Below, Hitler"s Luftwaffe adjutant, had been composed enough, despite the shock and the lacerations to his face through gla.s.s shards, to rush to the signals hut, where he demanded a block on all communications apart from those from Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl. At the same time, Below had Himmler and Goring summoned to Hitler"s bunker. Then he made his way there himself. Hitler was sitting in his study, relief written on his face, ready to show off with a tinge of pride, it seemed his shredded clothing. His attention had already turned to the question of who had carried out the a.s.sa.s.sination attempt. According to Below, he rejected suggestions (which he appears initially to have believed) that the bomb had been planted by Organisation Todt workers who were temporarily at Fuhrer Headquarters to complete the reinforcement of the compound against air-raids. By this time, suspicion had turned indubitably to the missing Stauffenberg. The search for Stauffenberg and investigation into the a.s.sa.s.sination attempt began around 2 p.m., though it was not at that point realized that this had been the signal for a general uprising against the regime. Hitler"s rage at the army leaders he had always distrusted mounted by the minute. He was ready to wreak terrible vengeance on those whom he saw as stabbing the Reich in the back in its hour of crisis.
IV.
Stauffenberg was by now well on his way back to Berlin. The conspirators there were anxiously awaiting his return, or news of what had happened to him, hesitating to act, still unsure whether to proceed with "Operation Valkyrie". The message that Fellgiebel had managed to get through, even before Stauffenberg had taken off from Rastenburg, was less clear than he thought. It was that something terrible had happened; the Fuhrer was still alive. That was all. There were no details. It was unclear whether the bomb had gone off, whether Stauffenberg had been prevented (as a few days earlier) from carrying out the attack, or whether Stauffenberg had been arrested, whether, in fact, he was even still alive. Further messages seeping through indicated that something had certainly happened in the Wolf "s Lair, but that Hitler had survived. Should "Valkyrie" still go ahead? No contingency plans had been made for carrying out a coup if Hitler were still alive. And without confirmed news of Hitler"s death, Fromm, in his position as commander of the reserve army, would certainly not give his approval for the coup. Olbricht concluded that to take any action before hearing definitive news would be to court disaster for all concerned. Vital time was lost. Meanwhile, it had only proved temporarily possible to block communications from the Wolf "s Lair. Soon after 4 p.m. that afternoon, before any coup had been started, the lines were fully open again.
Stauffenberg arrived back in Berlin between 2.45 and 3.15 p.m. There was no car to meet him. His chauffeur was waiting at Rangsdorf aerodrome. But Stauffenberg"s plane had flown to Tempelhof (or possibly another Berlin aerodrome this detail is not fully clear), and he had impatiently to telephone for a car to take him and Haeften to Bendlerstrae. It was a further delay. Stauffenberg did not reach the headquarters of the conspiracy, where tension was at fever-pitch, until 4.30 p.m. Haeften had in the meantime telephoned from the aerodrome to Bendlerstrae. He announced the first time the conspirators heard the message that Hitler was dead. Stauffenberg repeated this when he and Haeften arrived in Bendlerstrae. He had stood with General Fellgiebel outside the barrack-hut, he said, and seen with his own eyes first-aid men running to help and emergency vehicles arriving. No one could have survived such an explosion, was his conclusion. However convincing he was for those anxious to believe his message, a key figure, Colonel-General Fromm, knew otherwise. He had spoken to Keitel around 4 p.m. and been told that the Fuhrer had suffered only minor injuries. That apart, Keitel had asked where, in the meantime, Colonel Stauffenberg might be.
Fromm refused outright Olbricht"s request that he should sign the orders for "Valkyrie". But by the time Olbricht had returned to his room to announce Fromm"s refusal, his impatient chief of staff Colonel Mertz von Quirnheim, a friend of Stauffenberg, and long closely involved in the plot, had already begun the action with a cabled message to regional military commanders, beginning with the words: "The Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler, is dead." When Fromm tried to have Mertz arrested, Stauffenberg informed him that, on the contrary, it was he, Fromm, who was under arrest.
By now, several of the leading conspirators had been contacted and had begun a.s.sembling in the Bendlerstrae. Beck was there, already announcing that he had taken over command in the state; and that Field-Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, former commander-in-chief in France, and long involved in the conspiracy, was new commander-in-chief of the army. Colonel-General Hoepner, Fromm"s designated successor in the coup, dismissed by Hitler in disgrace in early 1942 and forbidden to wear a uniform again, arrived around 4.30 p.m. in civilian clothes, carrying a suitcase. It contained his uniform, which he donned once more that evening.
Scenes in the Bendlerstrae were increasingly chaotic. Conspiring to arrange a coup d"etat coup d"etat in a police state is scarcely a simple matter. But even in the existential circ.u.mstances prevailing, much smacked of dilettante organization. Too many loose ends had been left dangling. Too little attention had been paid to small but important details in timing, coordination, and, not least, communications. Nothing had been done about blowing up the communications centre at Fuhrer Headquarters or otherwise putting it permanently out of action. No steps were taken to gain immediate control of radio stations in Berlin and other cities. No broadcast was made by the putschists. Party and SS leaders were not arrested. The master-propagandist, Goebbels himself, was left at bay. Among the conspirators, too many were involved in issuing and carrying out commands. There was too much uncertainty; and too much hesitation. Everything had been predicated upon killing Hitler. It had simply been taken for granted that if Stauffenberg succeeded in exploding his bomb, Hitler would be dead. Once that premiss was called into question, then disproved, the haphazard lines of a plan for the in a police state is scarcely a simple matter. But even in the existential circ.u.mstances prevailing, much smacked of dilettante organization. Too many loose ends had been left dangling. Too little attention had been paid to small but important details in timing, coordination, and, not least, communications. Nothing had been done about blowing up the communications centre at Fuhrer Headquarters or otherwise putting it permanently out of action. No steps were taken to gain immediate control of radio stations in Berlin and other cities. No broadcast was made by the putschists. Party and SS leaders were not arrested. The master-propagandist, Goebbels himself, was left at bay. Among the conspirators, too many were involved in issuing and carrying out commands. There was too much uncertainty; and too much hesitation. Everything had been predicated upon killing Hitler. It had simply been taken for granted that if Stauffenberg succeeded in exploding his bomb, Hitler would be dead. Once that premiss was called into question, then disproved, the haphazard lines of a plan for the coup d"etat coup d"etat swiftly unravelled. What was crucial, in the absence of confirmed news of Hitler"s demise, was that there were too many regime-loyalists, and too many waverers, with too much to lose by committing themselves to the side of the conspirators. swiftly unravelled. What was crucial, in the absence of confirmed news of Hitler"s demise, was that there were too many regime-loyalists, and too many waverers, with too much to lose by committing themselves to the side of the conspirators.
Despite Stauffenberg"s intense avowals of Hitler"s death, the depressing news for the conspirators of his survival gathered strength. By mid-evening, it was increasingly obvious to the insurrectionists that their coup had faltered beyond repair.
It rapidly became plain in Fuhrer Headquarters that the a.s.sa.s.sination attempt was the signal for a military and political insurrection against the regime. By mid-afternoon, Hitler had given command of the reserve army to Himmler. And Keitel had informed army districts that an attempt on the Fuhrer"s life had been made, but that he still lived, and on no account were orders from the conspirators to be obeyed. Loyalists could be found even in the Bendlerstrae, the seat of the uprising. The communications officer there, also in receipt of Keitel"s order, was by the evening, as the conspirators were becoming more and more desperate, pa.s.sing on the message that the orders he was having to transmit on their behalf were invalid. Fromm"s adjutants were meanwhile able to spread the word in the building that Hitler was still alive, and to collect together a number of officers prepared to challenge the conspirators, whose already limited and hesitant support, inside and outside Bendlerstrae, was by now rapidly draining away. Early instances where army units initially supported the coup dwindled once news of Hitler"s survival hardened.
This was the case, too, in Paris. The military commander there, General Karl Heinrich von Stulpnagel, and his subordinate officers, had firmly backed the insurrectionists. But the supreme commander in the west, Field-Marshal von Kluge, vacillated as ever. In a vain call from Berlin, Beck failed to persuade him to commit himself to the rising. Once he learnt that the a.s.sa.s.sination attempt had failed, Kluge countered Stulpnagel"s orders to have the entire SS, SD, and Gestapo in Paris arrested, dismissed the general, denounced his actions to Keitel, and later congratulated Hitler on surviving a treacherous attack on his life.
By this time, the events in Berlin had reached their denouement. In the late morning, Goebbels had been hosting a speech about Germany"s armaments position, attended by ministers, leading civil servants, and industrialists, given by Speer in the Propaganda Ministry. After he had closed the meeting, Goebbels had taken Walther Funk and Albert Speer back with him into his study to talk about mobilizing remaining resources within Germany. While they were talking, he was suddenly called to take an urgent telephone call from Fuhrer Headquarters. Despite the swift block on communications, he had his own hot-line to FHQ, which, evidently, still remained open. The call was from Press Chief Otto Dietrich, who broke the news to Goebbels that there had been an attack on Hitler"s life. This was within minutes of the explosion taking place. There were few details at this stage, other than that Hitler was alive. Goebbels, told that Organisation Todt workers had probably been responsible, angrily reproached Speer about the evidently over-casual security precautions that had been taken.
The Propaganda Minister was unusually quiet and pensive over lunch. Somewhat remarkably, in the circ.u.mstances, he then retired for his usual afternoon siesta. He was awakened between 2 and 3 p.m. by the head of his press office, Wilfried von Oven, who had just taken a phone-call from an agitated Heinz Lorenz, Dietrich"s deputy. Lorenz had dictated a brief text drafted, he said, by Hitler himself for immediate radio transmission. Goebbels was little taken with the terse wording, and remarked that urgency in transmitting the news was less important than making sure it was suitably couched for public consumption. He gave instructions to prepare an adequately ma.s.saged commentary. At this stage, the Propaganda Minister clearly had no idea of the gravity of the situation, that army officers had been involved, and that an uprising had been unleashed. Believing a breach of security had allowed unreliable OT workers to perpetrate some attack, he had been told that Hitler was alive. More than that he did not know. Even so, his own behaviour after first hearing the news, and then during the afternoon, when he attended to regular business and showed unusual dilatoriness in putting out the broadcast urgently demanded from Fuhrer Headquarters, was odd. Possibly he had decided that any immediate crisis had pa.s.sed, and that he would await further information before putting out any press communique. More probably, he was unsure of developments and wanted to hedge his bets.
Eventually, after this lengthy interval, further news from the Wolf"s Lair ended his inaction. He rang Speer and told him to drop everything and rush over to his residence, close to the Brandenburg Gate. There he told Speer he had heard from Fuhrer Headquarters that a full-scale military putsch in the entire Reich was under way. Speer immediately offered Goebbels his support in any attempt to defeat and crush the uprising. Within minutes, Speer noticed armed troops on the streets outside, ringing the building. By this time, it was early evening, around 6.30 p.m. Goebbels took one glance and disappeared into his bedroom, putting a little box of cyanide pills "for all eventualities" into his pocket. The fact that he had been unable to locate Himmler made him worried. Perhaps the Reichsfuhrer-SS had fallen into the hands of the putschists? Perhaps he was even behind the coup? Suspicions were rife. The elimination of such an important figure as Goebbels ought to have been a priority for the conspirators. Amazingly, no one had even thought to cut off his telephone. This, and the fact that the leaders of the uprising had put out no proclamation over the radio, persuaded the Propaganda Minister that all was not lost, even though he heard disquieting reports of troops moving on Berlin.
The guard-battalion surrounding Goebbels"s house was under the command of Major Otto Ernst Remer, thirty-two years old at the time, a fanatical Hitler loyalist, who initially believed the fiction constructed by the plotters that they were putting down a rising by disaffected groups in the SS and party against the Fuhrer. When ordered by his superior, the Berlin City Commandant, Major-General Paul von Hase, to take part in sealing off the government quarter, Remer obeyed without demur. He soon became suspicious, however, that what he had first heard was untrue; that he was, in fact, helping suppress not a putsch of party and SS leaders against Hitler, but a military coup against the regime by rebellious officers. As luck had it, Lieutenant Hans Hagen, charged with inspiring n.a.z.i principles among the troops, had that afternoon lectured Remer"s battalion on behalf of the Propaganda Ministry. Hagen now used his fortuitous contact to Remer to help undermine the conspiracy against Hitler. He persuaded Goebbels to speak directly to Remer, to convince him of what was really happening, and to win him over. Hagen then sought out Remer, played on the seeds of doubt in his mind about the action in which he was engaged, and talked him into disregarding the orders of his superior, Hase, and going to see Goebbels. At this point, Remer was still unsure whether Goebbels was part of an internal party coup against Hitler. If he made a mistake, it could cost him his head. However, after some hesitation, he agreed to meet the Propaganda Minister.
Goebbels reminded him of his oath to the Fuhrer. Remer expressed his loyalty to Hitler and the party, but remarked that the Fuhrer was dead. "The Fuhrer is alive!" Goebbels retorted. "I spoke with him only a few minutes ago." The uncertain Remer was visibly wavering. Goebbels offered to let Remer speak himself with Hitler. It was around 7 p.m. Within minutes, the call to the Wolf "s Lair was made. Hitler asked Remer whether he recognized his voice. Standing rigidly to attention, Remer said he did. "Do you hear me? So I"m alive! The attempt has failed," he registered Hitler saying. "A tiny clique of ambitious officers wanted to do away with me. But now we have the saboteurs of the front. We"ll make short shrift of this plague. You are commissioned by me with the task of immediately restoring calm and security in the Reich capital, if necessary by force. You are under my personal command for this purpose until the Reichsfuhrer-SS arrives in the Reich capital!" Remer needed no further persuasion. All Speer, in the room at the time, could hear, was "Jawohl, my Fuhrer ... Jawohl, as you order, my Fuhrer." Remer was put in charge of security in Berlin to replace Hase. He was to follow all instructions from Goebbels.
Remer arranged for Goebbels to speak to his men. Goebbels addressed the guard-battalion in the garden of his residence around 8.30 p.m., and rapidly won them over. Almost two hours earlier, he had put out a radio communique telling listeners of the attack on Hitler, but how the Fuhrer had suffered only minor abrasions, had received Mussolini that afternoon, and was already back at his work. For those still wavering, the news of Hitler"s survival was a vital piece of information. Between 8 and 9 p.m. the cordon around the government quarter was lifted. The guard-battalion was by now needed for other duties: rooting out the conspirators in their headquarters in Bendlerstrae. The high-point of the conspiracy had pa.s.sed. For the plotters, the writing was on the wall.
V.
Some were already seeking to extricate themselves even before Goebbels"s communique broadcast the news of Hitler"s survival. By mid-evening, the group of conspirators in the Bendlerblock, the Wehrmacht High Command building in the Bendlerstrae, were as good as all that was left of the uprising. Remer"s guard-battalion was surrounding the building. Panzer units loyal to the regime were closing in on Berlin"s city centre. Troop commanders were no longer prepared to listen to the plotters" orders. Even in the Bendlerblock itself, senior officers were refusing to take orders from the conspirators, reminding them of the oath they had taken to Hitler which, since the radio had broadcast news of his survival, was still valid.
A group of staff officers, dissatisfied with Olbricht"s increasingly lame explanation of what was happening, and, whatever their feelings towards. .h.i.tler, not unnaturally anxious in the light of an evidently lost cause to save their own skins, became rebellious. Soon after 9 p.m., arming themselves, they returned to Olbricht"s room. While their spokesman, Lieutenant-Colonel Franz Herber, was talking to Olbricht, shots were fired in the corridor, one of which hit Stauffenberg in the shoulder. It was a brief flurry, no more. Herber and his men pressed into Fromm"s office, where Colonel-General Hoepner, the conspirators" choice as commander of the reserve army, Mertz, Beck, Haeften, and the injured Stauffenberg also gathered. Herber demanded to speak to Fromm and was told he was still in his apartment (where he had been kept under guard since the afternoon). One of the rebel officers immediately made his way there, was admitted, and told Fromm what had happened. The guard outside Fromm"s door had by now vanished. Liberated, Fromm returned to his office to confront the putschists. It was around 10 p.m. when his ma.s.sive frame appeared in the doorway of his office. He scornfully cast his eye over the utterly dispirited leaders of the insurrection. "So, gentlemen," he declared, "now I"m going to do to you what you did to me this afternoon."
What the conspirators had done to Fromm had been to lock him in his room and give him sandwiches and wine. Fromm was less naive. He had his neck to save or so he thought. He told the putschists they were under arrest and demanded they surrender all weapons. Beck asked to retain his "for private use". Fromm ordered him to make use of it immediately. Beck said at that moment he was thinking of earlier days. Fromm urged him to get on with it. Beck put the gun to his head, but succeeded only in grazing himself on the temple. Fromm offered the others a few moments should they wish to write any last words. Hoepner availed himself of the opportunity, sitting at Olbricht"s desk; so did Olbricht himself. Beck, meanwhile, reeling from the glancing blow to his head, refused attempts to take the pistol from him, and insisted on being allowed another shot. Even then, he only managed a severe head-wound. With Beck writhing on the floor, Fromm left the room to learn that a unit of the guard-battalion had entered the courtyard of the Bendlerblock. He knew, too, that Himmler, the newly appointed commander of the reserve army, was on his way. There was no time to lose. He returned to his room after five minutes and announced that he had held a court-martial in the name of the Fuhrer. Mertz, Olbricht, Haeften, and "this colonel whose name I will no longer mention" had been sentenced to death. "Take a few men and execute this sentence downstairs in the yard at once," he ordered an officer standing by. Stauffenberg tried to take all responsibility on his own shoulders, stating that the others had been merely carrying out his orders. Fromm said nothing, as the four men were taken to their execution, and Hoepner initially also earmarked for execution, but spared for the time being following a private discussion with Fromm was led out into captivity. With a glance at the dying Beck, Fromm commanded one of the officers to finish him off. The former Chief of the General Staff was unceremoniously dragged into the adjacent room and shot dead.
The condemned men were rapidly escorted downstairs into the courtyard, where a firing-squad of ten men drawn from the guard-battalion was already waiting. To add to the macabre scene, the drivers of the vehicles parked in the courtyard had been ordered to turn their headlights on the little pile of sand near the doorway from which Stauffenberg and his fellow-conspirators emerged. Without ceremony, Olbricht was put on the sand-heap and promptly shot. Next to be brought forward was Stauffenberg. Just as the execution-squad opened fire, Haeften threw himself in front of Stauffenberg, and died first. It was to no avail. Stauffenberg was immediately placed again on the sand-heap. As the shots rang out, he was heard to cry: "Long live holy Germany." Seconds later, the execution of the last of the four, Mertz von Quirnheim, followed. Fromm at once had a telegram dispatched, announcing the b.l.o.o.d.y suppression of the attempted coup and the execution of the ringleaders. Then he gave an impa.s.sioned address to those a.s.sembled in the courtyard, attributing Hitler"s wondrous salvation to the work of Providence. He ended with a three-fold "Sieg Heil" to the Fuhrer.
While the bodies of the executed men, along with Beck"s corpse, which had been dragged downstairs into the yard, were taken off in a lorry to be buried next day Himmler had them exhumed and cremated the remaining conspirators in the Bendlerblock were arrested. It was around half an hour after midnight.
Apart from the lingering remnants of the coup in Paris, Prague, and Vienna, and apart from the terrible and inevitable reprisals to follow, the last attempt to topple Hitler and his regime from within was over.
VI.
Hours earlier on this eventful 20 July 1944, shortly after arriving back in his bunker following the explosion, Hitler had refused to contemplate cancelling the planned visit of the Duce, scheduled for 2.30 p.m. that afternoon, but delayed half an hour because of the late arrival of Mussolini"s train. It was to prove the last of the seventeen meetings of the two dictators. It was certainly the strangest. Outwardly composed, there was little to denote that Hitler had just escaped an attempt on his life. He greeted Mussolini with his left hand, since he had difficulty in raising his injured right arm. He told the shocked Duce what had happened, then led him to the ruined wooden hut where the explosion had taken place. In a macabre scene, amid the devastation, accompanied only by the interpreter, Paul Schmidt, Hitler described to his fellow-dictator where he had stood, right arm leaning on the table as he studied the map, when the bomb went off. He showed him the singed hair at the back of his head. Hitler sat down on an upturned box. Schmidt found a still usable stool amid the debris for Mussolini. For a few moments, neither dictator said a word. Then Hitler, in a quiet voice, said: "When I go through it all again ... I conclude from my wondrous salvation, while others present in the room received serious injuries ... that nothing is going to happen to me." He was ever more convinced, he added, that it was given to him to lead their common cause to a victorious end.
The same theme, that Providence had saved him, ran through Hitler"s address transmitted by all radio stations soon after midnight. Hitler said he was speaking to the German people for two reasons: to let them hear his voice, and know that he was uninjured and well; and to tell them about a crime without parallel in German history. "A tiny clique of ambitious, unconscionable, and at the same time criminal, stupid officers has forged a plot to eliminate me and at the same time to eradicate with me the staff practically of the German armed forces" leadership." He likened it to the stab-in-the-back of 1918. But this time, the "tiny gang of criminal elements" would be "mercilessly eradicated". On three separate occasions he referred to his survival as "a sign of Providence that I must continue my work, and therefore will continue it".
In fact, as so often in his life, it had not been Providence that had saved him, but luck: the luck of the devil.
26.
No Way Out
I.
"Now I finally have the swine who have been sabotaging my work for years," raged Hitler as details of the plot against him started to emerge. "Now I have proof: the entire General Staff is contaminated." His long-standing, deep-seated distrust of his army leaders had found its confirmation. It suddenly seemed blindingly obvious to him why his military plans had encountered such setbacks: they had been sabotaged throughout by the treachery of his army officers. "Now I know why all my great plans in Russia had to fail in recent years," he ranted. "It was all treason! But for those traitors, we would have won long ago. Here is my justification before history" (an indication, too, that Hitler was consciously looking to his place in the pantheon of Teutonic heroes). Goebbels, as so often, echoed Hitler"s sentiments. "The generals are not opposed to the Fuhrer because we are experiencing crises at the front," he entered in his diary. "Rather, we are experiencing crises at the front because the generals are opposed to the Fuhrer." Hitler was convinced of an "inner blood-poisoning". With leading positions occupied by traitors bent on destroying the Reich, he railed, with key figures such as General Eduard Wagner (responsible as Quartermaster-General for army supplies) and General Erich Fellgiebel (chief of signals operations at Fuhrer Headquarters) connected to the conspiracy, it was no wonder that German military tactics had been known in advance by the Red Army. It had been "permanent treachery" all along. It was symptomatic of an underlying "crisis in morale". Action ought to have been taken sooner. It had been known, after all, for one and a half years that there were traitors in the army. But now, an end had to be made. "These most base creatures to have worn the soldier"s uniform in the whole of history, this rabble which has preserved itself from bygone times, must be got rid of and driven out." Military recovery would follow recovery from the crisis in morale. It would be "Germany"s salvation".
Vengeance was uppermost in Hitler"s mind. There would be no mercy in the task of cleansing the Augean stables. Swift and ruthless action would be taken. He would "wipe out and eradicate" the lot of them, he raged. "These criminals" would not be granted an honourable soldier"s execution by firing-squad. They would be expelled from the Wehrmacht, brought as civilians before the court, and executed within two hours of sentence. "They must hang immediately, without any mercy," he declared. He gave orders to set up a military "Court of Honour", in which senior generals (including among others Keitel, Rundstedt who presided and Guderian) would expel in disgrace those found to have been involved in the plot. Those subsequently sentenced to death by the People"s Court, he ordered, were to be hanged in prison clothing as criminals. He spoke favourably of Stalin"s purges of his officers. "The Fuhrer is extraordinarily furious at the generals, especially those of the General Staff," noted Goebbels after seeing Hitler on 22 July. "He is absolutely determined to set a b.l.o.o.d.y example and to eradicate a freemasons" lodge which has been opposed to us all the time and has only awaited the moment to stab us in the back in the most critical hour. The punishment which must now be meted out has to have historic dimensions."
Hitler had been outraged at Colonel-General Fromm"s peremptory action in having Stauffenberg and the other leaders of the attempted coup immediately executed by firing-squad. He gave orders forthwith that other plotters captured should appear before the People"s Court. The President of the People"s Court, Roland Freisler, a fanatical n.a.z.i who, despite early sympathies with the radical Left, had been ideologically committed to the volkisch volkisch cause since the early 1920s, saw himself a cla.s.sical instance of "working towards the Fuhrer" as p.r.o.nouncing judgement as the "Fuhrer would judge the case himself". The People"s Court was, for him, expressly a "political court". Under his presidency, the number of death sentences delivered by the court had risen from 102 in 1941 to 2,097 in 1944. It was little wonder that he had already gained notoriety as a "hanging judge". Recapitulating Hitler"s comments at their recent meeting, Goebbels remarked that those implicated in the plot were to be brought before the People"s Court "and sentenced to death". Freisler, he added, "would find the right tone to deal with them". Hitler himself was keen above all that the conspirators should be permitted "no time for long speeches" during their defence. "But Freisler will see to that," he added. "That"s our Vyschinsky" a reference to Stalin"s notorious prosecutor in the show-trials of the 1930s. cause since the early 1920s, saw himself a cla.s.sical instance of "working towards the Fuhrer" as p.r.o.nouncing judgement as the "Fuhrer would judge the case himself". The People"s Court was, for him, expressly a "political court". Under his presidency, the number of death sentences delivered by the court had risen from 102 in 1941 to 2,097 in 1944. It was little wonder that he had already gained notoriety as a "hanging judge". Recapitulating Hitler"s comments at their recent meeting, Goebbels remarked that those implicated in the plot were to be brought before the People"s Court "and sentenced to death". Freisler, he added, "would find the right tone to deal with them". Hitler himself was keen above all that the conspirators should be permitted "no time for long speeches" during their defence. "But Freisler will see to that," he added. "That"s our Vyschinsky" a reference to Stalin"s notorious prosecutor in the show-trials of the 1930s.
It took little encouragement from Goebbels to persuade Hitler that Fromm, Stauffenberg"s direct superior officer, had acted so swiftly in an attempt to cover up his own complicity. Fromm had, in fact, already been named by Bormann in a circular to the Gauleiter in mid-evening of 20 July as one of those to be arrested as part of the "reactionary gang of criminals" behind the conspiracy. Following the suppression of the coup in the Bendlerblock and the swift execution of Stauffenberg, Olbricht, Haeften, and Mertz von Quirnheim, Fromm had made his way to the Propaganda Ministry, wanting to speak on the telephone with Hitler. Instead of connecting him, Goebbels had had Fromm seated in another room while he himself telephoned Fuhrer Headquarters. He soon had the decision he wanted. Goebbels immediately had the former Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army placed under armed guard. After months of imprisonment, a mockery of a trial before the People"s Court, and a trumped-up conviction on grounds of alleged cowardice despite the less-than-heroic motive of self-preservation that had dictated his role on centre-stage in the Bendlerblock on 20 July, he was no coward Fromm would eventually die at the hands of a firing-squad in March 1945.
In the confusion in the Bendlerblock late on the night of 20 July, it had looked for a time as if other executions would follow those of the coup"s leaders (together with the a.s.sisted suicide of Beck). But the arrival soon after midnight of an SS unit under the command of Sturmbannfuhrer Otto Skorzeny the rescuer of Mussolini from captivity the previous summer along with the appearance at the scene of SD chief Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Major Otto Ernst Remer, newly appointed commander of the Berlin guards battalion and largely responsible for putting down the coup, blocked further summary executions and ended the upheaval. Meanwhile, Himmler himself had flown to Berlin and, in his new temporary capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve Army, had given orders that no further independent action was to be taken against officers held in suspicion.
Shortly before 4 a.m., Bormann was able to inform the party"s provincial chieftains, the Gauleiter, that the putsch was at an end. By then, those arrested in the Bendlerstrae including Stauffenberg"s brother, Berthold, former senior civil-servant and deputy Police President of Berlin Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg, leading member of the Kreisau Circle Peter Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, Protestant pastor Eugen Gerstenmaier, and landholder and officer in the Abwehr Ulrich Wilhelm Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld had been led off to await their fate. Former Colonel-General Erich Hoepner, arrested by Fromm but not executed, and Field-Marshal Erwin von Witzleben, who had left the Bendlerstrae before the collapse of the coup, were also promptly taken into custody, along with a number of others who had been implicated. Prussian Finance Minister Popitz, former Economics Minister Schacht, former Chief of Staff Colonel-General Halder, Major-General Stieff, and, from the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris and Major-General Oster were also swiftly arrested. Major Hans Ulrich von Oertzen, liaison officer for the Berlin Defence District (Wehrkreis III), who had given out the first "Valkyrie" orders, blew himself up with a hand-grenade. Major-General Henning von Tresckow, the early driving-force behind the attempts to a.s.sa.s.sinate Hitler, killed himself in similar fashion at the front near Ostrov in Poland. General Wagner shot himself. General Fellgiebel refused to do so. "You stand your ground, you don"t do that," he told his aide-de-camp. Well aware that his arrest was imminent, he spent much of the afternoon, remarkably, at the Wolf "s Lair, even congratulated Hitler on his survival, and awaited his inevitable fate. III), who had given out the first "Valkyrie" orders, blew himself up with a hand-grenade. Major-General Henning von Tresckow, the early driving-force behind the attempts to a.s.sa.s.sinate Hitler, killed himself in similar fashion at the front near Ostrov in Poland. General Wagner shot himself. General Fellgiebel refused to do so. "You stand your ground, you don"t do that," he told his aide-de-camp. Well aware that his arrest was imminent, he spent much of the afternoon, remarkably, at the Wolf "s Lair, even congratulated Hitler on his survival, and awaited his inevitable fate.
Those who fell into the clutches of the Gestapo had to reckon with fearsome torture. It was endured for the most part with the idealism, even heroism, which had sustained them throughout their perilous opposition. In the early stages of their investigations, the Gestapo managed to squeeze out remarkably limited information, beyond what they already knew, from those they so grievously maltreated. Even so, as the "Special Commission, 20 July", set up on the day after the attempted coup, expanded its investigations, the numbers arrested rapidly swelled to 600 persons. Almost all the leading figures in the various branches of the conspiracy were rapidly captured, though Goerdeler held out under cover until 12 August. Reports reached Hitler daily of new names of those implicated. His early belief that it had been no more than a "tiny clique" of officers which had opposed him had proved mistaken. The conspiracy had tentacles stretching further than he could have imagined. He was particularly incensed that even Graf h.e.l.ldorf, Berlin Police President, "Old Fighter" of the n.a.z.i Movement, and a former SA leader, turned out to have been deeply implicated. As the list lengthened, and the extent of the conspiracy became clear, Hitler"s fury and bitter resentment against the conservatives especially the landed aristocracy who had never fully accepted him mounted. "We wiped out the cla.s.s struggle on the Left, but unfortunately forgot to finish off the cla.s.s struggle on the Right," he was heard to remark. But now was the worst possible time to encourage divisiveness within the people; the general showdown with the aristocracy would have to wait till the war was over.
On 7 August, the intended show-trials began at the People"s Court in Berlin. The first eight including Witzleben, Hoepner, Stieff, and Yorck of what became a regular procession of the accused were each marched by two policemen into a courtroom bedecked with swastikas, holding around 300 selected spectators (including the journalists hand-picked by Goebbels). There they had to endure the ferocious wrath, scathing contempt, and ruthless humiliation heaped on them by the red-robed president of the court, Judge Roland Freisler. Seated beneath a bust of Hitler, Freisler"s face reflected in its contortions extremes of hatred and derision. He presided over no more than a base mockery of any semblance of a legal trial, with the death-sentence a certainty from the outset. The accused men bore visible signs of their torment in prison. To degrade them even in physical appearance, they were shabbily dressed, without collars and ties, and were handcuffed until seated in the courtroom. Witzleben was even deprived of braces or a belt, so that he had to hold up his trousers with one hand. The accused were not allowed to express themselves properly or explain their motivation before Freisler cut them short, bawling insults, calling them knaves, traitors, cowardly murderers. The order had been given probably by Goebbels, though undoubtedly with Hitler"s authorization for the court proceedings to be filmed with a view to showing extracts in the newsreels as well as in a "doc.u.mentary" ent.i.tled "Traitors before the People"s Court". So loudly did Freisler shout that the cameramen had to inform him that he was ruining their sound recordings. Nevertheless, the accused managed some moments of courageous defiance. For instance, after the death sentence had predictably been p.r.o.nounced, General Fellgiebel uttered: "Then hurry with the hanging, Mr President; otherwise you will hang earlier than we." And Field-Marshal von Witzleben called out: "You can hand us over to the hangman. In three months the enraged and tormented people will call you to account, and will drag you alive through the muck of the street." Such a black farce were the trials that even Reich Justice Minister Otto Georg Thierack, himself a fanatical n.a.z.i who in his ideological ardour had by this time surrendered practically the last vestiges of a completely perverted legal system to the arbitrary police lawlessness of the SS, subsequently complained about Freisler"s conduct.
Once the verdicts had been p.r.o.nounced, the condemned men were taken off, many of them to Plotzensee Prison in Berlin. On Hitler"s instructions they were denied any last rites or pastoral care (though this callous order was at least partially bypa.s.sed in practice). The normal mode of execution for civilian capital offences in the Third Reich was beheading. But Hitler had reportedly ordered that he wanted those behind the conspiracy of 20 July 1944 "hanged, hung up like meat-carca.s.ses". In the small, single-storey execution room, with whitewashed walls, divided by a black curtain, hooks, indeed like meat-hooks, had been placed on a rail just below the ceiling. Usually, the only light in the room came from two windows, dimly revealing a frequently used guillotine. Now, however, certainly for the first groups of conspirators being led to their doom, the executions were to be filmed and photographed, and the macabre scene was illuminated with bright lights, like a film studio. On a small table in the corner of the room stood a table with a bottle of cognac for the executioners, not to steady the nerves of the victims. The condemned men were led in, handcuffed and wearing prison trousers. There were no last words, no comfort from a priest or pastor; nothing but the black humour of the hangman. Eye-witness accounts speak of the steadfastness and dignity of those executed. The hanging was carried out within twenty seconds of the prisoner entering the room. Death was not, however, immediate. Sometimes it came quickly; in other cases, the agony was slow lasting more than twenty minutes. In an added gratuitous obscenity, some of the condemned men had their trousers pulled down by their executioners before they died. And all the time the camera whirred. The photographs and grisly film were taken to Fuhrer Headquarters. Speer later reported seeing a pile of such photographs lying on Hitler"s map-table when he visited the Wolf"s Lair on 18 August. SS-men and some civilians, he added, went into a viewing of the executions in the cinema that evening, though they were not joined by any members of the Wehrmacht. Whether Hitler saw the film of the executions is uncertain; the testimony is contradictory.
Most of the executions connected with the attempted coup of 20 July 1944 followed within the next weeks. Some took place only months later. By the time the blood-letting subsided, the death-toll of those directly implicated numbered around 200. But it was. .h.i.tler"s last triumph.
The Stauffenberg plot left its lasting mark on him. The injuries he had suffered in the bomb blast had been, as we saw, relatively superficial. As if to emphasize his own indestructibility and his manliness in surmounting pain, he made light of his injuries and even joked about them to his entourage. But they were less trivial than Hitler himself implied. Blood was still seeping through the bandages from the skin wounds almost a fortnight after the bomb-attack. He suffered sharp pain in especially the right ear, and his hearing was impaired. He was treated by Dr Erwin Giesing, an ear, nose, and throat specialist in a nearby hospital, then by Professor Karl von Eicken, who had removed a throat polyp in 1935 and was now flown in from Berlin. But the ruptured eardrums, the worst injury, continued bleeding for days, and took several weeks to heal. He thought for some time that his right ear would never recover. The disturbance to his balance from the inner-ear injuries made his eyes turn to the right and gave him a tendency to lean rightwards when he walked. There was also frequent dizziness and malaise. His blood pressure was too high. He looked aged, ill, and strained. Eleven days after the attack on his life, he told those present at the daily military briefing that he was unfit to speak in public for the time being; he could not stand up for long, feared a sudden attack of dizziness, and was also worried about not walking straight. A few weeks later, Hitler admitted to his doctor, Morell, that the weeks since the bomb-attack had been "the worst of his life" adding that he had mastered the difficulties "with a heroism no German could dream of". Strangely, the trembling in Hitler"s left leg and hands practically disappeared following the blast. Morell attributed it to the nervous shock. By mid-September, however, the tremor had returned. By this time, the heavy daily doses of pills and injections could do nothing to head off the long-term deterioration in Hitler"s health. At least as serious were the psychological effects.
His sense of distrust and betrayal now reached paranoid levels. Outward precautions were swiftly taken. Security was at once ma.s.sively tightened at Fuhrer Headquarters. At military briefings, all personnel were from now on thoroughly searched for weapons and explosives. Hitler"s food and medicines were tested for poison. Any presents of foodstuffs, such as chocolates or caviar (which he was fond of ), were immediately destroyed. But the outward security measures could do nothing to alter the deep shock that some of his own generals had turned against him. According to Guderian, whom he appointed as successor to Zeitzler as Chief of the Army General Staff within hours of Stauffenberg"s bomb exploding, "he believed no one any more. It had already been difficult enough dealing with him; it now became a torture that grew steadily worse from month to month. He frequently lost all self-control and his language grew increasingly violent. In his intimate circle he now found no restraining influence."
In 1918, according to his distorted vision of the momentous weeks of defeat and revolution, enemies from within had stabbed in the back those fighting at the front. His entire life in politics had been aimed at reversing that disaster, and in eliminating any possible repet.i.tion in a new war. Now, a new variant of such treachery had emerged led, this time, not by Marxist subversives at home threatening the military effort, but by officers of the Wehrmacht who had come close to undermining the war-effort on the home front. Suspicion had always been deeply embedded in Hitler"s nature. But the events of 20 July now transformed the underlying suspicion into the most visceral belief in treachery and betrayal all around him in the army, aimed once more at stabbing in the back a nation engaged in a t.i.tanic struggle for its very survival.
Alongside the thirsting for brutal revenge, the failed bomb-plot gave a further mighty boost to Hitler"s sense of walking with destiny. With "Providence" on his side, as he imagined, his survival was to him the guarantee that he would fulfil his historic mission. It intensified the descent into pure messianism. "These criminals who wanted to do away with me have no idea what would have happened to the German people," Hitler told his secretaries. "They don"t know the plans of our enemies, who want to annihilate Germany so that it can never arise again. If they think that the western powers are strong enough without Germany to hold Bolshevism in check, they are deceiving themselves. This war must be won by us. Otherwise Europe will be lost to Bolshevism. And I will see to it that no one else can hold me back or eliminate me. I am the only one who knows the danger, and the only one who can prevent it." Such sentiments were redolent, through a distorting mirror, of the Wagnerian redeemer-figure, a hero who alone could save the holders of the Grail, indeed the world itself, from disaster a latter-day Parsifal.
But, once more looking to his own place in history, and to the reasons why the path of destiny had led to mounting tragedy for Germany, instead of glorious victory, he found a further reason, beyond the treachery of his generals: the weakness of the people. If Speer can be believed, Hitler gave at this time an intimation that the German people might not deserve him, might have proved weak, have failed its test before history, and thus be condemned to destruction. It was one of the few hints, whether in public or in private, amid the continued outpourings of optimism about the outcome of the war, that Hitler indeed contemplated, even momentarily, the possibility of total defeat.
Whatever the positive gloss he instinctively and insistently placed upon news of the latest setbacks as he continued to play the role of Fuhrer to perfection, he was not devoid of understanding for the significance of the successful landing of the western Allies in Normandy, the dramatic collapse of the eastern front which left the Red Army in striking distance of the borders of the Reich itself, the ceaseless bombing that the Luftwaffe was powerless to prevent, the overwhelming Allied superiority in weaponry and raw materials, and gloomy reports of a mounting, critical fuel shortage. Kluge and Rommel had both urged Hitler to end the war which he could not win. But he continued to dismiss out of hand all talk of suing for peace. The situationwas "not yet ripe for a political solution", he declared. "To hope for a favourable political moment to do something during a time of severe military defeats is naturally childish and naive," he went on, during the military briefing session with his generals on 31 August 1944. "Such moments can present themselves when you have successes." But where were the successes likely to materialize? All he could point to was a feeling of certainty that at some point the Allied coalition would break down under the weight of its inner tensions. It was a matter of waiting for that moment, however tough the situation was.
"My task has been," he continued, "especially since 1941 under no circ.u.mstances to lose my nerve." He lived, he said, just to carry out this struggle since he knew that it it could only be won through a will of iron. Instead of spreading this iron will, the General Staff officers had undermined it, disseminating nothing but pessimism. But the fight would continue, if necessary even on the Rhine. He once more evoked one of his great heroes of history. "We will under all circ.u.mstances carry on the struggle until, as Frederick the Great said, one of our d.a.m.ned opponents is tired of fighting any longer, and until we get a peace which secures the existence of the German nation for the next fifty or a hundred years and" he was back at a central obsession "which, above all, does not defile our honour a second time, as happened in 1918." This thought brought him directly to the bomb plot, and to his own survival. "Fate could have taken a different turn," he continued, adding with some pathos: "If my life had been ended, it would have been for me personally, I might say, only a liberation from worries, sleepless nights, and severe nervous strain. In a mere fraction of a second you"re freed from all that and have rest and your eternal peace. For the fact that I"m still alive, I nevertheless have to thank Providence."
They were somewhat rambling thoughts. But they were plain enough in meaning: a negotiated peace could not be considered except from a position of strength (which was in realistic terms unimaginable); the only hope was to hold out until the Allied coalition collapsed (but time, and the cra.s.s imbalance of material resources, were scarcely on Germany"s side); his historic role, as he saw it, was to eradicate any possibility of a second capitulation on the lines of that of November 1918; he alone stood between Germany and calamity; but suicide would bring release for him (whatever the consequences for the German people) within a split second. In Hitler"s extraordinary perspective, his historic task was to continue the fight to the point of utter destruction and even self-destruction in order to prevent another "November 1918" and to erase the memory of that "disgrace" for the nation. It was a task of infinitely greater honour than negotiating a peace from weakness something which would bring new shame on himself and the German people. It amounted to scarcely less than a realization that the time for a last stand was approaching, and that no holds would be barred in a struggle likely to end in oblivion, where the only remaining monumental vision was the quest for historical greatness even if Reich and people should go down in flames in the process.
This meant in turn that there was no way out. The failure of the conspiracy to remove Hitler took away the last opportunity of a negotiated end to the war. The horrors of a war which Germany had inflicted on the rest of Europe were rebounding if, even now, in far milder form on to the Reich itself. With internal resistance crushed, and a leadership unable to bring victory, incapable of staving off defeat, and unwilling to attempt to find peace, only total military destruction could bring a release.
For Hitler"s countless victims throughout Europe, the human misery had, in fact, still not reached its peak. It would rise in crescendo in the months still to come.
II.
The inst.i.tutional pillars of the regime the Wehrmacht, the party, ministries of state, and the SS-controlled security apparatus remained intact in the second half of 1944. And Hitler, the keystone bonding the regime"s structure together, was still, paradoxically, indispensable to its survival while by now even in the eyes of some close to the leadership at the same time driving Germany inexorably towards perdition. The predictable rallying round Hitler following the July a.s.sa.s.sination attempt could not for long conceal the fact that the regime"s edifice was beginning to crumble as the n.a.z.i empire throughout Europe shrivelled and the increasing certainty of a lost war made even some of those who had gained most from n.a.z.ism start looking for possible exit-routes. The aftermath of the bomb-plot saw the regime enter its most radical phase. But it was a radicalism that mirrored an increasingly desperate regime"s reaction to internal as well as external crisis.
Hitler"s own obvious reaction in the wake of the shock of Stauffenberg"s bomb had been to turn to his firm loyalist base, the party leadership, and to his most long-standing and trusted band of paladins. In the backs-to-the-wall atmosphere of the last months, the party was to play a more dominant role than at any time since the "seizure of power", invoking the overcoming of adversity in the "time of struggle", attempting to instil the "fighting spirit of National Socialism" throughout the entire people in the increasingly vain attempt to combat overwhelming Allied arms and material superiority by little more than fanatical will-power.
As had invariably been the case in a crisis, Hitler had lost no time following the attempted coup on 20 July in ensuring the continued loyalty of the Gauleiter, the party"s provincial chieftains. Among them were some who had been among his most dependable lieutenants for close on two decades. Collectively, the Gauleiter const.i.tuted now, as before, a vital prop of his rule. His provincial viceroys were now, their party positions enhanced through their extensive powers as Reich Defence Commissars, his insurance against any prospect of army-led unrest or possible insurrection in the regions. Increasingly over the next months, as the threads of state administration started to fray and ultimately fell apart, the party chieftains especially those who acted as Reich Defence Commissars in their regions were decisive in holding together in the provinces what was left of n.a.z.i rule.
Extended scope for propaganda, mobilization, and tightened control over the population the overriding tasks of the party as most people looked beyond the end of the regime and looming military defeat into an uncertain future fell to the Reich Defence Commissars in the last desperate drive to maximize resources for "total war". The shortages of available men to be sent to the front, and workers for the armaments industries, had mounted alarmingly throughout the first half of 1944. Hitler"s authorization in January to Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary for Labour Deployment, to make up the manpower shortages through forced labour extracted from the occupied territories, while at the same time according Speer protection for the labour employed in his armaments plants in France, had done nothing to resolve the difficulty and merely sharpened the conflict between Sauckel and Speer. Apart from Speer, the SS, the Wehrmacht, and the party had also proved adept at preventing any inroads into their personnel. Bormann had even presided over a 51 per cent increase in the number of "reserved occupations", exempt from call-up, in the party administration between May 1943 and June 1944.
Meanwhile, the labour shortage had been greatly magnified through the double military disaster in June of the Allied landing in Normandy and the Red Army"s devastating offensive on the eastern front. This had prompted Goebbels and Speer to link their efforts to persuade Hitler to agree to a drastic radicalization of the "home front" to comb out all remaining manpower for the war effort. Both had sent him lengthy memoranda in mid-July, promising huge labour savings to tide over the situation until new weaponry became available and the anti-German coalition broke up. But before the Stauffenberg bomb, Hitler had, as we noted, shown little readiness to comply with their radical demands. Whatever the accompanying rhetoric, and the undoubted feeling (which Goebbels"s own propaganda had helped feed) among the underprivileged that many of the better-off were still able to escape the burdens of war, and were not pulling their weight in the national cause, such demands were bound to be unpopular in many circles, antagonize powerful vested interests, and also convey an impression of desperation. And, as the state administration rushed to point out, the gains might well be less than impressive; only one in twelve of those in the civil service who had not been called up was under forty-three, and more than two-thirds were over fifty-five years old.
Hitler had told his Propaganda Minister as recently as June that the time was not ripe for "a big appeal to total war in the true meaning of the word", that the crises would be surmounted "in the usual way", but that he would be ready to introduce "wholly abnormal measures" should "more serious crises take place". Hitler"s change of mind, directly following the failed a.s.sa.s.sination attempt, in deciding to grant Goebbels the new authority he had coveted, as Reich Plenipotentiary for the Total War Effort, was a tacit admission that the regime was faced with a more fundamental crisis than ever before.
Goebbels"s decisive action to put down the uprising on 20 July unquestionably weighed heavily in his favour when Hitler looked for the man to supervise the radicalization of the home front. And where before he had faced a hesitant Hitler, he was now pushing at an open door in his demands for draconian measures. The decision had in effect already been taken when, at a meeting of ministerial representatives along with some other leading figures in the regime two days after Stauffenberg"s a.s.sa.s.sination attempt, head of the Reich Chancellery Lammers proposed the bestowing of wide-ranging powers on the Propaganda Minister to bring about the reform of the state and public life. Himmler was given extensive complementary powers at the same time to reorganize the Wehrmacht and comb out all remaining manpower. The following day, 23 July, the regime"s leaders, now joined by Goring, a.s.sembled at the Wolf "s Lair, where Hitler himself, heavily leaning on Goebbels"s memorandum of the previous week, confirmed the new role of the Propaganda Minister. Hitler demanded "something fundamental" if the war were still to be won. Ma.s.sive reserves were available, he claimed, but had not been deployed. This would now have to be done without respect to person, position, or office. He pointed to the party in the early days, which had achieved "the greatest historic success" with only a simple administrative apparatus. Goebbels noted with interest the change in Hitler"s views since their previous meeting a month or so earlier. The a.s.sa.s.sination attempt and the events on the eastern front had produced clarity in his decisions, Goebbels noted in his diary. To his own staff, the Propaganda Minister laconically remarked that "it takes a bomb under his a.r.s.e to make Hitler see reason".
Goebbels relished his moment of triumph. He appeared to have finally achieved what he had desired for so long: control over the "home front" with "the most extensive plenipotentiary powers ... that have up to now been granted in the National Socialist Reich", with rights the decisive factor in his view to issue directives to ministers and the highest-ranking governmental authorities. To his staff, he spoke of having "practically full dictatorial powers" within the Reich.
However, nothing was ever quite what it seemed in the Third Reich. The decree itself limited Goebbels"s powers in some respects. He could issue directives to the "highest Reich authorities". But only they could issue any consequential decrees and ordinances. And these had to be agreed with Lammers, Bormann, and Himmler (in the capacity he had adopted when becoming Interior Minister, as Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration). Any directives related to the party itself had to have Bormann"s support (and, behind Bormann, to correspond with Hitler"s own wishes). Unresolved objections to Goebbels"s directives had to pa.s.s to Lammers for Hitler"s own final decision. Beyond the wording of the decree itself, Hitler let Goebbels know that those authorities directly responsible to him those involved in the rebuilding plans for Berlin, Munich, and Linz, his motor-vehicle staff, and the personnel of the Reich Chancellery, Presidential Chancellery, and Party Chancellery were also excluded from the directives. The Wehrmacht, its recruitment now under Himmler"s authority, had been exempt from the outset.
Such restrictions on his powers left Goebbels"s enthusiasm for his new task undimmed. The belief that "will" would overcome all problems was immediately put into action as with his usual forceful energy he unleashed a veritable frenzy of activity in his new role. The staff of fifty that he rapidly a.s.sembled from a number of ministries, most prominently from his own Propaganda Ministry, prided themselves on their unbureaucratic methods, swift decision-making, and improvisation. As his main agents in ensuring that directives were implemented in the regions, leaving no stone unturned in the quest to comb out all reserves of untapped labour, Goebbels looked to the party"s Gauleiter, bolstering their already extensive powers as Reich Defence Commissars. They could be relied upon, in his view, to reinvoke the spirit of the "time of struggle", to ensure that bureaucracy did not get in the way of action. (In practice, the cooperation of the Gauleiter was a.s.sured as long as no inroads were made into the personnel of their own party offices. Bormann ensured that they were well protected.) Behind the actionism of the party, Goebbels also needed Hitler"s backing. He ensured that this was forthcoming through a constant stream of bulletins on progress (Fuhrer-Informationen), printed out on a "Fuhrer-Machine" a typewriter with greatly enlarged characters which Hitler"s failing eyesight could cope with recording successes and couching general recommendations (such as simplifying unnecessary bureaucratic paperwork) in such a way that, given Hitler"s frame of mind, approval would be as good as automatic, thereby opening up yet further avenues for intervention. Nevertheless, Hitler did not give blanket approval to all measures suggested by Goebbels. He could rely upon Bormann to bring to his attention any proposals which his own still sharp antennae would tell him might have an unnecessarily harmful impact on morale, both at home and quite especially among soldiers at the front.
Goebbels certainly produced a new, extreme austerity drive within Germany in the first weeks in his new office as Total War Plenipoteniary. But a large proportion of the 451,800 men sifted out of the administration and economy were too old for military service. Goebbels was forced, therefore, to turn to fit men in reserved occupations work thought essential for the war-effort, including skilled employment in armaments factories or food production. Their replacement, where possible, by older, less fit, less experienced, less qualified workers was both administratively complicated and inefficient. And the net addition of women workers numbered only little over quarter of a million. Athough, partly through Goebbels"s measures, it proved possible to send around a million men to the front between August and December 1944, German losses in the first three of those months numbered 1,189,000 dead and wounded. Whatever the trumpeting by Goebbels of his achievements as Reich Plenipotentiary for the Total War Effort, the reality was that he was sc.r.a.ping the bottom of the barrel.
And among the most bizarre aspects of the "total war" drive in the secon