"When the last man and wagon of the flying division disappeared over the hill toward health and home, a despairing wail went up from the doomed 350 left in this condition of indescribable horror. "We are abandoned to die!" they cried; "we are deserted by our own comrades in the hour of danger and left to helplessly perish!"
"These men are those who fought the climate, hunger, and the enemy on the battle-field which has shed so much undying glory on the American arms. They are the men who have accomplished unheard-of feats of endurance and performed incredible feats of valor on the same ground--not for Cuba, but at the call of duty. They are citizens. They are brave soldiers who have done their full duty because it was duty."
The mail facilities were wretched. Cords of mail were stacked up at Siboney for weeks; and although there was more transportation on hand than could be used, the officer detailed to attend to the mail business of the corps, Lieut. Saville, of the 10th Infantry, could not succeed in securing a wagon to haul this mail to the front. Since the corps returned to the United States a dozen letters have reached the author which have chased him by way of Santiago and Montauk, since dates between the 1st and 20th of July, inclusive. The person to whom these letters were addressed was well known to every officer and employee in the corps, and if the mail addressed to one so well known could go astray in this manner, what could an unknown private expect?
This may seem like a little hardship, but to men in the weakened and enfeebled condition of the survivors of the 5th Corps a letter from home was both food and medicine. Scores of men who are to-day rotting in Cuban graves died of nostalgia, and might have lived if they had received the letters from home which were sent to them.
CHAPTER XI.
THE CAUSE.
The causes of these conditions are not far to seek. The United States has not had an army since 1866. There has been no such a thing as a brigade, a division, or a corps. There has been no opportunity to study and practice on a large scale, in a practical way, the problems of organization and supply. The Army has been administered as a unit, and the usual routine of business gradually became such that not a wheel could be turned nor a nail driven in any of the supply departments without express permission, previously obtained from the bureau chief in Washington. The same remarks apply equally to all the other staff departments. The administration had become a bureaucracy because the whole Army for thirty years had been administered as one body, without the subdivisions into organizations which are inevitable in war-time and in larger bodies.
War became a reality with great suddenness. Those who have grown gray in the service, and whose capacity, honesty, and industry had never been and can not be impeached, found themselves confronted with the problem of handling nearly three hundred thousand men, without authority to change the system of supply and transportation. The minutest acts of officers of these departments are regulated by laws of Congress, enacted with a view of the small regular force in time of peace, and with no provisions for modifications in war. In authorizing the formation of large volunteer armies, Congress did not authorize any change in the system of administration or make any emergency provision. As before, every detail of supply and transportation had to be authorized from the central head.
The administrative bureaus were handicapped to some extent by incompetent and ignorant members. Late in the campaign it was learned that the way to a "soft snap" was through the Capitol, and some came in that way who would certainly never have entered the Army in any other.
There were alleged staff officers who had tried to enter the service through the regular channels and who had failed, either by lack of ability or bad conduct, to keep up with the pace set by cla.s.smates at the Academy; there were others who were known as failures in civil life and as the "black sheep" of eminent families; and there were some who must have been utterly unknown before the war, as they will be afterward.
How these persons ever obtained places high above deserving officers of capacity and experience is a question which cries aloud for exposure--but in a good many cases they did. Indeed, it is to be observed that, for that matter, the next register of the Army will show a great many more promotions into the Volunteer service, of officers who never heard a hostile bullet during the war, who never left the United States at all, than it will of deserving officers who bore the heat and burden of the march and the battle.
[Ill.u.s.tration: "Reina Mercedes" Sunk by the "Iowa" near Mouth of Harbor of Santiago.]
The most discouraging thing about it all to a line officer is that this same register will afford no means of determining who did the service and who did the "baby act." Lieut. Blank will be borne thereon as major and subsequently colonel of the Steenth Volunteers (which never left the State rendezvous, probably) during the war with Spain; Lieut. Blank No. 2 will be carried on the same book as second lieutenant, ---- Infantry, during the same war. The gentle reader will at once "spot" the man who was so highly promoted as a gallant fellow who distinguished himself upon the b.l.o.o.d.y field; the other will be set down as the man who did nothing and deserved nothing.
Yet--the ones who went received no promotion, and those who staid behind and by their careless incompetence permitted camps amid the peaceful scenes of homes and plenty to become the hot-beds of fever and disease--these are the ones borne as field and other officers of the Volunteers.
To ill.u.s.trate some of the material with big t.i.tles sent to "a.s.sist" in running the staff departments, two incidents will suffice.
On the 11th of June, at a certain headquarters, it was desired to send a message, demanding reply, to each transport. A gray-haired officer turned to another and said, "Whom shall we send with this? Will So-and-so do?" naming one of the before-mentioned civil appointments.
"For heaven"s sake, no! He would tie up the whole business. Send an orderly," was the reply. The orderly, an enlisted man of the Regulars, was sent. The officer thus adjudged less competent to carry a message than a private soldier was perhaps actuated by a high sense of duty; but he filled a place which should have been occupied by an experienced and able officer--no, he did not fill it, but he prevented such a man from doing so.
The second incident was related by an officer on a transport bound for home. Say his name was--oh well, Smith.
Smith went, on the 20th of July, to a certain headquarters in the field on business. Those who could have attended to it were absent, but there was one of the recent arrivals, a high-ranking aide, there, and he, sorry for Smith"s worn-out look of hunger, heat, and thirst, asked if he would have a drink. Smith, expecting at the best a canteen of San Juan River water, said he was a little dry.
The newly-arrived clapped his hands, and, at the summons, a colored waiter in spotless white duck appeared. "Waitah, take this gentleman"s ordah," said the host. Smith, greatly astonished, asked what could be had, and was yet more astonished to learn that he could be served with Canadian or domestic whisky, claret, champagne, or sherry. Much bewildered, and utterly forgetting the awful dangers of liquor in the tropics, he called for Canadian Club. When it came, on a napkin-covered tray, he looked for water, and was about to use some from a bucket full of ice which he at that moment espied. "Aw! hold on," exclaimed the host; "we nevah use that, don"t y" know, except to cool the apollinaris. Waitah, bring the gentleman a bottle of apollinaris to wash down his liquor."
Within half a mile were soldiers and officers lying sick in hospital on the ground, eating hardtack and bacon, and drinking San Juan straight, because hospital supplies and rations could not be got to the front!
It was this same officer who explained that he approached his headquarters "by rushes," upon his arrival, for fear the enemy would see him and consider this reinforcement a violation of the truce.
These are two examples of some of the able a.s.sistants from civil life who were sent to help feed, clothe, and transport the 5th Corps.
With such a.s.sistants, is it any wonder that, under such extraordinary circ.u.mstances as those encountered in Cuba, a system designed for peace and 25,000 men weakened in some respects when the attempt was made to apply it to 300,000 in time of war?
The great wonder is that it did the work as well as it did. And this was due to the superhuman exertions of the chief officers of the supply departments and their experienced a.s.sistants. These men knew no rest. They were untiring and zealous. On their own responsibility they cut the red tape to the very smallest limit. Instead of the regular returns and requisitions, the merest form of lead-pencil memorandum was sufficient to obtain the necessary supplies, whenever they were available. This much was absolutely necessary, for these officers were personally responsible for every dollar"s worth of supplies and had to protect themselves in some degree. As it is now, many of them will find it years before their accounts are finally settled, unless some provision be made by law for their relief. This disregard of routine was essential; but how much to be desired is a system suited to the exigencies of the service, both in peace and war!
There is a lesson to be learned from these experiences, and it is this: The commanding officer of any army organization should not be hampered in the matter of supplies by having to obtain the approval or disapproval of a junior in rank, in a distant bureau, who knows nothing about the circ.u.mstances. In other words, the system which causes the staff departments of the United States Army to regard a civilian as their head, and makes them virtually independent of their line commanders, is an utterly vicious system. If an officer is competent to command an organization, he should be considered competent to look after the details of its administration, and should be held responsible, not only for its serviceable condition at all times, but for the care of its property and for all the other details connected with its service.
The quartermaster, or commissary, or other officer of a supply department should not know any authority on earth higher or other than the officer in command of the force he is to serve, except those in the line above such chief, and then only when such orders come through his chief.
The commanding officer having ordered supplies to be procured, there should be no question whatever in regard to their being furnished.
They should come at once and without fail. If they were not necessary, hold him responsible.
This theory of administration eliminates the bureaucracy which has insidiously crept upon the Army, and relegates to their proper position the supply departments.
The General Staff proper has a higher field of usefulness than the mere problems of supply. Its business is to care for the organization, mobilization, and strategic disposition of all the forces, both naval and military, of the United States. Its head should be the President, and the two divisions should be under the general commanding the Army and the admiral commanding the Navy. The remainder of this staff should be composed of a small but select personnel, and should limit its duties exclusively to those set forth above.
CHAPTER XII.
THE VOYAGE HOME AND THE END OF THE GATLING GUN DETACHMENT.
The detachment received permission on the 10th of August to use any standing tentage which it could find, and it was thoroughly under shelter an hour after this permission was received. The climate of Cuba was not so disagreeable when one could look at it through the door of a tent, but we were not destined to enjoy our tentage very long. On the 15th, at two o"clock, orders were received to go on board the Leona at Santiago, bound for Montauk Point, and at half-past five o"clock men, guns, and equipment were duly stowed for the voyage home.
It was much more agreeable than the one to Cuba, The transport was not crowded, the men had excellent hammocks, which could be rolled up during the day, thus leaving the whole berth deck for exercise and ventilation, and the Leona was a much better vessel than the Cherokee.
The detachment finally disembarked at Montauk Point on the 23d, pa.s.sed through the usual detention camp, and was a.s.signed a camping-place. It was disbanded per instructions from headquarters, Montauk Point, on the 5th of September, the members of the detachment returning to their respective regiments, well satisfied with the work they had done and with each other.
In concluding this memoir the author desires to pay a personal tribute of admiration and respect to the brave men composing the detachment, both individually and collectively. Some of them have figured more prominently in these pages than others, but there was not a man in the detachment who was not worthy to be called the highest term that can be applied to any man--a brave American soldier.
The End.
APPENDIX I.
Headquarters U. S. Troops, Santiago de Cuba, July 19, 1898.
General Orders No. 26.
The successful accomplishment of the campaign against Santiago de Cuba, resulting in its downfall and surrender of Spanish forces, the capture of large military stores, together with the destruction of the entire Spanish fleet in the harbor, which, upon the investment of the city, was forced to leave, is one of which the Army can well be proud.
This has been accomplished through the heroic deeds of the Army and its officers and men. The major-general commanding offers his sincere thanks for their endurance of hardships heretofore unknown in the American Army.
The work you have accomplished may well appeal to the pride of your countrymen and has been rivaled upon but few occasions in the world"s history. Landing upon an unknown coast, you faced dangers in disembarking and overcame obstacles that even in looking back upon seem insurmountable. Seizing, with the a.s.sistance of the Navy, the towns of Baiquiri and Siboney, you pushed boldly forth, gallantly driving back the enemy"s outposts in the vicinity of La Guasimas, and completed the concentration of the army near Sevilla, within sight of the Spanish stronghold at Santiago de Cuba. The outlook from Sevilla was one that might have appalled the stoutest heart. Behind you ran a narrow road made well-nigh impa.s.sable by rains, while to the front you looked upon high foot-hills covered with a dense tropical growth, which could only be traversed by bridle-paths terminating within range of the enemy"s guns. Nothing daunted, you responded eagerly to the order to close upon the foe, and, attacking at El Caney and San Juan, drove him from work to work until he took refuge within his last and strongest entrenchment immediately surrounding the city. Despite the fierce glare of a Southern sun and rains that fell in torrents, you valiantly withstood his attempts to drive you from the position your valor had won, holding in your vise-like grip the army opposed to you.
After seventeen days of battle and siege, you were rewarded by the surrender of nearly 24,000 prisoners, 12,000 being those in your immediate front, the others scattered in the various towns of eastern Cuba, freeing completely the eastern part of the island from Spanish troops.
This was not done without great sacrifices. The death of 230 gallant soldiers and the wounding of 1,284 others shows but too plainly the fierce contest in which you were engaged. The few reported missing are undoubtedly among the dead, as no prisoners were taken. For those who have fallen in battle, with you the commanding general sorrows, and with you will ever cherish their memory. Their devotion to duty sets a high example of courage and patriotism to our fellow-countrymen. All who have partic.i.p.ated in the campaign, battle, and siege of Santiago de Cuba will recall with pride the grand deeds accomplished, and will hold one another dear for having shared great suffering, hardships, and triumphs together.