[159] Writings, VIII. 232, 235.
[160] Sparks"s Life of Washington, p. 380.
[161] Letter of April 10, 1778. Writings of Washington, V. 312.
[162] Journals, IV. 221.
[163] Ibid. 228, 229. The States which voted in the negative were Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and South Carolina.
[164] Ibid. 243. The States voting in the negative were Ma.s.sachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and South Carolina. The State whose vote was divided was Pennsylvania.
[165] Ibid. 244. Under this resolve, each officer was ent.i.tled to receive half-pay annually, for the term of seven years after the conclusion of war, if living.
[166] Ibid. 288.
[167] On the 21st of April, in the resolution reported by a committee, the words "an establishment of half-pay for life" were, on motion, changed to a "provision of half-pay";--an amendment which reveals very plainly the character of the popular objections. Journals, IV. 228.
[168] Journals, V. 312.
[169] Ibid. 316, 317.
[170] Writings of Washington, VII. 165, 246.
[171] Journals, VI. 336.
[172] See General Washington"s letter to General Sullivan (in Congress), November 20, 1780. Writings, VII. 297.
[173] See the letter of General Lincoln, Secretary at War, to Washington, cited by Mr. Sparks, VIII. 356.
[174] The "Newburgh Addresses" were written by John Armstrong, (afterwards General Armstrong,) then a young man, and aide-de-camp to General Gates, with the rank of Major. (Sparks"s Life of Gouverneur Morris, I. 253. United States Magazine for January 1, 1823, New York.) The style of these papers, considering the period when they appeared, is remarkably good. They are written with great point and vigor of expression and great purity of English. For the purpose for which they were designed,--a direct appeal to feeling,--they show the hand of a master.
[175] March 18, 1783. Writings, VIII. 396.
[176] The resolves gave the option to lines of the respective States, and not to the officers individually in those lines, to accept or refuse the commutation. Journals, VIII. 162.
CHAPTER II.
1781-1783.
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE CONFEDERATION.--REVOLUTIONARY DEBT.--REVENUE SYSTEM OF 1783.
It is not easy to ascertain the amount of the public debt of the United States, at the time when the Confederation went into operation. But on the 1st of January, 1783, it amounted to about forty-two millions of dollars. About eight millions were due on loans obtained in France and Holland, and the residue was due to citizens of the United States. The annual interest of the debt was a little more than two million four hundred thousand dollars.[177]
The Confederation had no sooner gone into operation, than it was perceived by many of the princ.i.p.al statesmen of the country, that its financial powers were so entirely defective, that Congress would never be able, under them, to pay even the interest on the public debt.
Indeed, before the Confederation was finally ratified, so as to become obligatory upon all the States, on the 3d of February, 1781, Congress pa.s.sed a resolve, recommending to the several States, as indispensably necessary, to vest a power in Congress to levy for the use of the United States a duty of five per cent. _ad valorem_, at the time and place of importation, upon all foreign goods and merchandise imported into any of the States; and that the money arising from such duties should be appropriated to the discharge of the princ.i.p.al and interest of the debts already then contracted, or which might be contracted, on the faith of the United States, for the support of the war; the duties to be continued until the debts should be fully and finally discharged.
It was at this time that the office of Superintendent of the Finances was established, and Robert Morris was unanimously elected by Congress to fill it. He was an eminent merchant of Philadelphia, of known financial skill, devoted to the cause of the country, and possessed of very considerable private resources, which he more than once sacrificed to the public service. Under his administration, it is more than probable that, if the States had complied with the requisitions of Congress, the war would have been brought to a close at an earlier period. But there was scarcely any compliance with those requisitions, and, contemporaneously with this neglect, the proposal to vest in Congress the power to levy duties met with serious opposition. On the 30th of October, 1781, Congress made a requisition upon the States for eight millions of dollars, to meet the service of the ensuing year. In January, 1783, one year and three months from the date of this requisition, less than half a million of this sum had been received into the treasury of the United States. After a delay of nearly two years, one State entirely refused its concurrence with the plan of vesting in Congress a power to levy duties, another withdrew the a.s.sent it had once given, and a third had returned no answer.
The State which refused to grant this power to Congress was Rhode Island. On the 6th of December, 1782, Congress determined to send a deputation to that State, to endeavor to procure its a.s.sent to this const.i.tutional change. The increasing discontents of the army, the loud clamors of the public creditors, the extreme disproportion between the current means and the demands of the public service, and the impossibility of obtaining further loans in Europe unless some security could be held out to lenders, made it necessary for Congress to be especially urgent with the legislature of Rhode Island. But, at the moment when the deputation was about to depart on this mission, the intelligence was received that Virginia had repealed the act by which she had previously granted to Congress the power of laying duties, and the proposal was therefore abandoned for a time.[178] But the leading persons then in Congress--who saw the ruin impending over the country; who were aware that the whole amount of money which Congress had received, to carry on the public business for the year then just expiring, was less than two millions of dollars,[179] while the three branches of feeding, clothing, and paying the army exceeded five millions of dollars per annum, exclusive of all other departments of the public service; and who were equally aware that no means whatever existed of paying the interest on the public debts--resolved still to persevere in their endeavors to procure the establishment of revenues equal to the purpose of funding all the debts of the United States.
Among these persons, Hamilton and Madison were the most active; and the part which they took, at this period, in the measures for sustaining the sinking credit of the country, and the efforts which they made, are among the less conspicuous, but not less important services, which those great men performed for their country. Another plan was devised, after the failure of that of 1781, for investing Congress with a power to derive a revenue from duties, and, in April, 1783, its promoters procured for it the almost unanimous consent of Congress. This plan recommended the States to vest in Congress the power of levying certain duties upon goods imported into the country, partly specific and partly _ad valorem_; the proceeds of such duties to be applied to the discharge of the interest or princ.i.p.al of the debts incurred by the United States for supporting the war. The duties were to be collected by collectors appointed by the States, but accountable to Congress. It also recommended to the States to establish, for a term of twenty-five years, substantial and effectual revenues, exclusive of the duties to be levied by Congress for supplying their proportions of fifteen millions of dollars annually, for the same purpose; and that, when this plan had been acceded to by all the States, it should be considered as forming a mutual compact, irrevocable by one or more of them without the consent of the whole. It was also proposed that the rule of proportion fixed by the Confederation should be changed from the basis of real estate to the basis of population.
This plan was sent out to the States, accompanied by an address, prepared by Mr. Madison, in which the necessity of the measure was urged with much ability and force. Annexed to this paper were various doc.u.ments, exhibiting the nature and origin of the public debts, and the meritorious characters of the various public creditors; the whole of the Newburgh Addresses, and the proceedings of the officers; the contracts made with the king of France; and a very able answer by Hamilton to the objections of Rhode Island. No stronger and more direct appeal was ever made to the sense of right of any people. Never was the cause of national honor, public faith, and public safety more powerfully and eloquently set forth.[180]
And when we consider the various cla.s.ses of the public creditors, at the close of the war, and remember that the debts of the country had been contracted for the great purpose of establishing its independence, and that there was scarcely a creditor who had not some claim to the grat.i.tude of the country, we cannot but be astonished that such an appeal as was then made should have fallen, as it did, unheeded upon the legislatures and people of many of the States. In the first place, the debts were due to an ally, the generous king of France, who had loaned to the American people his armies and his treasures; who had added to his loans liberal donations; and whose very contracts for repayment contained proof of his magnanimity. In the next place, they were due to that n.o.ble band of officers and soldiers, who had fought the battles of their country, and who now asked only such a portion of their dues as would enable them to retire, with the means of daily bread, from the field of victory and glory into the bosom of peace and privacy, and such effectual security for the residue of their claims, as their country was unquestionably able to provide. In the last place, they were due partly to those citizens of the country who had lent their funds to the public, or manifested their confidence in the government by receiving transfers of public securities from those who had so lent, and partly to those whose property had been taken for the public service.[181]
The United States had achieved their independence. They were about to take rank among the nations of the world. As they should meet this crisis, their character would be determined. The rights for which they had contended were the rights of human nature. These rights had triumphed, and now formed the basis of the civil polity of thirteen independent States. The forms of republican government were therefore called upon to justify themselves by their fruits. The higher qualities of national character--justice, good faith, honor, grat.i.tude--were called upon to display an example, that would save the cause of republican liberty from reproach and disgrace.[182]
But, unhappily, the establishment of peace tended to weaken the slender bond which held the Union together, by turning the attention of men to the internal affairs of their own States. The advantage and the necessity of giving the regulation of foreign commerce to the general government, if perceived at all, was perceived only by a few leading statesmen. The commercial States fancied that they profited by a condition of things which enabled them as importers to levy contribution on their neighbors. The people did not as yet perceive, that, without some central authority to regulate the whole trade alike, the clashing regulations of rival States would sooner or later destroy the Confederacy. Nor were they willing to be taxed for the payment of the public debts. The people of the United States had not yet begun to feel, that such a burden is to be borne as one of the first of public and social duties. That part of the financial plan of 1783, which required from the States a pledge of internal revenues for twenty-five years, met with so much opposition, that Congress was obliged to abandon it, and to confine its efforts to that part of the scheme which related to the duties on imports. In 1786, all the States, except New York, had complied with the latter part of the plan; but the refusal of that State rendered the whole of it inoperative, and no resource remained to Congress, after the close of the war, but the old method of making requisitions on the States, under the rule of the Confederation.[183]
At the return of peace, therefore, the Confederation had had a trial of two years and six months, as a government for purposes of war. It was for these purposes, mainly, that it was established; being in fact, as it was in name, a league of friendship between sovereign States, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; the parties to which had bound themselves by it to a.s.sist each other against all external attacks. Doubtless the framers of the Confederation contemplated its duration beyond the period of the war; for, besides the perpetual character of the Union, which it sought and professed to establish, it had certain functions which were manifestly to be exercised in peace as well as in war. These functions, however, were few. The government was framed during a revolutionary war, for the purposes of that war, and it went into operation while the war was still waged; taking the place and superseding the powers of the Revolutionary Congress, under which the war had been commenced and prosecuted.
A written const.i.tution, with a precise and well-defined mode of operation, had thus succeeded to the vague and indefinite, but ample, powers of the earlier government. But in the very modes of its operation, there was a monstrous defect, which distorted the whole system from the true proportions and character of a government. It gave to the Confederation the power of contracting debts, and at the same time withheld from it the power of paying them. It created a corporate body, formed by the Union and known as the United States, and gave to it the faculty of borrowing money and incurring other obligations. It provided the mode in which its treasury should be supplied for the reimburs.e.m.e.nt of the public creditor. But over the sources of that supply, it gave the government contracting the debts no power whatever.
Thirteen independent legislatures granted or withheld the means which were to enable the general government to pay the debts which the general const.i.tution had enabled it to contract, according to their own convenience or their own views and feelings as to the purposes for which those debts had been incurred. Yet the debts were wholly national in their character, and by the nation they were to be discharged. But, by the operation of the system under which the nation had undertaken to discharge its obligations, the duty of performance was parcelled out among the various subordinate corporations of States, and the country was thus placed in the position of an empire whose power was at the mercy of its provinces, and was sure to be controlled by provincial objects and ideas.
A government thus situated, engaged in the prosecution of a war, perpetually borrowing, but never paying, and scarce likely ever to pay, was in a position to prosecute that war with far less than the real energies and resources of the nation: and it stands the recorded opinion of him who conducted his country through the whole struggle, and without whom it could not, under this defective system, have achieved its independence, that the war would have terminated sooner, and would have cost vastly less both of blood and treasure, if the government of the Union had possessed the power of direct or indirect taxation.[184] But the government of the Confederation was one that trusted too much to the patriotism and sense of honor of the different populations of the different States. The moral feelings of a people will prompt to high and heroic deeds; will impel them with irresistible force and energy to the accomplishment of the great objects of liberty and happiness; and will develop in individuals the highest capacity for endurance that human nature can display. They did so in the American Revolution. The annals of no people, struggling for liberty, exhibit more of the virtues of fort.i.tude, self-denial, and an ardent love of freedom, than ours exhibit, especially in the earlier stages of the contest. But any _feelings_ are an unsafe and uncertain reliance for the regular and punctual operations of civil government. The fiscal concerns of a nation, left to depend princ.i.p.ally upon the prevailing sentiments of justice, honor, and grat.i.tude,--upon the connection between these sentiments and that pa.s.sion for liberty which animated the earlier struggles for national independence,--are exposed to great hazards. If an appeal to the feelings of a people const.i.tutes the princ.i.p.al ground of security for the public creditor, other feelings may intervene, which will lead to a denial of the justice of the claim; for it is the very nature of such an appeal to submit the whole question of obligation and duty to popular determination. That government alone is likely to discharge the just obligations of any people, which possesses both the power to declare what those obligations are, and the power to levy the means of payment, without a reference of either point to popular sentiment.
The history of the Confederation contains abundant proofs of the soundness of this position. At the close of the war, a debt of more than forty millions of dollars was due from the United States to various cla.s.ses of creditors, and the whole of it had been contracted either by the government of the Confederation, or by its predecessors, for whose contracts the Confederation was expressly bound, by the Articles, to provide. This debt could not be discharged without a grant of internal revenues from the States, and without a grant of the power to collect other revenues from the external trade of the country. The appeal that was made by the government in order to obtain these grants was addressed almost wholly to the moral sentiments of the people of the different States; the time had scarcely arrived, although rapidly approaching, for an appeal to those interests which were involved in the surrender to the general government of the power of regulating foreign commerce;[185] and consequently the arguments addressed to the sense of justice and the feeling of grat.i.tude were answered by discussions of the propriety, justice, and reasonableness of some of the claims, for which the States were thus called upon to provide, as existing debts of the country, not without the hope, entertained in some quarters, of involving the whole in confusion and final rejection.[186]
The design of the framers of the revenue system of 1783 was twofold; first, to do justice to the creditors of the country, by procuring adequate power to fund the public debts; and second, to strengthen and consolidate the national government, by means of those debts and of the various interests which would be combined in the great object of their liquidation. They foresaw, on the approach of peace, that to leave these debts to be provided for by the States individually would lead to a separation of interests fatal to the continuance of the Union; but that to make the United States responsible for the whole of them would be to create a bond of union, that would be effectual and operative, after the external pressure of war, which had hitherto held the States together, should have been removed. For this purpose, they undoubtedly availed themselves of the discontents of the army, a cla.s.s of the public creditors the justice of whose claims there was immediate danger in denying. There is no reason to suppose that these discontents were promoted by any one concerned in giving direction to the action of Congress. But before the crisis had been reached in the "Newburgh Addresses," it was perceived to be extremely important to prevent the army from turning away from the general government, as their debtor, to look to their respective States; and, after the imminent hazard of that moment had pa.s.sed, the claims of the army were used, and used most rightfully, to impress upon the States the necessity of yielding to Congress the powers necessary to do justice.[187]
In the proposal of this scheme of finance, involving, as it did, a material change in the operation of the existing const.i.tution of the country, there was great wisdom; and it was eminently fortunate that it went forth before the advent of peace, to be considered and acted upon by the States. The system of the Confederation had utterly failed to supply the means of sustaining the public credit of the Union, and the consciousness of that failure tended to produce a resolution of the Union into its component elements, the States. Men had begun to abandon the hope of paying the debts of the country; or, if they were to be paid at all, they had begun to look to the States, in their individual capacities, as the ultimate debtors, to whom at least a part of the claims was to be referred. Had the country been permitted to pa.s.s from a state of war to a state of peace, without the suggestion and proposal of a definite system for funding these debts on continental securities, the Union would at once have been exhausted of all vitality. The Confederation, left to discharge the functions which belonged to it in peace, without the power of relieving the burdens which it had entailed upon the country during the war, would have been everywhere regarded as a useless machine, the purposes of which--poorly answered in the period of its greatest activity--had entirely ceased to exist. Congress would have been attended by delegates from few of the States, if attended at all;[188] and the rapid decay of the Union would have been marked by the feeble, spasmodic, and unsuccessful efforts of some of them to discharge so much of the general burdens as could have been a.s.signed to them in severalty; the open repudiation of others; and the final confusion and loss of the whole ma.s.s of the debts, in universal bankruptcy, poverty, and disgrace.
But the comprehensive scheme of 1783, although never adopted, saved the imperfect Union that then existed from the destruction to which it was hastening. It saved it for a prolonged, though feeble existence, through a period of desperate exhaustion. It saved it, by ascertaining the debts of the country, fixing their national character, and proposing a national system for their discharge. It directed the attention of the States to the advantage and the necessity of giving up to the Union some part of the imposts that might be levied on foreign commodities, and thus led the way to that grand idea of uniformity of regulation, which was afterwards developed as the true interest of communities, which, from their geographical and moral relations, const.i.tute in fact but one country.
It is not intended, however, in a.s.signing this influence to the revenue system proposed in 1783, to suggest that it contained the germ of the present Const.i.tution. It was an essentially different system. It proposed the enlargement of the powers of Congress, as they existed under the Confederation, only by the grant to the United States of the right to collect certain duties on foreign importations, for the limited period of twenty-five years, to be applied to the discharge of the debts contracted for the purposes of the war, but to be collected by officers appointed by the States, although amenable to Congress; and the levy and collection by the States of certain internal taxes, during the same limited term, for the purpose of raising certain proportionate sums, to be paid over to the United States, for the same object. So far, therefore, as this system suggested any new powers, there is a wide difference between its features and principles and those of an entire and irrevocable surrender to the Union of the whole subject of taxing and regulating foreign commerce. But the influence of this proposal upon the country, during the four years which followed, is to be measured by the evident necessities which it revealed, and by the means to which it pointed for their relief;--means which, though never applied, and, if applied, would have proved inadequate, still showed, through the period of increasing weakness in the Union, the high obligations which rested upon the country, and which could be discharged only by the preservation of the Union.
NOTE TO PAGE 185.
ON THE HALF-PAY FOR THE OFFICERS OF THE REVOLUTION.
In Connecticut, the opposition to the plan of enabling Congress to fund the public debts arose from the jealousy with which the provision of half-pay for the officers of the army had always been regarded in that State. In October, 1783, Governor Trumbull, in an address to the a.s.sembly declining a reelection, had spoken of the necessity of enlarging the powers of Congress, and of strengthening the arm of the government. A committee reported an answer to this address, which contained a paragraph approving of the principles which the Governor had inculcated, but it was stricken out in the lower house. Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., who had been one of Washington"s aids, thus wrote to him concerning the rejection of this paragraph: "It was rejected, lest, by adopting it, they should seem to convey to the people an idea of their concurring with the political sentiments contained in the address; so exceedingly jealous is the spirit of this State at present respecting the powers and the engagements of Congress, arising princ.i.p.ally from their aversion to the half-pay and commutation granted to the army; princ.i.p.ally, I say, arising from this cause. It is but too true, that some few are wicked enough to hope, that, by means of this clamor, they may be able to rid themselves of the whole public debt, by introducing so much confusion into public measures as shall eventually produce a general abolition of the whole." (Writings of Washington, IX. 5, note.) It appears from the Journals of Congress, that in November, 1783, the House of Representatives of Connecticut sent some remonstrance to Congress respecting the resolution which had granted half-pay for life to the officers, which was referred to a committee, to be answered. In the report of this committee it was said, that "the resolution of Congress referred to appears by the yeas and nays to have been pa.s.sed according to the then established rules of that body in transacting the business of the United States; the resolution itself had public notoriety, and does not appear to have been formally objected against by the legislature of any State till after the Confederation was completely adopted, _nor till after the close of the war_." These words were stricken out from the report by a vote of six States against one, two States declining to vote. The journal gives no further account of the matter. (Journals, IX. 79. March 12, 1784.)
In Ma.s.sachusetts, the half-pay had always been equally unpopular. The legislature of that State, on the 11th of July, 1783, addressed a letter to Congress, to a.s.sign, as a reason for not agreeing to the impost duty, the grant of half-pay to the officers. The tone of this letter does little credit to the State.
"_Commonwealth of Ma.s.sachusetts._
"Boston, July 11. 1783.
"Sir:--
"The Address of the United States in Congress a.s.sembled has been received by the legislature of the Commonwealth of Ma.s.sachusetts; and, while they consider themselves as bound in duty to give Congress the highest a.s.surance that no measures consistent with their circ.u.mstances, and the const.i.tution of this government and the Federal Union, shall remain unattempted by them to furnish those supplies which justice demands, and which are necessary to support the credit and honor of the United States, they find themselves under a necessity of addressing Congress in regard to the subject of the half-pay of the officers of the army, and the proposed commutation thereof; with some other matters of a similar nature, which produce among the people of this Commonwealth the greatest concern and uneasiness, and involve the legislature thereof in no small embarra.s.sments. The legislature have not been unacquainted with the sufferings, nor are they forgetful of the virtue and bravery, of their fellow-citizens in the army; and while they are sensible that justice requires they should be fully compensated for their services and sufferings, at the same time it is most sincerely wished that they may return to the bosom of their country, under such circ.u.mstances as may place them in the most agreeable light with their fellow-citizens. Congress, in the year 1780, resolved, that the officers of the army, who should continue therein during the war, should be ent.i.tled to half-pay for life; and at the same time resolved, that all such as should retire therefrom, in consequence of the new arrangement which was then ordered to take place, should be ent.i.tled to the same benefit; a commutation of which half-pay has since been proposed. The General Court are sensible that the United States in Congress a.s.sembled are, by the Confederation, vested with a discretionary power to make provision for the support and payment of the army, and such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States; but in making such provision, due regard ever ought to be had to the welfare and happiness of the people, the rules of equity, and the spirit and general design of the Confederation. We cannot, on this occasion, avoid saying, that, with due respect, we are of opinion those principles were not duly attended to, in the grant of half-pay to the officers of the army; that being, in our opinion, a grant of more than an adequate reward for their services, and inconsistent with that equality which ought to subsist among citizens of free and republican States. Such a measure appears to be calculated to raise and exalt some citizens in wealth and grandeur, to the injury and oppression of others, even if the inequality which will happen among the officers of the army, who have performed from one to eight years" service, should not be taken into consideration. The observations which have been made with regard to the officers of the army will in general apply to the civil officers appointed by Congress, who, in our opinion, have been allowed much larger salaries than are consistent with the state of our finances, the rules of equity, and a proper regard to the public good. And, indeed, if the United States were in the most wealthy and prosperous circ.u.mstances, it is conceived that economy and moderation, with respect to grants and allowances, in opposition to the measures which have been adopted by monarchical and luxurious courts, would most highly conduce to our reputation, even in the eyes of foreigners, and would cause a people, who have been contending with so much ardor and expense for republican const.i.tutions and freedom, which cannot be supported without frugality and virtue, to appear with dignity and consistency; and at the same time would, in the best manner, conduce to the public happiness. It is thought to be essentially necessary, especially at the present time, that Congress should be expressly informed, that such measures as are complained of are extremely opposite and irritating to the principles and feelings which the people of some Eastern States, and of this in particular, inherit from their ancestry. The legislature cannot without horror entertain the most distant idea of the dissolution of the Union which subsists between the United States, and the ruin which would inevitably ensue thereon; but with great pain they must observe, that the extraordinary grants and allowances which Congress have thought proper to make to their civil and military officers have produced such effects in this Commonwealth as are of a threatening aspect. From these sources, and particularly from the grant of half-pay to the officers of the army, and the proposed commutation thereof, it has arisen, that the General Court has not been able hitherto to agree in granting to the United States an impost duty, agreeable to the recommendation of Congress; while the General a.s.sembly at the same time have been deeply impressed with a sense of the necessity of speedily adopting some effectual measures for supplying the continental treasury, for the restoration of the public credit, and the salvation of the country;--and propose, as the present session is near terminating, again to take the subject of the impost duty into consideration early in the next. From these observations, you may easily learn the difficult and critical situation the legislature is in, and they rely on the wisdom of Congress to adopt and propose some measure for relief in this extremity.