Kahr had been reading out his prepared speech to the 3,000 or so packed into the Burgerbraukeller for about half an hour when, around 8.30 p.m., there was a disturbance at the entrance. Kahr broke off his speech. A body of men in steel helmets appeared. Hitler"s stormtroopers had arrived. A heavy machine-gun was pushed into the hall. People were standing on their seats trying to see what was happening as. .h.i.tler advanced through the hall, accompanied by two armed bodyguards, their pistols pointing at the ceiling. Hitler stood on a chair but, unable to make himself heard in the tumult, took out his Browning pistol and fired a shot through the ceiling. He then announced that the national revolution had broken out, and that the hall was surrounded by 600 armed men. If there was trouble, he said, he would bring a machine-gun into the gallery. The Bavarian government was deposed; a provisional Reich government would be formed. It was by this time around 8.45 p.m. Hitler requested though it was really an order Kahr, Lossow, and Seier to accompany him into the adjoining room. He guaranteed their safety. After some hesitation, they complied. There was bedlam in the hall, but eventually Goring managed to make himself heard. He said the action was directed neither at Kahr nor at the army and police. People should stay calm and remain in their places. "You"ve got your beer," he added. This quietened things somewhat.
In the adjoining room, Hitler announced, waving his pistol about, that no one would leave without his permission. He declared the formation of a new Reich government, headed by himself. Ludendorff was to be in charge of the national army, Lossow would be Reichswehr Minister, Seier Police Minister, Kahr himself would be head of state as regent (Landesverweser) (Landesverweser), and Pohner Minister President with dictatorial powers in Bavaria. He apologized for having to force the pace, but it had to be done: he had had to enable the triumvirate to act. If things went wrong, he had four bullets in his pistol three for his collaborators, the last for himself.
Hitler returned to the hall after about ten minutes amid renewed tumult. He repeated Goring"s a.s.surances that the action was not directed at the police and Reichswehr, but "solely at the Berlin Jew government and the November criminals of 1918". He put forward his proposals for the new governments in Berlin and Munich, now mentioning Ludendorff as "leader, and chief with dictatorial power, of the German national army". He told the crowded hall that matters were taking longer than he had earlier predicted. "Outside are Kahr, Lossow, and Seier," he declared. "They are struggling hard to reach a decision. May I say to them that you will stand behind them?" As the crowd bellowed back its approval, Hitler, with his p.r.o.nounced sense of the theatrical, announced in emotional terms: "I can say this to you: Either the German revolution begins tonight or we will all be dead by dawn!" By the time he had finished his short address the mood in the hall had swung completely in his favour.
About an hour had pa.s.sed since Hitler"s initial entry into the hall before he and Ludendorff (who had meanwhile arrived, dressed in full uniform of the Imperial Army), together with the Bavarian ruling triumvirate, returned to the podium. Kahr, calm, face like a mask, spoke first, announcing to tumultuous applause that he had agreed to serve Bavaria as regent for the monarchy. Hitler, with a euphoric expression resembling childlike delight, declared that he would direct the policy of the new Reich government, and warmly clasped Kahr"s hand. Ludendorff, deadly earnest, spoke next, mentioning his surprise at the whole business. Lossow, wearing a somewhat impenetrable expression, and Seier, the most agitated of the group, were pressed by Hitler into speaking. Pohner finally promised cooperation with Kahr. Hitler shook hands once more with the whole ensemble. He was the undoubted star of the show. It appeared to be his night.
From this point, however, things went badly wrong. The hurried improvisation of the planning, the hectic rush to prepare at only a day"s notice, that had followed Hitler"s impatient insistence that the putsch should be advanced to the evening of the Burgerbraukeller meeting, now took its toll, determining the shambolic course of the night"s events. Rohm did manage to occupy the Reichswehr headquarters, though amazingly failed to take over the telephone switchboard, allowing Lossow to order the transport to Munich of loyalist troops in nearby towns and cities. Frick and Pohner were also initially successful in taking control at police headquarters. Elsewhere, the situation was deteriorating rapidly. In a night of chaos, the putschists failed dismally, largely owing to their own disorganization, to take control of barracks and government buildings. The early and partial successes were for the most part rapidly overturned. Neither the army nor the state police joined forces with the putschists.
Back at the Burgerbraukeller, Hitler, too, was making his first mistake of the evening. Hearing reports of difficulties the putschists were encountering at the Engineers" Barracks, he decided to go there himself in what proved a vain attempt to intervene. Ludendorff was left in charge at the Burgerbraukeller and, believing the word of officers and gentlemen, promptly let Kahr, Lossow, and Seier depart. They were then free to renege on the promises extracted from them under duress by Hitler.
By late evening, Kahr, Lossow, and Seier were in positions to a.s.sure the state authorities that they repudiated the putsch. All German radio stations were informed of this by Lossow at 2.55 a.m. By the early hours, it was becoming clear to the putschists themselves that the triumvirate and far more importantly the Reichswehr and state police opposed the coup. At 5 a.m. Hitler was still giving a.s.surances that he was determined to fight and die for the cause a sign that by this time at the latest he, too, had lost confidence in the success of the putsch.
The putschist leaders were themselves by this time unclear what to do next. They sat around arguing, while the government forces regrouped. There was no fall-back position. Hitler was as clueless as the others. He was far from in control of the situation. As the bitterly cold morning dawned, depressed troops began to drift off from the Burgerbraukeller. Around 8 a.m. Hitler sent some of his SA men to seize bundles of 50-billion Mark notes direct from the printing press to keep his troops paid. It was more or less the only practical action taken as the putsch started rapidly to crumble.
Only during the course of the morning did Hitler and Ludendorff come up with the idea of a demonstration march through the city. Ludendorff apparently made the initial suggestion. The aim was predictably confused and unclear. "In Munich, Nuremberg, Bayreuth, an immeasurable jubilation, an enormous enthusiasm would have broken out in the German Reich," Hitler later remarked. "And when the first division of the German national army had left the last square metre of Bavarian soil and stepped for the first time on to Thuringian land, we would have experienced the jubilation of the people there. People would have had to recognize that the German misery has an end, that redemption could only come about through a rising." It amounted to a vague hope that the march would stir popular enthusiasm for the putsch, and that the army, faced with the fervour of the mobilized ma.s.ses and the prospect of firing on the war-hero Ludendorff, would change its mind. The gathering acclaim of the ma.s.ses and the support of the army would then pave the way for a triumphant march on Berlin. Such was the wild illusion gesture politics born out of pessimism, depression, and despair. Reality did not take long to a.s.sert itself.
Around noon, the column of about 2,000 men many of them, including Hitler, armed set out from the Burgerbraukeller. Pistols at the ready, they confronted a small police cordon on the Ludwigsbrucke and under threat swept it aside, headed to Marienplatz, in the centre of the city, and decided then to march to the War Ministry. They gained encouragement from throngs of shouting and waving supporters on the pavements. Some thought they were witnessing the arrival of the new government. The putschists could not help but note, however, that many of the posters proclaiming the national revolution had already been ripped down or papered over with new directions from the ruling triumvirate. The partic.i.p.ants on the march knew the cause was lost. One of them remarked that it was like a funeral procession.
At the top of the Residenzstrae, as it approaches Odeonsplatz, the marchers encountered the second, and larger, police cordon. "Here they come. Heil Hitler!" a bystander cried out. Then shots rang out. When the firing ceased, fourteen putschists and four policemen lay dead.
The dead included one of the putsch architects, Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, who had been in the front line of the putsch leaders, linking arms with Hitler, just behind the standard-bearers. Had the bullet which killed Scheubner-Richter been a foot to the right, history would have taken a different course. As it was, Hitler either took instant evasive action, or was wrenched to the ground by Scheubner-Richter. In any event, he dislocated his left shoulder. Goring was among those injured, shot in the leg. He and a number of other leading putschists were able to escape over the Austrian border. Some, including Streicher, Frick, Pohner, Amann, and Rohm, were immediately arrested. Ludendorff, who had emerged from the shoot-out totally unscathed, gave himself up and was released on his officer"s word.
Hitler himself was attended to by Dr Walter Schultze, chief of the Munich SA medical corps, pushed into his car, stationed nearby, and driven at speed from the scene of the action. He ended up at Hanfstaengl"s home in Uffing, near the Staffelsee, south of Munich, where the police, on the evening of 11 November, found and arrested him. While at Hanfstaengl"s Putzi himself had taken flight to Austria he composed the first of his "political testaments", placing the party chairmanship in Rosenberg"s hands, with Amann as his deputy. Hitler, according to Hanfstaengl"s later account, based on his wife"s testimony, was desolate on arrival in Uffing. But later stories that he had to be restrained from suicide have no firm backing. He was depressed but calm, dressed in a white nightgown, his injured left arm in a sling, when the police arrived to escort him to prison in the old fortress at Landsberg am Lech, a picturesque little town some forty miles west of Munich. Thirty-nine guards were on hand to greet him in his new place of residence. Graf Arco, the killer of Kurt Eisner, the Bavarian premier murdered in February 1919, was evicted from his s.p.a.cious Cell no. 7 to make room for the new, high-ranking prisoner.
In Munich and other parts of Bavaria, the putsch fizzled out as rapidly as it had started. Hitler was finished. At least, he should have been.
V.
Like the high-point of a dangerous fever, the crisis had pa.s.sed, then rapidly subsided. The following months brought currency stabilization with the introduction of the Rentenmark, regulation of the reparations issue through the Dawes Plan (named after the American banker Charles G. Dawes, head of the committee which established in 1924 a provisional framework for the phased payment of reparations, commencing at a low level and linked to foreign loans for Germany), and the beginning of the political stabilization that marked the end of the post-war turbulence and was to last until the new economic shock-waves of the late 1920s. With Hitler in jail, the NSDAP banned, and the volkisch volkisch movement split into its component factions, the threat from the extreme Right lost its immediate potency. movement split into its component factions, the threat from the extreme Right lost its immediate potency.
Sympathies with the radical Right by no means disappeared. With 33 per cent of the votes in Munich, the Volkischer Block (the largest grouping in the now fractured volkisch volkisch movement) was the strongest party in the city at the Landtag elections on 6 April 1924, gaining more votes than both the Socialists and Communists put together. At the Reichstag election on 4 May, the result was little different. The Volkischer Block won 28.5 per cent of the vote in Munich, 17 per cent overall in the electoral region of Upper Bavaria and Swabia, and 20.8 per cent in Franconia. But the bubble had burst. As Germany recovered and the Right remained in disarray, voters deserted the movement) was the strongest party in the city at the Landtag elections on 6 April 1924, gaining more votes than both the Socialists and Communists put together. At the Reichstag election on 4 May, the result was little different. The Volkischer Block won 28.5 per cent of the vote in Munich, 17 per cent overall in the electoral region of Upper Bavaria and Swabia, and 20.8 per cent in Franconia. But the bubble had burst. As Germany recovered and the Right remained in disarray, voters deserted the volkisch volkisch movement. By the second Reichstag elections of 1924, a fortnight before Hitler"s release from Landsberg, the vote for the Volkischer Block had dwindled to residual limits of 7.5 per cent in Franconia, 4.8 per cent in Upper Bavaria/Swabia, and 3.0 per cent in Lower Bavaria (compared with 10.2 per cent there eight months earlier). movement. By the second Reichstag elections of 1924, a fortnight before Hitler"s release from Landsberg, the vote for the Volkischer Block had dwindled to residual limits of 7.5 per cent in Franconia, 4.8 per cent in Upper Bavaria/Swabia, and 3.0 per cent in Lower Bavaria (compared with 10.2 per cent there eight months earlier).
Bavaria, for all its continuing ingrained oddities, was no longer the boiling cauldron of radical Right insurgency it had been between 1920 and 1923. The paramilitary organizations had had their teeth drawn in the confrontation with the legal forces of the state. Without the support of the army, they were shown to be little more than a paper tiger. In the aftermath of the putsch, the Kampfbund organizations were dissolved, and the "patriotic a.s.sociations" in general had their weaponry confiscated, a ban imposed on their military exercises, and their activities greatly curtailed. The triumvirate installed by the Bavarian government as a force on the Right to contain the wilder and even more extreme nationalist paramilitaries lost power and credibility through the putsch. Kahr, Lossow, and Seier were all ousted by early 1924. With the General Commissariat terminated, conventional cabinet government under a new Minister President, Dr Heinrich Held the leading figure in the Catholic establishment party in Bavaria, the BVP and with it a degree of calm, returned to Bavarian politics.
Even now, however, the forces which had given Hitler his entree into politics and enabled him to develop into a key factor on the Bavarian Right contrived to save him when his "career" ought to have been over. The "Hitler-Putsch" was, as we have seen, by no means merely Hitler"s putsch. The Bavarian Reichswehr had colluded ma.s.sively in the training and preparation of the forces which had tried to take over the state. And important personages had been implicated in the putsch attempt. Whatever their subsequent defence of their actions, the hands of Kahr, Lossow, and Seier were dirty, while the war hero General Ludendorff had been the spiritual figurehead of the entire enterprise. There was every reason, therefore, in the trial of the putsch leaders held in Munich between 26 February and 27 March 1924 to let the spotlight fall completely on Hitler. He was only too glad to play the role a.s.signed to him.
Hitler"s first reaction to his indictment had been very different from his later triumphalist performance in the Munich court. He had initially refused to say anything, and announced that he was going on hunger-strike. At this time, he plainly saw everything as lost. According to the prison psychologist though speaking many years after the event Hitler stated: "I"ve had enough. I"m finished. If I had a revolver, I would take it." Drexler later claimed that he himself had dissuaded Hitler from his intention to commit suicide.
By the time the trial opened, Hitler"s stance had changed diametrically. He was allowed to turn the courtroom into a stage for his own propaganda, accepting full responsibility for what had happened, not merely justifying but glorifying his role in attempting to overthrow the Weimar state. This was in no small measure owing to his threats to expose the complicity in treasonable activity of Kahr, Lossow, and Seier and in particular the role of the Bavarian Reichswehr.
The ruling forces in Bavaria did what they could to limit potential damage. The first priority was to make sure that the trial was held under Bavarian jurisdiction. In strict legality, the trial ought not to have taken place in Munich at all, but at the Reich Court in Leipzig. However, the Reich government gave way to pressure from the Bavarian government. The trial was set for the People"s Court in Munich.
Kahr had hoped to avoid any trial, or at least have no more than a perfunctory one where the indicted would plead guilty but claim mitigating grounds of patriotism. Since some at least of the putschists would not agree, this course of action had to be dropped. But it seems highly probable that the accused were offered leniency for such a proposal even to have been considered. Hitler had, at any rate, become confident about the outcome. He still held a trump card in his hand. When Hanfstaengl visited him in his cell in the courthouse, during the trial, he showed no fear of the verdict. "What can they do to me?" he asked. "I only need to come out with a bit more, especially about Lossow, and there"s the big scandal. Those in the know are well aware of that." This, and the att.i.tude of the presiding judge and his fellow judges, explains. .h.i.tler"s self-confident appearance at the trial.
Among those indicted alongside Hitler were Ludendorff, Pohner, Frick, Weber (of Bund Oberland), Rohm, and Kriebel. But the indictment itself was emphatic that "Hitler was the soul of the entire enterprise". Judge Neithardt, the president of the court, had reputedly stated before the trial that Ludendorff would be acquitted. The judge replaced a damaging record of Ludendorff "s first interrogation by one which indicated his ignorance about the putsch preparations. Hitler, meanwhile, was given the freedom of the courtroom. One journalist attending the trial described it as a "political carnival". He compared the deference shown to the defendants with the brusque way those arraigned for their actions in the Raterepublik had been handled. He heard one of the judges, after Hitler"s first speech, remark: "What a tremendous chap, this. .h.i.tler!" Hitler was allowed to appear in his suit, not prison garb, sporting his Iron Cross, First Cla.s.s. Ludendorff, not held in prison, arrived in a luxury limousine. Dr Weber, though under arrest, was allowed to take a Sunday afternoon walk round Munich. The extraordinary bias of the presiding judge was later most severely criticized both in Berlin and by the Bavarian government, irritated at the way attacks on the Reichswehr and state police had been allowed without contradiction. Judge Neithardt was informed in no uncertain terms during the trial of the "embarra.s.sing impression" left by allowing Hitler to speak for four hours. His only response was that it was impossible to interrupt the torrent of words. Hitler was also allowed the freedom to interrogate witnesses above all Kahr, Lossow, and Seier at length, frequently deviating into politically loaded statements.
When the verdicts were read out four days after the trial ended, on 1 April 1924, Ludendorff was duly acquitted which he took as an insult. Hitler, along with Weber, Kriebel, and Pohner, was sentenced to a mere five years" imprisonment for high treason (less the four months and two weeks he had already been in custody), and a fine of 200 Gold Marks (or a further twenty days" imprisonment). The others indicted received even milder sentences. The lay judges, as. .h.i.tler later acknowledged, had only been prepared to accept a verdict of "guilty" on condition that he received the mildest sentence, with the prospect of early release. The court explained why it rejected the deportation of Hitler under the terms of the "Protection of the Republic Act": "Hitler is a German-Austrian. He considers himself to be a German. In the opinion of the court, the meaning and intention of the terms of section 9, para II of the Law for the Protection of the Republic cannot apply to a man who thinks and feels as German as. .h.i.tler, who voluntarily served for four and a half years in the German army at war, who attained high military honours through outstanding bravery in the face of the enemy, was wounded, suffered other damage to his health, and was released from the military into the control of the District Command Munich I."
Even on the conservative Right in Bavaria, the conduct of the trial and sentences prompted amazement and disgust. In legal terms, the sentence was nothing short of scandalous. No mention was made in the verdict of the four policemen shot by the putschists; the robbery of 14,605 billion paper Marks (the equivalent of around 28,000 Gold Marks) was entirely played down; the destruction of the offices of the SPD newspaper Munchener Post Munchener Post and the taking of a number of Social Democratic city councillors as hostages were not blamed on Hitler; and no word was made of the text of a new const.i.tution, found in the pocket of the dead putschist von der Pfordten. Nor did the judge"s reasons for the sentence make any reference to the fact that Hitler was still technically within the probationary period for good behaviour imposed on him in the sentence for breach of the peace in January 1922. Legally, he was not eligible for any further probation. and the taking of a number of Social Democratic city councillors as hostages were not blamed on Hitler; and no word was made of the text of a new const.i.tution, found in the pocket of the dead putschist von der Pfordten. Nor did the judge"s reasons for the sentence make any reference to the fact that Hitler was still technically within the probationary period for good behaviour imposed on him in the sentence for breach of the peace in January 1922. Legally, he was not eligible for any further probation.
The judge in that first Hitler trial was the same person as the judge presiding over his trial for high treason in 1924: the nationalist sympathizer Georg Neithardt.
Hitler returned to Landsberg to begin his light sentence in conditions more akin to those of a hotel than a penitentiary. The windows of his large, comfortably furnished room on the first floor afforded an expansive view over the attractive countryside. Dressed in lederhosen, he could relax with a newspaper in an easy wicker chair, his back to a laurel wreath provided by admirers, or sit at a large desk sifting through the mounds of correspondence he received. He was treated with great respect by his jailers, some of whom secretly greeted him with "Heil Hitler", and accorded every possible privilege. Gifts, flowers, letters of support, encomiums of praise, all poured in. He received more visitors than he could cope with over 500 of them before he eventually felt compelled to restrict access. Around forty fellow-prisoners, some of them volunteer internees, able to enjoy almost all the comforts of normal daily life, fawned on him. He read of the demonstration on 23 April, to celebrate his thirty-fifth birthday three days earlier, of 3,000 National Socialists, former front soldiers, and supporters of the volkisch volkisch movement in the Burgerbraukeller "in honour of the man who had lit the present flame of liberation and movement in the Burgerbraukeller "in honour of the man who had lit the present flame of liberation and volkisch volkisch consciousness in the German people". Under the impact of the star-status that the trial had brought him, and the Fuhrer cult that his supporters had begun to form around him, he began to reflect on his political ideas, his "mission", his "restart" in politics once his short sentence was over, and pondered the lessons to be learnt from the putsch. consciousness in the German people". Under the impact of the star-status that the trial had brought him, and the Fuhrer cult that his supporters had begun to form around him, he began to reflect on his political ideas, his "mission", his "restart" in politics once his short sentence was over, and pondered the lessons to be learnt from the putsch.
The debacle at the Burgerbraukeller and its denouement next day at the Feldherrnhalle taught Hitler once and for all that an attempt to seize power in the face of opposition from the armed forces was doomed. He felt justified in his belief that propaganda and ma.s.s mobilization, not paramilitary putschism, would open the path to the "national revolution". Consequently, he distanced himself from Rohm"s attempts to revitalize in new guise the Kampfbund and to build a type of people"s militia. Ultimately, the different approaches, as well as power-ambitions, of Hitler and Rohm, would lead to the murderous split in 1934. It would be going too far, however, to presume that Hitler had renounced the idea of a takeover of the state by force in favour of the "legal path". Certainly, he subsequently had to profess a commitment to legality in order to involve himself in politics again. And later, electoral success appeared in any case the best strategy to win power. But the putschist approach was never given up. It continued, as the lingering problems with the SA would indicate, to coexist alongside the proclaimed "legal" way. Hitler was adamant, however, that on any future occasion it could only be with, not against, the Reichswehr.
Hitler"s experience was to lead to the last, and not least, of the lessons he would draw from his "apprenticeship years": that to be the "drummer" was not enough; and that to be more than that meant he needed not only complete mastery in his own movement but, above all, greater freedom from external dependencies, from competing groupings on the Right, from paramilitary organizations he could not fully control, from the bourgeois politicians and army figures who had smoothed his political rise, used him, then dropped him when it suited them.
The ambivalence about his intended role after the "national revolution" was still present in his comments during his trial. He insisted that he saw Ludendorff as the "military leader of the coming Germany" and "leader of the coming great showdown". But he claimed that he himself was "the political leader of this young Germany". The precise division of labour had, he said, not been determined. In his closing address to the court, Hitler returned to the leadership question though still in somewhat vague and indeterminate fashion. He referred to Lossow"s remarks to the court that during discussions in spring 1923 he had thought Hitler had merely wanted "as propagandist and awakener to arouse the people". "How petty do small men think," went on Hitler. He did not see the attainment of a ministerial post as worthy of a great man. What he wanted, he said, was to be the destroyer of Marxism. That was his task. "Not from modesty did I want at that time to be the drummer. That is the highest there is. The rest is unimportant." When it came to it, he had demanded two things: that he should be given the leadership of the political struggle; and that the organizational leadership should go to "the hero ... who in the eyes of the entire young Germany is called to it". Hitler hinted though did not state explicitly that this was to have been Ludendorff. On the other hand, in his address to Kampfbund leaders a fortnight before the putsch, he had seemed to envisage Ludendorff as no more than the reorganizer of the future national army. Then again, the proclamation put up during the putsch itself over Hitler"s name as Reich Chancellor appeared to indicate that the headship of government was the position he foresaw for himself, sharing dictatorial power with Ludendorff as head of state (Reichsverweser, or regent).
Whatever the ambivalence, real or simply tactical, still present in Hitler"s remarks at the trial, it soon gave way to clarity about his self-image. For in Landsberg the realization dawned on Hitler: he was not the "drummer" after all; he was the predestined Leader himself.
6.
Emergence of the Leader
I.
The year that ought to have seen the spectre of Hitler banished for good brought instead though this could scarcely be clearly seen at the time the genesis of his later absolute pre-eminence in the volkisch volkisch movement and his ascendancy to supreme leadership. In retrospect, the year 1924 can be seen as the time when, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, Hitler could begin his emergence from the ruins of the broken and fragmented movement and his ascendancy to supreme leadership. In retrospect, the year 1924 can be seen as the time when, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, Hitler could begin his emergence from the ruins of the broken and fragmented volkisch volkisch movement to become eventually the absolute leader with total mastery over a reformed, organizationally far stronger, and internally more cohesive n.a.z.i Party. movement to become eventually the absolute leader with total mastery over a reformed, organizationally far stronger, and internally more cohesive n.a.z.i Party.
Nothing could have demonstrated more plainly how indispensable Hitler was to the volkisch volkisch Right than the thirteen months of his imprisonment, the "leaderless time" of the movement. With Hitler removed from the scene and, from June 1924, withdrawing from all involvement in politics to concentrate on the writing of Right than the thirteen months of his imprisonment, the "leaderless time" of the movement. With Hitler removed from the scene and, from June 1924, withdrawing from all involvement in politics to concentrate on the writing of Mein Kampf Mein Kampf, the volkisch volkisch movement descended into squabbling factionalism and internecine strife. By courtesy of Bavarian justice, Hitler had been allowed to use the courtroom to portray himself as the hero of the Right for his role in the putsch. Competing individuals and groups felt compelled to a.s.sert Hitler"s authority and backing for their actions. But in his absence, this was insufficient in itself to ensure success. Moreover, Hitler was often inconsistent, contradictory, or unclear in his views on developments. His claim to a leadership position could not be ignored, and was not disputed. Any claim to exclusive leadership was, however, upheld only by a minority in the movement descended into squabbling factionalism and internecine strife. By courtesy of Bavarian justice, Hitler had been allowed to use the courtroom to portray himself as the hero of the Right for his role in the putsch. Competing individuals and groups felt compelled to a.s.sert Hitler"s authority and backing for their actions. But in his absence, this was insufficient in itself to ensure success. Moreover, Hitler was often inconsistent, contradictory, or unclear in his views on developments. His claim to a leadership position could not be ignored, and was not disputed. Any claim to exclusive leadership was, however, upheld only by a minority in the volkisch volkisch movement. And as long as. .h.i.tler was unable directly to influence developments, the narrow core of his fervent devotees was largely marginalized even within the broad movement. And as long as. .h.i.tler was unable directly to influence developments, the narrow core of his fervent devotees was largely marginalized even within the broad volkisch volkisch Right, often at war with each other, and split on tactics, strategy, and ideology. By the time of his release in December 1924, the Reichstag elections of that month had reflected the catastrophic decline of support for the Right, often at war with each other, and split on tactics, strategy, and ideology. By the time of his release in December 1924, the Reichstag elections of that month had reflected the catastrophic decline of support for the volkisch volkisch movement, which had come to form little more than a group of disunited nationalist and racist sects on the extreme fringe of the political spectrum. movement, which had come to form little more than a group of disunited nationalist and racist sects on the extreme fringe of the political spectrum.
Just before his arrest on 11 November 1923, Hitler had placed Alfred Rosenberg, editor of the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter, in charge of the banned party during his absence, to be supported by Esser, Streicher, and Amann. Like a number of leading n.a.z.is (including He, Scheubner-Richter, and Hitler himself ), Rosenberg"s origins did not lie within the boundaries of the German Reich. Born into a well-off bourgeois family in Reval (now Tallinn), Estonia, the introverted self-styled party "philosopher", dogmatic but dull, arrogant and cold, one of the least charismatic and least popular of n.a.z.i leaders, united other party bigwigs only in their intense dislike of him. Distinctly lacking in leadership qualities, he was scarcely an obvious choice, and was as surprised as others were by Hitler"s nomination. Possibly, as is usually surmised, it was precisely Rosenberg"s lack of leadership ability that commended itself to Hitler. Certainly, a less likely rival to Hitler could scarcely be imagined. But this would presume that Hitler, in the traumatic aftermath of the failed putsch, was capable of lucid, machiavellian planning, that he antic.i.p.ated what would happen and actually wanted and expected his movement to fall apart in his absence. A more likely explanation is that he made a hasty and ill-conceived decision, under pressure and in a depressed frame of mind, to entrust the party"s affairs to a member of his Munich coterie whose loyalty was beyond question. Rosenberg was, in fact, one of the few leading figures in the movement still available. Scheubner-Richter was dead. Others had scattered in the post-putsch turmoil, or had been arrested. Even though Hitler could scarcely have known this the three trusted lieutenants he had designated to support Rosenberg were temporarily out of action. Esser had fled to Austria, Amann was in jail, and Streicher was preoccupied with matters in Nuremberg. Rosenberg was probably no more than a hastily chosen least bad option.
On 1 January 1924, Rosenberg founded the Grodeutsche Volksgemeinschaft (GVG, "Greater German National Community"), intended to serve, during the NSDAP"s ban, as its successor organization. By the summer, Rosenberg had been ousted, and the GVG had fallen under the control of Hermann Esser (returned in May from his exile in Austria) and Julius Streicher. But the coa.r.s.e personalities, insulting behaviour, and clumsy methods of Esser and Streicher merely succeeded in alienating many Hitler followers. Far from all Hitler loyalists, in any case, had joined the GVG. Gregor Stra.s.ser, for example, a Landshut apothecary who was to emerge in the post-putsch era as the leading figure in the party after Hitler, joined the Deutschvolkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP), a rival volkisch volkisch organization headed by Albrecht Graefe, formerly a member of the conservative DNVP, with its stronghold in Mecklenburg and its headquarters in Berlin. organization headed by Albrecht Graefe, formerly a member of the conservative DNVP, with its stronghold in Mecklenburg and its headquarters in Berlin.
Conflict was not long deferred once Hitler was in prison. The DVFP had been less affected by proscription than had the NSDAP. In contrast to the disarray within the Hitler Movement, Graefe and other DVFP leaders were still at liberty to control a party organization left largely in place. And though the DVFP leaders lauded Hitler"s actions in the putsch in an attempt to win over his supporters, they were actually keen to take advantage of the situation and to establish their own supremacy. That the DVFP leaders advocated electoral partic.i.p.ation by the volkisch volkisch movement added to the growing conflict. A move towards a parliamentary strategy alienated many n.a.z.is, and was vehemently opposed by NSDAP diehards in northern Germany. Their spokesman, Ludolf Haase, the leader of the Gottingen branch, was increasingly critical of Rosenberg"s authority, and above all keen to keep the north German NSDAP from the clutches of Graefe. movement added to the growing conflict. A move towards a parliamentary strategy alienated many n.a.z.is, and was vehemently opposed by NSDAP diehards in northern Germany. Their spokesman, Ludolf Haase, the leader of the Gottingen branch, was increasingly critical of Rosenberg"s authority, and above all keen to keep the north German NSDAP from the clutches of Graefe.
Those volkisch volkisch groups that were prepared, however reluctantly, to enter parliament in order to be in a position one day to destroy it, decided to enter into electoral alliances to allow them to contest the series of regional (Landtag) elections that began in February, and the Reichstag election the first of two that year on 4 May 1924. Hitler was opposed to this strategy, but his opposition made no difference. The decision to partic.i.p.ate went ahead. It seemed to be borne out by the results. In the February Landtag elections in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Graefe"s stronghold, the DVFP won thirteen out of sixty-four seats. And on 6 April in the Bavarian Landtag elections, the Volkischer Block, as the electoral alliance called itself there, won 17 per cent of the vote. groups that were prepared, however reluctantly, to enter parliament in order to be in a position one day to destroy it, decided to enter into electoral alliances to allow them to contest the series of regional (Landtag) elections that began in February, and the Reichstag election the first of two that year on 4 May 1924. Hitler was opposed to this strategy, but his opposition made no difference. The decision to partic.i.p.ate went ahead. It seemed to be borne out by the results. In the February Landtag elections in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Graefe"s stronghold, the DVFP won thirteen out of sixty-four seats. And on 6 April in the Bavarian Landtag elections, the Volkischer Block, as the electoral alliance called itself there, won 17 per cent of the vote.
The Reichstag election results, it seems, helped persuade Hitler that the parliamentary tactic, pragmatically and purposefully deployed, promised to pay dividends. The volkisch volkisch vote, bolstered by the publicity and outcome of the Hitler trial, had stood up well, with a result of 6.5 per cent and thirty-two seats in the Reichstag. The results in Graefe"s territory of Mecklenburg (20.8 per cent) and Bavaria (16 per cent) were particularly good. That only ten of the vote, bolstered by the publicity and outcome of the Hitler trial, had stood up well, with a result of 6.5 per cent and thirty-two seats in the Reichstag. The results in Graefe"s territory of Mecklenburg (20.8 per cent) and Bavaria (16 per cent) were particularly good. That only ten of the volkisch volkisch Reichstag members were from the NSDAP and twenty-two from the DVFP gave some indication, however, of the relative weakness of the remnants of the Hitler Movement at the time. Reichstag members were from the NSDAP and twenty-two from the DVFP gave some indication, however, of the relative weakness of the remnants of the Hitler Movement at the time.
In the first of two visits he paid to Landsberg in May, Ludendorff, whose contacts in north Germany were extensive despite his continued residence near Munich, seized the moment to try to persuade Hitler to agree to a merger of the NSDAP and DVFP fractions in the Reichstag, and in the second meeting even to full unity of the two parties. Hitler equivocated. He agreed in principle, but stipulated preconditions that needed to be discussed with Graefe. One of these, it transpired, was that the headquarters of the movement would be based in Munich. Hitler was in difficulties because, though he had always insisted on a separate and unique ident.i.ty for the NSDAP, there was the danger, following the electoral success of the Volkischer Block, that such an uncompromising stance would seem less than compelling to his supporters. Moreover, the DVFP was the stronger of the two parties, as the election had shown, and Ludendorff was now generally regarded as the leading figure in the volkisch volkisch movement. movement.
Some north German n.a.z.is were, not surprisingly, confused and uncertain about Hitler"s position regarding any merger. In a letter of 14 June, Haase, the n.a.z.i leader in Gottingen, sought confirmation that Hitler rejected a merger of the two parties. Replying two days later, Hitler denied that he had fundamentally rejected a merger, though he had stipulated preconditions for such a step. He acknowledged the opposition among many n.a.z.i loyalists to a merger with the DVFP, which, he also pointed out, had made plain its rejection of some of the old guard of the party. Under the circ.u.mstances, he went on, he could no longer intervene or accept responsibility. He had decided, therefore, to withdraw from politics until he could properly lead again. He refused henceforth to allow his name to be used in support of any political position, and asked for no further political letters to be sent to him.
Hitler announced his decision to withdraw from politics in the press on 7 July. He requested no further visits to Landsberg by his supporters, a request he felt compelled to repeat a month later. The press announcement gave as his reasons the impossibility of accepting practical responsibility for developments while he was in Landsberg, "general overwork", and the need to concentrate on the writing of his book (the first volume of Mein Kampf Mein Kampf ). A not insignificant additional factor, as the opposition press emphasized, was. .h.i.tler"s anxiety to do nothing to jeopardize his chances of parole, which could be granted from 1 October. His withdrawal was not a machiavellian strategy to exacerbate the split that was already taking place, increase confusion, and thereby bolster his image as a symbol of unity. This was the outcome, not the cause. In June 1924, the outcome could not be clearly foreseen. Hitler acted from weakness, not strength. He was being pressed from all sides to take a stance on the growing schism. His equivocation frustrated his supporters. But any clear stance would have alienated one side or the other. His decision not to decide was characteristic. ). A not insignificant additional factor, as the opposition press emphasized, was. .h.i.tler"s anxiety to do nothing to jeopardize his chances of parole, which could be granted from 1 October. His withdrawal was not a machiavellian strategy to exacerbate the split that was already taking place, increase confusion, and thereby bolster his image as a symbol of unity. This was the outcome, not the cause. In June 1924, the outcome could not be clearly foreseen. Hitler acted from weakness, not strength. He was being pressed from all sides to take a stance on the growing schism. His equivocation frustrated his supporters. But any clear stance would have alienated one side or the other. His decision not to decide was characteristic.
Hitler"s frustration was also increased by his inability, despite his outright disapproval, to curtail Rohm"s determination to build up a nationwide paramilitary organization called the Frontbann. Unable to deter Rohm already freed on 1 April, bound over on probation, his derisory fifteen-month prison sentence for his part in the putsch set aside on condition of good behaviour Hitler ended their last meeting before he left Landsberg, on 17 June, by telling him that, having laid down the leadership of the National Socialist Movement, he wished to hear no more about the Frontbann. Rohm nevertheless simply ignored Hitler, and pressed on with his plans, looking to Ludendorff for patronage and protection.
A much-vaunted conference in Weimar on 1517 August, intended to cement the organizational merger of the NSDAP and DVFP, produced only the most superficial unity in a newly-proclaimed National Socialist Freedom Movement (Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung, NSFB). By the end of the summer, the fragmentation of the NSDAP, and of the volkisch volkisch movement in general, was, despite all the talk of merger and unity, advancing rather than receding. Only Hitler"s position was emerging significantly strengthened by the inner-party warfare. movement in general, was, despite all the talk of merger and unity, advancing rather than receding. Only Hitler"s position was emerging significantly strengthened by the inner-party warfare.
As summer dragged into autumn, then winter approached, the rifts in the volkisch volkisch movement widened still further. From the NSFB"s point of view, unity without Hitler, and in the face of his continued refusal to commit himself publicly to a unified organization, was impossible. In Bavaria, the movement widened still further. From the NSFB"s point of view, unity without Hitler, and in the face of his continued refusal to commit himself publicly to a unified organization, was impossible. In Bavaria, the volkisch volkisch feud surrounding the figures of Esser and Streicher widened into open breach. On 26 October, the Volkischer Block decided to join the NSFB to create a united organization to fight the coming elections. With this, it accepted the NSFB"s Reich Leadership. Gregor Stra.s.ser, the spokesman of the Volkischer Block, hoped that the Grodeutsche Volksgemeinschaft would also soon join the NSFB, but at the same time openly condemned its leaders, Esser and Streicher. Esser"s reply in a letter to all GVG affiliations, a bitter attack on the leaders of the Volkischer Block, with a side-swipe at Ludendorff for his support of the Block"s position, reaffirmed the Munich loyalist position: "the only man who has a right to exclude someone who has fought for years for his place in the Movement of National Socialists is solely and singly Adolf Hitler." But Esser"s bravado, and the brash attacks of Streicher, supported by the Thuringian National Socialist, Artur Dinter, could not conceal the sharp decline of the GVG. feud surrounding the figures of Esser and Streicher widened into open breach. On 26 October, the Volkischer Block decided to join the NSFB to create a united organization to fight the coming elections. With this, it accepted the NSFB"s Reich Leadership. Gregor Stra.s.ser, the spokesman of the Volkischer Block, hoped that the Grodeutsche Volksgemeinschaft would also soon join the NSFB, but at the same time openly condemned its leaders, Esser and Streicher. Esser"s reply in a letter to all GVG affiliations, a bitter attack on the leaders of the Volkischer Block, with a side-swipe at Ludendorff for his support of the Block"s position, reaffirmed the Munich loyalist position: "the only man who has a right to exclude someone who has fought for years for his place in the Movement of National Socialists is solely and singly Adolf Hitler." But Esser"s bravado, and the brash attacks of Streicher, supported by the Thuringian National Socialist, Artur Dinter, could not conceal the sharp decline of the GVG.
The Reichstag elections that took place on 7 December demonstrated just how marginal this perpetual squabbling in the volkisch volkisch movement was to the overall shaping of German politics. The NSFB won only 3 per cent of the vote. It had lost over a million votes compared with the movement was to the overall shaping of German politics. The NSFB won only 3 per cent of the vote. It had lost over a million votes compared with the volkisch volkisch showing in the May election. Its Reichstag representation fell from thirty-two to fourteen seats, only four of whom were National Socialists. It was a disastrous result. But it pleased Hitler. In his absence, showing in the May election. Its Reichstag representation fell from thirty-two to fourteen seats, only four of whom were National Socialists. It was a disastrous result. But it pleased Hitler. In his absence, volkisch volkisch politics had collapsed, but his own claims to leadership had, in the process, been strengthened. The election result also had the advantage of encouraging the Bavarian government to regard the danger from the extreme Right as past. There was now, it seemed, no need for undue concern about Hitler"s release from Landsberg, for which his supporters had been clamouring since October. politics had collapsed, but his own claims to leadership had, in the process, been strengthened. The election result also had the advantage of encouraging the Bavarian government to regard the danger from the extreme Right as past. There was now, it seemed, no need for undue concern about Hitler"s release from Landsberg, for which his supporters had been clamouring since October.
Only political bias explains the determination of the Bavarian judiciary to insist upon Hitler"s early release, despite the well-reasoned opposition of the Munich police and the state prosecutor"s office. On 20 December, at 12.15 p.m., he was released. A calculation in the files of the state prosecution office noted that he had three years, 333 days, twenty-one hours, fifty minutes of his short sentence still to serve. History would have taken a different course had he been made to serve it.
The prison staff, all sympathetic to Hitler, gathered to bid their famous prisoner an emotional farewell. He paused for photographs by the gates of the old fortress town, hurrying his photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, because of the cold, then was gone. Within two hours, he was back at his Munich apartment in Thierschstrae, greeted by friends with garlands of flowers, and nearly knocked over by his dog, Wolf. Hitler said later that he did not know what to do with his first evening of freedom. Politically, he continued at first to remain publicly non-committal. He needed to take stock of the situation in view of the months of internecine warfare in the volkisch volkisch movement. More important, it was necessary in order to establish with the Bavarian authorities the conditions for his re-entry into politics and to ensure that the ban on the NSDAP was lifted. Now that he was released, serious preparation for his party"s new start could begin. movement. More important, it was necessary in order to establish with the Bavarian authorities the conditions for his re-entry into politics and to ensure that the ban on the NSDAP was lifted. Now that he was released, serious preparation for his party"s new start could begin.
II.
"Landsberg", Hitler told Hans Frank, was his "university paid for by the state". He read, he said, everything he could get hold of: Nietzsche, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Ranke, Treitschke, Marx, Bismarck"s Gedanken und Erinnerungen (Thoughts and Memories) Gedanken und Erinnerungen (Thoughts and Memories), and the war memoirs of German and Allied generals and statesmen. Other than dealing with visitors and answering correspondence neither of which preoccupied him much once he had withdrawn from public involvement in politics in the summer the long days of enforced idleness in Landsberg were ideal for reading and reflection. But Hitler"s reading and reflection were anything but academic. Doubtless he did read much. However, reading, for him, had purely an instrumental purpose. He read not for knowledge or enlightenment, but for confirmation of his own preconceptions. He found what he was looking for. As he remarked to Hans Frank the party"s legal expert who would eventually become Governor General in occupied Poland through the reading he did in Landsberg, "I recognized the correctness of my views."
Sitting in his cell in Nuremberg many years later, Frank adjudged the year 1924 to have been one of the most decisive turning-points in Hitler"s life. This was an exaggeration. Landsberg was not so much a turning-point as a period in which Hitler inwardly consolidated and rationalized for himself the "world-view" he had been developing since 1919 and, in some significant ways, modifying in the year or so before the putsch. As the n.a.z.i Movement fell apart in his absence, and with time on his hands, away from the hurly-burly of active politics, Hitler could scarcely avoid ruminating on past mistakes. And, expecting his release within months, he was even more strongly compelled to look to the way forward for himself and his broken movement. During this time, he revised in certain respects his views on how to attain power. In so doing, his perception of himself changed. He came to think of his own role in a different way. In the wake of the triumph of his trial, he began to see himself, as his followers had started to portray him from the end of 1922 onwards, as Germany"s saviour. In the light of the putsch, one might have expected his self-belief to be crushed once and for all. On the contrary: it was elevated beyond measure. His almost mystical faith in himself as walking with destiny, with a "mission" to rescue Germany, dates from this time.
At the same time, there was an important adjustment to another aspect of his "world-view". Ideas which had been taking shape in his mind since late 1922, if not earlier, on the direction of future foreign policy were now elaborated into the notion of a quest for "living s.p.a.ce", to be gained at the expense of Russia. Blended into his obsessive antisemitism, aimed at the destruction of "Jewish Bolshevism", the concept of a war for "living s.p.a.ce" an idea which Hitler would repeatedly emphasize in the following years rounded off his "world-view". Thereafter, there would be tactical adjustments, but no further alteration of substance. Landsberg was no "Jordan conversion" for Hitler. In the main, it was a matter of adding new emphases to the few basic idees fixes idees fixes already formed, at least in embryo, or clearly taking shape in the years before the putsch. already formed, at least in embryo, or clearly taking shape in the years before the putsch.
The modifications in Hitler"s "world-view" that were already forming in the year before the putsch are clearly evident in Mein Kampf Mein Kampf. Hitler"s book offered nothing new. But it was the plainest and most expansive statement of his "world-view" that he had presented. He acknowledged that without his stay in Landsberg the book which after 1933 (though not before) would sell in its millions would never have been written. No doubt he hoped for financial gain from the book. But his main motivation was the need he felt, as during his trial, to demonstrate his own special calling, and to justify his programme as the only possible way of rescuing Germany from the catastrophe brought about by the "November Criminals".
Hitler was already at work on what would become the first volume by May 1924, building upon ideas formed during and immediately after his trial. He called his book at that time by the scarcely catchy t.i.tle "Four and a Half Years of Struggle against Lies, Stupidity, and Cowardice", which gave way to the more pithy Mein Kampf (My Struggle) Mein Kampf (My Struggle) only in spring 1925. By then, the book had undergone major structural changes. The initial intention of a "reckoning" with the "traitors" responsible for his downfall in 1923 never materialized. Instead, the first volume, which appeared on 18 July 1925, was largely autobiographical though with many distortions and inaccuracies ending with Hitler"s triumph at the announcement of the Party Programme in the Hofbrauhaus on 24 February 1920. The second volume, written after his release and published on 11 December 1926, dealt more extensively with his ideas on the nature of the only in spring 1925. By then, the book had undergone major structural changes. The initial intention of a "reckoning" with the "traitors" responsible for his downfall in 1923 never materialized. Instead, the first volume, which appeared on 18 July 1925, was largely autobiographical though with many distortions and inaccuracies ending with Hitler"s triumph at the announcement of the Party Programme in the Hofbrauhaus on 24 February 1920. The second volume, written after his release and published on 11 December 1926, dealt more extensively with his ideas on the nature of the volkisch volkisch state, questions of ideology, propaganda, and organization, concluding with chapters on foreign policy. state, questions of ideology, propaganda, and organization, concluding with chapters on foreign policy.
The presumption, widespread at the time and persisting later, that Hitler at first dictated the indigestible prose to his chauffeur and general dogsbody, Emil Maurice, later to Rudolf He (both of whom were also serving sentences for their part in the putsch), is wide of the mark. Hitler typed the drafts of the first volume himself (though some of the second volume was dictated to a secretary). Badly written and rambling as the published version of Mein Kampf Mein Kampf was, the text had, in fact, been subjected to innumerable stylistic "improvements" since the original composition. The typescript was read by the culture critic of the was, the text had, in fact, been subjected to innumerable stylistic "improvements" since the original composition. The typescript was read by the culture critic of the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter, Josef Stolzing-Cerny, and at least parts of it by the future wife of Rudolf He, Ilse Prohl. Both made editorial changes. Others were by Hitler himself. According to Hans Frank, Hitler accepted that the book was badly written, and described it as no more than a collection of leading articles for the Volkischer Beobachter Volkischer Beobachter.
Before Hitler came to power, Mein Kampf Mein Kampf, brought out in the party"s own publishing house, the Franz Eher-Verlag, run by Max Amann, was scarcely the runaway bestseller he had apparently expected it to be. Its turgid content, dreadful style, and relatively high price of 12 Reich Marks a volume evidently deterred many potential readers. By 1929, the first volume had sold around 23,000 copies, the second only 13,000. Sales increased sharply following the NSDAP"s electoral successes after 1930, and reached 80,000 in 1932. From 1933, they rose stratospherically. One and a half million copies were sold that year. Even the blind could read it should they have wished to do so once a braille version had been published in 1936. And from that year, a copy of the people"s edition of both volumes bound together was given to each happy couple on their wedding day. Some 10 million copies were sold by 1945, not counting the millions sold abroad, where Mein Kampf Mein Kampf was translated into sixteen languages. How many people actually read it is unknown. For Hitler, it was of little importance. Having from the early 1920s described himself in official doc.u.ments as a "writer", he could well afford in 1933 to refuse his Reich Chancellor"s salary (in contrast, he pointed out, to his predecessors): was translated into sixteen languages. How many people actually read it is unknown. For Hitler, it was of little importance. Having from the early 1920s described himself in official doc.u.ments as a "writer", he could well afford in 1933 to refuse his Reich Chancellor"s salary (in contrast, he pointed out, to his predecessors): Mein Kampf Mein Kampf had made him a very rich man. had made him a very rich man.
No policy outline was offered in Mein Kampf Mein Kampf. But the book did provide, however garbled the presentation, an uncompromising statement of Hitler"s political principles, his "world-view", his sense of his own "mission", his "vision" of society, and his long-term aims. Not least, it established the basis of the Fuhrer myth. For in Mein Kampf Mein Kampf, Hitler portrayed himself as uniquely qualified to lead Germany from its existing misery to greatness.
Mein Kampf gives an important insight into his thinking in the mid-1920s. By then, he had developed a philosophy that afforded him a complete interpretation of history, of the ills of the world, and how to overcome them. Tersely summarized, it boiled down to a simplistic, Manichean view of history as racial struggle, in which the highest racial ent.i.ty, the aryan, was being undermined and destroyed by the lowest, the parasitic Jew. "The racial question," he wrote, "gives the key not only to world history but to all human culture." The culmination of this process was taken to be the brutal rule of the Jews through Bolshevism in Russia, where the "blood Jew" had, "partly amid inhuman torture killed or let starve to death around 30 million people in truly satanic savagery in order to secure the rule over a great people of a bunch of Jewish gives an important insight into his thinking in the mid-1920s. By then, he had developed a philosophy that afforded him a complete interpretation of history, of the ills of the world, and how to overcome them. Tersely summarized, it boiled down to a simplistic, Manichean view of history as racial struggle, in which the highest racial ent.i.ty, the aryan, was being undermined and destroyed by the lowest, the parasitic Jew. "The racial question," he wrote, "gives the key not only to world history but to all human culture." The culmination of this process was taken to be the brutal rule of the Jews through Bolshevism in Russia, where the "blood Jew" had, "partly amid inhuman torture killed or let starve to death around 30 million people in truly satanic savagery in order to secure the rule over a great people of a bunch of Jewish literati literati and stock-market bandits". The "mission" of the n.a.z.i Movement was, therefore, clear: to destroy "Jewish Bolshevism". At the same time a leap of logic that moved conveniently into a justification for outright imperialist conquest this would provide the German people with the "living s.p.a.ce" needed for the "master race" to sustain itself. He held rigidly to these basic tenets for the rest of his life. Nothing of substance changed in later years. The very inflexibility and quasi-messianic commitment to an "idea", a set of beliefs that were unalterable, simple, internally consistent, and comprehensive, gave Hitler the strength of will and sense of knowing his own destiny that left its mark on all those who came into contact with him. Hitler"s authority in his entourage derived in no small measure from the certainty in his own convictions that he could so forcefully express. Everything could be couched in terms of black and white, victory or total destruction. There were no alternatives. And, like all ideologues and "conviction politicians", the self-reinforcing components of his "world-view" meant that he was always in a position to deride or dismiss out of hand any "rational" arguments of opponents. Once head of state, Hitler"s personalized "world-view" would serve as "guidelines for action" for policy-makers in all areas of the Third Reich. and stock-market bandits". The "mission" of the n.a.z.i Movement was, therefore, clear: to destroy "Jewish Bolshevism". At the same time a leap of logic that moved conveniently into a justification for outright imperialist conquest this would provide the German people with the "living s.p.a.ce" needed for the "master race" to sustain itself. He held rigidly to these basic tenets for the rest of his life. Nothing of substance changed in later years. The very inflexibility and quasi-messianic commitment to an "idea", a set of beliefs that were unalterable, simple, internally consistent, and comprehensive, gave Hitler the strength of will and sense of knowing his own destiny that left its mark on all those who came into contact with him. Hitler"s authority in his entourage derived in no small measure from the certainty in his own convictions that he could so forcefully express. Everything could be couched in terms of black and white, victory or total destruction. There were no alternatives. And, like all ideologues and "conviction politicians", the self-reinforcing components of his "world-view" meant that he was always in a position to deride or dismiss out of hand any "rational" arguments of opponents. Once head of state, Hitler"s personalized "world-view" would serve as "guidelines for action" for policy-makers in all areas of the Third Reich.
Hitler"s book was not a prescriptive programme in the sense of a short-term political manifesto. But many contemporaries made a mistake in treating Mein Kampf Mein Kampf with ridicule