During the afternoon, Maj. Dillenback, by my order, brought forward the two remaining batteries of his battalion and put them in position at El Pozo, to the left of Grimes. Later in the afternoon all three batteries were moved forward to positions near the firing-line, but the nature of the country and the intensity of the enemy"s small-arm fire was such that no substantial results were gained by our artillery in the new positions. The batteries were intrenched during the night.
Gen. Duffield, with the 33d Michigan, attacked Aguadores, as ordered, but was unable to accomplish more than to detain the Spaniards in that vicinity.
After the brilliant and important victory gained at El Caney, Lawton started his tried troops, who had been fighting all day and marching much of the night before, to connect with the right of the cavalry division. Night came on before this movement could be accomplished. In the darkness the enemy"s pickets were encountered, and the division commander, being uncertain of the ground and as to what might be in his front, halted his command and reported the situation to me. This information was received about 12:30 a. m., and I directed Gen. Lawton to return by my headquarters and the El Pozo house as the only certain way of gaining his new position.
This was done, and the division took position on the right of the cavalry early next morning; Chaffee"s Brigade arriving first, about half-past seven, and the other brigades before noon.
On the night of July 1st, I ordered Gen. Duffield, at Siboney, to send forward the 34th Michigan and the 9th Ma.s.sachusetts. Both of which had just arrived from the United States. These regiments reached the front the next morning. The 34th was placed in rear of Kent, and the 9th was a.s.signed to Bates, who placed it on his left.
Soon after daylight on July 2d the enemy opened battle, but because of the intrenchments made during the night, the approach of Lawton"s Division, and the presence of Bates" Brigade, which had taken position during the night on Kent"s left, little apprehension was felt as to our ability to repel the Spaniards.
It is proper here to state that Gen. Bates and his brigade had performed most arduous and efficient service, having marched much of the night of June 30th-July 1st, and a good part of the latter day, during which he also partic.i.p.ated in the battle of El Caney, after which he proceeded, by way of El Pozo, to the left of the line at San Juan, reaching his new position about midnight.
All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less fury, but such of our troops as were in position at daylight held their ground, and Lawton gained a strong and commanding position on the right.
About 10 p. m. the enemy made a vigorous a.s.sault to break through my lines, but he was repulsed at all points.
SUMMONING THE ENEMY TO SURRENDER.
On the morning of the 3d the battle was renewed, but the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the a.s.sault of the previous night, and the firing along the lines was desultory until stopped by my sending the following letter within the Spanish lines:
"Headquarters U. S. Forces, near San Juan River, "July 3, 1898--8:30 a. m.
"Sir,--I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to sh.e.l.l Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and all the women and children, that they should leave the city before 10 o"clock to-morrow morning.
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"William R. Shafter, "Maj.-Gen. U. S. Vols.
"The Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba."
To this letter I received the following reply:
"Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898.
"His Excellency the General Commanding Forces of the United States, near San Juan River:
"Sir,--I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-day, written at 8:30 a. m. and received at 1 p. m., demanding the surrender of this city, or, in the contrary case, announcing to me that you will bombard this city, and that I advise the foreigners, women and children, that they must leave the city before 10 o"clock to-morrow morning.
"It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message.
"Very respectfully, Jose Toral, "Commander-in-Chief 4th Corps."
Several of the foreign consuls came into my lines and asked that the time given for them--the women and children--to depart from the city be extended until 10 o"clock on July 5th. This induced me to write a second letter, as follows:
"Santiago de Cuba, July 3d, 1898.
"Sir,--In consideration of a request of the consular officers in your city for further delay in carrying out my intentions to fire on the city, and in the interests of the poor women and children who will suffer very greatly by their hasty and enforced departure from the city, I have the honor to announce that I will delay such action, solely in their interests, until noon of the 5th, provided that during the interim your forces make no demonstration whatever upon those of my own.
"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
"William R Shafter, "Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.
"The Commanding General, Spanish Forces."
My first message went under a flag of truce at 12:42 p.m. I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, and I thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war.
Acting upon this presumption, I determined to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry.
Our troops were received with honors, and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades.
OPERATIONS AFTER SANTIAGO--OUR LOSSES.
The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically terminated the battle of Santiago; all that occurred after this time may properly be treated under the head of the siege which followed. After deducting the detachments required at Siboney and Baiquiri to render those depots secure from attack, organizations held to protect our flanks, others acting as escorts and guards to light batteries, the members of the Hospital Corps, guards left in charge of blanket-rolls which the intense heat caused the men to cast aside before entering battle, orderlies, etc., it is doubtful if we had more than 12,000 men on the firing-line on July 1, when the battle was fiercest and when the important and strong positions of El Caney and San Juan were captured.
A few Cubans a.s.sisted in the attack at El Caney, and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to materially change the strength, as indicated above. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our own; they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the company officers and men, and the benefits derived from the careful training and instruction given in the company in the recent years in rifle practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later.
The arrival of Gen. Escario on the night of July 2d, and his entrance into the city was not antic.i.p.ated, for although it was known, as previously stated, that Gen. Pando had left Manzanillo with reinforcements for the garrison of Santiago, it was not believed his troops could arrive so soon. Gen. Garcia, with between 4,000 and 5,000 Cubans, was intrusted with the duty of watching for and intercepting the reinforcement expected. This, however, he failed to do, and Escario pa.s.sed into the city along on my extreme right and near the bay. Up to this time I had been unable to complete investment of the town with my own men; but to prevent any more reinforcements coming in or the enemy escaping. I extended my lines as rapidly as possible to the extreme right, and completed the investment of the place, leaving Gen. Garcia"s forces in the rear of my right flank to scout the country for any approaching Spanish reinforcements, a duty which his forces were very competent to perform.
It had been reported that 8,000 Spanish troops had left Holquin for Santiago. It was also known that there was a considerable force at San Luis, twenty miles to the north.
In the battle of Santiago the Spanish navy endeavored to sh.e.l.l our troops on the extreme right, but the latter were concealed by the inequalities of the ground, and the sh.e.l.ls did little, if any, harm.
Their naval forces also a.s.sisted in the trenches, having 1,000 on sh.o.r.e, and I am informed they sustained considerable loss; among others, Admiral Cervera"s chief-of-staff was killed. Being convinced that the city would fall, Admiral Cervera determined to put to sea, informing the French consul it was better to die fighting than to sink his ships. The news of the great naval victory which followed was enthusiastically received by the Army.
The information of our naval victory was transmitted under flag of truce to the Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4th, and the suggestion again made that he surrender to save needless effusion of blood.
On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into the harbor the city would surrender without any further sacrifice of life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson"s) opinion the Navy should not enter the harbor.
In the meanwhile letters pa.s.sing between Gen. Toral and myself caused the cessation of hostilities to continue. Each army, however, continued to strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinion the Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, and on July 6th called Gen. Toral"s attention to the changed conditions, and at his request gave him time to consult his home government. This he did, asking that the British consul, with the employees of the cable company, be permitted to return from El Caney to the city. This I granted.
The strength of the enemy"s position was such I did not wish to a.s.sault if it could be avoided.
An examination of the enemy"s works, made after the surrender, fully justifies the wisdom of the course adopted. The intrenchments could only have been carried with very great loss of life, probably with not less than 6,000 killed and wounded.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL TORAL.
On July 8th Gen. Toral offered to march out of the city with arms and baggage, provided he would not be molested before reaching Holquin, and to surrender to the American forces the territory then occupied by him. I replied that while I would submit his proposition to my home government. I did not think it would be accepted.
In the meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson that when the Army again engaged the enemy the Navy would a.s.sist by sh.e.l.ling the city from ships stationed off Aguadores, dropping a sh.e.l.l every few minutes.
On July 10th the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia arrived and were placed on the line to the right of the Cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton farther to the right and to practically command the Cobre road.
On the afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken off at 4 p.m., and I determined to open with four batteries of artillery and went forward in person to the trenches to give the necessary orders, but the enemy antic.i.p.ated us by opening fire with his artillery a few minutes after the hour stated. His batteries were apparently silenced before night, while ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark. During this firing the Navy fired from Aguadores, most of the sh.e.l.ls falling in the city. There was also some small arms firing. On this afternoon and the next morning, we lost Capt. Charles W. Rowell, 2d Infantry, and one man killed, and Lieut.
Lutz, 2d Infantry, and ten men wounded.
On the morning of July 11th the bombardment by the Navy and my field guns was renewed, and continued until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to the Adjutant General of the Army that the right of Ludlow"s brigade of Lawton"s division rested on the bay. Thus our hold upon the enemy was complete.
At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the city was again demanded. The firing ceased, and was not again renewed. By this date the sickness in the Army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of exposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of the Army, I did not think an a.s.sault would be justifiable, especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in their preliminary propositions to surrender.
On July 11th I wrote to General Toral as follows: