Ernst Rohm"s SA had been the spearhead of the n.a.z.i revolution in the first months of 1933. The explosion of elemental violence had needed no commands from above. The SA had long been kept on a leash, told to wait for the day of reckoning. Now it could scarcely be contained. Orgies of hate-filled revenge against political enemies and horrifically brutal a.s.saults on Jews were daily occurrences. A large proportion of the estimated 100,000 persons taken into custody in these turbulent months were held in makeshift SA prisons and camps. Some hundred of these were set up in the Berlin area alone. Many victims were b.e.s.t.i.a.lly tortured. The minimal figure of some 500600 murdered in what the n.a.z.is themselves proclaimed as a bloodless and legal revolution can largely be placed on the account of the SA. The first Gestapo chief, Rudolf Diels, described after the war the conditions in one of the SA"s Berlin prisons: "The "interrogations" had begun and ended with a beating. A dozen fellows had laid into their victims at intervals of some hours with iron bars, rubber coshes, and whips. Smashed teeth and broken bones bore witness to the tortures. As we entered, these living skeletons with festering wounds lay in rows on the rotting straw ..."
As long as the terror was levelled in the main at Communists, Socialists, and Jews, it was in any case not likely to be widely unpopular, and could be played down as "excesses" of the "national uprising". But already by the summer, the number of incidents mounted in which overbearing and loutish behaviour by SA men caused widespread public offence even in pro-n.a.z.i circles. By this time, complaints were pouring in from industry, commerce, and local government offices about disturbances and intolerable actions by stormtroopers. The Foreign Office added its own protest at incidents where foreign diplomats had been insulted or even manhandled. The SA was threatening to become completely uncontrollable. Steps had to be taken. Reich President Hindenburg himself requested Hitler to restore order.
The need for Hitler to act became especially urgent after Rohm had openly stated the SA"s aim of continuing the "German Revolution" in the teeth of attempts by conservatives, reactionaries, and opportunist fellow-travellers to undermine and tame it. Rohm was clearly signalling to the new rulers of Germany that for him the revolution was only just starting; and that he would demand a leading role for himself and the mighty organization he headed by now some 4 million strong.
Forced now for the first time to choose between the demands of the party"s paramilitary wing and the "big battalions" pressing for order, Hitler summoned the Reich Governors to a meeting in the Reich Chancellery on 6 July. "The revolution is not a permanent condition," he announced; "it must not turn into a lasting situation. It is necessary to divert the the river of revolution that has broken free into the secure bed of evolution." Other n.a.z.i leaders Frick, Goring, Goebbels, and He took up the message in the weeks that followed. There was an unmistakable change of course.
Rohm"s ambitions were, however, undaunted. They amounted to little less than the creation of an "SA state", with extensive powers in the police, in military matters, and in the civil administration. It was not just a matter of Rohm"s own power ambitions. Within the gigantic army of Brownshirts, expectations of the wondrous shangri-la to follow the day when National Socialism took power had been hugely disappointed. Though they had poured out their bile on their political enemies, the offices, financial rewards, and power they had naively believed would flow their way remained elusive. Talk of a "second revolution", however little it was grounded in any clear programme of social change, was, therefore, bound to find strong resonance among rank-and-file stormtroopers.
Ernst Rohm had, then, no difficulty in expanding his popularity among SA men through his continued dark threats in early 1934 about further revolution which would accomplish what the "national uprising" had failed to bring about. He remained publicly loyal to Hitler. Privately, he was highly critical of Hitler"s policy towards the Reichswehr and his dependency on Blomberg and Reichenau. And he did nothing to deter the growth of a personality cult elevating his leadership of the SA. At the Reich Party Rally of Victory in 1933, he had been the most prominent party leader after Hitler, clearly featuring as the Fuhrer"s right-hand man. By early 1934, Hitler had been largely forced from the pages of the SA"s newspaper, SA-Mann SA-Mann, by the expanding Rohm-cult.
At least in public, the loyalty was reciprocated. Hitler wavered, as he would continue to do during the first months of 1934, between Rohm"s SA and the Reichswehr. He could not bring himself to discipline, let alone dismiss, Rohm. The political damage and loss of face and popularity involved made such a move risky. But the realities of power compelled him to side with the Reichswehr leadership. This became fully clear only at the end of February.
By 2 February 1934, at a meeting of his Gauleiter, Hitler was again criticizing the SA in all but name. Only "idiots" thought the revolution was not over; there were those in the Movement who only understood "revolution" as meaning "a permanent condition of chaos".
The previous day, Rohm had sent Blomberg a memorandum on relations between the army and SA. What he appeared to be demanding no copy of the actual memorandum has survived was no less than the concession of national defence as the domain of the SA, and a reduction of the function of the armed forces to the provision of trained men for the SA. So cra.s.s were the demands that it seems highly likely that Blomberg deliberately falsified or misconstrued them when addressing a meeting of army District Commanders on 2 February in Berlin. They were predictably horrified. Now Hitler had to decide, stated Blomberg. The army lobbied him. In a conscious attempt to win his support against the SA, Blomberg, without any pressure from the n.a.z.i leadership, introduced the NSDAP"s emblem into the army and accepted the "Aryan Paragraph" for the officer corps, leading to the prompt dismissal of some seventy members of the armed forces. Rohm, too, sought to win his support. But, faced with having to choose between the Reichswehr, with Hindenburg"s backing, or his party army, Hitler could now only decide one way.
By 27 February the army leaders had worked out their "guidelines for cooperation with the SA", which formed the basis for Hitler"s speech the next day and had, therefore, certainly been agreed with him. At the meeting in the Reichswehr Ministry on 28 February, attended by Reichswehr, SA, and SS leaders, Hitler rejected outright Rohm"s plans for an SA-militia. The SA was to confine its activities to political, not military, matters. A militia, such as Rohm was suggesting, was not suitable even for minimal national defence. He was determined to build up a well-trained "people"s army" in the Reichswehr, equipped with the most modern weapons, which must be prepared for all eventualities on defence within five years and suitable for attack after eight years. He demanded of the SA that they obey his orders. For the transitional period before the planned Wehrmacht was set up, he approved Blomberg"s suggestion to deploy the SA for tasks of border protection and pre-military training. But "the Wehrmacht must be the sole bearer of weapons of the nation".
Rohm and Blomberg had to sign and shake hands on the "agreement". Hitler departed. Champagne followed. But the atmosphere was anything but cordial. When the officers had left, Rohm was overheard to remark: "What the ridiculous corporal declared doesn"t apply to us. Hitler has no loyalty and has at least to be sent on leave. If not with, then we"ll manage the thing without Hitler." The person taking note of these treasonable remarks was SA-Obergruppenfuhrer Viktor Lutze, who reported what had gone on to Hitler. "We"ll have to let the thing ripen" was all he gleaned as reply. But the show of loyalty was noted. When he needed a new SA chief after the events of 30 June, Lutze was. .h.i.tler"s man.
II.
From the beginning of 1934, Hitler seems to have recognized that he would be faced with no choice but to cut Rohm down to size. How to tackle him was, however, unclear. Hitler deferred the problem. He simply awaited developments. The Reichswehr leadership, too, was biding its time, expecting a gradual escalation, but looking then to a final showdown. Relations between the army and the SA continued to fester. But Hitler did, it seems, order the monitoring of SA activities. According to the later account of Gestapo chief Rudolf Diels, it was in January 1934 that Hitler requested him and Goring to collect material on the excesses of the SA. From the end of February onwards, the Reichswehr leadership started a.s.sembling its own intelligence on SA activities, which was pa.s.sed to Hitler. Once Himmler and Heydrich had taken over the Prussian Gestapo in April, the build-up of a dossier on the SA was evidently intensified. Rohm"s foreign contacts were noted, as well as those with figures at home known to be cool towards the regime, such as former Chancellor Schleicher.
By this time, Rohm had incited an ensemble of powerful enemies, who would eventually coagulate into an unholy alliance against the SA. Goring was so keen to be rid of the SA"s alternative power-base in Prussia which he himself had done much to establish, starting when he made the SA auxiliary police in February 1933 that he was even prepared by 20 April to concede control over the Prussian Gestapo to Heinrich Himmler, thus paving the way for the creation of a centralized police-state in the hands of the SS. Himmler himself, and even more so his cold and dangerous henchman Reinhard Heydrich, recognized that their ambitions to construct such an empire the key edifice of power and control in the Third Reich rested on the elite SS breaking with its superior body, the SA, and eliminating the power-base held by Rohm. In the party, the head of the organization, installed in April 1933 with the grand t.i.tle of Deputy Fuhrer, Rudolf He, and the increasingly powerful figure behind the scenes Martin Bormann, were more than aware of the contempt in which the Political Organization was held by Rohm"s men and the threat of the SA actually replacing the party, or making it redundant. For the army, as already noted, Rohm"s aim to subordinate the Reichswehr to the interests of a people"s militia was anathema. Intensified military exercises, expansive parades, and, not least, reports of extensive weapon collections in the hands of the SA, did little to calm the nerves.
At the centre of this web of countervailing interests and intrigue, united only in the anxiety to be rid of the menace of the SA, Hitler"s sharp instinct for the realities of power by now must have made it plain that he had to break with Rohm.
In April it became known that Hindenburg was seriously ill. Hitler and Blomberg had already been told that the end was not far off. At the beginning of June, the Reich President retired to his estate at Neudeck in East Prussia. The most important prop of the conservatives was now far from the centre of the action. And the succession issue was imminent. Moreover, to remove the obstacle which the SA was providing to recommencing talks about rearmament with the western powers, Hitler had, at the end of May, ordered the SA to stop military exercises, and, in the last talks he had with Rohm, a few days later, had sent the stormtroopers on leave for a month.
This defusing of the situation, together with Hindenburg"s absence, made the situation more difficult, rather than easier, for the conservatives. But Papen used a speech on 17 June at the University of Marburg to deliver a pa.s.sionate warning against the dangers of a "second revolution" and a heated broadside against the "selfishness, lack of character, insincerity, lack of chivalry, and arrogance" featuring under the guise of the German revolution. He even criticized the creation of a "false personality cult". "Great men are not made by propaganda, but grow out of their actions," he declared. "No nation can live in a continuous state of revolution," he went on. "Permanent dynamism permits no solid foundations to be laid. Germany cannot live in a continuous state of unrest, to which no one sees an end." The speech met with roars of applause within the hall. Outside, Goebbels moved swiftly to have it banned, though not before copies of the speech had been run off and circulated, both within Germany and to the foreign press. Word of it quickly went round. Never again in the Third Reich was such striking criticism at the heart of the regime to come from such a prominent figure. But if Papen and his friends were hoping to prompt action by the army, supported by the President, to "tame" Hitler, they were disappointed. As it was, the Marburg speech served as the decisive trigger to the brutal action taken at the end of the month.
Hitler"s own mood towards the "reactionaries" was darkening visibly. Without specifying any names, his speech at Gera at the Party Rally of the Thuringian Gau on 17 June, the same day as Papen"s speech, gave a plain indication of his fury at the activities of the Papen circle. He castigated them as "dwarves", alluding, it seems, to Papen himself as a "tiny worm". Then came the threat: "If they should at any time attempt, even in a small way, to move from their criticism to a new act of perjury, they can be sure that what confronts them today is not the cowardly and corrupt bourgeoisie of 1918 but the fist of the entire people. It is the fist of the nation that is clenched and will smash down anyone who dares to undertake even the slightest attempt at sabotage." Such a mood prefigured the murder of some prominent members of the conservative "reaction" on 30 June. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the Papen speech, a strike against the "reactionaries" seemed more likely than a showdown with the SA.
At the imposition of the ban on publishing his speech, Papen went to see Hitler. He said Goebbels"s action left him no alternative but to resign. He intended to inform the Reich President of this unless the ban were lifted and Hitler declared himself ready to follow the policies outlined in the speech. Hitler reacted cleverly in wholly different manner from his tirades in the presence of his party members. He acknowledged that Goebbels was in the wrong in his action, and that he would order the ban to be lifted. He also attacked the insubordination of the SA and stated that they would have to be dealt with. He asked Papen, however, to delay his resignation until he could accompany him to visit the President for a joint interview to discuss the entire situation. Papen conceded and the moment was lost.
Hitler wasted no time. He arranged an audience alone with Hindenburg on 21 June. On the way up the steps to Hindenburg"s residence, Schlo Neudeck, he was met by Blomberg, who had been summoned by the President in the furore following Papen"s speech. Blomberg told him bluntly that it was urgently necessary to take measures to ensure internal peace in Germany. If the Reich Government was incapable of relieving the current state of tension, the President would declare martial law and hand over control to the army. Hitler realized that there could be no further prevarication. He had to act. There was no alternative but to placate the army behind which stood the President. And that meant destroying the power of the SA without delay.
What Hitler had in mind at this stage is unclear. He seems to have spoken about deposing Rohm, or having him arrested. By now, however, Heydrich"s SD the part of the labyrinthine SS organization responsible for internal surveillance and the Gestapo were working overtime to concoct alarmist reports of an imminent SA putsch. SS and SD leaders were summoned to Berlin around 25 June to be instructed by Himmler and Heydrich about the measures to be taken in the event of an SA revolt, expected any time. For all their unruliness, the SA had never contemplated such a move. The leadership remained loyal to Hitler. But now, the readiness to believe that Rohm was planning a takeover was readily embraced by all the SA"s powerful enemies. The Reichswehr, during May and June becoming increasingly suspicious about the ambitions of the SA leadership, made weapons and transport available to the SS (whose small size and at this time confinement to largely policing work posed no threat to the military). An SA putsch was now thought likely in summer or autumn. The entire Reichswehr leadership were prepared for imminent action against Rohm. The psychological state for a strike against the SA was rapidly forming. Alarm bells were set ringing loudly on 26 June through what seemed to be an order by Rohm for arming the SA in preparation for an attack on the Reichswehr. The "order", in fact a near-certain fake (though by whom was never established), had mysteriously found its way into the office of the Abwehr chief, Captain Conrad Patzig. Lutze was present when Blomberg and Reichenau presented Hitler the following day with the "evidence". Hitler had already hinted to Blomberg two days earlier that he would summon SA leaders to a conference at Bad Wiessee on the Tegernsee, some fifty miles south-east of Munich, where Rohm was residing, and have them arrested. This decision seems to have been confirmed at the meeting with Blomberg and Reichenau on 27 June. The same day, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Sepp Dietrich, commander of Hitler"s houseguards, the Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler, arranged with the Reichswehr to pick up the arms needed for a "secret and very important commission of the Fuhrer".
III.
The timing of the "action" seems to have been finally determined on the evening of 28 June, while Hitler, together with Goring and Lutze, was in Essen for the wedding of Gauleiter Terboven. During the wedding reception, Hitler had received a message from Himmler, informing him that Oskar von Hindenburg had agreed to arrange for his father to receive Papen, probably on 30 June. It marked a final attempt to win the Reich President"s approval for moves to constrain the power not only of Rohm and the SA, but of Hitler himself. Hitler left the wedding reception straight away and raced back to his hotel. There, according to Lutze, he decided there was no time to lose: he had to strike.
Rohm"s adjutant was ordered by telephone to ensure that all SA leaders attended a meeting with Hitler in Bad Wiessee on the late morning of 30 June. In the meantime, the army had been put on alert. Goring flew back to Berlin to take charge of matters there, ready at a word to move not only against the SA, but also the Papen group.
Rumours of unrest in the SA were pa.s.sed to Hitler, whose mood was becoming blacker by the minute. The telephone rang. The "rebels", it was reported, were ready to strike in Berlin. There was, in fact, no putsch attempt at all. But groups of SA men in different parts of Germany, aware of the stories circulating of an impending strike against the SA, or the deposition of Rohm, were going on the rampage. Sepp Dietrich was ordered to leave for Munich immediately. Soon after midnight, he phoned Hitler from Munich and was given further orders to pick up two companies of the Leibstandarte and be in Bad Wiessee by eleven in the morning. Around 2 a.m. Hitler left to fly to Munich, accompanied by his adjutants Bruckner, Schaub, and Schreck, along with Goebbels, Lutze, and Press Chief Dietrich. The first glimmers of dawn were breaking through as he arrived. He was met by Gauleiter Adolf Wagner and two Reichswehr officers, who told him that the Munich SA, shouting abuse at the Fuhrer, had attempted an armed demonstration in the city. Though a serious disturbance, it was, in fact, merely the biggest of the protest actions of despairing stormtroopers, when as many as 3,000 armed SA men had rampaged through Munich in the early hours, denouncing the "treachery" against the SA, shouting: "The Fuhrer is against us, the Reichswehr is against us; SA out on the streets." However, Hitler had not heard of the Munich disturbances before he arrived there in the early hours of the morning. Now, in blind rage at what he interpreted as the betrayal by Rohm "the blackest day of my life", he was heard to say he decided not to wait till the following morning, but to act immediately.
He and his entourage raced to the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior. The local SA leaders Obergruppenfuhrer Schneidhuber and Gruppenfuhrer Schmid were peremptorily summoned. Hitler"s fury was still rising as he awaited them. By now he had worked himself into a near-hysterical state of mind, reminiscent of the night of the Reichstag fire. Accepting no explanations, he ripped their rank badges from their shoulders, shouting "You are under arrest and will be shot." Bewildered and frightened, they were taken off to Stadelheim prison.
Hitler, without waiting for Dietrich"s SS men to arrive, now demanded to be taken immediately to Bad Wiessee. It was just after 6.30 a.m. as the three cars pulled up outside the Hotel Hanselbauer in the resort on the Tegernsee, where Rohm and other SA leaders were still sleeping off an evening"s drinking. Hitler, followed by members of his entourage and a number of policemen, stormed up to Rohm"s room and, pistol in hand, denounced him as a traitor (which the astonished Chief of Staff vehemently denied) and declared him under arrest. Edmund Heines, the Breslau SA leader, was found in a nearby room in bed with a young man a scene that Goebbels"s propaganda later made much of to heap moral opprobrium on the SA. Other arrests of Rohm"s staff followed.
Hitler and his entourage then travelled back to the Brown House. At midday he spoke to party and SA leaders gathered in the "Senators" Hall". The atmosphere was murderous. Hitler was beside himself, in a frenzy of rage, spittle dribbling from his mouth as he began to speak. He spoke of the "worst treachery in world history". Rohm, he claimed, had received 12 million Marks in bribes from France to have him arrested and killed, to deliver Germany to its enemies. The SA chief and his co-conspirators, Hitler railed, would be punished as examples. He would have them all shot. One after the other, the n.a.z.i leaders demanded the extermination of the SA "traitors". He pleaded that the task of shooting Rohm fall to him.
Back in his own room, Hitler gave the order for the immediate shooting of six of the SA men held in Stadelheim, marking crosses against their names in a list provided by the prison administration. They were promptly taken out and shot by Dietrich"s men. Not even a peremptory trial was held. The men were simply told before being shot: "You have been condemned to death by the Fuhrer! Heil Hitler!"
Rohm"s name was not among the initial six marked by Hitler for instant execution. One witness later claimed to have overheard Hitler saying that Rohm had been spared because of his many earlier services to the Movement. A similar remark was noted by Alfred Rosenberg in his diary. "Hitler did not want to have Rohm shot," he wrote. "He stood at one time at my side before the People"s Court," Hitler had said to the head of the n.a.z.i publishing empire, Max Amann.
The loss of face at having to murder his right-hand man on account of his alleged rebellion was most likely the chief reason for Hitler"s reluctance to order Rohm"s death. For the moment, at any rate, he hesitated about having Rohm killed. In Berlin, meanwhile, there was no hesitation. Immediately on return from Bad Wiessee, Goebbels had telephoned Goring with the pa.s.sword "Kolibri" ("Humming Bird"), which set in motion the murder-squads in the capital city and the rest of the country. Herbert von Bose, Papen"s press secretary, was brutally shot down by a Gestapo hit-squad after the Vice-Chancellery had been stormed by SS men. Edgar Jung, an intellectual on the conservative Right and speech-writer for Papen, in "protective custody" since 25 June, was also murdered, found dead in a ditch near Oranienburg on 1 July. Papen"s staff were arrested. The Vice-Chancellor himself, whose murder would have proved a diplomatic embarra.s.sment, was placed under house-arrest. The killing was extended to others who had nothing to do with the leadership of the SA. Old scores were settled. Gregor Stra.s.ser was taken to Gestapo headquarters and shot in one of the cells. General Schleicher and his wife were shot dead in their own home. Also among the victims was Major-General von Bredow, one of Schleicher"s right-hand men. In Munich, Hitler"s old adversary Ritter von Kahr was dragged away by SS men and later found hacked to death near Dachau. In all, there were twenty-two victims in and around Munich, mostly killed through "local initiative". The blood-l.u.s.t had developed its own momentum.
Hitler arrived back in Berlin around ten o"clock on the evening of 30 June, tired, drawn, and unshaven, to be met by Goring, Himmler, and a guard of honour. He hesitated until late the following morning about the fate of the former SA Chief of Staff. He was, it seems, put under pressure by Himmler and Goring to have Rohm liquidated. In the early afternoon of Sunday 1 July, during a garden party at the Reich Chancellery for cabinet members and their wives, Hitler finally agreed. Even now, however, he was keen that Rohm take his own life rather than be "executed". Theodor Eicke, Commandant of Dachau Concentration Camp, was ordered to go to Stadelheim and offer Rohm the chance to recognize the enormity of his actions by killing himself. If not, he was to be shot. Along with his deputy, SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Michael Lippert, and a third SS man from the camp, Eicke drove to Stadelheim. Rohm was left with a pistol. After ten minutes, no shot had been heard, and the pistol was untouched on the small table near the door of the cell, where it had been left. Eicke and Lippert returned to the cell, each with pistol drawn, signalled to Rohm, standing and bare-chested, and trying to speak, that they would wait no longer, took careful aim, and shot him dead. Hitler"s published announcement was terse: "The former Chief of Staff Rohm was given the opportunity to draw the consequences of his treacherous behaviour. He did not do so and was thereupon shot."
On 2 July, Hitler formally announced the end of the "cleansing action". Some estimates put the total number killed at 150200 persons.
With the SA still in a state of shock and uncertainty, the purge of its ma.s.s membership began under the new leader, the Hitler loyalist Viktor Lutze. Within a year, the SA had been reduced in size by over 40 per cent. Many subordinate leaders were dismissed in disciplinary hearings. The structures built up by Rohm as the foundation of his power within the organization were meanwhile systematically dismantled. The SA was turned into little more than a military sports and training body. For anyone still harbouring alternative ideas, the ruthlessness shown by Hitler had left its own unmistakable message.
IV.
Outside Germany, there was horror at the butchery, even more so at the gangster methods used by the state"s leaders. Within Germany, it was a different matter. Public expressions of grat.i.tude to Hitler were not long in coming. Already on 1 July, Reichswehr Minister Blomberg, in a statement to the armed forces, praised the "soldierly determination and exemplary courage" shown by the Fuhrer in attacking and crushing "the traitors and mutineers". The grat.i.tude of the armed forces, he added, would be marked by "devotion and loyalty". The following day, the Reich President sent Hitler a telegram expressing his own "deep-felt grat.i.tude" for the "resolute intervention" and "courageous personal involvement" which had "rescued the German people from a serious danger". Much later, when they were both in prison in Nuremberg, Papen asked Goring whether the President had ever seen the congratulatory telegram sent in his name. Goring replied that Otto Meissner, Hindenburg"s State Secretary, had asked him, half-jokingly, whether he had been "satisfied with the text".
Hitler himself gave a lengthy account of the "plot" by Rohm to a meeting of ministers on the morning of 3 July. Antic.i.p.ating any allegations about the lawlessness of his actions, he likened his actions to those of the captain of a ship putting down a mutiny, where immediate action to smash a revolt was necessary, and a formal trial was impossible. He asked the cabinet to accept the draft Law for the Emergency Defence of the State that he was laying before them. In a single, brief paragraph, the law read: "The measures taken on 30 June and 1 and 2 July for the suppression of high treasonable and state treasonable attacks are, as emergency defence of the state, legal." The Reich Minister of Justice, the conservative Franz Gurtner, declared that the draft did not create new law, but simply confirmed existing law. Reichswehr Minister Blomberg thanked the Chancellor in the name of the cabinet for his "resolute and courageous action through which he had protected the German people from civil war". With this statement of suppliance by the head of the armed forces, and the acceptance by the head of the judicial system of the legality of acts of brute violence, the law acknowledging Hitler"s right to commit murder in the interest of the state was unanimously accepted. The law was signed by Hitler, Frick, and Gurtner.
The account to the cabinet was in essence the basis of the justification which Hitler offered in his lengthy speech to the Reichstag on 13 July. If not one of his best rhetorical performances, it was certainly one of the most remarkable, and most effective, he was ever to deliver. The atmosphere was tense. Thirteen members of the Reichstag had been among those murdered; friends and former comrades-in-arms of the SA leaders were among those present. The presence of armed SS men flanking the rostrum and at various points of the hall was an indication of Hitler"s wariness, even among the serried ranks of party members. After he had offered a lengthy, fabricated account of the "revolt" and the part allegedly played in the conspiracy by General Schleicher, Major-General Bredow, and Gregor Stra.s.ser, he came to the most extraordinary sections of the speech. In these, the head of the German government openly accepted full responsibility for what amounted to ma.s.s murder. Hitler turned defence into attack. "Mutinies are broken according to eternal, iron laws. If I am reproached with not turning to the law-courts for sentence, I can only say: in this hour, I was responsible for the fate of the German nation and thereby the supreme judge of the German people ... I gave the order to shoot those most guilty of this treason, and I further gave the order to burn out down to the raw flesh the ulcers of our internal well-poisoning and the poisoning from abroad." The cheering was tumultuous. Not just among the n.a.z.i Reichstag members, but in the country at large, Hitler"s ruthless subst.i.tution of the rule of law by murder in the name of raison d"etat raison d"etat was applauded. It matched exactly what n.a.z.i parlance dubbed the "healthy sentiments of the people". was applauded. It matched exactly what n.a.z.i parlance dubbed the "healthy sentiments of the people".
The public was ignorant of the plots, intrigues, and power-games taking place behind the scenes. What people saw for the most part was the welcome removal of a scourge. Once the SA had done its job in crushing the Left, the bullying and strutting arrogance, open acts of violence, daily disturbances, and constant unruliness of the stormtroopers were a ma.s.sive affront to the sense of order, not just among the middle cla.s.ses. Instead of being shocked by Hitler"s resort to shooting without trial, most people accepting, too, the official versions of the planned putsch acclaimed the swift and resolute actions of their Leader.
There was great admiration for what was seen to be Hitler"s protection of the "little man" against the outrageous abuses of power of the over-mighty SA leadership. Even more so, the emphasis that Hitler had placed in his speech on the immorality and corruption of the SA leaders left a big mark on public responses. The twelve points laid down by Hitler in his order to the new Chief of Staff, Viktor Lutze, on 30 June had focused heavily on the need to eradicate h.o.m.os.e.xuality, debauchery, drunkenness, and high living from the SA. Hitler had explicitly pointed to the misuse of large amounts of money for banquets and limousines. The h.o.m.os.e.xuality of Rohm, Heines, and others among the SA leaders, known to Hitler and other n.a.z.i leaders for years, was highlighted as particularly shocking in Goebbels"s propaganda. Above all, Hitler was seen as the restorer of order. That murder on the orders of the head of government was the basis of the "restoration of order" pa.s.sed people by, was ignored, or most generally met with their approval. There were wide expectations that Hitler would extend the purge to the rest of the party an indication of the distance that had already developed between Hitler"s own ma.s.sive popularity and the sullied image of the party"s "little Hitlers", the power-crazed functionaries found in towns and villages throughout the land.
There was no show of disapproval of Hitler"s state murders from any quarter. Both Churches remained silent, even though the Catholic Action leader, Erich Klausener, had been among the victims. Two generals had also been murdered. Though a few of their fellow officers momentarily thought there should be an investigation, most were too busy clinking their champagne gla.s.ses in celebration at the destruction of the SA. As for any sign that the legal profession might distance itself from acts of blatant illegality, the foremost legal theorist in the country, Carl Schmitt, published an article directly relating to Hitler"s speech on 13 July. Its t.i.tle was: "The Fuhrer Protects the Law".
The smashing of the SA removed the one organization that was seriously destabilizing the regime and directly threatening Hitler"s own position. The army leadership could celebrate the demise of their rival, and the fact that Hitler had backed their power in the state. The army"s triumph was, however, a hollow one. Its complicity in the events of 30 June 1934 bound it more closely to Hitler. But in so doing, it opened the door fully to the crucial extension of Hitler"s power following Hindenburg"s death. The generals might have thought Hitler was their man after 30 June. The reality was different. The next few years would show that the "Rohm affair" was a vital stage on the way to the army becoming Hitler"s tool, not his master.
The other major beneficiary was the SS. "With regard to the great services of the SS, especially in connection with the events of the 30th of June," Hitler removed its subordination to the SA. From 20 July 1934 onwards, it was responsible to him alone. Instead of any dependence on the huge and unreliable SA, with its own power pretensions, Hitler had elevated the smaller, elite praetorian guard, its loyalty unquestioned, its leaders already in almost total command of the police. The most crucial ideological weapon in the armoury of Hitler"s state was forged.
Not least, the crushing of the SA leadership showed what Hitler wanted it to show: that those opposing the regime had to reckon with losing their heads. All would-be opponents could now be absolutely clear that Hitler would stop at nothing to hold on to power, that he would not hesitate to use the utmost brutality to smash those in his way.
V.
An early intimation that a head of government who had had his own immediate predecessor as Chancellor, General von Schleicher, murdered might also not shy away from involvement in violence abroad was provided by the a.s.sa.s.sination of the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dolfuss in a failed putsch attempt undertaken by Austrian SS men on 25 July while Hitler was attending the Bayreuth Festival. Hitler"s own role, and the extent to which he had detailed information of the putsch plans, is less than wholly clear. The initiative for the coup attempt clearly came from local n.a.z.is. However, it seems that Hitler was aware of it, and gave his approval. The putsch attempt was rapidly put down. Under Kurt Schuschnigg, successor to the murdered Dollfuss, the Austrian authoritarian regime, treading its tightrope between the predatory powers of Germany and Italy, continued in existence for the present.
The international embarra.s.sment for Hitler was enormous, the damage to relations with Italy considerable. For a time, it even looked as if Italian intervention was likely. Papen found Hitler in a near-hysterical state, denouncing the idiocy of the Austrian n.a.z.is for landing him in such a mess. Every attempt was made by the German government, however unconvincingly, to dissociate itself from the coup. The headquarters of the Austrian NSDAP in Munich were closed down. A new policy of restraint in Austria was imposed. But at least one consequence of the ill-fated affair pleased Hitler. He found the answer to what to do with Papen who had "just been in our way since the Rohm business", as Goring reportedly put it. He made him the new German amba.s.sador in Vienna.
In Neudeck, meanwhile, Hindenburg was dying. His condition had been worsening during the previous weeks. On 1 August, Hitler told the cabinet that the doctors were giving Hindenburg less than twenty-four hours to live. The following morning, the Reich President was dead.
So close to the goal of total power, Hitler had left nothing to chance. The Enabling Act had explicitly stipulated that the rights of the Reich President would be left untouched. But on 1 August, while Hindenburg was still alive, Hitler had all his ministers put their names to a law determining that, on Hindenburg"s death, the office of the Reich President would be combined with that of the Reich Chancellor. The reason subsequently given was that the t.i.tle "Reich President" was uniquely bound up with the "greatness" of the deceased. Hitler wished from now on, in a ruling to apply "for all time", to be addressed as "Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor". The change in his powers was to be put to the German people for confirmation in a "free plebiscite", scheduled for 19 August.
Among the signatories to the "Law on the Head of State of the German Reich" of 1 August 1934 had been Reichswehr Minister Blomberg. The law meant that, on Hindenburg"s death, Hitler would automatically become supreme commander of the armed forces. The possibility of the army appealing over the head of the government to the Reich President as supreme commander thereby disappeared. This caused no concern to the Reichswehr leadership. Blomberg and Reichenau were, in any case, determined to go further. They were keen to exploit the moment to bind Hitler, as they imagined, more closely to the armed forces. The fateful step they took, however, had precisely the opposite effect. As Blomberg later made clear, it was without any request by Hitler, and without consulting him, that he and Reichenau hastily devised the oath of unconditional loyalty to the person of the Fuhrer, taken by every officer and soldier in the armed forces in ceremonies throughout the land on 2 August, almost before Hindenburg"s corpse had gone cold. The oath meant that the distinction between loyalty to the state and loyalty to Hitler had been eradicated. Opposition was made more difficult. For those later hesitant about joining the conspiracy against Hitler, the oath would also provide an excuse. Far from creating a dependence of Hitler on the army, the oath, stemming from ill-conceived ambitions of the Reichswehr leadership, marked the symbolic moment when the army chained itself to the Fuhrer.
"Today Hitler is the Whole of Germany," ran a headline on 4 August. The funeral of the Reich President, held with great pomp and circ.u.mstance at the Tannenberg Memorial in East Prussia, the scene of his great victory in the First World War, saw Hindenburg, who had represented the only countervailing source of loyalty, "enter Valhalla", as. .h.i.tler put it. Hindenburg had wanted to be buried at Neudeck. Ever alert to propaganda opportunities, Hitler insisted on his burial in the Tannenberg Memorial. On 19 August, the silent coup of the first days of the month duly gained its ritual plebiscitary confirmation. According to the official figures, 89.9 per cent of the voters supported Hitler"s const.i.tutionally now unlimited powers as head of state, head of government, leader of the party, and supreme commander of the armed forces. The result, disappointing though it was to the n.a.z.i leadership, and less impressive as a show of support than might perhaps have been imagined when all account is taken of the obvious pressures and manipulation, nevertheless reflected the fact that Hitler had the backing, much of it fervently enthusiastic, of the great majority of the German people.
In the few weeks embracing the Rohm affair and the death of Hindenburg, Hitler had removed all remaining threats to his position with an ease which even in the spring and early summer of 1934 could have been barely imagined. He was now inst.i.tutionally unchallengeable, backed by the "big battalions", adored by much of the population. He had secured total power. The Fuhrer state was established. Germany had bound itself to the dictatorship it had created.
After the crisis-ridden summer, Hitler was, by September, once again in his element on the huge propaganda stage of the Nuremberg Rally. In contrast even to the previous year"s rally, this was consciously created as a vehicle of the Fuhrer cult. Hitler now towered above his Movement, which had a.s.sembled to pay him homage. The film which the talented and glamorous director Leni Riefenstahl made of the rally subsequently played to packed houses throughout Germany, and made its own significant contribution to the glorification of Hitler. The t.i.tle of the film, devised by Hitler himself, was Triumph of the Will Triumph of the Will. In reality, his triumph owed only a little to will. It owed far more to those who had much to gain or thought they had by placing the German state at Hitler"s disposal.
12.
Working Towards the Fuhrer
I.
Everyone with opportunity to observe it knows that the Fuhrer can only with great difficulty order from above everything that he intends to carry out sooner or later. On the contrary, until now everyone has best worked in his place in the new Germany if, so to speak, he works towards the Fuhrer.
This was the central idea of a speech made by Werner Willikens, State Secretary in the Prussian Agriculture Ministry, at a meeting of representatives from Lander agriculture ministries held in Berlin on 21 February 1934. Willikens continued: Very often, and in many places, it has been the case that individuals, already in previous years, have waited for commands and orders. Unfortunately, that will probably also be so in future. Rather, however, it is the duty of every single person to attempt, in the spirit of the Fuhrer, to work towards him. Anyone making mistakes will come to notice it soon enough. But the one who works correctly towards the Fuhrer along his lines and towards his aim will in future as previously have the finest reward of one day suddenly attaining the legal confirmation of his work.
These comments, made in a routine speech, hold a key to how the Third Reich operated. Between Hindenburg"s death at the beginning of August 1934 and the BlombergFritsch crisis in late January and early February 1938, the Fuhrer state took shape. These were the "normal" years of the Third Reich that lived in the memories of many contemporaries as the "good" years (though they were scarcely that for the already growing numbers of victims of n.a.z.ism). But they were also years in which the "c.u.mulative radicalization" so characteristic of the n.a.z.i regime began to gather pace. One feature of this process was the fragmentation of government as. .h.i.tler"s form of personalized rule distorted the machinery of administration and called into being a panoply of overlapping and competing agencies dependent in differing ways upon the "will of the Fuhrer". At the same time, the racial and expansionist goals at the heart of Hitler"s own Weltanschauung Weltanschauung began in these years gradually to come more sharply into focus, though by no means always as a direct consequence of Hitler"s own actions. Not least, these were the years in which Hitler"s prestige and power, inst.i.tutionally unchallengeable after the summer of 1934, expanded to the point where it was absolute. began in these years gradually to come more sharply into focus, though by no means always as a direct consequence of Hitler"s own actions. Not least, these were the years in which Hitler"s prestige and power, inst.i.tutionally unchallengeable after the summer of 1934, expanded to the point where it was absolute.
These three tendencies erosion of collective government, emergence of clearer ideological goals, and Fuhrer absolutism were closely interrelated. Hitler"s personal actions, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, were certainly vital to the development. But the decisive component was that unwittingly singled out in his speech by Werner Willikens. Hitler"s personalized form of rule invited radical initiatives from below and offered such initiatives backing, so long as they were in line with his broadly defined goals. This promoted ferocious compet.i.tion at all levels of the regime, among competing agencies, and among individuals within those agencies. In the Darwinist jungle of the Third Reich, the way to power and advancement was through antic.i.p.ating the "Fuhrer will", and, without waiting for directives, taking initiatives to promote what were presumed to be Hitler"s aims and wishes. For party functionaries and ideologues and for SS "technocrats of power", "working towards the Fuhrer" could have a literal meaning. But, metaphorically, ordinary citizens denouncing neighbours to the Gestapo, often turning personal animosity or resentment to their advantage through political slur, businessmen happy to exploit anti-Jewish legislation to rid themselves of compet.i.tors, and the many others whose daily forms of minor cooperation with the regime took place at the cost of others, were whatever their motives indirectly "working towards the Fuhrer". They were as a consequence helping drive on an unstoppable radicalization which saw the gradual emergence in concrete shape of policy objectives embodied in the "mission" of the Fuhrer.
Through "working towards the Fuhrer", initiatives were taken, pressures created, legislation instigated all in ways which fell into line with what were taken to be Hitler"s aims, and without the Dictator necessarily having to dictate. The result was continuing radicalization of policy in a direction which brought Hitler"s own ideological imperatives more plainly into view as practicable policy options. The disintegration of the formal machinery of government and the accompanying ideological radicalization resulted then directly and inexorably from the specific form of personalized rule under Hitler. Conversely, both decisively shaped the process by which Hitler"s personalized power was able to free itself from all inst.i.tutional constraints and become absolute.
Those close to Hitler later claimed that they detected a change in him after Hindenburg"s death. According to Press Chief Otto Dietrich, the years 1935 and 1936, with Hitler "now as absolute ruler on the lookout for new deeds", were "the most significant" in his development "from domestic reformer and social leader of the people to the later foreign-policy desperado and gambler in international politics". "In these years," Dietrich went on, "a certain change also made itself noticeable in Hitler"s personal conduct and behaviour. He became increasingly unwilling to receive visitors on political matters if they had not been ordered by him to attend. Equally, he knew how to distance himself inwardly from his entourage. While, before the takeover of power, they had the possibility of putting forward their differing political opinion, he now as head of state and person of standing kept strictly out of all unrequested political discussion ... Hitler began to hate objections to his views and doubts on their infallibility ... He wanted to speak, but not to listen. He wanted to be the hammer, not the anvil."
Hitler"s increasing withdrawal from domestic politics once the period of consolidation of power had come to an end in August 1934 was, as Dietrich"s remarks suggest, not simply a matter of character and choice. It also directly mirrored his position as Leader, whose prestige and image could not allow him to be politically embarra.s.sed or sullied by a.s.sociation with unpopular policy choices. Hitler represented, and as the regime"s central integrating mechanism had had to represent, the image of national unity. He could not be seen to be involved in internal, day-to-day political conflict. Beyond that, his growing aloofness reflected, too, the effective transformation of domestic politics into propaganda and indoctrination. Choice and debate about options the essence of politics had by now been removed from the public arena (even if, of course, bitter disputes and conflicts continued behind the scenes). "Politics" within a "coordinated" Germany now amounted to what Hitler had since the early 1920s regarded as its sole aim: the "nationalization of the ma.s.ses" in preparation for the great and inevitable struggle against external enemies. But this goal, the creation of a strong, united, and impregnable "national community", was so all-embracing, so universal in its impact, that it amounted to little more than an extremely powerful emotional incitement to formulate policy initiatives in every sphere of the regime"s activity, affecting all walks of life. What his form of leadership, linked to the broad "directions for action" which he embodied national revival, "removal" of Jews, racial "improvement", and restoration of Germany"s power and standing in the world did was to unleash an unending dynamic in all avenues of policy-making. As Willikens had remarked, the greatest chances of success (and best opportunities for personal aggrandizement), occurred where individuals could demonstrate how effectively they were "working towards the Fuhrer". But since this frenzy of activity was uncoordinated and could not be coordinated because of Hitler"s need to avoid being openly drawn into disputes, it inexorably led to endemic conflict (within the general understanding of following the "Fuhrer"s will"). And this in turn merely reinforced the impossibility of Hitler"s personal involvement in resolving the conflict. Hitler was, therefore, at one and the same time the absolutely indispensable fulcrum of the entire regime, and yet largely detached from any formal machinery of government. The result, inevitably, was a high level of governmental and administrative disorder. to represent, the image of national unity. He could not be seen to be involved in internal, day-to-day political conflict. Beyond that, his growing aloofness reflected, too, the effective transformation of domestic politics into propaganda and indoctrination. Choice and debate about options the essence of politics had by now been removed from the public arena (even if, of course, bitter disputes and conflicts continued behind the scenes). "Politics" within a "coordinated" Germany now amounted to what Hitler had since the early 1920s regarded as its sole aim: the "nationalization of the ma.s.ses" in preparation for the great and inevitable struggle against external enemies. But this goal, the creation of a strong, united, and impregnable "national community", was so all-embracing, so universal in its impact, that it amounted to little more than an extremely powerful emotional incitement to formulate policy initiatives in every sphere of the regime"s activity, affecting all walks of life. What his form of leadership, linked to the broad "directions for action" which he embodied national revival, "removal" of Jews, racial "improvement", and restoration of Germany"s power and standing in the world did was to unleash an unending dynamic in all avenues of policy-making. As Willikens had remarked, the greatest chances of success (and best opportunities for personal aggrandizement), occurred where individuals could demonstrate how effectively they were "working towards the Fuhrer". But since this frenzy of activity was uncoordinated and could not be coordinated because of Hitler"s need to avoid being openly drawn into disputes, it inexorably led to endemic conflict (within the general understanding of following the "Fuhrer"s will"). And this in turn merely reinforced the impossibility of Hitler"s personal involvement in resolving the conflict. Hitler was, therefore, at one and the same time the absolutely indispensable fulcrum of the entire regime, and yet largely detached from any formal machinery of government. The result, inevitably, was a high level of governmental and administrative disorder.
Hitler"s personal temperament, his unbureaucratic style of operating, his Darwinistic inclination to side with the stronger, and the aloofness necessitated by his role as Fuhrer, all merged together to produce a most extraordinary phenomenon: a highly modern, advanced state without any central coordinating body and with a head of government largely disengaged from the machinery of government. Cabinet meetings (which Hitler had never liked running) now lost significance. There were only twelve gatherings of ministers in 1935. By 1937, this had fallen to a mere six meetings. After 5 February 1938, the cabinet never met again. During the war, Hitler would even ban his ministers getting together occasionally over a gla.s.s of beer. In the absence of cabinet discussions which might have determined priorities, a flood of legislation emanating independently from each ministry had to be formulated by a c.u.mbersome and grossly inefficient process whereby drafts were circulated and recirculated among ministers until some agreement was reached. Only at that stage would Hitler, if he approved after its contents were briefly summarized for him, sign the bill (usually scarcely bothering to read it) and turn it into law. Hans Heinrich Lammers, the head of the Reich Chancellery, and sole link between the ministers and the Fuhrer, naturally attained considerable influence over the way legislation (or other business of ministers) was presented to Hitler. Where Lammers decided that the Fuhrer was too busy with other pressing matters of state, legislation that had taken months to prepare could simply be ignored or postponed, sometimes indefinitely. Alternatively, Hitler intervened, sometimes in minutiae, on the basis of some one-sided piece of information he had been fed. The result was an increasing arbitrariness as. .h.i.tler"s highly personalized style of rule came into inevitable and ultimately irreconcilable conflict with bureaucracy"s need for regulated norms and clearly-defined procedures. Hitler"s ingrained secretiveness, his preference for one-to-one meetings (which he could easily dominate) with his subordinates, and his strong favouritism among ministers and other leaders in party as well as state, were added ingredients that went to undermine formal patterns of government and administration.
Access to Hitler was naturally a key element in the continuing power-struggle within the regime. Ministers who had for some reason fallen out of favour could find it impossible to speak to him. Agriculture Minister Walther Darre, for instance, was in the later 1930s to attempt in vain for over two years to gain an audience with the Fuhrer to discuss the country"s seriously worsening agricultural problems. Though they could not hinder the access of "court favourites" like Goebbels and the highly ambitious young architect, Albert Speer skilful in pandering to Hitler"s obsession with building plans and a rapidly rising star in the n.a.z.i firmament Hitler"s adjutants acquired a good deal of informal power through their control of the portals of the Fuhrer.
Fritz Wiedemann, during the First World War Hitler"s immediate superior and in the mid-1930s one of his adjutants, later recalled the extraordinary style of his arbitrary and haphazard form of personal rule. In 1935, commented Wiedemann, Hitler still maintained a relatively orderly routine. Mornings, between about 10.00 a.m. and lunch at 1.00 or 2.00 p.m., were normally taken up with meetings with Lammers, State Secretary Meissner, Funk (from the Propaganda Ministry) and ministers or other significant figures who had pressing business to discuss. In the afternoons, Hitler held discussions with military or foreign-policy advisers, though he preferred to talk to Speer about building plans. Gradually, however, any formal routine crumbled. Hitler reverted to the type of dilettante lifestyle which, in essence, he had enjoyed as a youth in Linz and Vienna. "Later on," recalled Wiedemann, "Hitler appeared as a rule only just before lunch, quickly read the press summaries provided by Reich Press Chief Dr Dietrich, then went to eat. It became, therefore, ever more difficult for Lammers and Meissner to acquire decisions from Hitler which he alone as head of state could take." When Hitler was at his residence on the Obersalzberg, it was even worse. "There he invariably left his room only approaching 2.00 p.m. Then it was lunch. The afternoon was mainly taken up with a walk, and in the evenings, straight after the evening meal, films were shown."
The walks were always downhill, with a car stationed at the bottom to ferry Hitler and his accompaniment back up again. Hitler"s detestation of physical exercise and fear of embarra.s.sment through lack of athleticism remained acute. The whole area was cordoned off during the afternoon walk, to keep away the crowds of sightseers eager for a glimpse of the Fuhrer. Instead, the tradition set in of the visitors" "march-past". Up to 2,000 people of all ages and from all parts of Germany, whose devotion had persuaded them to follow the steep paths up to the Obersalzberg and often wait hours, marched, at a signal from one of the adjutants, in a silent column past Hitler. For Wiedemann, the adulation had quasi-religious overtones.
Hitler rarely missed his evening film. The adjutants had to see to it that a fresh film was on offer each day. Hitler invariably preferred light entertainment to serious doc.u.mentaries, and, according to Wiedemann, probably gleaned some of his strong prejudices about the culture of other nations from such films.
In the Reich Chancellery, the company was almost exclusively male the atmosphere part way between that of a men"s club and an officers" mess (with a whiff of the gangsters" den thrown in). On the Obersalzberg, the presence of women (Eva Braun and wives or lady-friends of members of Hitler"s entourage) helped to lighten the atmosphere, and political talk was banned as long as they were there. Hitler was courteous, even charming in a somewhat awkwardly stiff and formal fashion, to his guests, especially towards women. He was invariably correct and attentive in dealings with the secretaries, adjutants, and other attendants on his personal staff, who for the most part liked as well as respected him. He could be kind and thoughtful, as well as generous, in his choice of birthday and Christmas presents for his entourage. Even so, whether at the Reich Chancellery or on the Obersalzberg, the constrictions and tedium of living in close proximity to Hitler were considerable. Genuine informality and relaxation were difficult when he was present. Wherever he was, he dominated. In conversation, he would brook no contradiction. Guests at meals were often nervous or hesitant lest a false word incur his displeasure. His adjutants were more concerned late at night lest a guest unwittingly lead on to one of Hitler"s favourite topics notably the First World War, or the navy where he would launch into yet another endless monologue which they would be forced to sit through until the early hours.
Hitler"s unmethodical, even casual, approach to the flood of often serious matters of government brought to his attention was a guarantee of administrative disorder. "He disliked reading files," recalled Wiedemann. "I got decisions out of him, even on very important matters, without him ever asking me for the relevant papers. He took the view that many things sorted themselves out if they were left alone."
Hitler"s lethargy regarding paperwork knew one major exception. When it came to preparing his speeches, which he composed himself, he would withdraw into his room and could work deep into the night several evenings running, occupying three secretaries taking dictation straight into the typewriter before carefully correcting the drafts. The public image was vital. He remained, above all, the propagandist par excellence par excellence.
Even had Hitler been far more conscientious and less idiosyncratic and haphazard in his style of leadership, he would have found the highly personalized direction of the complex and varied issues of a modern state beyond him. As it was, the doors were opened wide to mismanagement and corruption on a ma.s.sive scale. Hitler coupled financial incompetence and disinterest with an entirely exploitative and cavalier usage of public funds. Posts were found for "old fighters". Vast amounts of money were poured into the construction of imposing representative buildings. Architects and builders were lavishly rewarded. For favoured building or artistic projects, money was no object. Leading figures in the regime could draw upon enormous salaries, enjoy tax relief, and benefit further from gifts, donations, and bribes to accommodate their extravagant tastes in palatial homes, fine trappings, works of art, and other material luxuries including, of course, the inevitable showy limousines. Corruption was rife at all levels of the regime. Hitler was happy to indulge the infinite craving for the material trappings of power and success of his underlings, aware that corruption on a ma.s.sive scale ensured loyalty as the Third Reich developed into a modern variant of a feudal system resting on personal allegiance rewarded by private fiefdoms. He himself, by now a millionaire on the proceeds of sales of Mein Kampf Mein Kampf, led his publicly acclaimed spartan lifestyle (as regards his food and clothing) in a context of untold luxury. Alongside his magnificent apartments his official one in Berlin and his private one in Munich the initially somewhat modest alpine residence, Haus Wachenfeld on the Obersalzberg, was now converted at vast expense into the grandiose Berghof, suitable for state visits of foreign dignitaries. His restless energy demanded that he and his sizeable entourage were almost constantly on the move within Germany. For that, a special train with eleven coaches containing sleeping compartments, a fleet of limousines, and three aeroplanes stood at his disposal.
Even more serious than the way corrupt party despots profited from the bonanza of a seemingly unlimited free-for-all with public funds was the corruption of the political system itself. In the increasing absence of any formal procedures for arriving at political decisions, favoured party bosses with access to Hitler were often able, over lunch or at coffee, to put forward some initiative and manipulate a comment of approval to their own advantage. Hitler"s spa.r.s.e involvement in initiating domestic policy during the mid- and later 1930s and the disintegration of any centralized body for policy formulation meant that there was wide scope for those able to exert pressure for action in areas broadly echoing the aims of nationalization of the ma.s.ses and exclusion of those deemed not to belong to the "national community". The pressure came above all from two sources: the party (both its central office and its provincial bosses, the Gauleiter) and the elite organization, the SS (now merging into the police to become an ideologically driven state security force of immense power). Using Hitler"s professed (and unlimited) goals of national rebirth and strength through racial purity to legitimate their demands and actions, they ensured that the dynamic unleashed by the takeover of power would not subside.
Once power had been attained in 1933, the NSDAP, its numbers now rapidly swelling through the intake of hundreds of thousands of opportunists, became in essence a loosely coordinated vehicle of propaganda an