It was undoubtedly true, that Gonzalo, while he gave attention, as his friends say, to the public business, found time for free indulgence in those pleasures which wait on the soldier of fortune in his hour of triumph. He was the object of flattery and homage; courted even by those who hated him. For such as did not love the successful chieftain had good cause to fear him; and his exploits were commemorated in romances or ballads, as rivalling - it was not far from truth - those of the most doughty paladins of chivalry. *23
[Footnote 23: Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap.
32.]
Amidst this burst of adulation, the cup of joy commended to Pizarro"s lips had one drop of bitterness in it that gave its flavor to all the rest; for, notwithstanding his show of confidence, he looked with unceasing anxiety to the arrival of tidings that might a.s.sure him in what light his conduct was regarded by the government at home. This was proved by his jealous precautions to guard the approaches to the coast, and to detain the persons of the royal emissaries. He learned, therefore, with no little uneasiness, from Hinojosa, the landing of President Gasca, and the purport of his mission. But his discontent was mitigated, when he understood that the new envoy had come without military array, without any of the ostentatious trappings of office to impose on the minds of the vulgar, but alone, as it were, in the plain garb of an humble missionary. *24 Pizarro could not discern, that under this modest exterior lay a moral power, stronger than his own steel-clad battalions, which, operating silently on public opinion, - the more sure that it was silent, - was even now undermining his strength, like a subterraneous channel eating away the foundations of some stately edifice, that stands secure in its pride of place!
[Footnote 24: Gonzalo, in his letter to Valdivia, speaks of Gasca as a clergyman of a G.o.dly reputation, who, without recompense, in the true spirit of a missionary, had come over to settle the affairs of the country. "Dicen ques mui buen christiano i hombre de buena vida i clerigo, i dicen que viene a estas partes con buena intencion i no quiso salario ninguno del Rey sino venir para poner paz en estos reynos con sus cristiandades." Carta de Gonzalo Pizarro a Valdivia, Ms.]
But, although Gonzalo Pizarro could not foresee this result, he saw enough to satisfy him that it would be safest to exclude the president from Peru. The tidings of his arrival, moreover, quickened his former purpose of sending an emba.s.sy to Spain to vindicate his late proceedings, and request the royal confirmation of his authority. The person placed at the head of this mission was Lorenzo de Aldana, a cavalier of discretion as well as courage, and high in the confidence of Pizarro, as one of his most devoted partisans. He had occupied some important posts under that chief, one secret of whose successes was the sagacity he showed in the selection of his agents.
Besides Aldana and one or two cavaliers, the bishop of Lima was joined in the commission, as likely, from his position, to have a favorable influence on Gonzalo"s fortunes at court. Together with the despatches for the government, the envoys were intrusted with a letter to Gasca from the inhabitants of Lima; in which, after civilly congratulating the president on his arrival, they announce their regret that he had come too late. The troubles of the country were now settled by the overthrow of the viceroy, and the nation was reposing in quiet under the rule of Pizarro. An emba.s.sy, they stated, was on its way to Castile, not to solicit pardon, for they had committed no crime, *25 but to pet.i.tion the emperor to confirm their leader in the government, as the man in Peru best ent.i.tled to it by his virtues. *26 They expressed the conviction that Gasca"s presence would only serve to renew the distractions of the country, and they darkly intimated that his attempt to land would probably cost him his life. - The language of this singular doc.u.ment was more respectful than might be inferred from its import. It was dated the 14th of October, 1546, and was subscribed by seventy of the princ.i.p.al cavaliers in the city. It was not improbably dictated by Cepeda, whose hand is visible in most of the intrigues of Pizarro"s little court.
It is also said, - the authority is somewhat questionable, - that Aldana received instructions from Gonzalo secretly to offer a bribe of fifty thousand pesos de oro to the president, to prevail on him to return to Castile; and in case of his refusal, some darker and more effectual way was to be devised to rid the country of his presence. *27
[Footnote 25: "Porque perdo ninguno de nosotros le pide, porque no entendemos que emos errado, sino seruido a su Magestad: conseruado nuestro derecho; que por sus leyes Reales a sus vasallos es permitido." Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib.
2, cap. 33.]
[Footnote 26: "Porque el por sus virtudes es muy amado de todos: y tenido por padre del Peru." Ibid., ubi supra.]
[Footnote 27: Ibid., loc. cit. - Herrera, Hist. General, dec. 8, lib. 2, cap. 10. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 8. - Gomara, Hist. de las Ind., cap. 177. - Montesinos, Annales, Ms., ano 1546.
Pizarro, in his letter to Valdivia, notices this remonstrance to Gasca, who, with all his reputation as a saint, was as deep as any man in Spain, and had now come to send him home, as a reward, no doubt, of his faithful services. "But I and the rest of the cavaliers," he concludes, "have warned him not to set foot here."
"Y agora que yo tenia puesta esta tierra en sosiego embiava su parte al de la Gasca que aunque arriba digo que dicen ques un santo, es un hombre mas manoso que havia en toda Espana e mas sabio; e asi venia por presidente e Governador, e todo quanto el quiera; e para poderme embiar a mi a Espana, i a cabo de dos anos que andavamos fuera de nuestras casas queria el Rey darme este pago, mas yo con todos los cavalleros deste Reyno le embiavamos a decir que se vaya, sino que haremos con el como con Blasco Nunez." Carta de Gonzalo Pizarro a Valdivia, Ms.]
Aldana, fortified with his despatches, sped swiftly on his voyage to Panama. Through him the governor learned the actual state of feeling in the councils of Pizarro; and he listened with regret to the envoy"s conviction, that no terms would be admitted by that chief or his companions, that did not confirm him in the possession of Peru. *28 [Footnote 28: With Aldana"s mission to Castile Gonzalo Pizarro closes the important letter, so often cited in these pages, and which may be supposed to furnish the best arguments for his own conduct. It is a curious fact, that Valdivia, the conqueror of Chili, to whom the epistle is addressed, soon after this openly espoused the cause of Gasca, and his troops formed part of the forces who contended with Pizarro, not long afterwards, at Huarina. Such was the friend on whom Gonzalo relied!]
Aldana was soon admitted to an audience by the president. It was attended with very different results from what had followed from the conferences with Hinojosa; for Pizarro"s envoy was not armed by nature with that stubborn panoply which had hitherto made the other proof against all argument. He now learned with surprise the nature of Gasca"s powers, and the extent of the royal concessions to the insurgents. He had embarked with Gonzalo Pizarro on a desperate venture, and he found that it had proved successful. The colony had nothing more, in reason, to demand; and, though devoted in heart to his leader, he did not feel bound by any principle of honor to take part with him, solely to gratify his ambition, in a wild contest with the Crown that must end in inevitable ruin. He consequently abandoned his mission to Castile, probably never very palatable to him, and announced his purpose to accept the pardon proffered by government, and support the president in settling the affairs of Peru. He subsequently wrote, it should be added, to his former commander in Lima, stating the course he had taken, and earnestly recommending the latter to follow his example.
The influence of this precedent in so important a person as Aldana, aided, doubtless, by the conviction that no change was now to be expected in Pizarro, while delay would be fatal to himself, at length prevailed over Hinojosa"s scruples, and he intimated to Gasca his willingness to place the fleet under his command. The act was performed with great pomp and ceremony.
Some of Pizarro"s stanchest partisans were previously removed from the vessels; and on the nineteenth of November, 1546, Hinojosa and his captains resigned their commissions into the hands of the president. They next took the oaths of allegiance to Castile; a free pardon for all past offences was proclaimed by the herald from a scaffold erected in the great square of the city; and the president, greeting them as true and loyal va.s.sals of the Crown, restored their several commissions to the cavaliers. The royal standard of Spain was then unfurled on board the squadron, and proclaimed that this strong-hold of Pizarro"s power had pa.s.sed away from him for ever. *29
[Footnote 29: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Zarate, Conq.
del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 9. - Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 38, 42. - Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 178. - Ms. de Caravantes.
Garcila.s.so de la Vega, - whose partiality for Gonzalo Pizarro forms a wholesome counterpoise to the unfavorable views taken of his conduct by most other writers, - in his notice of this transaction, seems disposed to allow little credit to that loyalty which is shown by the sacrifice of a benefactor. Com.
Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 4.]
The return of their commissions to the insurgent captains was a politic act in Gasca. It secured the services of the ablest officers in the country, and turned against Pizarro the very arm on which he had most leaned for support. Thus was this great step achieved, without force or fraud, by Gasca"s patience and judicious forecast. He was content to bide his time; and he now might rely with well-grounded confidence on the ultimate success of his mission.
Chapter II
Gasca a.s.sembles His Forces. - Defection Of Pizarro"s Followers. - He Musters His Levies. - Agitation In Lima. - He Abandons The City. - Gasca Sails From Panama. - b.l.o.o.d.y Battle Of Huarina.
1547.
No sooner was Gasca placed in possession of Panama and the fleet, than he entered on a more decisive course of policy than he had been hitherto allowed to pursue. He made levies of men, and drew together supplies from all quarters. He took care to discharge the arrears already due to the soldiers, and promised liberal pay for the future; for, though mindful that his personal charges should cost little to the Crown, he did not stint his expenditure when the public good required it. As the funds in the treasury were exhausted, he obtained loans on the credit of the government from the wealthy citizens of Panama, who, relying on his good faith, readily made the necessary advances. He next sent letters to the authorities of Guatemala and Mexico, requiring their a.s.sistance in carrying on hostilities, if necessary, against the insurgents; and he despatched a summons, in like manner, to Benalcazar, in the provinces north of Peru, to meet him, on his landing in that country, with his whole available force.
The greatest enthusiasm was shown by the people of Panama in getting the little navy in order for his intended voyage; and prelates and commanders did not disdain to prove their loyalty by taking part in the good work, along with the soldiers and sailors. *1 Before his own departure, however, Gasca proposed to send a small squadron of four ships under Aldana, to cruise off the port of Lima, with instructions to give protection to those well affected to the royal cause, and receive them, if need be, on board his vessels. He was also in trusted with authenticated copies of the president"s commission, to be delivered to Gonzalo Pizarro, that the chief might feel, there was yet time to return before the gates of mercy were closed against him. *2
[Footnote 1: "Y ponia sus fuercas con tanta llaneza y obediencia, que los Obispos y clerigos y los capitanes y mas princ.i.p.ales personas eran los que primero echauan mano, y tirauan de las gumenas y cables de los nauios, para los sacar a la costa."
Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 70.]
[Footnote 2: Ibid., ubi supra. - Montesinos, Annales, Ms., ano 1546. - Gomara, Hist. de las Ind., cap. 178. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 9. - Herrera, Hist General, dec. 8, lib. 3, cap. 3.]
While these events were going on, Gasca"s proclamations and letters were doing their work in Peru. It required but little sagacity to perceive that the nation at large, secured in the protection of person and property, had nothing to gain by revolution. Interest and duty, fortunately, now lay on the same side; and the ancient sentiment of loyalty, smothered for a time, but not extinguished, revived in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of the people.
Still this was not manifested, at once, by any overt act; for, under a strong military rule, men dared hardly think for themselves, much less communicate their thoughts to one another.
But changes of public opinion, like changes in the atmosphere that come on slowly and imperceptibly, make themselves more and more widely felt, till, by a sort of silent sympathy, they spread to the remotest corners of the land. Some intimations of such a change of sentiment at length found their way to Lima, although all accounts of the president"s mission had been jealously excluded from that capital. Gonzalo Pizarro himself became sensible of these symptoms of disaffection, though almost too faint and feeble, as yet, for the most experienced eye to descry in them the coming tempest.
Several of the president"s proclamations had been forwarded to Gonzalo by his faithful partisans; and Carbajal, who had been summoned from Potosi, declared they were "more to be dreaded than the lances of Castile." *3 Yet Pizarro did not, for a moment, lose his confidence in his own strength; and with a navy like that now in Panama at his command, he felt he might bid defiance to any enemy on his coasts. He had implicit confidence in the fidelity of Hinojosa.
[Footnote 3: "Que eran mas de temer aquellas cartas que a las lacas del Rey de Castilla." Fernandez, Hist. del Peru Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 45.]
It was at this period that Paniagua arrived off the port with Gasca"s despatches to Pizarro, consisting of the emperor"s letter and his own. They were instantly submitted by that chieftain to his trusty counsellors, Carbajal and Cepeda, and their opinions asked as to the course to be pursued. It was the crisis of Pizarro"s fate.
Carbajal, whose sagacious eye fully comprehended the position in which they stood, was in favor of accepting the royal grace on the terms proposed; and he intimated his sense of their importance by declaring, that "he would pave the way for the bearer of them into the capital with ingots of gold and silver."
*4 Cepeda was of a different way of thinking. He was a judge of the Royal Audience; and had been sent to Peru as the immediate counsellor of Blasco Nunez. But he had turned against the viceroy, had encountered him in battle, and his garments might be said to be yet wet with his blood! What grace was there, then, for him? Whatever respect might be shown to the letter of the royal provisions, in point of fact, he must ever live under the Castilian rule a ruined man. He accordingly strongly urged the rejection of Gasca"s offers. "They will cost you your government," he said to Pizarro; "the smooth-tongued priest is not so simple a person as you take him to be. He is deep and politic. *5 He knows well what promises to make; and, once master of the country, he will know, too, how to keep them."
[Footnote 4: "Y le enladrillen los caminos por do viniere con barras de plata, y tejos de Oro." Garcila.s.so, Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 5.]
[Footnote 5: "Que no lo embiauan por hombre sencillo y llano, sino de grandes cautelas, astucias, falsedades y enganos." Ibid., loc. cit.]
Carbajal was not shaken by the arguments or the sneers of his companions; and as the discussion waxed warm, Cepeda taxed his opponent with giving counsel suggested by fears for his own safety - a foolish taunt, sufficiently disproved by the whole life of the doughty old warrior. Carbajal did not insist further on his own views, however, as he found them unwelcome to Pizarro, and contented himself with coolly remarking, that "he had, indeed, no relish for rebellion; but he had as long a neck for a halter, he believed, as any of his companions; and as he could hardly expect to live much longer, at any rate, it was, after all, of little moment to him." *6
[Footnote 6: "Por lo demas, quado acaezca otra cosa, ya yo he viuido muchos anos, y tengo tan bue palmo de pescueco para la soga, como cada uno de vuesas mercedes." Ibid., loc. cit.]
Pizarro, spurred on by a fiery ambition that overleaped every obstacle, *7 did not condescend to count the desperate chances of a contest with the Crown. He threw his own weight into the scale with Cepeda. The offer of grace was rejected; and he thus cast away the last tie which held him to his country, and, by the act, proclaimed himself a rebel. *8 [Footnote 7: "Loca y luciferina soberuia," as Fernandez characterizes the aspiring temper of Gonzalo. Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 15.]
[Footnote 8: Ms. de Caravantes.
According to Garcila.s.so, Paniagua was furnished with secret instructions by the president, empowering him, in case he judged it necessary to the preservation of the royal authority, to confirm Pizarro in the government, "it being little matter if the Devil ruled there, provided the country remained to the Crown!"
The fact was so reported by Paniagua, who continued in Peru after these events. (Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 5.) This is possible. But it is more probable that a credulous gossip, like Garcila.s.so, should be in error, than that Charles the Fifth should have been prepared to make such an acknowledgment of his imbecility, or that the man selected for Gasca"s confidence should have so indiscreetly betrayed his trust.]
It was not long after the departure of Paniagua, that Pizarro received tidings of the defection of Aldana and Hinojosa, and of the surrender of the fleet, on which he had expended an immense sum, as the chief bulwark of his power. This unwelcome intelligence was followed by accounts of the further defection of some of the princ.i.p.al towns in the north, and of the a.s.sa.s.sination of Puelles, the faithful lieutenant to whom he had confided the government of Quito. It was not very long, also, before he found his authority a.s.sailed in the opposite quarter at Cuzco; for Centeno, the loyal chieftain who, as the reader may remember, had been driven by Carbajal to take refuge in a cave near Arequipa, had issued from his concealment after remaining there a year, and, on learning the arrival of Gasca, had again raised the royal standard. Then collecting a small body of followers, and falling on Cuzco by night, he made himself master of that capital, defeated the garrison who held it, and secured it for the Crown. Marching soon after into the province of Charcas, the bold chief allied himself with the officer who commanded for Pizarro in La Plata; and their combined forces, to the number of a thousand, took up a position on the borders of Lake t.i.ticaca, where the two cavaliers coolly waited an opportunity to take the field against their ancient commander.
Gonzalo Pizarro, touched to the heart by the desertion of those in whom he most confided, was stunned by the dismal tidings of his losses coming so thick upon him. Yet he did not waste his time in idle crimination or complaint; but immediately set about making preparations to meet the storm with all his characteristic energy. He wrote, at once, to such of his captains as he believed still faithful, commanding them to be ready with their troops to march to his a.s.sistance at the shortest notice. He reminded them of their obligations to him, and that their interests were identical with his own. The president"s commission, he added, had been made out before the news had reached Spain of the battle of Anaquito, and could never cover a pardon to those concerned in the death of the viceroy. *9
[Footnote 9: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Zarate, Conq.
del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 11, 13. - Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 45, 59. - Montesinos, Annales, Ms., ano 1547.]
Pizarro was equally active in enforcing his levies in the capital, and in putting them in the best fighting order. He soon saw himself at the head of a thousand men, beautifully equipped, and complete in all their appointments; "as gallant an array,"
says an old writer, "though so small in number, as ever trod the plains of Italy," - displaying in the excellence of their arms, their gorgeous uniforms, and the caparisons of their horses, a magnificence that could be furnished only by the silver of Peru.
*10 Each company was provided with a new stand of colors, emblazoned with its peculiar device. Some bore the initials and arms of Pizarro, and one or two of these were audaciously surmounted by a crown, as if to intimate the rank to which their commander might aspire. *11 [Footnote 10: "Mil Hombres tan bien armados i aderecados, como se han visto en Italia, en la maior prosperidad, porque ninguno havia, demas de las Armas, que no llevase Calcas, i Jubon de Seda, i muchos de Tela de Oro, i de Brocado, i otros bordados, i recamados de Oro, i Plata, con mucha Chaperia de Oro por los Sombreros, i especialmente por Frascos, i Caxas de Arcubuces."
Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 11.]
[Footnote 11: Ibid., ubi supra.
Some writers even a.s.sert that Pizarro was preparing for his coronation at this time, and that he had actually despatched his summons to the different towns to send their deputies to a.s.sist at it. "Queria spresurar su coronacion, y para ello des.p.a.cho cartas a todas las ciudades del Peru." (Montesinos, Annales, Ms., ano 1547.) But it is hardly probable he could have placed so blind a confidence in the colonists at this crisis, as to have meditated so rash a step. The loyal Castilian historians are not slow to receive reports to the discredit of the rebel.]
Among the leaders most conspicuous on this occasion was Cepeda, "who," in the words of a writer of his time, "had exchanged the robe of the licentiate for the plumed casque and mailed harness of the warrior." *12 But the cavalier to whom Pizarro confided the chief care of organizing his battalions was the veteran Carbajal, who had studied the art of war under the best captains of Europe, and whose life of adventure had been a practical commentary on their early lessons. It was on his arm that Gonzalo most leaned in the hour of danger; and well had it been for him, if he had profited by his counsels at an earlier period.
[Footnote 12: "El qual en este tiempo, oluidado de lo que conuenia a sus letras, y profession, y officio de Oydor; salio en calcas jubon, y cuera, de muchos recamados: y gorra con plumas."
Fernandez Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2 cap. 62.]
It gives one some idea of the luxurious accommodations of Pizarro"s forces, that he endeavoured to provide each of his musketeers with a horse. The expenses incurred by him were enormous. The immediate cost of his preparations, we are told, was not less than half a million of pesos de oro; and his pay to the cavaliers, and, indeed, to the common soldiers, in his little army, was on an extravagant scale, nowhere to be met with but on the silver soil of Peru. *13 [Footnote 13: Ibid., ubi supra. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 11. - Herrera, Hist. General, dec. 8, lib. 3, cap. 5. - Montesinos, Annales, ano 1547.]
When his own funds were exhausted, he supplied the deficiency by fines imposed on the rich citizens of Lima as the price of exemption from service, by forced loans, and various other schemes of military exaction. *14 From this time, it is said, the chieftain"s temper underwent a visible change. *15 He became more violent in his pa.s.sions, more impatient of control, and indulged more freely in acts of cruelty and license. The desperate cause in which he was involved made him reckless of consequences.
Though naturally frank and confiding, the frequent defection of his followers filled him with suspicion. He knew not in whom to confide. Every one who showed himself indifferent to his cause, or was suspected of being so, was dealt with as an open enemy.
The greatest distrust prevailed in Lima. No man dared confide in his neighbour. Some concealed their effects; others contrived to elude the vigilance of the sentinels, and hid themselves in the neighbouring woods and mountains. *16 No one was allowed to enter or leave the city without a license. All commerce, all intercourse, with other places was cut off. It was long since the fifths belonging to the Crown had been remitted to Castile; as Pizarro had appropriated them to his own use. He now took possession of the mints, broke up the royal stamps, and issued a debased coin, emblazoned with his own cipher. *17 It was the most decisive act of sovereignty.
[Footnote 14: Fernandez, Parte 1, lib. 2 cap. 62. - Montesinos, Annales Ms., ano 1547.]