26 "If a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another life, be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reason, because G.o.d, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbist be asked why, he will answer, because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not. And if one of the old heathen philosophers had been asked, he would have answered, because it was dishonest, below the dignity of man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise."-Locke"s _Essay_, i. 3.
27 Thus Paley remarks that-"The Christian religion hath not ascertained the precise quant.i.ty of virtue necessary to salvation," and he then proceeds to urge the probability of graduated scales of rewards and punishments. (_Moral Philosophy_, book i. ch. vii.)
28 This view was developed by Locke (_Essay on the Human Understanding_, book ii. ch. xxi.) Pascal, in a well-known pa.s.sage, applied the same argument to Christianity, urging that the rewards and punishments it promises are so great, that it is the part of a wise man to embrace the creed, even though he believes it improbable, if there be but a possibility in its favour.
29 Cudworth, in his _Immutable Morals_, has collected the names of a number of the schoolmen who held this view. See, too, an interesting note in Miss Cobbe"s very learned _Essay on Intuitive Morals_, pp.
18, 19.
30 E.g. Soame Jenyns, Dr. Johnson, Crusius, Pascal, Paley, and Austin.
Warburton is generally quoted in the list, but not I think quite fairly. See his theory, which is rather complicated (_Divine Legation_, i. 4). Waterland appears to have held this view, and also Condillac. See a very remarkable chapter on morals, in his _Traite des Animaux_, part ii. ch. vii. Closely connected with this doctrine is the notion that the morality of G.o.d is generically different from the morality of men, which having been held with more or less distinctness by many theologians (Archbishop King being perhaps the most prominent), has found in our own day an able defender in Dr.
Mansel. Much information on the history of this doctrine will be found in Dr. Mansel"s _Second Letter_ to Professor Goldwin Smith (Oxford, 1862).
31 Leibnitz noticed the frequency with which Supralapsarian Calvinists adopt this doctrine. (_Theodicee_, part ii. -- 176.) Archbishop Whately, who from his connection with the Irish Clergy had admirable opportunities of studying the tendencies of Calvinism, makes a similar remark as the result of his own experience. (_Whately"s Life_, vol. ii. p. 339.)
32 "G.o.d designs the happiness of all His sentient creatures.... Knowing the tendencies of our actions, and knowing His benevolent purpose, we know His tacit commands."-Austin"s _Lectures on Jurisprudence_, vol. i. p. 31. "The commands which He has revealed we must gather from the terms wherein they are promulgated. The commands which He has not revealed we must construe by the principle of utility."-Ibid. p. 96. So Paley"s _Moral Philosophy_, book ii. ch.
iv. v.
33 Paley"s _Moral Philosophy_, book i. ch. vii. The question of the disinterestedness of the love we should bear to G.o.d was agitated in the Catholic Church, Bossuet taking the selfish, and Fenelon the unselfish side. The opinions of Fenelon and Molinos on the subject were authoritatively condemned. In England, the less dogmatic character of the national faith, and also the fact that the great anti-Christian writer, Hobbes, was the advocate of extreme selfishness in morals, had, I think, a favourable influence upon the ethics of the church. Hobbes gave the first great impulse to moral philosophy in England, and his opponents were naturally impelled to an unselfish theory. Bishop c.u.mberland led the way, resolving virtue (like Hutcheson) into benevolence. The majority of divines, however, till the present century, have, I think, been on the selfish side.
_ 34 Moral Philosophy_, ii. 3.
_ 35 Essay on the Human Understanding_, ii. 28.
_ 36 Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. iii. Mr. Mill observes that, "Bentham"s idea of the world is that of a collection of persons pursuing each his separate interest or pleasure, and the prevention of whom from jostling one another more than is unavoidable, may be attempted by hopes and fears derived from three sources-the law, religion, and public opinion. To these three powers, considered as binding human conduct, he gave the name of sanctions; the political sanction operating by the rewards and penalties of the law; the religious sanction by those expected from the ruler of the universe; and the popular, which he characteristically calls also the moral sanction, operating through the pains and pleasures arising from the favour or disfavour of our fellow-creatures."-_Dissertations_, vol. i. pp. 362-363.
37 Hume on this, as on most other points, was emphatically opposed to the school of Hobbes, and even declared that no one could honestly and in good faith deny the reality of an unselfish element in man.
Following in the steps of Butler, he explained it in the following pa.s.sage:-"Hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end, and from the gratification of these primary appet.i.tes arises a pleasure which may become the object of another species of desire or inclination that is secondary and interested. In the same manner there are mental pa.s.sions by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular objects, such as fame or power or vengeance, without any regard to interest, and when these objects are attained a pleasing enjoyment ensues.... Now where is the difficulty of conceiving that this may likewise be the case with benevolence and friendship, and that from the original frame of our temper we may feel a desire of another"s happiness or good, which by means of that affection becomes our own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment?"-Hume"s _Enquiry concerning Morals_, Appendix II. Compare Butler, "If there be any appet.i.te or any inward principle besides self-love, why may there not be an affection towards the good of our fellow-creatures, and delight from that affection"s being gratified and uneasiness from things going contrary to it?"-_Sermon on Compa.s.sion._
38 "By sympathetic sensibility is to be understood the propensity that a man has to derive pleasure from the happiness, and pain from the unhappiness, of other sensitive beings."-Bentham"s _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. vi. "The sense of sympathy is universal. Perhaps there never existed a human being who had reached full age without the experience of pleasure at another"s pleasure, of uneasiness at another"s pain.... Community of interests, similarity of opinion, are sources from whence it springs."-_Deontology_, vol. i. pp. 169-170.
39 "The idea of the pain of another is naturally painful. The idea of the pleasure of another is naturally pleasurable.... In this, the unselfish part of our nature, lies a foundation, even independently of inculcation from without, for the generation of moral feelings"-Mill"s _Dissertations_, vol. i. p. 137. See, too, Bain"s _Emotions and the Will_, pp. 289, 313; and especially Austin"s _Lectures on Jurisprudence_. The first volume of this brilliant work contains, I think without exception, the best modern statement of the utilitarian theory in its most plausible form-a statement equally remarkable for its ability, its candour, and its uniform courtesy to opponents.
40 See a collection of pa.s.sages from Aristotle, bearing on the subject, in Mackintosh"s _Dissertation_.
41 Cic. _De Finibus_, i. 5. This view is adopted in Tucker"s _Light of Nature_ (ed. 1842), vol. i. p. 167. See, too, Mill"s _a.n.a.lysis of the Human Mind_, vol. ii. p. 174.
_ 42 Essay_, book ii. ch. x.x.xiii.
43 Hutcheson _On the Pa.s.sions_, -- 1. The "secondary desires" of Hutcheson are closely related to the "reflex affections" of Shaftesbury. "Not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affection; but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, grat.i.tude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves."-Shaftesbury"s _Enquiry concerning Virtue_, book i. part ii. -- 3.
44 See the preface to Hartley _On Man_. Gay"s essay is prefixed to Law"s translation of Archbishop King _On the Origin of Evil_.
45 "The case is this. We first perceive or imagine some real good; i.e.
fitness to promote our happiness in those things which we love or approve of.... Hence those things and pleasures are so tied together and a.s.sociated in our minds, that one cannot present itself, but the other will also occur. And the a.s.sociation remains even after that which at first gave them the connection is quite forgotten, or perhaps does not exist, but the contrary."-Gay"s _Essay_, p. lii.
"All affections whatsoever are finally resolvable into reason, pointing out private happiness, and are conversant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the a.s.sociation of ideas, and may properly enough be called habits."-Ibid. p. x.x.xi.
46 Princ.i.p.ally by Mr. James Mill, whose chapter on a.s.sociation, in his _a.n.a.lysis of the Human Mind_, may probably rank with Paley"s beautiful chapter on happiness, at the head of all modern writings on the utilitarian side,-either of them, I think, being far more valuable than anything Bentham ever wrote on morals. This last writer-whose contempt for his predecessors was only equalled by his ignorance of their works, and who has added surprisingly little to moral science (considering the reputation he attained), except a barbarous nomenclature and an interminable series of cla.s.sifications evincing no real subtlety of thought-makes, as far as I am aware, no use of the doctrine of a.s.sociation. Paley states it with his usual admirable clearness. "Having experienced in some instances a particular conduct to be beneficial to ourselves, or observed that it would be so, a sentiment of approbation rises up in our minds, which sentiment afterwards accompanies the idea or mention of the same conduct, although the private advantage which first existed no longer exist."-Paley, _Moral Philos_. i. 5. Paley, however, made less use of this doctrine than might have been expected from so enthusiastic an admirer of Tucker. In our own day it has been much used by Mr. J. S. Mill.
47 This ill.u.s.tration, which was first employed by Hutcheson, is very happily developed by Gay (p. lii.). It was then used by Hartley, and finally Tucker reproduced the whole theory with the usual ill.u.s.tration without any acknowledgment of the works of his predecessors, employing however, the term "translation" instead of "a.s.sociation" of ideas. See his curious chapter on the subject, _Light of Nature_, book i. ch. xviii.
48 "It is the nature of translation to throw desire from the end upon the means, which thenceforward become an end capable of exciting an appet.i.te without prospect of the consequences whereto they lead. Our habits and most of the desires that occupy human life are of this translated kind."-Tucker"s _Light of Nature_, vol. ii. (ed. 1842), p. 281.
49 Mill"s _a.n.a.lysis of the Human Mind_. The desire for posthumous fame is usually cited by intuitive moralists as a proof of a naturally disinterested element in man.
50 Mill"s _a.n.a.lysis_.
51 Hartley _On Man_, vol. i. pp. 474-475.
52 "Benevolence ... has also a high degree of honour and esteem annexed to it, procures us many advantages and returns of kindness, both from the person obliged and others, and is most closely connected with the hopes of reward in a future state, and of self-approbation or the moral sense; and the same things hold with respect to generosity in a much higher degree. It is easy therefore to see how such a.s.sociations may be formed as to engage us to forego great pleasure, or endure great pain for the sake of others, how these a.s.sociations may be attended with so great a degree of pleasure as to overrule the positive pain endured or the negative one from the foregoing of a pleasure, and yet how there may be no direct explicit expectation of reward either from G.o.d or man, by natural consequence or express appointment, not even of the concomitant pleasure that engages the agent to undertake the benevolent and generous action; and this I take to be a proof from the doctrine of a.s.sociation that there is and must be such a thing as pure disinterested benevolence; also a just account of the origin and nature of it."-Hartley _On Man_, vol. i. pp. 473-474. See too Mill"s _a.n.a.lysis_, vol. ii. p.
252.
53 Mill"s _a.n.a.lysis_, vol. ii. pp. 244-247.
54 "With self-interest," said Hartley, "man must begin; he may end in self-annihilation;" or as Coleridge happily puts it, "Legality precedes morality in every individual, even as the Jewish dispensation preceded the Christian in the world at large."-_Notes Theological and Political_, p. 340. It might be retorted with much truth, that we begin by practising morality as a duty-we end by practising it as a pleasure, without any reference to duty.
Coleridge, who expressed for the Benthamite theories a very cordial detestation, sometimes glided into them himself. "The happiness of man," he says, "is the end of virtue, and truth is the knowledge of the means." (_The Friend_, ed. 1850, vol. ii. p. 192.) "What can be the object of human virtue but the happiness of sentient, still more of moral beings?" (_Notes Theol. and Polit._ p. 351.) Leibnitz says, "Quand on aura appris a faire des actions louables par ambition, on les fera apres par inclination." (_Sur l" Art de connaitre les Hommes._)
55 E.g. Mackintosh and James Mill. Coleridge in his younger days was an enthusiastic admirer of Hartley; but chiefly, I believe, on account of his theory of vibrations. He named his son after him, and described him in one of his poems as:-
"He of mortal kind Wisest, the first who marked the ideal tribes Up the fine fibres through the sentient brain."
_Religious Musings._
56 This position is elaborated in a pa.s.sage too long for quotation by Mr. Austin. (_Lectures on Jurisprudence_, vol. i. p. 44.)
57 Hobbes defines conscience as "the opinion of evidence" (_On Human Nature_, ch. vi. --8). Locke as "our own opinion or judgment of the moral rect.i.tude or pravity of our own actions" (_Essay_, book i. ch.
iii. -- 8). In Bentham there is very little on the subject; but in one place he informs us that "conscience is a thing of fict.i.tious existence, supposed to occupy a seat in the mind" (_Deontology_, vol. i. p. 137); and in another he ranks "love of duty" (which he describes as an "impossible motive, in so far as duty is synonymous to obligation") as a variety of the "love of power" (_Springs of Action_, ii.) Mr. Bain says, "conscience is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us." (_Emotions and Will_, p.
313.)
58 "However much they [utilitarians] may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue, yet this being granted ... they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact the possibility of its being to the individual a good in itself....
Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so....
What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness has come to be desired ... as part of happiness.... Human nature is so const.i.tuted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness."-J. S. Mill"s _Utilitarianism_, pp. 54, 55, 56, 58.
59 "A man is tempted to commit adultery with the wife of his friend.
The composition of the motive is obvious. He does not obey the motive. Why? He obeys other motives which are stronger. Though pleasures are a.s.sociated with the immoral act, pains are a.s.sociated with it also-the pains of the injured husband, the pains of the wife, the moral indignation of mankind, the future reproaches of his own mind. Some men obey the first rather than the second motive. The reason is obvious. In these the a.s.sociation of the act with the pleasure is from habit unduly strong, the a.s.sociation of the act with pains is from want of habit unduly weak. This is the case of a bad education.... Among the different cla.s.ses of motives, there are men who are more easily and strongly operated on by some, others by others. We have also seen that this is entirely owing to habits of a.s.sociation. This facility of being acted upon by motives of a particular description, is that which we call disposition."-Mill"s _a.n.a.lysis_, vol. ii. pp. 212, 213, &c. Adam Smith says, I think with much wisdom, that "the great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects."-_Moral Sentiments_, part vi. -- 3.
60 "Goodness in ourselves is the prospect of satisfaction annexed to the welfare of others, so that we please them for the pleasure we receive ourselves in so doing, or to avoid the uneasiness we should feel in omitting it. But G.o.d is completely happy in Himself, nor can His happiness receive increase or diminution from anything befalling His creatures; wherefore His goodness is pure, disinterested bounty, without any return of joy or satisfaction to Himself. Therefore it is no wonder we have imperfect notions of a quality whereof we have no experience in our own nature."-Tucker"s _Light of Nature_, vol.
i. p. 355. "It is the privilege of G.o.d alone to act upon pure, disinterested bounty, without the least addition thereby to His own enjoyment."-Ibid. vol. ii. p. 279. On the other hand, Hutcheson asks, "If there be such disposition in the Deity, where is the impossibility of some small degree of this public love in His creatures, and why must they be supposed incapable of acting but from self-love?"-_Enquiry concerning Moral Good_, -- 2.
61 "We gradually, through the influence of a.s.sociation, come to desire the means without thinking of the end; the action itself becomes an object of desire, and is performed without reference to any motive beyond itself. Thus far, it may still be objected that the action having, through a.s.sociation, become pleasurable, we are as much as before moved to act by the antic.i.p.ation of pleasure, namely, the pleasure of the action itself. But granting this, the matter does not end here. As we proceed in the formation of habits, and become accustomed to will a particular act ... because it is pleasurable, we at last continue to will it without any reference to its being pleasurable.... In this manner it is that habits of hurtful excess continue to be practised, although they have ceased to be pleasurable, and in this manner also it is that the habit of willing to persevere in the course which he has chosen, does not desert the moral hero, even when the reward ... is anything but an equivalent for the suffering he undergoes, or the wishes he may have to renounce."-Mill"s _Logic_ (4th edition), vol. ii. pp. 416, 417.
62 "In regard to interest in the most extended, which is the original and only strictly proper sense of the word disinterested, no human act has ever been or ever can be disinterested.... In the only sense in which disinterestedness can with truth be predicated of human actions, it is employed ... to denote, not the absence of all interest ... but only the absence of all interest of the self-regarding cla.s.s. Not but that it is very frequently predicated of human action in cases in which divers interests, to no one of which the appellation of self-regarding can with propriety be denied, have been exercising their influence, and in particular fear of G.o.d, or hope from G.o.d, and fear of ill-repute, or hope of good repute. If what is above be correct, the most disinterested of men is not less under the dominion of interest than the most interested.
The only cause of his being styled disinterested, is its not having been observed that the sort of motive (suppose it sympathy for an individual or cla.s.s) has as truly a corresponding interest belonging to it as any other species of motive has. Of this contradiction between the truth of the case and the language employed in speaking of it, the cause is that in the one case men have not been in the habit of making-as in point of consistency they ought to have made-of the word interest that use which in the other case they have been in the habit of making of it."-Bentham"s _Springs of Action_, ii. -- 2.
63 Among others Bishop Butler, who draws some very subtle distinctions on the subject in his first sermon "on the love of our neighbour."
Dugald Stewart remarks that "although we apply the epithet selfish to avarice and to low and private sensuality, we never apply it to the desire of knowledge or to the pursuits of virtue, which are certainly sources of more exquisite pleasure than riches or sensuality can bestow."-_Active and Moral Powers_, vol. i. p. 19.
64 Sir W. Hamilton.
65 Cic. _De Fin._ lib. ii.