On the third of August our whole army had landed on St. Joseph"s island, about thirty miles from the Rio Nueces, across which it was to pa.s.s to its proposed encampment on Corpus Christi bay, near a smuggling village known as Kinney"s _rancho_. As Corpus Christi and Aransas bays are connected by a shallow and winding channel, it was at once discovered that steamers were altogether inadequate for the transportation of troops from the islets to the mainland; and our forces would have remained where they disembarked had not a few skiffs of light draft, together with some sail and row boats, been obtained in the neighborhood at considerable expense. In these frail vessels a detachment of forty men, armed only with muskets, crossed the Nueces, and landed on the stormy coast as pioneers in a country a.s.serted to be Mexican. Had the authorities of that republic been prepared to resist our landing, a few field pieces might have presented the alleged invasion, as our general was unable to protect the disembarkation of his troops by cannon. In addition to these mistakes, the 2d regiment of dragoons was not despatched from fort Jesup in time to co-operate with our forces when they first landed at Corpus Christi; and, as the artillery had not yet been forwarded from our a.r.s.enals, the campaign may be said to have commenced with _infantry alone_. This was a novelty in military science, and indicated an ignorance of war, an unpardonable imprudence, or a conviction that the whole drama was got up only to intimidate an enemy we despised.
It is impossible to narrate every circ.u.mstance of interest that occurred during the encampment of our forces west of the Nueces, a position taken by General Taylor with the concurrence of the war department. But a history of this war would be incomplete were not the position as well as the condition of our army accurately stated. Our government, relying probably on the acknowledged feebleness of Mexico, and on the fact that she had not yet declared war, imagined that the mere presence of American troops would pacify Texas or prevent hostilities. This was an unfortunate mistake, especially in the unsettled condition of things; for in May, 1845, Mr. Donelson, our charge to Texas, had warned the government to be prepared for an immediate blow upon Mexico, if she should unfortunately declare war against us, and that declaration might have been expected at any moment.
The details of the organization of our forces seem, nevertheless, to have been sadly neglected. Sailing vessels, alone, were relied on to convey despatches to General Taylor; and, from the wreck of one of them, a drummer boy, strolling along the beach, on the 15th of August, rescued a valuable package containing the proclamation of the Mexican government in which the people were summoned to unite in an army for national preservation, under the sonorous t.i.tle of "Defenders of independence and the laws."[77] The day after this despatch was received, the smugglers along the coast reported that Arista was rapidly advancing to attack us with three thousand choice troops. Without artillery to defend the camp, or dragoons to act as scouts, our general could do nothing but order entrenchments to be thrown up. Entrenching tools, however, had not been furnished; and, with only a few old and broken spades the troops labored briskly, and erected, in a few days, a solid field-work a few yards from the beach, protected in the rear by the bay. But the battery had not yet arrived, nor was Gen. Taylor able to obtain from the sloop of war St.
Mary"s, which was on the station, any guns of a suitable calibre.
Fortunately, however, he procured three pieces, indifferently equipped, and a small supply of ammunition, from the citizens of Corpus Christi.
These guns added materially to the strength of our position in case we were attacked, but were entirely unsuitable for field service.[78]
The proclamation to which we have alluded, and the rumors of vigorous hostility on the part of Mexico, produced great alarm in the United States, especially along our southern frontier. In New Orleans, indignation was openly expressed that our gallant men had been despatched on this forlorn enterprize without the amplest means of defence and attack, while our a.r.s.enals were filled with all the munitions of war. A large force of volunteers was, therefore, ordered out in the south, while two companies of artillery were immediately despatched to Taylor"s succor under the command of Maj. Gally.
The report of Arista"s progress, however, proved to be false, so that we were fortunately saved from attack. Yet the sufferings of our army did not cease with those military inconveniences. "Two thirds of the tents furnished our soldiers were worn out or rotten, and had been condemned by boards of survey appointed by the proper authorities in accordance with the army regulations. Transparent as gauze, they afforded little or no protection against the intense heat of summer or the drenching rains and severe cold of winter. Even the dews penetrated the thin covering almost without obstruction. Such were the tents provided for campaigners in a country almost deluged three months in the year, and more variable in its climate than any other region, pa.s.sing from the extreme of heat to that of cold in a few hours. During the whole of November and December, either the rains were descending with violence, or the furious "northers" which ravage this coast were breaking the frail tent-poles or rending the rotten canvas. For days and weeks every article in hundreds of tents was thoroughly soaked; and during these terrible months, the sufferings of the sick, in the crowded hospital tents, were indescribably horrible. Every day added to the frightfulness of the mortality. At one time a sixth of the entire camp was on the sick list, and at least one-half unfit for service, in consequence of dysentery and catarrhal fevers which raged like a pestilence."[79] The camp was without fires, and, being situated on the edge of a vast prairie spa.r.s.ely covered with muskeet trees, was but scantily supplied with wood even for the most needful purposes. The quarter-master"s department furnished only the weak and stunted _mustangs_ of the country; and the little and inefficient ponies, geared in the large harness made at the north for American horses, looked as if they would jump through their collars instead of use them for traction. With such teams only a sufficiency of wood could be drawn for cooking, and none for camp fires to comfort the sick and suffering soldiers. "As winter advanced, the prairie became a quagmire, the roads almost impa.s.sable, and as the _mustangs_ died in large numbers, wood enough for cooking even, could not be procured. The encampment now resembled a marsh, the water, at times, being three or four feet deep in the tents of whole wings of regiments. All military exercises were suspended, and the bleak gloomy days were pa.s.sed in inactivity, disgust and sullenness. The troops, after being thoroughly drenched all day, without fires to dry them, lay down at night in wet blankets on the soaked ground, as plank for tent floors was not furnished by the quarter-masters until the rainy season was over. At times the men, at tattoo, gasped for breath in the sultry night air, and, at reveille, found their moist blankets frozen around them and their tents stiff with ice. A portion of the men were kept without pay for six months, and the rest for four months, although the law strictly requires payment every two months.
"Officers and soldiers, dest.i.tute of funds, were compelled to borrow, upon the strength of pay due, of their more fortunate companions, or of the Shylocks, in search of victims, that polluted the camp. Sick soldiers, directed by their surgeons to return to the United States, had either to remain and die, or to submit to exorbitant exactions from unfeeling villains in their pension certificates and pay accounts, though the law requires the paymasters to cash them in specie.
"On the first landing of the 3d and 4th infantry at Corpus Christi, "Kinney"s Rancho," though a lawless, smuggling town, under the vigorous sway of its martial proprietor, was as quiet and peaceful as a village in New England. But every fresh arrival of troops was followed by some portion of that vast horde of harpies, that are ever to be found in the train of all armies, ready to prey upon the simple and unsuspecting among the soldiers. In a short time, hundreds of temporary structures were erected on the outskirts of the "Rancho," and in them, all the cut-throats, thieves, and murderers of the United States and Texas, seem to have congregated. No sight could have been more truly melancholy than that of their bloated and sin-marked visages, as they lounged through the purlieus of this modern Pandemonium. The air, by day, was polluted with their horrid oaths and imprecations,--and the savage yells, exulting shouts, and despairing groans of their murderous frays, made night hideous. But, not content with confining their h.e.l.lish deeds to their own worthy fraternity, they laid their worthless hands on the troops. Many of the soldiers, enticed to their dram-shops, were drugged with stupefying potions, and then robbed of their hard earnings, or murdered in cold blood."
General Taylor, looking to the probability of a movement against Mexico, warned the department that a ponton train was indispensable in a country wherein streams abounded and wood for bridges was scarce; but it was not despatched until after the next meeting of congress.
"Six months after the army had taken the field, there were not teams and wagons enough to transport one half of the troops; so that, in case of hostilities, had a forward movement been ordered, it could only have been effected by detachments, and, in consequence, that most fatal of all military errors would have been committed, of permitting the enemy to attack and beat in detail. The few teams furnished, it is natural to think, were the choicest to be found in the west. For, it had been said, that though the "Army of occupation" was small, the great celerity of its movements, from the superiority of the American horses, would contribute, as well as the greater bravery of its men, to make it more than a match for the largest Mexican force. Ninety yoke of oxen and several hundred mustangs were therefore bought, but not a single American horse!
"Three batteries of artillery were added to the one which, at length reached the company from Charleston. Horses were sent with two of them, to manoeuvre them rapidly on the field of battle, and to transport them wherever the army might go. But the third came unprovided with cavalry.
"When the New Orleans volunteers left Corpus Christi, their artillery horses were turned over to the company from Charleston. This company, having always acted as infantry, had never even seen a flying artillery drill,--half of the men could not ride,--many had never ridden at all, and, in mounting for the first time, made Mr. Winkle"s mistake as to which stirrup to use. It was certainly an original idea, to convert, _in a single day_, a company of foot into light artillery. However, as horses had at length been given to the company from Charleston, it was the ardent desire of the lieutenant commanding, to teach his men to ride and drive, and the sabre exercise. This the loyal quarter-masters resolved to prevent, and, at the same time, to show the world how economical they were. They, therefore, refused to purchase any more hay and told the dragoons and light artillery, that they, themselves, must cut and haul the dry and sapless broom straw of the prairie, and forage their horses on that."[80]
Such is a picture of the sufferings of our army of occupation, drawn by an eye-witness, and scarcely colored by the warmth of his feelings. If the advice of military men, and the opinion of persons whose experience as campaigners ent.i.tled them to respect, had been heeded, this war would have been speedily ended. Ever since the rumor of annexation in 1843, but, especially, since the inaugural address of President Polk in 1845, in which he p.r.o.nounced so emphatic an opinion as to our right to the whole of Oregon, our political firmament had been clouded. Prudent men thought it probable that there would be war with Mexico or hostilities with England, and that the two sources of irritation, by distracting our powers, would materially increase each other"s virulence.
At this time, General Gaines, a chieftain who has become venerable in the service of his country, and whose skill and bravery on many a field have manifested his character in actions that no citizen can ever forget, commanded on our south-western frontier. The delicate character of our foreign relations, to which allusion has just been made, attracted his anxious attention in 1845; and his responsibility as Chief on a long, exposed frontier, compelled him to give timely warning to the department. It seemed to this officer, if we engaged hastily in war with Mexico or England, at such a crisis, and with no preparations either for an army or its instruction, that the conflict would be disastrous or procrastinated, especially as the latter power had so far surpa.s.sed us in applying steam to naval purposes. Long years of peace had rendered us indifferent to war; and unvarying success in other conflicts had made us confident. Accordingly, he recommended the concentration of a large force of volunteers on the borders of the probable theatre of war, where they should be trained in military science, together with the regulars commanded by General Taylor, until the spring of 1846. If war could not be averted before that period, we might then be able to march against the enemy with a powerful and disciplined army. He contended that the true policy of our country, in such an a.s.sault, was to pursue with relentless energy the military bandits who swayed the destinies of Mexico, whilst, on all sides, we protected the persons and property of non-combatants; so that in pushing onward to the capital we would leave throughout the country traversed an indelible impression of our justice. Thus the confidence of the best portions of Mexico would be secured, the _prestige_ of her army promptly destroyed, and peace obtained before she was able to rally. On the other hand, General Gaines believed that if we began war without large and instructed forces, we might count on a protracted struggle, as in the Seminole campaigns from 1836 to 1842. The precipices upon the doubtful verge of whose summits we tottered during the war, prove the wisdom of these suggestions. The faithful page of history admonishes that nations as well as individuals who recklessly disregard the essential maxims that prescribe their prudent duties, must sooner or later pay the penalty of neglect. But politicians, uneducated even in the pleasant discipline of militia trainings, do not view matters in the same light as military men whose knowledge of detail, and of the responsibilities of real service, make them unwilling to engage in war, or even to threaten hostilities, without the amplest preparation to perform all they promise. Without such true and earnest discipline warlike array is but a military cheat.
It is vain to predict what might have been the result had the advice of the gallant and prudent Gaines been adopted; yet it cannot be doubted that a well equipped body of twenty-five or thirty thousand men would have marched to the city of Mexico and dictated peace at the cost of one fourth the blood and treasure that were subsequently expended. A lingering policy of hesitation together with the acknowledged inefficiency of Mexico, may palliate the errors of our cabinet; but wise politicians will not henceforth fail to be impressed with the necessity of military preparation which this conflict has taught us.
A war which was originally supposed to be one exclusively of defence, was suddenly changed to an aggressive conflict, and is, perhaps, an additional excuse for our unpreparedness. Most of the events in this narrative derive peculiar interest from the fact that it is the first and only offensive war into which we have been forced. With every known principle of defence we had been long acquainted; for, in the school of Washington, we acquired a sound, practical knowledge, which subsequent experience, under the most perfect system of self-government, enabled us to improve. But it is to be hoped that many years will elapse before our volunteers will be again called from their peaceful duties to take part in an aggressive war, and especially against a government whose theory of rule is the same as our own.
NOTE.--General Gaines, who commanded the western division, was censured by the War department for having made a requisition on the governor of Louisiana for State troops to be sent to the army in Texas under Taylor"s command, at the moment of apprehended danger described in this chapter.
General Taylor, for more than a year previous to September, 1845, commanded one of the brigades of Gaines"s division, and the latter never knew _by authority_ that the former had been disconnected from him, except upon temporary service, until advised by the secretary of war on the 13th of September. He never received a copy of the authority given to Taylor to go to Texas until after the date of his requisition for Louisiana volunteers, on the 15th of August, 1845; consequently he _then_ considered himself responsible for the strength and support of one of his own brigades, and bound to succor it speedily when he believed it to be in imminent danger.--See Senate doc. No. 378, for his correspondence, and especially p. 48.
FOOTNOTES:
[70] Almonte"s report. Kennedy"s Texas, chap. 1.
[71] Senate doc. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 56.
[72] Kennedy"s Texas, chap. 1.
[73] Senate doc. No. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 76.
[74] An account of the army of observation and occupation, written by one of its officers, in the Southern Quarterly Review for April, 1846.
[75] S. Q. Review, _ut antea_, p. 442. (April, 1846.)
[76] Kennedy"s Texas, chap. 2d.
[77] Niles" Reg. vol. 68, p. 305.
[78] S. Q. Rev. _ut antea_. Senate doc. No. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p.
93.
[79] S. Q. Rev. _ut antea_.
[80] Southern Quarterly Review, _ut antea_. These statements are made by an able and distinguished officer of our army, who was on the field, and is perfectly versed in all the matters he discusses.
CHAPTER II.
Our position at Corpus Christi--Instructions to Taylor as to the boundary of the Rio Grande--Taylor"s views--Review and history of the boundary question--Letter from Mr. Adams--Santa Anna"s agreements with Texas, &c.--March to the Rio Grande ordered--Justification in a military point of view of the occupation of the disputed territory--Anecdote of Frederick the Great--War in Silesia and Austria--Madison"s conduct to Spain in 1810--Right of declaration of war--Justifiable causes of war--Opinion of Sir J. Mackintosh--War and diplomacy contrasted.
One of the most inclement winters in the Gulf of Mexico had pa.s.sed in the comfortless manner described in the last chapter. Our attempts to negotiate with Mexico were repulsed, and although our minister had not yet returned to the United States--having delayed at Jalapa with the hope of finding Paredes more accessible than Herrera--every thing indicated an ultimate defeat of diplomacy.
Meanwhile our forces at Corpus Christi were gradually augmenting, under the command of Generals Taylor and Worth. In October, 1845, the troops amounted to near four thousand, and General Taylor made every preparation, by reconnoissances between the Nueces and the Rio Grande for the ultimate defence of soil which had been claimed by our government as part of Texas.[81]
As a military man it was not his duty to affix the boundaries that were to be the subject of negotiation or war; but simply to ascertain precisely the extent of defence required along a disputed territory, and to dispose his troops accordingly.[82]
In October, 1845, therefore, General Taylor reviewed the instructions from the war department, and, seeing that he had been ordered to select and occupy near the Rio Grande such a site as would consist with the health of the troops, and was best adapted to repel invasion, he ventured to suggest an advance of his army. This however, was done by him whilst he felt great diffidence in touching topics that might become matter of delicate diplomacy. Nevertheless, taking a soldier"s view of the topographical and not the diplomatic question, he informed our government, that if it made the Rio Grande an _ultimatum_ in adjusting a boundary, he doubted not that the settlement would be facilitated by taking possession, at once, of one or two suitable points on, or quite near, that river. At these spots, our strength would be displayed in a manner not to be mistaken, while the position of our troops at the remote camp of Corpus Christi, with arid wastes between them and the outposts of Mexico, altogether failed to impress that government with our readiness to vindicate by force of arms our t.i.tle to the country as far as the Rio Grande.[83] Moreover, General Taylor felt enc.u.mbered by the orders from our war department of the 8th July, in which he was told that Mexico held military establishments on the east side of the Rio Grande, whose forces he should not disturb until our peaceful relations were finally destroyed.[84]
Accordingly, on the 13th of January, 1846, our commander-in-chief was directed to advance with his troops to the Rio Grande.[85] This movement was made in consequence of the antic.i.p.ated failure of our negotiations, clearly indicated by the conduct of the Mexican government immediately upon the arrival of Mr. Slidell in the capital. But before these orders were despatched to General Taylor, he had already in August, 1845, been apprised of his duties in the event of hostile demonstrations on the part of the enemy. In case of an invasion of Texas by the Mexicans, he was directed to drive them back beyond the Rio Grande; and, although it was desirable that he should confine himself as much as possible to defensive measures, yet, in the event of such a repulse, he was authorized to seize and hold possession of Matamoros and other places on the soil of Mexico.
This resolution of our government was made the subject of grave complaint by persons who opposed the war. The order to advance from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande was alleged to be an act of invasion, and consequently, that _hostilities_ were commenced by us and not by Mexico.
It may be pardoned if we pause awhile to consider a subject of such vital importance. The solution of the question was placed by one party upon the determination whether the Rio Grande was the boundary between Texas and Mexico before the battle of San Jacinto; and, if not, whether it has been made so since by competent authority. Up to that period it was a.s.serted to be a recognized fact that the Nueces was the western boundary of Texas. Mr. John Quincy Adams, in his controversy with Don Luis De Onis, upon the Spanish boundary question, in March, 1818;[86]
and Messieurs Pinckney and Monroe, in their argument with Cevallos at Madrid in April, 1805,[87] claimed the Rio Grande as the true limit between the United States and Mexico, by virtue of the ancient rights of France and the treaties between that sovereignty and the Spanish king.[88] It was a.s.serted, therefore, that by the cession of Louisiana all the rights of France over Texas, as an integral part of her territory, accrued to us; and consequently that when the State of Texas was united to this country it was only _re_-annexed with what were _claimed_ to be its ancient limits. But this was not a true statement of the controversy, for after our treaty with Spain the aspect of the affair changed. The question then was no longer what had been the boundary under the laws between France and Spain, or between Spain and the United States,--but what were the limits either under the colonial government of the Mexican viceroyalty, or under the laws of Mexico, when she became an independent republic. It was a.s.serted that no map or geography existed since the establishment of the republic that did not lay down the boundary north of the Rio Grande. The map of Texas, compiled by Stephen H. Austin, the parent of Texan colonization, published at Philadelphia in 1835, and setting forth all the Mexican grants in Texas, represents the Rio Nueces as the western boundary.
General Almonte in 1834, as I have previously stated, alleged, upon the authority of the State government of Coahuila and Texas that the boundary between them was even east of the Nueces. This was probably in accordance with the ancient Spanish division; for, in 1805 Cevallos declared to our ministers at Madrid that the province of Texas, "where the Spaniards have had settlements from the 17th century, was bounded on the east by Louisiana, and contains the extensive country which lies between the river Medina _where the government of Coahuila ends_, and the post now abandoned." Authorities to this effect might be extensively multiplied.[90] Brazos de Santiago was a Mexican port of entry, which continued to be held up to the period of hostilities, and Laredo was a small Mexican town, occupied by a Mexican garrison. If such was the geographical division between Texas and Mexico on the lower Rio Grande, near its mouth in the gulf, it was a.s.serted that there could be infinitely less right to claim it as a limit nearer its source, since Santa Fe, the capital of New Mexico, had never been within the jurisdiction of Texas, and since the boundaries of Chihuahua commenced near the head waters of the Nueces.
These were some of the arguments used by individuals who deemed the march to Point Isabel an invasion of Mexican territory. It is just that a few reasons should also be presented on behalf of those who believed it to be lawful or expedient.
When Santa Anna was captured after the battle of San Jacinto in 1836, the leading men in Texas had great difficulty in rescuing him from popular vengeance for the ma.s.sacres he had committed. The victory over the central chief--the despot and dictator of Mexico--was generally believed to be a crowning measure of success, for the bitter persecutor soon dwindled into the humble supplicant, and pledged his name and his oath to secure the independence of the rebellious State. Accordingly, with every appearance and promise of good faith and honor, he executed contracts with the Texan authorities which deserve consideration in discussing this question. On the 14th of May, 1836, at Velasco, two of these doc.u.ments were signed by Santa Anna, Burnet, Collingsworth, Hardiman and Grayson,--the first being a public, and the second a secret convention between the parties. The third article of the first paper stipulates that the Mexican troops shall evacuate the _territory_ of Texas, _pa.s.sing to the other side of the Rio Grande_, while the fourth article of the secret agreement declares that a treaty of amity, commerce and limits shall be made between Mexico and Texas, _the territory of the latter power not to extend beyond the Rio Bravo del Norte, or Rio Grande_. In conformity with these contracts, Texas set free the prisoner, whose "prompt release and departure for Vera Cruz,"
according to their tenor, "were necessary for the fulfilment of his _solemn oath_," to obtain a recognition of the independence of Texas, and to dispose the Mexican cabinet for the reception of commissioners.[91]
Santa Anna returned to his country in disgrace after his disastrous campaign, and lurked in retirement at his farm until the French attacked Vera Cruz, when he threw himself again at the head of the departmental forces. In the action he fortunately lost a limb, and by the skilful display of his mutilation in defence of Mexico, he renewed his claims to national grat.i.tude. Instead, however, of using his influence to obtain the treaty, promised as the boon for his life, he became at once the bitterest foe of Texas, and pledged himself to fight "forever for its reconquest." Texas, meanwhile, acting in good faith, and presuming to adopt the spirit and letter of the convention with Santa Anna, whom she naturally regarded as the dictator of Mexico, pa.s.sed the act of December 19, 1836, establishing the Rio Grande as her boundary from the gulf to its source. Besides this, her congress created senatorial and representative districts west of the Nueces; organized and defined limits of counties extending to the Rio Grande; created courts of justice; spread her judicial system over the country wherever her people roamed, and performed other acts of sovereignty which we are compelled not to disregard. It cannot be contended that these acts and agreements were alone sufficient, under the laws of nations, to confer upon Texas unquestionable rights over the soil between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, for a contract with the captive president and general was not legally binding; but it is equally clear that all these arguments of the old authorities as to the original boundary, and all the new claims set up by Texas, under her statutes, as well as stipulations with Santa Anna, made that territory a disputed ground whose real ownership could only be equitably settled by negotiation. The strong language of both the contracts, just recited, seems to _concede_ the fact that the president of Mexico regarded, at least the lower Rio Grande, as already the real boundary between Mexico and Texas, notwithstanding the opinion of Almonte in 1834; and consequently that it was neither the subject of treaty or agreement at that moment, nor could it become so afterwards when commissioners were appointed.
When Texas was annexed to the United States she was received with these a.s.serted limits, though she did not join the Union with any specific boundaries.[92] It was thought best by both parties to leave the question of confines open between Mexico and our country, so as not to complicate the national entanglements. After the congress of the United States and convention in Texas had acted upon the joint resolution it was impossible for us to recede. The course of our presidents, therefore, was at once pacific and soothing towards Mexico. For although they believed that republic had no right to be consulted as to the annexation of Texas, a free and independent State, they nevertheless admitted all her natural and just privileges in regard to boundary. Mr.
Tyler and Mr. Polk therefore despatched envoys to Mexico with the offer of liberal negotiations as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself. But the charge and minister of Mr. Tyler were scornfully rejected, while Mr. Slidell, as has been already related, was refused an audience upon frivolous pretences at a moment when the Mexican secretary was secretly craving to receive him.[93]