From the very beginning of the Reformation the Romanists had slandered Luther also by maintaining that he condemned good works and simply denied their necessity. A similar charge was made by the Majorists against their opponents generally. And Melanchthon"s writings, too, frequently create the same impression. But it was an inference of their own. They argued: If good works are not necessary to salvation, they cannot be necessary at all. Wigand wrote: "It is a most malicious and insidious trait in the new teachers [the Majorists] that they, in order to gloss over their case, cry out with the Papists that the controversy is whether good works are necessary. But this is not in dispute, for no Christian ever denied it. Good works are necessary; that is certainly true. But the conflict arises from the appendix attached to it, and the patch pasted to it, _viz._, "to salvation." And here all G.o.d-fearing men say that it is a detrimental, offensive, d.a.m.nable, papistic appendix." (Planck 4, 498. 544.)
It is true, however, that the Antinomians (who will be dealt with more extensively in a following chapter) as well as several other opponents of the Majorists were unwilling to allow the statement, "Good works are necessary." Falsely interpreting the proposition as necessarily implying, not merely moral obligation, but also compulsion and coercion, they rejected it as unevangelical and semipopish. The word "must" is here not in place, they protested. Agricola, as well as the later Antinomians (Poach and Otto), rejected the expressions "_necessarium,_ necessary" and "duty, _debitum,_" when employed in connection with good works. January 13, 1555, Melanchthon wrote: "Some object to the words, "Good works are _necessary,_" or, "One _must_ do good works." They object to the two words _necessitas_ and _debitum._ And the Court-preacher [Agricola] at that time juggled with the word _must: "das Muss ist versalzen._" He understood _necessarium_ and _debitum_ as meaning, coerced by fear of punishment, _extortum coactione_ (extorted by coercion), and spoke high-sounding words, such as, how good works came without the Law. Yet the first meaning of _necessarium_ and _debitum_ is not _extortum coactione,_ but the eternal and immutable order of divine wisdom; and the Lord Christ and Paul themselves employ these words _necessarium_ and _debitum._" In December, 1557, he wrote: "They [the Antinomians] object to the proposition: "New obedience is necessary;" again: "New obedience is a debt (_debitum_)." And now Amsdorf writes: "Good works are detrimental to salvation,"and it was Eisleben"s [Agricola"s] slogan: "Das Muss ist versalzen." In Nordhausen some one has publicly announced a disputation which contains the proposition: "_Summa ars Chriatianorum est nescire legem._--The highest art of a Christian is not to know the Law."" March 4, 1558: "Some, for instance, Amsdorf and Gallus, object to the word _debitum._" (_C. R._ 8, 411. 194. 842; 9, 405. 474.)
Andrew Musculus, professor in Frankfurt on the Oder, is reported to have said in a sermon, 1558: "They are all the devil"s own who teach: "New obedience is necessary (_nova obedientia est necessaria_)"; the word "must (necessary)" does not belong here. "Good works are necessary to salvation," and, "Good works are necessary, but not to salvation"--these are both of a cloth--_das sind zwei Hosen aus EINEM Tuch._" (Meusel, _Handlexikon_ 4, 710; Gieseler 3, 2, 216.)
Over against this extreme position, Melanchthon, Flacius, Wigand, Moerlin, and others held that it was entirely correct to say that good works are necessary. In the _Opinion_ of November 13, 1559, referred to above, Melanchthon, after stating that he does not employ the phrase, "Good works are necessary to salvation," continues as follows: "But I do affirm that these propositions are true, and that one may properly and without sophistry say, "The new obedience or good works are necessary,"
because obedience is due to G.o.d and because it is necessary that, after the Holy Spirit has been received, regeneration or conversion be followed by motions corresponding to the Holy Spirit.... And the words "duty" and "necessity" signify the order of G.o.d"s wisdom and justice; they do not signify an obedience which is compelled or extorted by fear." (_C. R._ 9, 969.) The Frankfurt _Rezess_ of 1558 [Rezess, Rueckzug, Vergleich = Agreement], written by Melanchthon and signed by the Lutheran princes, declared: "These propositions, "_Nova obedientia est necessaria, nova obedientia est debitum,_ New obedience is necessary, is a debt," shall not be rejected." The _Rezess_ explained: "It is certainly a divine, immovable truth that new obedience is necessary in those who are justified; and these words are to be retained in their true meaning. "Necessary" signifies divine order. New obedience is necessary and is a debt for the very reason that it is an immutable divine order that the rational creature obeys G.o.d." (_C. R._ 9, 496.
498.)
In a similar way this matter was explained by Flacius and other theologians. They all maintained that it is correct to say, Good works are necessary. Even Amsdorf wrote 1552 in his _Brief Instruction_ against Major: "For we all say and confess that a Christian after his renewal and new birth _should_ and _must_ (_soll und muss_) love and fear G.o.d and do all manner of good works, but not in order to be saved thereby, for he is saved already by faith." (Schlb. 7, 210.) This view, which was also plainly taught in the _Augsburg Confession,_ prevailed and received the sanction of our Church in Article IV of the _Formula of Concord._ When a Christian spontaneously and by the free impulse of his own faith does (and would do, even if there were no law at all) what, according to the holy will of G.o.d, revealed in the Ten Commandments, he is obliged and in duty bound to do--such works, and such only, are, according to the _Formula of Concord,_ truly good works, works pleasing to G.o.d. It was the doctrine of Luther, who had written, _e.g._, in his _Church Postil_ of 1521: "No, dear man, you [cannot earn heaven by your good works, but you] must have heaven and already be saved before you do good works. Works do not merit heaven, but, on the contrary, heaven, imparted by pure grace, does good works spontaneouslv, seeking no merit, but only the welfare of the neighbor and the glory of G.o.d. _Nein, lieber Mensch, du musst den Himmel haben und schon selig sein, ehe du gute Werke tust. Die Werke verdienen nicht den Himmel, sondern wiederum [umgekehrt], der Himmel, aus lauter Gnaden gegeben, tut die guten Werke dahin, ohne Gesuch des Verdienstes, nur dem Naechsten zu Nutz und Gott zu Ehren._" (E. 7, 174.) Again, in _De Servio Arbitrio_ of 1525: "The children of G.o.d do good entirely voluntarily, seeking no reward, but only the glory and will of G.o.d, ready to do the good even if, a.s.suming the impossible, there were neither heaven nor h.e.l.l. _Filii autem Dei gratuita voluntate faciunt bonum, nullum praemium quaerentes, sed solam gloriam et voluntatem Dei, parati bonum facere, si per impossibile neque regnum neque infernus esset._" (E. v. a. 7, 234.)
XIV. The Synergistic Controversy.
151. Relation of Majorism and Synergism.
The theological connection between Majorism and synergism is much closer than is generally realized. Both maintain that, in part, or in a certain respect, salvation depends not on grace alone, but also on man and his efforts. The Majorists declared good works to be necessary to salvation, or at least to the preservation of faith and of salvation. Thus salvation would, in a way, depend on the right conduct of a Christian after his conversion. The Synergists a.s.serted: Man, too, must do his bit and cooperate with the Holy Spirit if he desires to be saved. Conversion and salvation, therefore, would depend, at least in part, on man"s conduct toward converting grace, and he would be justified and saved, not by grace alone, but by a faith which to a certain extent is a work of his own. The burden of both, Majorism and synergism, was the denial of the _sola gratia._ Both coordinated man and G.o.d as the causes of our salvation. Indeed, consistently carried out, both destroyed the central Christian truth of justification by grace alone and, with it, the a.s.surance of a gracious G.o.d and of eternal salvation--the supreme religious concern of Luther and the entire Lutheran theology.
Majorists and Synergists employed also the same line of argument. Both derived their doctrine, not from any clear statements of the Bible, but by a process of anti-Scriptural and fallacious reasoning. The Majorists inferred: Since evil works and sins against conscience destroy faith and justification, good works are required for their preservation. The Synergists argued: Since all who are not converted or finally saved must blame, not G.o.d, but themselves for rejecting grace, those, too, who are converted must be credited with at least a small share in the work of their salvation, that is to say, with a better conduct toward grace than the conduct of those who are lost.
However, while Majorism as well as synergism, as stated, represented essentially the same error and argued against the doctrine of grace in the same unscriptural manner, the more subtle, veiled, and hence the more dangerous of the two, no doubt, was synergism, which reduced man"s cooperation to a seemingly harmless minimum and, especially in the beginning, endeavored to clothe itself in ambiguous phrases and apparently pious and plausible formulas. Perhaps this accounts also for the fact that, though Melanchthon and the Majorists felt constrained to abandon as described in the preceding chapter, the coa.r.s.er and more offensive Majoristic propositions, they had at the same time no compunctions about retaining and defending essentially the same error in their doctrine of conversion; and that, on the other hand, their opponents, who by that time fully realized also the viciousness of synergism, were not satisfied with Major"s concessions in the controversy on good works, because he and his colleagues in Wittenberg were known to identify themselves with the Synergists. For the same reason the dangerous error lurking in the synergistic phrases does not seem from the first to have been recognized by the Lutherans in the same degree as was the error contained in the Majoristic propositions, which indeed had even during Luther"s life to some extent become a subject of dispute. Yet it seems hardly possible that for years they should not have detected the synergistic deviations in Wittenberg from Luther"s doctrine of free will. Perhaps the fact that at the time when Melanchthon came out boldly with his synergism, 1548, the Lutherans were engrossed with the Adiaphoristic and Majoristic controversies may help to explain, at least to some extent, why the synergistic error caused small concern, and was given but little consideration in the beginning.
As a matter of fact, although a considerable amount of synergistic material had been published by 1548, the controversy did not begin till 1556, while the error that good works are necessary to salvation was publicly opposed soon after its reappearance in the Leipzig Interim. At the Weimar Disputation, 1560, Strigel referred to this silence, saying: "I am astonished that I am pressed so much in this matter [concerning synergism], since three years ago at Worms no mention whatever [?] was made of this controversy, while many severe commands were given regarding others." (Richard, _Conf. Prin.,_ 349.) The matter was mentioned at Worms, but Melanchthon is reported to have satisfied Brenz and others by declaring that in the pa.s.sages of his _Loci_ suspected of synergism he meant "the regenerated will."
152. Luther"s Monergism.
According to Lutheran theology, the true opposite of synergism is not Calvinism with its double election, irresistible grace, denial of universal redemption, etc., but the monergism of grace, embracing particularly the tenets that in consequence of Adam"s fall man is spiritually dead and utterly unable to contribute in any degree or manner toward his own justification and conversion; moreover, that, being an enemy of G.o.d, man, of his own natural powers, is active only in resisting the saving efforts of G.o.d, as well as able and p.r.o.ne only to do so; that G.o.d alone and in every respect is the Author of man"s conversion, perseverance, and final salvation; and that, since the grace of G.o.d is universal and earnestly proffered, man alone is responsible for, and the cause of, his own d.a.m.nation.
_"Sola fides iustificat,_ Faith alone justifies"--that was the great slogan of the Reformation sounded forth by Luther and his followers with ever increasing boldness, force and volume. And the distinct meaning of this proposition, which Luther called "_hoc meum dogma,_ this my dogma,"
was just this, that we are saved not by any effort or work of our own, but in every respect by G.o.d"s grace alone. The restoration of this wonderful truth, taught by St. Paul, made Luther the Reformer of the Church. This truth alone, as Luther had experienced, is able to impart solid comfort to a terror-stricken conscience, engender divine a.s.surance of G.o.d"s pardon and acceptance, and thus translate a poor miserable sinner from the terrors of h.e.l.l into paradise.
In the _Seven Penitential Psalms,_ written 1517, Luther says: "If G.o.d"s mercy is to be praised, then all [human] merits and worthiness must come to naught." (Weimar 1, 161.) "Not such are blessed as have no sins or extricate themselves by their own labors, but only those whose sins are graciously forgiven by G.o.d." (167.) "It is characteristic of G.o.d (_es ist Gottes Natur_) to make something out of nothing. Hence G.o.d cannot make anything out of him who is not as yet nothing.... Therefore G.o.d receives none but the forsaken, heals none but the ill, gives sight to none but the blind, quickens none but the dead, makes pious none but the sinners, makes wise none but the ignorant,--in short, He has mercy on none but the miserable, and gives grace to none but those who are in disgrace. Whoever therefore, is a proud saint, wise or just, cannot become G.o.d"s material and receive G.o.d"s work within himself, but remains in his own work and makes an imaginary, seeming, false, and painted saint of himself, _i.e._, a hypocrite." (183.) "For he whom Thou [G.o.d]
dost justify will never become righteous by his works; hence it is called Thy righteousness, since Thou givest it to us by grace, and we do not obtain it by works." (192.) "Israel the true [new] man, does not take refuge in himself, nor in his strength, nor in his righteousness and wisdom.... For help and grace is not with themselves. They are sinners and d.a.m.ned in themselves, as He also says through Hosea: O Israel, with thee there is nothing but d.a.m.nation, but with Me is thine help." (210.) "He, He, G.o.d Himself, not they themselves, will deliver the true Israel.... Mark well, Israel has sin and cannot help itself."
(211.)
In his explanation of Ps. 109 (110), 1518, Luther says: "He calls these children [conceived from spiritual seed, the Word of G.o.d] dew, since no soul is converted and transformed from Adam"s sinful childhood to the gracious childhood of Christ by human work, but only by G.o.d, who works from heaven like the dew, as Micah writes: "The children of Israel will be like the dew given by G.o.d which does not wait for the hands of men.""
(701.) Again: "In every single man G.o.d precedes with grace and works before we pray for grace or cooperate. The Doctors call this _gratiam primam et praevenientem,_ that is, the first and prevenient grace.
Augustine: _Gratia Dei praevenit, ut velimus, ne frustra velimus._ G.o.d"s grace prevenes that we will, lest we will in vain." (710.)
In his 40 theses for the Heidelberg disputation, also of 1518, Luther says of man"s powers in spiritual matters: "13. Free will after sin [the Fall] is a mere t.i.tular affair [an empty t.i.tle only], and sins mortally when it does what it is able to do. _Liberum arbitrium post peccatum res est de solo t.i.tulo et dum facit, quod in se est, peccat mortaliter._"
"16. A man desirous of obtaining grace by doing what he is able to do adds sin to sin, becoming doubly guilty. _h.o.m.o putans, se ad gratiam velle pervenire faciendo, quod est in se, peccatum addit peccato, ut duplo reus fiat._" "18. It is certain that a man must utterly despair of himself in order to become apt to acquire the grace of Christ. _Certum est, hominem de se penitus oportere desperare, ut aptus fiat ad consequendam gratiam Christi._" (W. 1, 354.) By way of explanation Luther added to thesis 13: "The first part [of this thesis, that free will is a mere empty t.i.tle] is apparent, because the will is a captive and a servant to sin, not that it is nothing, but that it is free only to [do] evil--_non quod sit nihil, sed quod non sit liberum nisi ad malum._ John 8, 34. 36: "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.
If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." Hence, St.
Augustine says in his book _De Spiritu et Litera:_ Free will without grace can only sin--_non nisi ad peccandum valet._ And in his second book against Julia.n.u.s: You call that a free will which in truth is captive, etc." To thesis 16 Luther added: "When man does what he is able to do (_dum facit, quod est in se_), he sins, seeking altogether his own. And if he is minded to become worthy of, and apt for, grace by a sin, he adds proud presumption."
In his sermon of 1519 on Genesis 4, Luther remarked: "This pa.s.sage ["The Lord had respect unto Abel"] subverts the entire liberty of our human will. _Hic locus semel invert.i.t universam libertatem voluntatis nostrae._" (Weimar 9, 337.) In a sermon of September 8, 1520, we read: "By nature we are born accursed;... through Christ we are born again children of life. Thus we are born not by free will, not by works, not by our efforts. As a child in the womb is not born by its own works, but suffers itself to be carried and to be given birth, so we are justified by suffering, not by doing." (474.) "Where, then," Luther exclaimed about the same time in his _Operationes in Psalmos,_ "will free will remain? where the doing what one can? _Ubi ergo manebit liberum arbitrium, ubi facere quod in se?_" (5, 544. 74.) In a sermon of February 2, 1521, he said: "Whatever grace is in us comes from G.o.d alone. Here free will is entirely dead. All that we attempt to establish with our powers is lost unless He prevenes and makes us alive through His grace. Grace is His own work, which we receive in our hearts by faith. This grace the soul did not possess before, for it is the new man.... The great proud saints will not do this [ascribe everything to G.o.d and His mercy]. They, too, would have a share in it, saying to our Lord: "This I have done by my free will, this I have deserved."" (9, 573; 5, 544.)
Thus Luther, from the very beginning of the Reformation, stood for the doctrine of justification, conversion, and salvation by grace alone.
Most emphatically he denied that man though free to a certain extent in human and temporal affairs, is able to cooperate with the powers of his natural, unregenerate will in matters spiritual and pertaining to G.o.d.
This was also the position which Luther victoriously defended against Erasmus in his _De Servo Arbitrio_ of 1525. Goaded on by the Romanists to come out publicly against the German heretic, the great Humanist, in his _Diatribe_ of 1524, had shrewdly planned to attack his opponent at the most vulnerable point. As such he regarded Luther"s monergistic doctrine, according to which it is G.o.d alone who justifies, converts, preserves, and saves men, without any works of their own. In reality, however, as presently appeared from his glorious cla.s.sic on the _sola-gratia_ doctrine, Erasmus had a.s.saulted the strongest gate of Luther"s fortress. For the source of the wonderful power which Luther displayed throughout the Reformation was none other than the divine conviction born of the Word of G.o.d that in every respect grace alone is the cause of our justification and salvation. And if ever this blessed doctrine was firmly established, successfully defended, and greatly glorified, it was in Luther"s book against Erasmus.
Justification, conversion, perseverance in faith, and final salvation, obtained not by any effort of ours, but in every respect received as a gracious gift of G.o.d alone--that was the teaching also to which Luther faithfully, most determinedly, and without any wavering adhered throughout his life. In his _Large Confession_ of 1528, for example, we read: "Herewith I reject and condemn as nothing but error all dogmas which extol our free will, as they directly conflict with this help and grace of our Savior Jesus Christ. For since outside of Christ death and sin are our lords, and the devil our G.o.d and prince, there can be no power or might, no wisdom or understanding, whereby we can qualify ourselves for, or strive after, righteousness and life; but we must be blinded people and prisoners of sin and the devil"s own, to do and to think what pleases them and is contrary to G.o.d and His commandments."
(CONC. TRIGL. 897, 43.)
153. Luther"s Doctrine Endorsed.
To adhere faithfully to Luther"s doctrine of conversion and salvation by grace alone was also the determination of the loyal Lutherans in their opposition to the Synergists. Planck correctly remarks that the doctrine which Flacius and the Anti-Synergists defended was the very doctrine which "Luther advocated in his conflict with Erasmus." (_Prot.
Lehrbegriff_ 4, 667.) This was substantially conceded even by the opponents. When, for example, at the colloquy in Worms, 1557, the Romanists demanded that Flacius"s doctrine of free will be condemned by the Lutherans, Melanchthon declared that herein one ought not to submit to the Papists, who slyly, under the name of Illyricus [Flacius], demanded the condemnation of Luther, whose opinion in the doctrine of free will he [Melanchthon] was neither able nor willing to condemn.
(Gieseler 3, 2, 232.) In their _Confession,_ published in March, 1569, the theologians of Ducal Saxony (Wigand, Coelestin, Irenaeus, Kirchner, etc.) declared: "We also add that we embrace the doctrine and opinion of Dr. Luther, the Elias of these latter days of the world, as it is most luminously and skilfully set forth in the book _De Servo Arbitrio,_ against Erasmus, in the _Commentary on Genesis,_ and in other books; and we hold that this teaching of Luther agrees with the eternal Word of G.o.d." (Schluesselburg, _Catalogus_ 5, 133.)
Luther"s _sola-gratia_-doctrine was embodied also in the _Formula of Concord,_ and this with a special endors.e.m.e.nt of his book _De Servo Arbitrio._ For here we read: "Even so Dr. Luther wrote of this matter [the doctrine that our free will has no power whatever to qualify itself for righteousness, etc.] also in his book _De Servo Arbitrio; i.e._, Of the Captive Will of Man, in opposition to Erasmus, and elucidated and supported this position well and thoroughly [_egregie et solide_]; and afterward he repeated and explained it in his glorious exposition of the book of Genesis, especially of chapter 26. There likewise his meaning and understanding of some other peculiar disputations introduced incidentally by Erasmus, as of absolute necessity, etc., have been secured by him in the best and most careful way against all misunderstanding and perversion; to which we also hereby appeal and refer others." (897, 44; 981, 28.) In the pa.s.sage of his _Commentary on Genesis_ referred to by the _Formula,_ Luther does not, as has been claimed, retract or modify his former statements concerning the inability of the human will and the monergism of grace, but emphasizes that, in reading _De Servo Arbitrio,_ one must heed and not overlook his frequent admonitions to concern oneself with G.o.d as He has revealed Himself in the Gospel, and not speculate concerning G.o.d in His transcendence, absoluteness, and majesty, as the One in whom we live and move and have our being, and without whom nothing can either exist or occur, and whose wonderful ways are past finding out. (CONC. TRIGL., 898.) And the fact that the Lutheran theologians, living at the time and immediately after the framing of the _Formula of Concord,_ objected neither to the book _De Servo Arbitrio_ itself nor to its public endors.e.m.e.nt by the _Formula of Concord,_ is an additional proof of the fact that they were in complete agreement with Luther"s teaching of conversion and salvation by grace alone. (Frank 1, 120.)
This _sola-gratia_-doctrine, the vital truth of Christianity, rediscovered and proclaimed once more by Luther, was, as stated, the target at which Erasmus directed his shafts. In his _Diatribe_ he defined the power of free will to be the faculty of applying oneself to grace (_facultas applicandi se ad gratiam_), and declared that those are the best theologians who, while ascribing as much as possible to the grace of G.o.d, do not eliminate this human factor. He wrote: Free will is "the ability of the human will according to which man is able either to turn himself to what leads to eternal salvation or to turn away from it." (St.L. 18, 1612.) Again: "Those, therefore, who are farthest apart from the views of Pelagius ascribe to grace the most, but to free will almost nothing; yet they do not abolish it entirely. They say that man cannot will anything good without special grace, cannot begin anything good, cannot continue in it, cannot complete anything without the chief thing, the constant help of divine grace. This opinion seems to be pretty probable because it leaves to man a striving and an effort, and yet does not admit that he is to ascribe even the least to his own powers." (1619.) One must avoid extremes, and seek the middle of the road, said Erasmus. Pelagius had fallen into Scylla, and Luther into Charybdis. "I am pleased with the opinion of those who ascribe to free will something, but to grace by far the most." (1666.) Essentially, this was the error held, nursed, and defended also by the Synergists, though frequently in more guarded and ambiguous phrases. But their theory of conversion also involved, as Schaff and Schmauk put it, "the idea of a partnership between G.o.d and man, and a corresponding division of work and merit." (_Conf. Principle,_ 600.)
However, these attempts to revamp the Semi-Pelagian teaching resulted in a controversy which more and longer than any other endangered and disquieted the Lutheran Church, before as well as after the adoption of the _Formula of Concord._ Whether the unregenerate man, when the Word of G.o.d is preached, and the grace of G.o.d is offered him, is able to prepare himself for grace, accept it, and a.s.sent thereto, was, according to the _Formula of Concord,_ "the question upon which, _for quite a number of years now,_ there has been a controversy among some theologians in the churches of the Augsburg Confession." (881, 2.) And of all the controversies after Luther"s death the synergistic controversy was most momentous and consequential. For the doctrine of grace with which it dealt is the vital breath of every Christian. Without it neither faith nor the Christian religion can live and remain. "If we believe," says Luther in _De Servo Arbitrio,_ "that Christ has redeemed men by His blood, then we must confess that the entire man was lost; otherwise we make Christ superfluous or the Redeemer of but the meanest part of us, which is blasphemous and sacrilegious." Reading the book of Erasmus, in which he bent every effort toward exploding the doctrine of grace, Luther felt the hand of his opponent clutching his throat. In the closing paragraph of _De Servo Arbitrio_ Luther wrote: "I highly laud and extol you for this thing also, that of all others you alone have gone to the heart of the subject.... You alone have discerned the core of the matter and have aimed at the throat, for which I thank you heartily.--_Unus tu et solus cardinem rerum vidisti, et ipsum iugulum petisti, pro quo ex animo tibi gratias ago, in hac enim causa libentius versor, quantum favet tempus et otium._" (E. v. a. 7, 367. 137; St. L.
18, 1967; Pieper, _Dogm._ 2, 543.) And so the Synergists, who renewed the doctrine of Erasmus, also flew at the throat of Christianity.
Genuine Lutheranism would have been strangled if synergism had emerged victorious from this great controversy of grace versus free will.
154. The Father of Synergism.
During the first period of his activity in Wittenberg, Melanchthon was in perfect agreement with Luther also on the question of man"s inability in spiritual matters and the sole activity, or monergism, of grace in the work of his salvation. As late as 1530 he incorporated these views in the _Augsburg Confession,_ as appears, in particular, from Articles II, V, XVIII, and XIX. His later doctrine concerning the three concurring causes of conversion (the Holy Spirit, the Word, and the consenting will of man), as well as his theory explaining synergistically, from an alleged dissimilar action in man, the difference why some are saved while others are lost, is not so much as hinted at in the Confession. But even at this early date (1530) or soon after, Melanchthon also does not seem any longer to have agreed whole-heartedly with Luther in the doctrine of grace and free will. And in the course of time his theology drifted farther and farther from its original monergistic moorings. Nor was Luther wholly unaware of the secret trend of his colleague and friend toward--Erasmus. In 1536, when the deviations of Melanchthon and Cruciger, dealt with in our previous chapter, were brought to his notice, Luther exclaimed: "_Haec est ipsissima theologia Erasmi._ This is the identical theology of Erasmus, nor can there be anything more opposed to our doctrine." (Kolde, _a.n.a.lecta,_ 266.)
That Melanchthon"s theology was verging toward Erasmus appears from his letter of June 22, 1537, to Veit Dietrich, in which he said that he desired a more thorough exposition also of the doctrines of predestination and of the _consent of the will._ (_C. R._ 3, 383.) Before this, in his _Commentary on Romans_ of 1532, he had written that there is some cause of election also in man; _viz._, in as far as he does not repudiate the grace offered--"_tamen eatenus aliquam causam in accipiente esse quatenus promissionem oblatam non repudiat_." (Seeberg 4, 442.) In an addition to his _Loci_ of 1533 he also spoke of a cause of justification and election residing in man. (_C. R._ 21, 332.) In the revised editions of 1535 and 1543 he plainly began to prepare the way for his later bold and unmistakable deviations. For even though unable to point out a clean-cut and unequivocal synergistic statement, one cannot read these editions without scenting a Semi-Pelagian and Erasmian atmosphere. What Melanchthon began to teach was the doctrine that man, when approached by the Word of G.o.d, is able to a.s.sume either an att.i.tude of _pro_ or _con_, _i.e._, for or against the grace of G.o.d. The same applies to the _Variata_ of 1540 in which the frequent "_adiuvari_"
there employed, though not incorrect as such, was not without a synergistic flavor.
Tschackert remarks of the _Loci_ of 1535: "Melanchthon wants to make man responsible for his state of grace. Nor does the human will in consequence of original sin lose the ability to decide itself when incited; the will produces nothing new by its own power, but a.s.sumes an att.i.tude toward what approaches it. When man hears the Word of G.o.d, and the Holy Spirit produces spiritual affections in his heart, the will can either a.s.sent or turn against it. In this way Melanchthon arrives at the formula, ever after stereotype with him, that there are three concurring causes in the process of conversion: "the Word of G.o.d, the Holy Spirit, and the human will, which, indeed, is not idle, _but strives against its infirmity."_" (520.)
However, during the life of Luther, Melanchthon made no further measurable progress towards synergism. Perhaps the unpleasant experiences following upon his innovations in the doctrine of good works acted as a check also on the public development of his synergistic tendencies. During Luther"s life Melanchthon, as he himself admitted to Carlowitz (106), dissimulated, keeping his deviating views to himself and his intimate friends. After Luther"s death, however, he came out unmistakably and publicly, also in favor of synergism, endorsing even the Erasmian definition of free will as "the power in man to apply himself to grace." He plainly taught that, when drawn by the Holy Spirit, the will is able to decide _pro_ or _con,_ to obey or to resist.
Especially in his lectures, Melanchthon--not indeed directly, but mentioning the name of Flacius--continually lashed such phrases of Luther as "purely pa.s.sive," "block," "resistance,"--a fact to which Schluesselburg, who had studied in Wittenberg, refers in support of his a.s.sertion that Melanchthon had departed from Luther"s teaching on free will. (_Catalogus_ 5, 32.) While Melanchthon formerly (in his _Loci_ of 1543) had spoken of three causes of a good action (_bonae actionis_) he now publicly advocated the doctrine of three concurring causes of _conversion._ Now he boldly maintained that, since the grace of G.o.d is universal, one must a.s.sume, and also teach, that there are different actions in different men, which accounts for the fact that some are converted and saved while others are lost. According to the later Melanchthon, therefore, man"s eternal salvation evidently does not depend on the gracious operations of G.o.d"s Holy Spirit and Word alone, but also on his own correct conduct toward grace. In his heart, especially when approaching the mercy-seat in prayer, Melanchthon, no doubt, forgot and disavowed his own teaching, and believed and practised Luther"s _sola-gratia_-doctrine. But it cannot be denied that, in his endeavors to harmonize universal grace with the fact that not all, but some only, are saved, Melanchthon repudiated the monergism of Luther, espoused and defended the powers of free will in spiritual matters, and thought, argued, spoke, and wrote in terms of synergism. Indeed, Melanchthon must be regarded as the father of both synergism and the rationalistic methods employed in its defense, and as the true father also of the modern rationalistico-synergistic theology represented by such distinguished men as Von Hofmann, Thomasius, Kahnis, Luthardt, etc.
(Pieper 2, 582; Frank 1, 231.)
155. Unsound Statements of Melanchthon.
Following are some of the ambiguous and false deliverances of Melanchthon: In the _Loci_ of 1535 the so-called human cause of conversion which must be added to the Word and Spirit is described as endeavoring, striving, and wishing to obey and believe. We read: "We do not say this to ensnare the consciences, or to deter men from the endeavor to obey and believe, or from making an effort. On the contrary, since we are to begin with the Word, we certainly must not resist the Word of G.o.d, but strive to obey it.... We see that these causes are united: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not idle, but strives against its infirmity. In this manner ecclesiastical writers are accustomed to join these causes. Basil says: "Only will, and G.o.d will precede," G.o.d precedes, calls, moves, a.s.sists us, but let us beware lest we resist.... Chrysostom says: He who draws, draws him who is willing." (_C. R._ 21, 376.)
In conversion and salvation G.o.d certainly must do and does His share, but man must beware lest he fail to do what is required of him. This is also the impression received from Melanchthon"s statements in the third elaboration of his _Loci,_ 1543. We read: "Here three causes of a good action concur (_hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis_): the Word of G.o.d, the Holy Spirit, and the human will a.s.senting to and not resisting the Word of G.o.d (_humana voluntas a.s.sentiens, nec repugnans Verbo Dei_). For it could expel [the Spirit], as Saul expelled [Him] of his own free will. But when the mind hearing and sustaining itself does not resist, does not give way to diffidence, but, the Holy Spirit a.s.sisting, endeavors to a.s.sent,--in such a struggle the will is not inactive (_in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa_). The ancients have said that good works are done when grace precedes and the will follows.
So also Basil says: "_Monon theleson, kai theos proapanta_, Only will, and G.o.d antic.i.p.ates. G.o.d precedes, calls, moves, a.s.sists us; but as for us, let us see to it that we do not resist. _Deus antevert.i.t nos, vocat, movet, adiuvat, SED NOS VIDERIMUS, ne repugnemus,_" (21, 658.) And Phil.
1, 6: "He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ," _i.e._, we are a.s.sisted by G.o.d (_adiuvamur a Deo_), but we must hear the Word of G.o.d and not resist the drawing G.o.d."
(916.) "G.o.d draws our minds that they will, but we must a.s.sent, not resist. _Deus trahit mentes, ut velint, sed a.s.sentiri nos, non repugnare oportet._" (917.) Here we also meet the remark: "But the will, when a.s.sisted by the Holy Spirit, becomes more free. _Fit autem voluntas adiuvata Spiritu Sancto magis libera._" (663.) Frank comments pertinently that the _magis_ presupposes a certain degree of liberty of the will before the a.s.sistance of the Holy Spirit. (1, 198.)
The boldest synergistic statements are found in the _Loci_ of 1548. It was the year of the Leipzig Interim, in which the same error was embodied as follows: "The merciful G.o.d does not deal with man as with a block, but draws him in such a way that his will, too, cooperates." (_C.
R._ 7, 51. 260.) As to the _Loci_ of this year, Bindseil remarks in the _Corpus Reformatorum:_ "This edition is famous on account of certain paragraphs inserted by the author in the article on Free Will. For these additions contain the Erasmian definition of free will (that it is the faculty of applying oneself to grace), on account of which Melanchthon was charged with synergism by the Flacians.... For this reason the edition is called by J. T. Mayer "the worst of all (_omnium pessima_).""
At the Weimar colloquy, 1560, even Strigel was not willing to identify himself openly with the Erasmian definition of free will (_facultas applicandi se ad gratiam_) as found in one of these sections. When Flacius quoted the pa.s.sage, Strigel retorted excitedly: "I do not defend that definition which you have quoted from the recent edition [1548]. When did you hear it from me? When have I undertaken to defend it?" (Frank 1, 199. 135.) At the Herzberg colloquy Andreae remarked: "The _Loci Communes_ of Melanchthon are useful. But whoever reads the _locus de libero arbitrio_ must confess, even if he judges most mildly, that the statements are dubious and ambiguous. And what of the four paragraphs which were inserted after Luther"s death? For here we read: "There must of necessity be a cause of difference in us why a Saul is rejected, a David received."" (Pieper 2, 587.)
From these additions of 1548 we cite: "Nor does conversion occur in David in such a manner as when a stone is turned into a fig: but free will does something in David; for when he hears the rebuke and the promise, he willingly and freely confesses his fault. And his will does something when he sustains himself with this word: The Lord hath taken away your sin. And when he endeavors to sustain himself with this word, he is already a.s.sisted by the Holy Spirit." (_C. R._ 21, 659.) Again: "I therefore answer those who excuse their idleness because they think that free will does nothing, as follows: It certainly is the eternal and immovable will of G.o.d that you obey the voice of the Gospel, that you hear the Son of G.o.d, that you acknowledge the Mediator. How black is that sin which refuses to behold the Mediator, the Son of G.o.d, presented to the human race! You will answer: "I cannot." But in a manner you can (_immo aliquo modo potes_), and when you sustain yourself with the voice of the Gospel, then pray that G.o.d would a.s.sist you, and know that the Holy Spirit is efficacious in such consolation. Know that just in this manner G.o.d intends to convert us, when we, roused by the promise wrestle with ourselves, pray and resist our diffidence and other vicious affections. For this reason some of the ancient Fathers have said that free will in man is the faculty to apply himself to grace (_liberum arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam_); _i.e._, he hears the promise, endeavors to a.s.sent, and abandons sins against conscience. Such things do not occur in devils. The difference therefore between the devils and the human race ought to be considered. These matters however, become still clearer when the promise is considered.
For since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory wills in G.o.d, there must of necessity be in us some cause of difference why Saul is rejected and David is received; _i.e._, there must of necessity be some dissimilar action in these two. _c.u.m promissio sit universalis, nec sint in Deo contradictoriae voluntates, necesse est in n.o.bis esse aliquam discriminis causam, cur Saul abiiciatur. David recipiatur, id est, necesse est aliquam esse actionem dissimilem in his duobus._ Properly understood, this is true, and the use [_usus_] in the exercises of faith and in true consolation (when our minds acquiesce in the Son of G.o.d, shown in the promise) will ill.u.s.trate this copulation of causes: the Word of G.o.d, the Holy Spirit, and the will." (_C. R._ 21, 659f.)
At the colloquy of Worms, 1557, Melanchthon, interpellated by Brenz, is reported to have said that the pa.s.sage in his _Loci_ of 1548 defining free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace referred to the regenerated will (_voluntas renata_), as, he said, appeared from the context. (Gieseler 3, 2, 225; Frank 1, 198.) As a matter of fact, however, the context clearly excludes this interpretation. In the pa.s.sage quoted, Melanchthon, moreover, plainly teaches: 1. that in conversion man, too, can do, and really does, something by willingly confessing his fault, by sustaining himself with the Word, by praying that G.o.d would a.s.sist him, by wrestling with himself, by striving against diffidence, etc.; 2. that the nature of fallen man differs from that of the devils in this, that his free will is still able to apply itself to grace, endeavor to a.s.sent to it, etc.; 3. that the dissimilar actions resulting from the different use of this natural ability accounts for the fact that some are saved while others are lost. Such was the plain teaching of Melanchthon from which he never receded, but which he, apart from other publications, reaffirmed in every new edition of his _Loci._ For all, including the last one to appear during his life (1559), contain the additions of 1548. "The pa.s.sage added by the author [Melanchthon, 1548] after Luther"s death is repeated in all subsequent editions," says Bindseil. (_C. R._ 21, 570.)
The sections which were added to the _Loci_ after 1548 also breathe the same synergistic spirit. In 1553 Melanchthon inserted a paragraph which says that, when approached by the Holy Spirit, the will can obey or resist. We read: "The liberty of the human will after the Fall, also in the non-regenerate, is the faculty by virtue of which man is able to govern his motions, _i.e._, he can enjoin upon his external members such actions as agree, or such as do not agree, with the Law of G.o.d. But he cannot banish doubts from his mind and evil inclinations from his heart without the light of the Gospel and without the Holy Spirit. But when the will is drawn by the holy Spirit, it can obey or resist. _c.u.m autem trahitur a Spiritu Sancto, potest obsequi et repugnare._" (21, 1078; 13, 162.)