These views and opinions should be carefully considered by the reader, not only in justice to this great statesman, but because they had much influence, in an indirect manner, in producing the form and tone which the Const.i.tution finally received.
It should be recollected, in making this examination, that, so far as there was at this time a distinct issue before the Convention, it was presented by the New Jersey plan of a system that would leave the sovereignties of the States almost wholly undiminished, on the one hand, and on the other by the Virginia plan of a partial but as yet undefined surrender of powers to a general government. The construction of this proposed government, and the powers that it ought to possess, were the points which Hamilton now dealt with, in the first address which he made to the committee.
He has left it on record, that the views which he announced on this occasion were rested upon the three following positions:--1. That the political principles of the people of this country would endure nothing but a republican government. 2. That, in the actual situation of the country, it was of itself right and proper that the republican theory should have a full and fair trial. 3. That to such a trial it was essential that the government should be so constructed as to give it all the energy and stability reconcilable with the principles of that republican theory.[55] The opinions advanced by Hamilton at the stage of the proceedings which we are now examining must always be considered with reference to the principles which guided him, in order that a right estimate may be formed of their influence on the final result of the issue then pending.
After disposing of the objection that the Convention had no power to propose a plan of government differing from the principle of the Confederation, he proceeded to say, that there were three lines of conduct before them: first, to make a league offensive and defensive between the States, treaties of commerce, and an apportionment of the public debt; secondly, to amend the present Confederation by adding such powers as the public mind seemed ready to grant; thirdly, to form a new government, which should pervade the whole, with decisive powers and a complete sovereignty. The practicability of the last course, and the mode in which the object should be accomplished, were the important and the only real questions before them. But the solution of those questions involved an inquiry into the principles of civil obedience, which are the great and essential supports of all government.
The first of these principles, he said, is an active and constant interest in the support of a government. This principle did not then exist in the States, in favor of the general government. They constantly pursued their own particular interests, which were adverse to those of the whole. The second principle is a conviction of the utility and necessity of a government. As the general government might be dissolved and yet the order of society would continue,--so that many of the purposes of government would still be attainable, to a considerable degree, within the States themselves,--a conviction of the utility or the necessity of a general government could not at that time be considered as an active principle among the people of the States. The third principle is an habitual sense of obligation; and here the whole force of the tie was on the side of State government.
Its sovereignty was immediately before the eyes of the people; its protection they immediately enjoyed; by its hand, private justice was administered. In the existing state of things, the central government was known only by its unwelcome demands of money or service.
The fourth principle on which government must rely is force; by which he meant both the coercion of laws and the coercion of arms. But as to the general government, the coercion of laws did not exist; and to employ the force of arms on the States would amount to a war between the parties to the confederacy. The fifth principle was influence; by which he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors and just emoluments which produce an attachment to government.
Almost the whole weight of these was then on the side of the States, and must remain so in any mere confederacy, rendering it in its very nature feeble and precarious.
The lessons afforded by experience led to the evident conclusion that all federal governments were weak and distracted. They were so, because the strong principles which he had enumerated operated on the side of the const.i.tuent members of the confederacy, and against the central authority. In order, therefore, to establish a general and national government, with any hope of its duration, they must avail themselves of these principles. They must interest the wants of men in its support; they must make it useful and necessary; and they must give it the means of coercion. For these purposes, it would be necessary to make it completely sovereign.
The New Jersey plan certainly would not produce this effect. It merely granted the regulation of trade and a more effectual collection of the revenue, and some partial duties, which, at five or ten per cent, would perhaps only amount to a fund to discharge the debt of the corporation. But there were a variety of objects which must necessarily engage the attention of a national government. It would have to protect our rights against Canada on the north, against Spain on the south, and the western frontier against the savages. It would have to adopt necessary plans for the settlement of the frontiers, and to inst.i.tute the mode in which settlements and good governments were to be made. According to the New Jersey plan, the expense of supporting and regulating these important matters could only be defrayed by requisitions. This mode had already proved, and would always be found, ineffectual. The national revenue must be drawn from commerce,--from imposts, taxes on specific articles, and even from exports, which, notwithstanding the common opinion, he held to be fit objects of moderate taxation.
The radical objections to the New Jersey plan he held to be its equality of suffrage as between the States; its incapacity to raise forces or to levy taxes; and the organization of Congress, which it proposed to leave unchanged. On the other hand, the great extent of the country to be governed, and the difficulty of drawing a suitable representation from such distances, led him to regard the Virginia plan with doubt and hesitation. At the same time, he declared that the system must be a representative and republican government. But representation alone, without the element of a permanent tenure of office in some part of the system, would not, as he believed, answer the purpose. For, as society naturally falls into the political divisions of the few and the many, or the majority and the minority, some part of every good representative government must be so const.i.tuted as to furnish a check to the mere democratic element. The Virginia plan, which proposed that both branches of the national legislature should be chosen by the people of the States, and that the executive should be appointed by the legislature, presented a democratic a.s.sembly to be checked by a democratic Senate, and both of them by a democratic chief magistrate. To give a Senate or an executive thus chosen an official term a few years longer than that of the members of the a.s.sembly, would not be sufficient to remove them from the violence and turbulence of the popular pa.s.sions.
For these reasons, they must go as far, in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles would admit. He would therefore have the Senate and the executive hold their offices during good behavior. Such a system would be strictly republican, so long as these offices remained elective and the inc.u.mbents were subject to impeachment. The term _monarchy_ could not apply to such a system, for it marks neither the degree nor the duration of power. And in order to obviate the danger of tumults attending the election of an executive who should hold his office during good behavior, he proposed that the election should be made by a body of electors, to be chosen by the people, or by the legislatures of the States. The a.s.sembly he proposed to have chosen by the people of the States for three years. The legislative _powers_ of the general government he desired to have extended to all subjects; at the same time, he did not contemplate the total abolition of the State governments, but considered them essential, both as subordinate agents of the general government, and as the administrators of private justice among their own citizens.[56]
His conclusions were, first, that it was impossible to secure the Union by any modification of a federal government; secondly, that a league, offensive and defensive, was full of certain evils and greater dangers; thirdly, that to establish a general government would be very difficult, if not impracticable, and liable to various objections.
What then was to be done? He answered, that they must balance the inconveniences and the dangers, and choose that system which seemed to have the fewest objections.
The plan which Hamilton then read to the Convention, the princ.i.p.al features of which have thus been stated, was designed to explain his views, but was not intended to be offered as a subst.i.tute for either of the two others then under consideration. The issue accordingly remained unchanged; and that issue lay between the Virginia and the New Jersey plans, or between a system of equal representation by States, and a system of proportionate representation of the people of the States. Besides this radical difference, the Virginia plan contemplated two houses, while the New Jersey plan proposed to retain the existing system of a single body.
But in order that a sound judgment may be formed of the correctness of Hamilton"s opinions, and of the useful influence which they exerted, it must be remembered that there was an inconsistency in the Virginia plan, which he was then aiming to exhibit. That plan was a purely national system; it drew both branches of the national legislature from the people of the States, in proportion to their numbers, and merely interposed the legislatures of the States as the electors of so many senators as the State might be ent.i.tled to have according to the ratio of representation. Its inconsistency lay in the fact, that, while it would have created a government in which the proportionate principle of representation would have obtained in both houses, making a purely national government, in which the States, as equal political corporations, could have exercised no direct control over its legislation, it left the separate political sovereignties of the States almost wholly unimpaired, taking from them jurisdiction over such subjects only as seemed to require national legislation. The operation of such a system must necessarily have involved perpetual conflicts between national and State power; for the States, possessed of a large part of their original sovereignties, and yet unable to exert an equal control in either branch of Congress, would have been constantly tempted and obliged to exert the indirect power of their separate legislation against the direct and democratic force of a majority of the people of the United States. To such a system, the objection urged by Hamilton, that it presented a democratic House checked by a democratic Senate, was strikingly applicable. This objection, it is true, was not presented by him as a reason for admitting the States to a direct and equal representation in the government; he employed it to enforce the expediency of giving to the Senate a different basis from that of the House, and one farther removed from popular influences. But when, at a subsequent period, the first great compromise of the Const.i.tution--that between a purely national and a purely federal system--took place by the admission of the States to an equal representation in the Senate, the force of Hamilton"s reasoning was felt, and the necessity for a check as between the two houses, founded on a difference of origin, which he had so strenuously maintained, both facilitated and hastened the concession to the demands of the smaller States.
At present, Hamilton"s object, in the discussions which we are now considering, was to show that, if the government was to be purely national,--as was the theory of the Virginia plan, and as he undoubtedly preferred,--it must be consistent with that theory and with the situation in which its adoption would leave the country. It must introduce through the Senate a real check upon the democratic power that would act through the House, by a different mode of election and a permanent tenure of office; and in order that the States might not be in a situation to resist the measures of a government designed to be national and supreme, that government must possess complete and universal legislative power.
Surely it can be no impeachment of the wisdom or the statesmanship of this great man, that, at a time when a large majority of the Convention were seeking to establish a purely national system, founded on a proportionate representation of the people of the States, he should have pointed out the inconsistencies of such a plan, and should have endeavored to bring it into a nearer conformity with the theory which so many of the members and so many of the States had determined to adopt. It seems rather to be a proof of the deep sagacity which had always marked his opinions and his conduct, that he should have foreseen the inevitable collisions between the powers of a national government thus const.i.tuted and the powers of the States. The whole experience of the past had taught him to antic.i.p.ate such conflicts, and the theory of a purely national government, when applied by the arrangement now proposed, rendered it certain that these conflicts must continue and increase. That theory could only be put in practice by transferring the whole legislative powers of the people of the States to the national government. This he would have preferred; and in this, looking from the point of view at which he then stood, and considering the actual position of the subject, he was undoubtedly right.[57]
For it is not to be forgotten, that after the votes which had been taken, and after the position a.s.sumed by the States opposed to anything but a federal plan, the choice seemed to lie between a purely national and a purely federal system; that the indications then were, that the Virginia plan would be adopted; and that we owe the present compound character of the Const.i.tution, as a government partly national and partly federal, not to the mere theories proposed on either side, but to the fortunate results of a wise compromise, made necessary by the collision between the opposite purposes and desires of different cla.s.ses of the States.
At the time when Hamilton laid his views before the Convention, there were two parties in that body, which were coming gradually to a struggle, not yet openly avowed, between the larger and the smaller States, on the fundamental principle of the government. The princ.i.p.al question at stake was whether there should be any national popular representation at all. While the Virginia plan carried a popular representation into both branches of the legislature, the New Jersey plan excluded it, and confined the system to a representation of States, in a single body. The larger and more populous States adhered to the former of these two systems, because it involved the only principle upon which they believed they could form a new Union, or enter into new relations with the smaller members of the confederacy; while, on the other hand, the smaller members felt that self-preservation was for them involved in adhering to the old principle of the Confederation. Notwithstanding the defects and imperfections of the Virginia plan, it was deemed necessary by the majority of the Convention to insist upon it, until the principle of popular representation should be conceded by all, as proper to exist in some part of the government; for an admission that it was theoretically incorrect in its application to either branch of the proposed legislature would have applied equally to the other branch; and the admission that would have been involved in the acceptance of Hamilton"s propositions, namely, that in a purely national system there must be a Senate permanently in office, and that the legislative powers of the States must be mainly surrendered, would have tended only to confirm the opposition and to swell the numbers of the minority. The contest went on, therefore, as it had begun, between the opposite principles of popular and State representation, until it resulted in an absolute difference, requiring mutual concessions, or an abandonment of the effort to form a Const.i.tution.
On the day following that on which Hamilton had addressed the committee, Mr. Madison entered into an elaborate examination of the plan proposed by the minority. The previous Congressional experience of this distinguished and sagacious man had well qualified him to detect the imperfections of a system calculated to perpetuate the evils under which the country had long suffered. His object now was to show that a Union founded on the principle of the Confederation, and containing no diminution of the existing powers of the States, could not accomplish even the princ.i.p.al objects of a general government. It would not, he observed, in the first place, prevent the States from violating, as they had all along violated, the obligations of treaties with foreign powers; for it left them as uncontrolled as they had always been. It would not restrain the States from encroaching on the federal authority, or prevent breaches of the federal articles. It would not secure that equality of privileges between the citizens of different States, and that impartial administration of justice, the want of which had threatened both the harmony and the peace of the Union. It would not secure the republican theory, which vested the right and the power of government in the majority; as the case of Ma.s.sachusetts then demonstrated. It would not secure the Union against the influence of foreign powers over its members. Whatever might have been the case with ours, all former confederacies had exhibited the effects of intrigues practised upon them by other nations; and as the New Jersey plan gave to the general councils no negative on the will of the particular States, it left us exposed to the same pernicious machinations.
He begged the smaller States, which had brought forward this plan, to consider in what position its adoption would leave them. They would be subject to the whole burden of maintaining their delegates in Congress. They and they alone would feel the power of coercion on which the efficacy of this plan depended, for the larger States would be too powerful for its exercise. On the other hand, if the obstinate adherence of the smaller States to an inadmissible system should prevent the adoption of any, the Union must be dissolved, and the States must remain individually independent and sovereign, or two or more new confederacies must be formed. In the first event, would the small States be more secure against the ambition and power of their larger neighbors, than they would be under a general government pervading with equal energy every part of the empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part against every other part? In the second event, could the smaller States expect that their larger neighbors would unite with them on the principle of the present confederacy, or that they would exact less severe concessions than were proposed in the Virginia scheme?
The great difficulty, he continued, lay in the affair of representation; and if that could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was admitted by both of the gentlemen from New Jersey,[58] that it would not be just to allow Virginia, which was sixteen times as large as Delaware, an equal vote only. Their language was, that it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virginia sixteen times as many votes. Their expedient was, that all the States should be thrown into one ma.s.s, and a new part.i.tion be made into thirteen equal parts. Would such a scheme be practicable? The dissimilarities in the rules of property, as well as in the manners, habits, and prejudices of the different States, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt. It had been impossible for the power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe,[59] directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and patriotic ministers that any age had produced,[60] to equalize in some points only the different usages and regulations of the different provinces. But, admitting a general amalgamation and repart.i.tion of the States to be practicable, and the danger apprehended by the smaller States from a proportional representation to be real, would not their special and voluntary coalition with their neighbors be less inconvenient to the whole community and equally effectual for their own safety?[61] If New Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage would accrue to them from an equalization of the States, in which case they would necessarily form a junction with their neighbors, why might not this end be attained by leaving them at liberty to form such a junction whenever they pleased? And why should they wish to obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the least, extremely difficult, and would be obnoxious to many of the States,--and when neither the inconvenience nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves would be lessened by confining it to themselves? The prospect of many new States to the westward was another consideration of importance. If they should come into the Union at all, they would come when they contained but few inhabitants.
If they should be ent.i.tled to vote according to their proportion of inhabitants, all would be right and safe. Let them have an equal vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever might give law to the whole.[62]
At the close of Mr. Madison"s remarks, the committee decided, by a vote of seven States against three, one State being divided, to report the Virginia plan to the Convention. The delegation of New York (with the exception of Hamilton), and those of New Jersey and Delaware, const.i.tuted the negative votes. The vote of Maryland was divided by Luther Martin, who had constantly acted with the minority. The vote of Connecticut was given for the report, but she was not long to remain on that side of the question.[63]
NOTE ON THE OPINIONS OF HAMILTON.
The idea has been more or less entertained, from the time of the Convention to the present day, that Hamilton desired the establishment of a _monarchical_ government. This impression has arisen partly from the theoretical opinions on government which he undoubtedly held, and which he expressed with entire freedom in the course of the debate, of which an account has been given in the previous chapter; and partly from the nature of some of his propositions, especially that for an executive during good behavior, which has been sometimes a.s.sumed to have been the same thing as an executive for life.
I believe that the imputation of a purpose on his part to bring about the establishment of any system not essentially republican in its spirit and forms, is unfounded and unjust, and that it can be shown to be so.
Mr. Luther Martin, in his celebrated letter or report to the legislature of Maryland on the doings of the Federal Convention, referred to a distinct monarchical party in that body, "whose object and wish," he said, "it was to abolish and annihilate all State governments, and to bring forward one general government over this whole continent, of a monarchical nature, under certain restrictions and limitations. Those who openly avowed this sentiment," he said, "were, it is true, but few; yet it is equally true, that there was a considerable number who did not openly avow it, who were, by myself and many others of the Convention, considered as being in reality favorers of that sentiment and acting upon those principles, covertly endeavoring to carry into effect what they well knew openly and avowedly could not be accomplished." He then goes on to say, that there was a second party, who were "not for the abolition of the State governments, nor for the introduction of a monarchical government under any form; but they wished to establish such a system as could give their own States undue power and influence, in the government, over the other States." "A third party," he adds, "was what I considered _truly federal and republican_"; that is to say, it consisted of the delegations from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and in part from Maryland, and of some members from other States, who were in favor of a federal equality and the old principle of the Confederation.
Upon this rule of cla.s.sification, the test of republicanism was to be found in the views entertained by members upon the question whether the State governments ought to be abolished.
Mr. Martin, indeed, went further, and considered those only as _truly_ republican, who were in favor of a purely federal system, and opposed to any plan of popular representation.
Now it is quite clear, that the abolition of the State governments, so far as that subject was considered at all, and in the sense in which it was at any time mentioned, did not necessarily lead to _monarchy_ as a conclusion. The reduction of the State governments to local corporations and to the position of subordinate agents of the central government, was considered by some as a necessary consequence of a national representative government. This arose from the circ.u.mstance that a union of federal and national representation had nowhere been witnessed, and had not therefore been considered. I have already suggested, in the text, that, if the framers of the Const.i.tution had gone on to the adoption of a pure system of popular and proportional representation in all the branches of the government, they must inevitably have bestowed upon that government full legislative power over all subjects; otherwise, they would have left the States, possessed of the sovereign powers of a distinct political organization, to contend with the national government by adverse legislation. The subsequent expedient of a direct and equal representation of the States in one branch of the government has in reality, to a great degree, disarmed State jealousy and opposition, by giving to the States as political bodies an equal voice in the check established by the branch in which they are represented.
So that to argue, that, because there were men who saw the necessity for making a purely national or proportionate system of popular representation consistent with the situation in which it would place the country, they were therefore in favor of a monarchical system, was to argue from premises to a conclusion in no way connected. Had such a plan been carried out, it could have been, and must have been, purely republican in all its details; and it would have been liable to the reproach of being _monarchical_ in no other sense than any system which did not yield the point of a full federal equality, for which Mr. Martin and his party contended.
Undoubtedly, Hamilton, as I have said, was in favor of bestowing upon the national government full _power_ to legislate upon all subjects; and to this extent, and in this sense, he proposed the abolition of the State governments.
But any one who will attend carefully to the course of his argument,--imperfectly as it has been preserved,--will find that it embraces the following course of reasoning. All federal governments are weak and distracted. In order to avoid the evils incident to that form, the government of the American Union must be a national representative system. But no such system can be successful, in the actual situation of this country, unless it is endowed with all the principles and means of influence and power which are the proper supports of government. It must therefore be made completely sovereign, and State power, as a separate legislative authority, must be annihilated; otherwise, the States will be not only able, but will be constantly tempted, to exert their own authority against the authority of the nation. I have already expressed the opinion, that in this view of the subject, a.s.suming that the States were not to be admitted to an equal representation as political corporations in any branch of the government,--as the framers and friends of the Virginia plan had thus far contended,--Hamilton was right. I believe that a const.i.tution, in which the States had not been placed upon an equal footing in one branch of the legislative power, and under which the State sovereignties had been left as they were left by the system actually adopted, if it could have been ratified by all the States, could not have endured to our times. Yet the fortunate result of the mixed system that is embraced in the Const.i.tution of the United States, is the product, not simply of either of the theories of a national or a federal government, but of a compromise between the two.
But the charge of anti-republican tendencies or designs has been most often urged against Hamilton, on account of his theoretical opinions concerning the comparative merits of different governments, and of certain features of the plan of a const.i.tution which he read to the Convention. With respect to these points, I shall state the results of a very careful examination which I have made of all the sources of information as to the views and opinions which he expressed or entertained. Mr. Madison has given us what he probably intended as a full report of at least the substance of Hamilton"s great speech addressed to the committee of the whole, and has informed us that his report was submitted to Colonel Hamilton, who approved it, with a few verbal changes.
But how meagre a report, which fills but six pages in the octavo edition of Mr. Madison"s "Debates," must have been in comparison with the speech actually made by Hamilton, will occur to every reader who notices the fact that the speech occupied the entire session of one day (June 18), and who examines the brief from which he spoke, and which is still extant. (Hamilton"s Works, II. 409.)
He was an earnest, and I am inclined to think a fervid and rapid speaker. Certainly he spoke from a mind full of knowledge of the principles and the working of other systems of polity, and possessed of resources which have never been excelled in any statesman who has been called to aid in the work of creating a government. The topics set down in his brief exhibit a very wide range of thought, enriched by copious ill.u.s.trations from the history and experience of other countries, and from the views of the most important writers on government; while the whole argument bears logically and closely upon the actual situation of our confederacy and upon the questions at issue. It is not probable, therefore, that Mr. Madison"s report gives us an adequate idea of the speech, or fully exhibits its reasoning.
I have collated it, sentence by sentence, with the report in Judge Yates"s Minutes, and with Hamilton"s own brief, and have prepared for my own use a draft containing the substance of what these three sources can give us. The results may be thus given:--
1. That Hamilton, in stating his views of the theoretical value of different systems of government, frankly expressed the opinion that the British const.i.tution was the best form which the world had then produced;--citing the praise bestowed upon it by Necker, that it is the only government "which unites public strength with individual security."
2. That, with equal clearness, he stated it as his opinion that none but a republican form could be attempted in this country, or would be adapted to our situation.
3. That he proposed to look to the British Const.i.tution for nothing but those elements of stability and permanency which a republican system requires, and which may be incorporated into it without changing its characteristic principles.
The only question that remains, in order to form a judgment of his purposes, is, whether there was anything in the plan of a const.i.tution drawn up by him that is inconsistent with the spirit of republican liberty. The answer is, that there was not. There is throughout this plan a constant recognition of the authority of the people, as the source of all political power. It proposed that the members of the a.s.sembly should be elected by the people directly, and the members of the Senate by electors chosen for the purpose by the people.
The executive was in like manner to be chosen by electors, appointed by the people or by the State legislatures. So far, therefore, his plan was as strictly republican, as is that of the Const.i.tution under which we are actually living. But he proposed that the executive and the senators should hold their offices _during good behavior_; and this has been his offence against republicanism, with those who measure the character of a system by the frequency with which it admits of rotation in office. His accusers have failed to notice that he made his executive personally responsible for official misconduct, and provided that both he and the senators should be subject to impeachment and to removal from office. This was a wide departure from the principles of the English const.i.tution, and it const.i.tutes a most important distinction between a republican and a monarchical system, when it is accompanied by the fact that the office of a ruler or legislator is attained, not by hereditary right, or the favor of the crown, but by the favor and choice of the people.
I have thus stated the princ.i.p.al points to which the inquiries of the reader should be directed in investigating the opinions of this great man, because I believe it to be unjust to impute to him any other than a sincere desire for the establishment and success of republican government. That he desired a strong government, that he was little disposed to dogmatize upon abstract theories of liberty, and that he trusted more to experience than to hypothesis, may be safely a.s.sumed. But that he ardently desired the success of that republican freedom which is founded on a perfect equality of rights among citizens, exclusive of hereditary distinctions, is as certain as that he labored earnestly throughout his life for the maxims, the doctrines, and the systems which he believed most likely to secure for it a fair trial and ultimate success. (See his description of his own opinions, when writing of himself as a third person in 1792; Works, VII. 52.)
That the system of government sketched by Hamilton was not received by many of those who listened to him with disapprobation on account of what has since been supposed its _monarchical_ character, we may safely a.s.sume, on the testimony of Dr. Johnson of Connecticut, one of the most moderate men in the Convention. Contrasting the New Jersey and Virginia plans, he is reported (by Yates) to have said: "It appears to me that the Jersey plan has for its princ.i.p.al object the preservation of the State governments. So far it is a departure from the plan of Virginia, which, although it concentrates in a distinct national government, is not totally independent of that of the States. A gentleman from New York, with boldness and decision, proposed a system totally different from both; _and although he has been praised by everybody_, he has been supported by none."
(Yates"s Minutes, Elliot, I. 431.)
Even Luther Martin did not seem to regard the objects of what he calls the monarchical party as being any worse, or more dangerous to liberty, than the projects of those whom he represents as aiming to obtain undue power and influence for their own States, and whom at the same time he acquits of monarchical designs or a desire to abolish the State governments. The truth is, that n.o.body had any improper purposes, or anything at heart but the liberties and happiness of the people of America. We are not to try the speculative views of men engaged in such discussions as these by the charges or complaints elicited in the heats of conflicting opinions and interests, inflamed by a zeal too warm to admit the possibility of its own error, or to perceive the wisdom and purity of an opponent.
FOOTNOTES:
[51] The regulation of commerce was not, any more than other specific powers, otherwise provided for than by these general descriptions.
[52] This, together with the Virginia plan, which was recommitted along with it, was referred to a second committee of the whole, June 15th.
[53] William Patterson of New Jersey.
[54] See the remarks of Wilson, Pinckney, and Randolph, as given in Madison, Elliot, V. 195-198.
[55] See his letter of September 16, 1803, addressed to Timothy Pickering; first published in Niles"s Register, November 7, 1812.
[56] See the note at the end of this chapter.
[57] See the note at the end of this chapter.