THE CONSt.i.tUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE PEACE OF 1783 TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787.
CHAPTER I.
JANUARY, 1784-MAY, 1787.
DUTIES AND NECESSITIES OF CONGRESS.--REQUISITIONS ON THE STATES.--REVENUE SYSTEM OF 1783.
The period which now claims our attention is that extending from the Peace of 1783 to the calling of the Convention which framed the Const.i.tution, in 1787. It was a period full of dangers and difficulties.
The destinies of the Union seemed to be left to all the hazards arising from a defective government and the illiberal and contracted policy of its members. Patriotism was generally thought to consist in adhesion to State interests, and a reluctance to intrust power to the organs of the nation. The national obligations were therefore disregarded; treaty stipulations remained unfulfilled; the great duty of justice failed to be discharged; rebellion raised a dangerous and nearly successful front; and the commerce of the country was exposed to the injurious policy of other nations, with no means of counteracting or escaping from its effects. At length, the people of the United States began to see danger after they had felt it, and the growth of sounder views and higher principles of public conduct gave to the friends of order, public faith, and national security a controlling influence in the country, and enabled the men, who had won for it the blessings of liberty, to establish for it a durable and sufficient government.
Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the downfall of a government which had been framed with the hope and promise of perpetual duration;--an interval of time no longer than that during which the people of the United States are now accustomed to witness a change of their rulers, without injury to any principle or any form of their inst.i.tutions. But this brief interval was full of suffering and peril. There are scarcely any evils or dangers, of a political nature, and springing from political and social causes, to which a free people can be exposed, which the people of the United States did not experience during this period. That these evils and dangers did not precipitate the country into civil war, and that the great undertaking of forming a new and const.i.tutional government, by delegates of the people, could be entered upon and prosecuted, with the calmness, conciliation, and concession essential to its success, is owing partly to the fact that the country had scarcely recovered from the exhausting effects of the Revolutionary struggle; but mainly to the existence of a body of statesmen, formed during that struggle, and fitted by hard experience to build up the government. But before their efforts and their influences are explained, the period which developed the necessity for their interposition must be described. He who would know what the Const.i.tution of the United States was designed to accomplish, must understand the circ.u.mstances out of which it arose.
On the 3d of November, 1783, a new Congress, according to annual custom, was a.s.sembled at Annapolis, and attended by only fifteen members, from seven States. Two great acts awaited the attention of this a.s.sembly;--both of an interesting and important character, both of national concern. The one was the resignation of Washington; a solemnity which appealed to every feeling of national grat.i.tude and pride, and which would seem to have demanded whatever of pomp and dignity and power the United States could display. The other was a legislative act, which was to give peace to the country, by the ratification of the Treaty.
Several weeks pa.s.sed on, and yet the attendance was not much increased.
Washington"s resignation was received, at a public audience of seven States, represented by about twenty delegates;[210] and on the same day letters were despatched to the other States, urging them, for the safety, honor, and good faith of the United States, to require the immediate attendance of their members.[211] It was not, however, until the 14th of January that the Treaty could be ratified by the const.i.tutional number of nine States; and, when this took place, there were present but three-and-twenty members.[212]
It should undoubtedly be considered, that, from the nature and form of the government, the delegates in Congress had in some sense an amba.s.sadorial character, and were a.s.sembled as the representatives of sovereign States. But with whatever dignity, real or fict.i.tious, they may be considered as having been clothed, the government itself was one that created a constant tendency to the neglect of its functions, and therefore produced great practical evils. The Articles of Confederation provided that delegates should be annually appointed by the States, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November in every year; and although they also gave to Congress the power of adjournment for a recess, during which the government was to be devolved on a Committee of the States, they fixed no period for the termination of a session. While the war lasted, it had been both customary and necessary for the old Congress, and for its successors under the Confederation, to be perpetually in session; and this practice was continued after the peace, with very short intervals of Committees of the States, partly from habit, and partly in consequence of the reduction of the delegations to the lowest const.i.tutional number. This rendered despatch impossible, by putting it in the power of a few members to withhold from important matters the const.i.tutional concurrence of nine States. Without any reference to population by the Articles of Confederation, not less than two nor more than seven delegates were allowed to each State; and by casting the burden of maintaining its own delegates upon each State, they created a strong motive for preferring the smaller number, and often for not being represented at all. This motive became more active after the peace, when the immediate stimulus of hostilities was withdrawn; and it was at the same time accompanied, in most of the States, by a great jealousy of the powers of Congress, a disinclination to enlarge them, and a prevalent feeling that each State was sufficient unto itself for all the purposes of government.[213] The consequence was, that the Congress of the Confederation, from the ratification of the Treaty of Peace to the adoption of the Const.i.tution, although ent.i.tled to ninety-one members, was seldom attended by one third of that number; and the state of the representation was sometimes so low, that one eighth of the whole number present could, under the const.i.tutional rule, negative the most important measures.[214]
Such was the government which was now called to provide for the payment of at least the interest on the public debts, and to procure the means for its own support; to carry out the Treaty of Peace, and secure to the country its advantages; to complete the cessions of the Western lands, and provide for their settlement and government; to guard the commerce of the country against the hostile policy of other nations; to secure to each State the forms and principles of a republican government; to extend and secure the relations of the country with foreign powers; and to preserve and perpetuate the Union. By tracing the history of its efforts and its failures with regard to these great objects, we may understand the princ.i.p.al causes which brought about the conviction on the part of the people of the United States, that another and a stronger government must take the place of the Confederation.
It was ascertained in April, 1784, that a sum exceeding three millions of dollars would be wanted to pay the arrears of interest, and to meet the interest and current expenses of the public service for the year.[215] Two sources only could be looked to for this supply. It must either be obtained by requisitions on the States, according to the old rule of the Confederation, or from the new duties and taxes proposed by the revenue system of 1783. But that proposal was still under the consideration of the State legislatures; some of them having as yet acceded to the impost only, and others having decided neither on the impost nor on the supplementary taxes. Some time must therefore elapse before the final confirmation of this system, even if its final confirmation were probable; and, after it should have been confirmed, further time would be requisite to bring it into operation. It was quite clear, therefore, that other measures must be resorted to. Requisitions presented the sole resource. But in what mode were they to be made? The preceding Congress had offered two recommendations to the States on the subject of the rule of the Confederation, which directed that the quotas of the several States should be apportioned according to the value of their lands. The Congress of 1783, in order to give this rule a fair trial, had recommended to the States to make returns of their lands, buildings, and inhabitants;[216] but, apprehending that the insufficiency of the rule would immediately show itself, they had followed this recommendation with another, to change the basis of contribution from land to numbers of inhabitants.[217] Both of these propositions were still under the consideration of the State legislatures, and four States only had acceded to them.[218] A new requisition, therefore, if made at all, must be made under the old rule of the Confederation, and with entirely imperfect means of making it with justice and equality. It was found, however, that large arrears were still due from the States, of the old requisitions made during the war.[219] A new call upon them to pay one half of these arrears, deducting therefrom the amount of their payments to the close of the year, would, if complied with, produce a sum nearly sufficient for the wants of the government. This resource was accordingly tried.[220]
In the year 1785, three millions, it was ascertained, would be required for the service of the year. A renewed call was made for the remaining unpaid moiety of the old requisition of eight millions, and for the whole of the old requisition of two millions; but, considering that the public faith required Congress to continue their annual demand for money, they issued a new requisition for three millions, and adjusted it according to the best information they could obtain.[221]
In the year 1786, a sum of more than three millions was wanted for the current demands on the treasury, and a new requisition was made for it, under the old rule of the Confederation.[222] Two of the States, Rhode Island and New Jersey, thereupon pa.s.sed acts, making their own paper currency receivable on all arrears of taxes due to the United States, and proposing to pay their quotas in such currency.[223]
But the entire inadequacy of this source of supply to maintain the federal government, and to discharge the annual public engagements, had now become but too apparent. From the 1st of November, 1781, to the 1st of January, 1786, less than two and a half millions of dollars had been received from requisitions made during that period, amounting to more than ten millions.[224] For the last fourteen months of that interval, the average receipts from requisitions amounted to less than four hundred thousand dollars per annum, while the interest alone due on the foreign debt was more than half a million; and, in the course of each of the nine following years, the average sum of one million, annually, would become due by instalments on the princ.i.p.al of that debt.[225] In addition to this, the interest on the domestic debt; the security of the navigation and commerce of the country against the Barbary powers; the immediate protection of the people dwelling on the frontier from the savages; the establishment of military magazines in different parts of the Union, quite indispensable to the public safety; the maintenance of the federal government at home, and the support of the public servants abroad,--each and all depended upon the contribution of the States under the annual requisitions, and were each and all likely to be involved in a common failure and ruin.[226]
There can be no doubt that the continuance of the practice of making requisitions, after the proposal of the revenue system of 1783, had some tendency to prevent the adoption of that system by the States. But there was no other alternative within the const.i.tutional reach of Congress; and in the mean time, the revenue system, submitted as it necessarily was to the legislatures of thirteen different States, was, as far as it was a.s.sented to, embarra.s.sed with the most discordant and irreconcilable provisions. It was ascertained in February, 1786, that seven of the States had granted the impost part of the system, in such a manner, that, if the other six States had made similar grants, the plan of the general impost might have been immediately put into operation.[227] Two of the other States had also granted the impost, but had embarra.s.sed their grants with provisos, which suspended their operation until all the other States should have pa.s.sed laws in full conformity with the whole system.[228] Two other States had fully acceded to the system in all its parts;[229] but four others had not decided in favor of any part of it.[230]
No member of the Confederacy had, at this time, suggested to Congress any reasonable objection to the principles of the system; and the contradictory provisions by which their a.s.sent to it had been clogged, present a striking proof of the inherent difficulties of obtaining any important const.i.tutional change from the legislatures of the States. The government was founded upon a principle, by which all its powers were derived from the States in their corporate capacities; in other words, it was a government created by, and deriving its authority from, the governments of the States. They alone could change the fundamental law of its organization; and they were actuated by such motives and jealousies, as rendered a unanimous a.s.sent to any change a great improbability. Still, the Congress of 1786 hoped that, by a clear and explicit declaration of the true position of the country, the requisite compliance of the States might be obtained. They accordingly made known, in the most solemn manner, the public embarra.s.sments, and declared that the crisis had arrived, when the people of the United States must decide whether they were to continue to rank as a nation, by maintaining the public faith at home and abroad; or whether, for want of timely exertion in establishing a general revenue, they would hazard the existence of the Union, and the great national privileges which they had fought to obtain.[231]
Under the influence of this urgent representation, all the States, except New York, pa.s.sed acts granting the impost, and vesting the power to collect it in Congress, pursuant to the recommendations of 1783, but upon the condition that it should not be in force until all the States had granted it in the same manner. The State of New York pa.s.sed an act[232], reserving to itself the sole power of levying and collecting the impost; making the collectors amenable to and removable by the State, and not by Congress; and making the duties receivable in specie or bills of credit, at the option of the importer. Such a departure from the plan suggested by Congress, and adopted by the other States, of course made the whole system inoperative in the other States, and there remained no possibility of procuring its adoption, but by inducing the State of New York to reconsider its determination. All hope of meeting the public engagements, and of carrying on the government, now turned upon the action of a single State.
The princ.i.p.al argument made use of, by those who supported the conduct of New York, was, that Congress, being a single body, might misapply the money arising from the duties. An answer to this pretence, from the pen of Hamilton, declared that the interests and liberties of the people were not less safe in the hands of those whom they had delegated to represent them for one year in Congress, than they were in the hands of those whom they had delegated to represent them for one or four years in the legislature of the State; that all government implies trust, and that every government must be trusted so far as it is necessary to enable it to attain the ends for which it is inst.i.tuted, without which insult and oppression from abroad, and confusion and convulsion at home, must ensue[233]. The real motive, however, with those who ruled the counsels of New York at this period, was a hope of the commercial aggrandizement of the State; and the jealousies and fears of national power, which were widely prevalent, were diligently employed to defeat the system proposed by Congress.
After the pa.s.sage of the act of New York, and the adjournment of the legislature, Congress earnestly recommended to the executive of that State to convene the legislature again, to take into its consideration the recommendation of the revenue system, for the purpose of granting the impost to the United States, in conformity with the grants of other States, so as to enable the United States to carry it into immediate effect[234]. The Governor declined to accede to this recommendation.[235] Congress repeated it, declaring that the critical and embarra.s.sed state of the finances required that the impost should be carried into immediate operation, and expressing their opinion, that the occasion was sufficiently important and extraordinary for them to request that the legislature should be specially convened.[236] The executive of New York again refused the request of Congress, and the fate of the impost system remained suspended until the meeting of the legislature, at its regular session in January, 1787. It was never adopted by that State, and consequently never took effect.
FOOTNOTES:
[210] The Journals give the following account of General Washington"s resignation:--
"According to order, his Excellency the Commander-in-chief was admitted to a public audience, and being seated, the President, after a pause, informed him that the United States in Congress a.s.sembled were prepared to receive his communications; whereupon he arose and addressed as follows: "MR. PRESIDENT,--The great events on which my resignation depended having at length taken place, I have now the honor of offering my sincere congratulations to Congress, and of presenting myself before them to surrender into their hands the trust committed to me, and to claim the indulgence of retiring from the service of my country. Happy in the confirmation of our independence and sovereignty, and pleased with the opportunity afforded the United States of becoming a respectable nation, I resign with satisfaction the appointment I accepted with diffidence; a diffidence in my abilities to accomplish so arduous a task; which, however, was superseded by a confidence in the rect.i.tude of our cause, the support of the supreme power of the Union, and the patronage of Heaven. The successful termination of the war has verified the most sanguine expectations; and my grat.i.tude for the interposition of Providence, and the a.s.sistance I have received from my countrymen, increases with every review of the momentous contest. While I repeat my obligations to the army in general, I should do injustice to my own feelings not to acknowledge, in this place, the peculiar services and distinguished merits of the gentlemen who have been attached to my person during the war. It was impossible the choice of confidential officers to compose my family should have been more fortunate. Permit me, sir, to recommend in particular those who have continued in the service to the present moment, as worthy of the favorable notice and patronage of Congress. I consider it an indispensable duty to close this last act of my official life by commending the interests of our dearest country to the protection of Almighty G.o.d, and those who have the superintendence of them to his holy keeping. Having now finished the work a.s.signed me, I retire from the great theatre of action, and, bidding an affectionate farewell to this august body, under whose orders I have so long acted, I here offer my commission, and take my leave of all the employments of public life." He then advanced and delivered to the President his commission, with a copy of his address, and having resumed his place, the President (Thomas Mifflin) returned him the following answer: "SIR,--The United States in Congress a.s.sembled receive with emotions too affecting for utterance the solemn resignation of the authorities under which you have led their troops with success through a perilous and doubtful war. Called upon by your country to defend its invaded rights, you accepted the sacred charge, before it had formed alliances, and whilst it was without funds or a government to support you. You have conducted the great military contest with wisdom and fort.i.tude, invariably regarding the rights of the civil power through all disasters and changes. You have, by the love and confidence of your fellow-citizens, enabled them to display their martial genius, and transmit their fame to posterity. You have persevered, till these United States, aided by a magnanimous king and nation, have been enabled, under a just Providence, to close the war in freedom, safety, and independence; on which happy event we sincerely join you in congratulations. Having defended the standard of liberty in this New World, having taught a lesson useful to those who inflict and to those who feel oppression, you retire from the great theatre of action with the blessings of your fellow-citizens; but the glory of your virtues will not terminate with your military command; it will continue to animate remotest ages. We feel with you our obligations to the army in general, and will particularly charge ourselves with the interests of those confidential officers who have attended your person to this affecting moment. We join you in commending the interests of our dearest country to the protection of Almighty G.o.d, beseeching him to dispose the hearts and minds of its citizens to improve the opportunity afforded them of becoming a happy and respectable nation. And for you we address to him our earnest prayers that a life so beloved may be fostered with all his care; that your days may be happy as they have been ill.u.s.trious; and that he will finally give you that reward which this world cannot give." Journals, IX. 12, 13. December 22, 1783.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Journals, IX. 30. January 14, 1784.
[213] See Washington"s letter to Governor Harrison, of the date of January 18, 1784. Writings, IX. 11.
[214] Twenty-three members voted on the ratification of the Treaty, January 14, 1784. On the 19th of April of the same year, the same number being present, eleven States only being represented, and nine of these having only two members each, the following resolution was pa.s.sed: "_Resolved_, That the legislatures of the several States be informed, that, whilst they are respectively represented in Congress by two delegates only, such a unanimity for conducting the most important public concerns is necessary as can be rarely expected; that if each of the thirteen States should be represented by two members, five out of twenty-six, being only a fifth of the whole, may negative any measures requiring the voice of nine States; that of eleven States now on the floor of Congress, nine being represented by only two members from each, it is in the power of three out of twenty-five, making only one eighth of the whole, to negative such a measure, notwithstanding that by the Articles of Confederation the dissent of five out of thirteen, being more than one third of the number, is necessary for such a negative; that in a representation of three members from each State, not less than ten of thirty-nine could so negative a matter requiring the voice of nine States; that, from facts under the observation of Congress, they are clearly convinced that a representation of two members from the several States is extremely injurious, by producing delays, and for this reason is likewise much more expensive than a general representation of three members from each State; that therefore Congress conceive it to be indispensably necessary, and earnestly recommend, that each State, at all times when Congress are sitting, be hereafter represented by three members at least; as the most injurious consequences may be expected from the want of such representation." At the time when the report of the Convention, transmitting the Const.i.tution, was received (September 28, 1787), there were thirty-three members in attendance, from twelve States. Rhode Island was not represented.
[215] The sum reported by a committee, and finally agreed to be necessary, was $3,812,539.33. Journals, IX. 171. April 27, 1784.
[216] Journals, VIII. 129. February 17, 1783.
[217] Ibid. 198. April 26, 1783.
[218] Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
[219] Of the old requisition of $8,000,000, made October 30, 1781, only $1,486,511.71 had been paid by all the States before December 31, 1783.
[220] Journals, IX. 171-179. April 27, 1784.
[221] Journals, X. 325-334. September 27, 1785.
[222] Journals, XI. 167. August 2, 1786.
[223] Ibid. 224. September 18, 1786. Upon this attempt of Rhode Island and New Jersey to pay their proportions in their own paper currency, the report of a committee declared, "That, to admit the receipt of bills of credit, issued under the authority of an individual State, in discharge of their specie proportions of a requisition, would defeat its object, as the said bills do not circulate out of the limits of the State in which they are emitted, and because a paper medium of any State, however well funded, cannot, either in the extensiveness of its circulation, or in the course of its exchange, be equally valuable with gold and silver.
That if the bills of credit of the States of Rhode Island and New Jersey were to be received from those States in discharge of federal taxes, upon the principles of equal justice, bills emitted by any other States must be received from them also in payment of their proportions, and thereby, instead of the requisitions yielding a sum in actual money, nothing but paper would be brought into the federal treasury, which would be wholly inapplicable to the payment of any part of the interest or princ.i.p.al of the foreign debt, or the maintenance of the government of the United States."
[224] Journals, XI. 34-40. February 15, 1786.
[225] Ibid.
[226] Journals, XI. 34-40. February 15, 1786.
[227] New Hampshire, Ma.s.sachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
[228] Pennsylvania and Delaware.
[229] Delaware and North Carolina.
[230] Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, and Georgia.
[231] The report on this occasion (February 15, 1786), drawn by Rufus King, declared, "that the requisitions of Congress for eight years past have been so irregular in their operation, so uncertain in their collection, and so evidently unproductive, that a reliance on them in future as a source from whence moneys are to be drawn to discharge the engagements of the Confederacy, definite as they are in time and amount, would be not less dishonorable to the understandings of those who entertain such confidence, than it would be dangerous to the welfare and peace of the Union. The committee are therefore seriously impressed with the indispensable obligation that Congress are under, of representing in the immediate and impartial consideration of the several States the utter impossibility of maintaining and preserving the faith of the federal government by temporary requisitions on the States, and the consequent necessity of an early and complete accession of all the States to the revenue system of the 18th of April, 1783."
[232] May 4, 1786.
[233] Life of Hamilton, II. 385.
[234] August 11, 1786.
[235] The ground of his refusal was, "that he had not the power to convene the legislature before the time fixed by law for their stated meeting, except upon "_extraordinary occasions_," and as the present business had already been particularly laid before them, and so recently as at their last session received their determination, it cannot come within that description." Life of Hamilton, II. 389.