest this goodwill. Need you be a.s.sured that precisely those who continue faithful to them in their misfortunes would in like manner be ashamed not to requite you with grat.i.tude?
And if we seem to be but small states, who are willing to share their dangers with them, lay to heart that there is a speedy cure for this defect: with the accession of your city the reproach that, in spite of all our a.s.sistance, we are but small cities, will cease to be.
"For my part, men of Athens, I have hitherto on hearsay admired and envied this great state, whither, I was told, every one who was wronged or stood in terror of aught needed only to betake himself and he would obtain a.s.sistance. To-day I no longer hear, I am present myself and see these famous citizens of Lacedaemon here, and by their side their trustiest friends, who have come to you, and ask you in their day of need to give them help. I see Thebans also, the same who in days bygone failed to persuade the Lacedaemonians to reduce you to absolute slavery, (43) to-day asking you to suffer those who saved you to be destroyed.
(43) See "h.e.l.l." II. ii. 19; III. v. 8, in reference to B.C. 405.
"That was a great deed and of fair renown, attributed in old story to your ancestors, that they did not suffer those Argives who died on the Cadmeia (44) to lie unburied; but a fairer wreath of glory would you weave for your own brows if you suffer not these still living Lacedaemonians to be trampled under the heel of insolence and destroyed.
Fair, also, was that achievement when you stayed the insolence of Eurystheus and saved the sons of Heracles; (45) but fairer still than that will your deed be if you rescue from destruction, not the primal authors (46) merely, but the whole city which they founded; fairest of all, if because yesterday the Lacedaemonians won you your preservation by a vote which cost them nothing, you to-day shall bring them help with arms, and at the price of peril. It is a proud day for some of us to stand here and give what aid we can in pleading for a.s.sistance to brave men. What, then, must you feel, who in very deed are able to render that a.s.sistance! How generous on your parts, who have been so often the friends and foes of Lacedaemon, to forget the injury and remember only the good they have done! How n.o.ble of you to repay, not for yourselves only, but for the sake of h.e.l.las, the debt due to those who proved themselves good men and true in her behalf!"
(44) In reference to the Seven against Thebes, see Herod. IX. xxvii.
4; Isoc. "Paneg." 55.
(45) Herod. IX. xxvii. 3; see Isoc. "Paneg." 56. "The greatness of Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese--a recollection which ought to restrain Sparta from injuring or claiming to rule Athens.
Argos, Thebes, Sparta were in early times, as they are now, the foremost cities of h.e.l.las; but Athens was the greatest of them all --the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of those who founded Sparta."--Jebb, "Att. Or." ii. 154.
(46) Plut. "Lyc." vi.
After these speeches the Athenians deliberated, and though there was opposition, the arguments of gainsayers (47) fell upon deaf ears. The a.s.sembly finally pa.s.sed a decree to send a.s.sistance to Lacedaemon in force, and they chose Iphicrates general. Then followed the preliminary sacrifices, and then the general"s order to his troops to take the evening meal in the grove of the Academy. (48) But the general himself, it is said, was in no hurry to leave the city; many were found at their posts before him. Presently, however, he put himself at the head of his troops, and the men followed cheerily, in firm persuasion that he was about to lead them to some n.o.ble exploit. On arrival at Corinth he frittered away some days, and there was a momentary outburst of discontent at so much waste of precious time; but as soon as he led the troops out of Corinth there was an obvious rebound. The men responded to all orders with enthusiasm, heartily following their general"s lead, and attacking whatever fortified place he might confront them with.
(47) As to the anti-Laconian or Boeotian party at Athens, see Curtius, "H. G." vol. v. ch. ii. (Eng. tr.)
(48) See Baedeker, "Greece," p. 103.
And now reverting to the hostile forces on Laconian territory, we find that the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians had retired in large numbers.
They had every inducement so to do since their homes bordered on Laconia; and off they went, driving or carrying whatever they had looted. The Thebans and the rest were no less anxious to get out of the country, though for other reasons, partly because the army was melting away under their eyes day by day, partly because the necessities of life were growing daily scantier, so much had been either fairly eaten up and pillaged or else recklessly squandered and reduced to ashes. Besides this, it was winter; so that on every ground there was a general desire by this time to get away home.
As son as the enemy began his retreat from Laconian soil, Iphicrates imitated his movement, and began leading back his troops out of Arcadia into Corinthia. Iphicrates exhibited much good generalship, no doubt, with which I have no sort of fault to find. But it is not so with that final feature of the campaign to which we are now come. Here I find his strategy either meaningless in intent or inadequate in execution.
He made an attempt to keep guard at Oneion, in order to prevent the Boeotians making their way out homewards; but left meanwhile far the best pa.s.sage through Cenchreae unguarded. Again, when he wished to discover whether or not the Thebans had pa.s.sed Oneion, he sent out on a reconnaissance the whole of the Athenian and Corinthian cavalry; whereas, for the object in view, the eyes of a small detachment would have been as useful as a whole regiment; (49) and when it came to falling back, clearly the smaller number had a better chance of hitting on a traversable road, and so effecting the desired movement quietly.
But the height of folly seems to have been reached when he threw into the path of the enemy a large body of troops which were still too weak to cope with him. As a matter of fact, this body of cavalry, owing to their very numbers, could not help covering a large s.p.a.ce of ground; and when it became necessary to retire, had to cling to a series of difficult positions in succession, so that they lost not fewer than twenty hors.e.m.e.n. (50) It was thus the Thebans effected their object and retired from Peloponnese.
(49) See "Hipparch." viii. 10 foll.
(50) See Diod. xv. 63; Plut. "Pelop." 24.
BOOK VII