In communist Romania almost everything was owned by the state. Democratic Romania quickly privatised its a.s.sets, selling them at bargain prices to the ex-communists, who alone grasped what was happening and collaborated to feather each other"s nests. Government companies that controlled national infrastructure and natural resources were sold to former communist officials at end-of-season prices while the party"s foot soldiers bought houses and apartments for pennies.
Ion Iliescu was elected president of Romania, while his colleagues became ministers, parliament members, bank directors and multimillionaires. The new Romanian elite that controls the country to this day is composed mostly of former communists and their families. The ma.s.ses who risked their necks in Timioara and Bucharest settled for sc.r.a.ps, because they did not know how to cooperate and how to create an efficient organisation to look after their own interests.21 A similar fate befell the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. What television did in 1989, Facebook and Twitter did in 2011. The new media helped the ma.s.ses coordinate their activities, so that thousands of people flooded the streets and squares at the right moment and toppled the Mubarak regime. However, it is one thing to bring 100,000 people to Tahrir Square, and quite another to get a grip on the political machinery, shake the right hands in the right back rooms and run a country effectively. Consequently, when Mubarak stepped down the demonstrators could not fill the vacuum. Egypt had only two inst.i.tutions sufficiently organised to rule the country: the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence the revolution was hijacked first by the Brotherhood, and eventually by the army.
The Romanian ex-communists and the Egyptian generals were not more intelligent or nimble-fingered than either the old dictators or the demonstrators in Bucharest and Cairo. Their advantage lay in flexible cooperation. They cooperated better than the crowds, and they were willing to show far more flexibility than the hidebound Ceauescu and Mubarak.
Beyond s.e.x and Violence If Sapiens rule the world because we alone can cooperate flexibly in large numbers, then this undermines our belief in the sacredness of human beings. We tend to think that we are special, and deserve all kinds of privileges. As proof, we point to the amazing achievements of our species: we built the pyramids and the Great Wall of China; we deciphered the structure of atoms and DNA molecules; we reached the South Pole and the moon. If these accomplishments resulted from some unique essence that each individual human has an immortal soul, say then it would make sense to sanctify human life. Yet since these triumphs actually result from ma.s.s cooperation, it is far less clear why they should make us revere individual humans.
A beehive has much greater power than an individual b.u.t.terfly, yet that doesn"t imply a bee is therefore more hallowed than a b.u.t.terfly. The Romanian Communist Party successfully dominated the disorganised Romanian population. Does it follow that the life of a party member was more sacred than the life of an ordinary citizen? Humans know how to cooperate far more effectively than chimpanzees, which is why humans launch s.p.a.ceships to the moon whereas chimpanzees throw stones at zoo visitors. Does it mean that humans are superior beings?
Well, maybe. It depends on what enables humans to cooperate so well in the first place. Why are humans alone able to construct such large and sophisticated social systems? Social cooperation among most social mammals such as chimpanzees, wolves and dolphins relies on intimate acquaintance. Among common chimpanzees, individuals will go hunting together only after they have got to know each other well and established a social hierarchy. Hence chimpanzees spend a lot of time in social interactions and power struggles. When alien chimpanzees meet, they usually cannot cooperate, but instead scream at each other, fight or flee as quickly as possible.
Among pygmy chimpanzees also known as bon.o.bos things are a bit different. Bon.o.bos often use s.e.x in order to dispel tensions and cement social bonds. Not surprisingly, h.o.m.os.e.xual intercourse is consequently very common among them. When two alien groups of bon.o.bos encounter one another, at first they display fear and hostility, and the jungle is filled with howls and screams. Soon enough, however, females from one group cross no-chimp"s-land, and invite the strangers to make love instead of war. The invitation is usually accepted, and within a few minutes the potential battlefield teems with bon.o.bos having s.e.x in almost every conceivable posture, including hanging upside down from trees.
Sapiens know these cooperative tricks well. They sometimes form power hierarchies similar to those of common chimpanzees, whereas on other occasions they cement social bonds with s.e.x just like bon.o.bos. Yet personal acquaintance whether it involves fighting or copulating cannot form the basis for large-scale co-operation. You cannot settle the Greek debt crisis by inviting Greek politicians and German bankers to either a fist fight or an orgy. Research indicates that Sapiens just can"t have intimate relations (whether hostile or amorous) with more than 150 individuals.22 Whatever enables humans to organise ma.s.s-cooperation networks, it isn"t intimate relations.
This is bad news for psychologists, sociologists, economists and others who try to decipher human society through laboratory experiments. For both organisational and financial reasons, the vast majority of experiments are conducted either on individuals or on small groups of partic.i.p.ants. Yet it is risky to extrapolate from small-group behaviour to the dynamics of ma.s.s societies. A nation of 100 million people functions in a fundamentally different way to a band of a hundred individuals.
Take, for example, the Ultimatum Game one of the most famous experiments in behavioural economics. This experiment is usually conducted on two people. One of them gets $100, which he must divide between himself and the other partic.i.p.ant in any way he wants. He may keep everything, split the money in half or give most of it away. The other player can do one of two things: accept the suggested division, or reject it outright. If he rejects the division, n.o.body gets anything.
Cla.s.sical economic theories maintain that humans are rational calculating machines. They propose that most people will keep $99, and offer $1 to the other partic.i.p.ant. They further propose that the other partic.i.p.ant will accept the offer. A rational person offered a dollar will always say yes. What does he care if the other player gets $99?
Cla.s.sical economists have probably never left their laboratories and lecture halls to venture into the real world. Most people playing the Ultimatum Game reject very low offers because they are "unfair". They prefer losing a dollar to looking like suckers. Since this is how the real world functions, few people make very low offers in the first place. Most people divide the money equally, or give themselves only a moderate advantage, offering $30 or $40 to the other player.
The Ultimatum Game made a significant contribution to undermining cla.s.sical economic theories and to establishing the most important economic discovery of the last few decades: Sapiens don"t behave according to a cold mathematical logic, but rather according to a warm social logic. We are ruled by emotions. These emotions, as we saw earlier, are in fact sophisticated algorithms that reflect the social mechanisms of ancient hunter-gatherer bands. If 30,000 years ago I helped you hunt a wild chicken and you then kept almost all the chicken to yourself, offering me just one wing, I did not say to myself: "Better one wing than nothing at all." Instead my evolutionary algorithms kicked in, adrenaline and testosterone flooded my system, my blood boiled, and I stamped my feet and shouted at the top of my voice. In the short term I may have gone hungry, and even risked a punch or two. But it paid off in the long term, because you thought twice before ripping me off again. We refuse unfair offers because people who meekly accepted unfair offers didn"t survive in the Stone Age.
Observations of contemporary hunter-gatherer bands support this idea. Most bands are highly egalitarian, and when a hunter comes back to camp carrying a fat deer, everybody gets a share. The same is true of chimpanzees. When one chimp kills a piglet, the other troop members will gather round him with outstretched hands, and usually they all get a piece.
In another recent experiment, the primatologist Frans de Waal placed two capuchin monkeys in two adjacent cages, so that each could see everything the other was doing. De Waal and his colleagues placed small stones inside each cage, and trained the monkeys to give them these stones. Whenever a monkey handed over a stone, he received food in exchange. At first the reward was a piece of cuc.u.mber. Both monkeys were very pleased with that, and happily ate their cuc.u.mber. After a few rounds de Waal moved to the next stage of the experiment. This time, when the first monkey surrendered a stone, he got a grape. Grapes are much more tasty than cuc.u.mbers. However, when the second monkey gave a stone, he still received a piece of cuc.u.mber. The second monkey, who was previously very happy with his cuc.u.mber, became incensed. He took the cuc.u.mber, looked at it in disbelief for a moment, and then threw it at the scientists in anger and began jumping and screeching loudly. He ain"t a sucker.23 This hilarious experiment (which you can see for yourself on YouTube), along with the Ultimatum Game, has led many to believe that primates have a natural morality, and that equality is a universal and timeless value. People are egalitarian by nature, and unequal societies can never function well due to resentment and dissatisfaction.
But is that really so? These theories may work well on chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and small hunter-gatherer bands. They also work well in the lab, where you test them on small groups of people. Yet once you observe the behaviour of human ma.s.ses you discover a completely different reality. Most human kingdoms and empires were extremely unequal, yet many of them were surprisingly stable and efficient. In ancient Egypt, the pharaoh sprawled on comfortable cushions inside a cool and sumptuous palace, wearing golden sandals and gem-studded tunics, while beautiful maids popped sweet grapes into his mouth. Through the open window he could see the peasants in the fields, toiling in dirty rags under a merciless sun, and blessed was the peasant who had a cuc.u.mber to eat at the end of the day. Yet the peasants rarely revolted.
In 1740 King Frederick II of Prussia invaded Silesia, thus commencing a series of b.l.o.o.d.y wars that earned him his sobriquet Frederick the Great, turned Prussia into a major power and left hundreds of thousands of people dead, crippled or dest.i.tute. Most of Frederick"s soldiers were hapless recruits, subject to iron discipline and draconian drill. Not surprisingly, the soldiers lost little love on their supreme commander. As Frederick watched his troops a.s.semble for the invasion, he told one of his generals that what struck him most about the scene was that "we are standing here in perfect safety, looking at 60,000 men they are all our enemies, and there is not one of them who is not better armed and stronger than we are, and yet they all tremble in our presence, while we have no reason whatsoever to be afraid of them".24 Frederick could indeed watch them in perfect safety. During the following years, despite all the hardships of war, these 60,000 armed men never revolted against him indeed, many of them served him with exceptional courage, risking and even sacrificing their very lives.
Why did the Egyptian peasants and Prussian soldiers act so differently than we would have expected on the basis of the Ultimatum Game and the capuchin monkeys experiment? Because large numbers of people behave in a fundamentally different way than do small numbers. What would scientists see if they conducted the Ultimatum Game experiment on two groups of 1 million people each, who had to share $100 billion?
They would probably have witnessed strange and fascinating dynamics. For example, since 1 million people cannot make decisions collectively, each group might sprout a small ruling elite. What if one elite offers the other $10 billion, keeping $90 billion? The leaders of the second group might well accept this unfair offer, siphon most of the $10 billion into their Swiss bank accounts, while preventing rebellion among their followers with a combination of sticks and carrots. The leadership might threaten to severely punish dissidents forthwith, while promising the meek and patient everlasting rewards in the afterlife. This is what happened in ancient Egypt and eighteenth-century Prussia, and this is how things still work out in numerous countries around the world.
Such threats and promises often succeed in creating stable human hierarchies and ma.s.s-cooperation networks, as long as people believe that they reflect the inevitable laws of nature or the divine commands of G.o.d, rather than just human whims. All large-scale human cooperation is ultimately based on our belief in imagined orders. These are sets of rules that, despite existing only in our imagination, we believe to be as real and inviolable as gravity. "If you sacrifice ten bulls to the sky G.o.d, the rain will come; if you honour your parents, you will go to heaven; and if you don"t believe what I am telling you you"ll go to h.e.l.l." As long as all Sapiens living in a particular locality believe in the same stories, they all follow the same rules, making it easy to predict the behaviour of strangers and to organise ma.s.s-cooperation networks. Sapiens often use visual marks such as a turban, a beard or a business suit to signal "you can trust me, I believe in the same story as you". Our chimpanzee cousins cannot invent and spread such stories, which is why they cannot cooperate in large numbers.
The Web of Meaning People find it difficult to understand the idea of "imagined orders" because they a.s.sume that there are only two types of realities: objective realities and subjective realities. In objective reality, things exist independently of our beliefs and feelings. Gravity, for example, is an objective reality. It existed long before Newton, and it affects people who don"t believe in it just as much as it affects those who do.
Subjective reality, in contrast, depends on my personal beliefs and feelings. Thus, suppose I feel a sharp pain in my head and go to the doctor. The doctor checks me thoroughly, but finds nothing wrong. So she sends me for a blood test, urine test, DNA test, X-ray, electrocardiogram, fMRI scan and a plethora of other procedures. When the results come in she announces that I am perfectly healthy, and I can go home. Yet I still feel a sharp pain in my head. Even though every objective test has found nothing wrong with me, and even though n.o.body except me feels the pain, for me the pain is 100 per cent real.
Most people presume that reality is either objective or subjective, and that there is no third option. Hence once they satisfy themselves that something isn"t just their own subjective feeling, they jump to the conclusion it must be objective. If lots of people believe in G.o.d; if money makes the world go round; and if nationalism starts wars and builds empires then these things aren"t just a subjective belief of mine. G.o.d, money and nations must therefore be objective realities.
However, there is a third level of reality: the intersubjective level. Intersubjective ent.i.ties depend on communication among many humans rather than on the beliefs and feelings of individual humans. Many of the most important agents in history are intersubjective. Money, for example, has no objective value. You cannot eat, drink or wear a dollar bill. Yet as long as billions of people believe in its value, you can use it to buy food, beverages and clothing. If the baker suddenly loses his faith in the dollar bill and refuses to give me a loaf of bread for this green piece of paper, it doesn"t matter much. I can just go down a few blocks to the nearby supermarket. However, if the supermarket cashiers also refuse to accept this piece of paper, along with the hawkers in the market and the salespeople in the mall, then the dollar will lose its value. The green pieces of paper will go on existing, of course, but they will be worthless.
Such things actually happen from time to time. On 3 November 1985 the Myanmar government unexpectedly announced that bank-notes of twenty-five, fifty and a hundred kyats were no longer legal tender. People were given no opportunity to exchange the notes, and savings of a lifetime were instantaneously turned into heaps of worthless paper. To replace the defunct notes, the government introduced new seventy-five-kyat bills, allegedly in honour of the seventy-fifth birthday of Myanmar"s dictator, General Ne Win. In August 1986, banknotes of fifteen kyats and thirty-five kyats were issued. Rumour had it that the dictator, who had a strong faith in numerology, believed that fifteen and thirty-five are lucky numbers. They brought little luck to his subjects. On 5 September 1987 the government suddenly decreed that all thirty-five and seventy-five notes were no longer money.
The value of money is not the only thing that might evaporate once people stop believing in it. The same can happen to laws, G.o.ds and even entire empires. One moment they are busy shaping the world, and the next moment they no longer exist. Zeus and Hera were once important powers in the Mediterranean basin, but today they lack any authority because n.o.body believes in them. The Soviet Union could once destroy the entire human race, yet it ceased to exist at the stroke of a pen. At 2 p.m. on 8 December 1991, in a state dacha near Viskuli, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belavezha Accords, which stated that "We, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, as founding states of the USSR that signed the union treaty of 1922, hereby establish that the USSR as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality ceases its existence."25 And that was that. No more Soviet Union.
It is relatively easy to accept that money is an intersubjective reality. Most people are also happy to acknowledge that ancient Greek G.o.ds, evil empires and the values of alien cultures exist only in the imagination. Yet we don"t want to accept that our G.o.d, our nation or our values are mere fictions, because these are the things that give meaning to our lives. We want to believe that our lives have some objective meaning, and that our sacrifices matter to something beyond the stories in our head. Yet in truth the lives of most people have meaning only within the network of stories they tell one another.
Signing the Belavezha Accords. Pen touches paper and abracadabra! The Soviet Union disappears.
NOVOSTI/AFP/Getty Images.
Meaning is created when many people weave together a common network of stories. Why does a particular action such as getting married in church, fasting on Ramadan or voting on election day seem meaningful to me? Because my parents also think it is meaningful, as do my brothers, my neighbours, people in nearby cities and even the residents of far-off countries. And why do all these people think it is meaningful? Because their friends and neighbours also share the same view. People constantly reinforce each other"s beliefs in a self-perpetuating loop. Each round of mutual confirmation tightens the web of meaning further, until you have little choice but to believe what everyone else believes.
Yet over decades and centuries the web of meaning unravels and a new web is spun in its place. To study history means to watch the spinning and unravelling of these webs, and to realise that what seems to people in one age the most important thing in life becomes utterly meaningless to their descendants.
In 1187 Saladin defeated the crusader army at the Battle of Hattin and conquered Jerusalem. In response the Pope launched the Third Crusade to recapture the holy city. Imagine a young English n.o.bleman named John, who left home to fight Saladin. John believed that his actions had an objective meaning. He believed that if he died on the crusade, after death his soul would ascend to heaven, where it would enjoy everlasting celestial joy. He would have been horrified to learn that the soul and heaven are just stories invented by humans. John wholeheartedly believed that if he reached the Holy Land, and if some Muslim warrior with a big moustache brought an axe down on his head, he would feel an unbearable pain, his ears would ring, his legs would crumble under him, his field of vision would turn black and the very next moment he would see brilliant light all around him, he would hear angelic voices and melodious harps, and radiant winged cherubs would beckon him through a magnificent golden gate.
John had a very strong faith in all this, because he was enmeshed within an extremely dense and powerful web of meaning. His earliest memories were of Grandpa Henry"s rusty sword, hanging in the castle"s main hall. Ever since he was a toddler John had heard stories of Grandpa Henry who died on the Second Crusade and who is now resting with the angels in heaven, watching over John and his family. When minstrels visited the castle, they usually sang about the brave crusaders who fought in the Holy Land. When John went to church, he enjoyed looking at the stained-gla.s.s windows. One showed G.o.dfrey of Bouillon riding a horse and impaling a wicked-looking Muslim on his lance. Another showed the souls of sinners burning in h.e.l.l. John listened attentively to the local priest, the most learned man he knew. Almost every Sunday, the priest explained with the help of well-crafted parables and hilarious jokes that there was no salvation outside the Catholic Church, that the Pope in Rome was our holy father and that we always had to obey his commands. If we murdered or stole, G.o.d would send us to h.e.l.l; but if we killed infidel Muslims, G.o.d would welcome us to heaven.
One day when John was just turning eighteen a dishevelled knight rode to the castle"s gate, and in a choked voice announced the news: Saladin has destroyed the crusader army at Hattin! Jerusalem has fallen! The Pope has declared a new crusade, promising eternal salvation to anyone who dies on it! All around, people looked shocked and worried, but John"s face lit up in an otherworldly glow and he proclaimed: "I am going to fight the infidels and liberate the Holy Land!" Everyone fell silent for a moment, and then smiles and tears appeared on their faces. His mother wiped her eyes, gave John a big hug and told him how proud she was of him. His father gave him a mighty pat on the back, and said: "If only I was your age, son, I would join you. Our family"s honour is at stake I am sure you won"t disappoint us!" Two of his friends announced that they were coming too. Even John"s sworn rival, the baron on the other side of the river, paid a visit to wish him G.o.dspeed.
As he left the castle, villagers came forth from their hovels to wave to him, and all the pretty girls looked longingly at the brave crusader setting off to fight the infidels. When he set sail from England and made his way through strange and distant lands Normandy, Provence, Sicily he was joined by bands of foreign knights, all with the same destination and the same faith. When the army finally disembarked in the Holy Land and waged battle with Saladin"s hosts, John was amazed to discover that even the wicked Saracens shared his beliefs. True, they were a bit confused, thinking that the Christians were the infidels and that the Muslims were obeying G.o.d"s will. Yet they too accepted the basic principle that those fighting for G.o.d and Jerusalem will go straight to heaven when they die.
In such a way, thread by thread, medieval civilisation spun its web of meaning, trapping John and his contemporaries like flies. It was inconceivable to John that all these stories were just figments of the imagination. Maybe his parents and uncles were wrong. But the minstrels too, and all his friends, and the village girls, the learned priest, the baron on the other side of the river, the Pope in Rome, the Provencal and Sicilian knights, and even the very Muslims is it possible that they were all hallucinating?
And the years pa.s.s. As the historian watches, the web of meaning unravels and another is spun in its stead. John"s parents die, followed by all his siblings and friends. Instead of minstrels singing about the crusades, the new fashion is stage plays about tragic love affairs. The family castle burns to the ground and, when it is rebuilt, no trace is found of Grandpa Henry"s sword. The church windows shatter in a winter storm and the replacement gla.s.s no longer depicts G.o.dfrey of Bouillon and the sinners in h.e.l.l, but rather the great triumph of the king of England over the king of France. The local priest has stopped calling the Pope "our holy father" he is now referred to as "that devil in Rome". In the nearby university scholars pore over ancient Greek ma.n.u.scripts, dissect dead bodies and whisper quietly behind closed doors that perhaps there is no such thing as the soul.
And the years continue to pa.s.s. Where the castle once stood, there is now a shopping mall. In the local cinema they are screening Monty Python and the Holy Grail for the umpteenth time. In an empty church a bored vicar is overjoyed to see two j.a.panese tourists. He explains at length about the stained-gla.s.s windows, while they politely smile, nodding in complete incomprehension. On the steps outside a gaggle of teenagers are playing with their iPhones. They watch a new YouTube remix of John Lennon"s "Imagine". "Imagine there"s no heaven," sings Lennon, "it"s easy if you try." A Pakistani street cleaner is sweeping the pavement, while a nearby radio broadcasts the news: the carnage in Syria continues, and the Security Council"s meeting has ended in an impa.s.se. Suddenly a hole in time opens, a mysterious ray of light illuminates the face of one of the teenagers, who announces: "I am going to fight the infidels and liberate the Holy Land!"
Infidels and Holy Land? These words no longer carry any meaning for most people in today"s England. Even the vicar would probably think the teenager is having some sort of psychotic episode. In contrast, if an English youth decided to join Amnesty International and travel to Syria to protect the human rights of refugees, he will be seen as a hero. In the Middle Ages people would have thought he had gone bonkers. n.o.body in twelfth-century England knew what human rights were. You want to travel to the Middle East and risk your life not in order to kill Muslims, but to protect one group of Muslims from another? You must be out of your mind.
That"s how history unfolds. People weave a web of meaning, believe in it with all their heart, but sooner or later the web unravels, and when we look back we cannot understand how anybody could have taken it seriously. With hindsight, going on crusade in the hope of reaching Paradise sounds like utter madness. With hindsight, the Cold War seems even madder. How come thirty years ago people were willing to risk nuclear holocaust because of their belief in a communist paradise? A hundred years hence, our belief in democracy and human rights might look equally incomprehensible to our descendants.
Dreamtime Sapiens rule the world because only they can weave an intersubjective web of meaning: a web of laws, forces, ent.i.ties and places that exist purely in their common imagination. This web allows humans alone to organise crusades, socialist revolutions and human rights movements.
Other animals may also imagine various things. A cat waiting to ambush a mouse might not see the mouse, but may well imagine the shape and even taste of the mouse. Yet to the best of our knowledge, cats are able to imagine only things that actually exist in the world, like mice. They cannot imagine things that they have never seen or smelled or tasted such as the US dollar, Google corporation or the European Union. Only Sapiens can imagine such chimeras.
Consequently, whereas cats and other animals are confined to the objective realm and use their communication systems merely to describe reality, Sapiens use language to create completely new realities. During the last 70,000 years the intersubjective realities that Sapiens invented became ever more powerful, so that today they dominate the world. Will the chimpanzees, the elephants, the Amazon rainforests and the Arctic glaciers survive the twenty-first century? This depends on the wishes and decisions of intersubjective ent.i.ties such as the European Union and the World Bank; ent.i.ties that exist only in our shared imagination.
No other animal can stand up to us, not because they lack a soul or a mind, but because they lack the necessary imagination. Lions can run, jump, claw and bite. Yet they cannot open a bank account or file a lawsuit. And in the twenty-first century, a banker who knows how to file a lawsuit is far more powerful than the most ferocious lion in the savannah.
As well as separating humans from other animals, this ability to create intersubjective ent.i.ties also separates the humanities from the life sciences. Historians seek to understand the development of intersubjective ent.i.ties like G.o.ds and nations, whereas biologists hardly recognise the existence of such things. Some believe that if we could only crack the genetic code and map every neuron in the brain, we will know all of humanity"s secrets. After all, if humans have no soul, and if thoughts, emotions and sensations are just biochemical algorithms, why can"t biology account for all the vagaries of human societies? From this perspective, the crusades were territorial disputes shaped by evolutionary pressures, and English knights going to fight Saladin in the Holy Land were not that different from wolves trying to appropriate the territory of a neighbouring pack.
The humanities, in contrast, emphasise the crucial importance of intersubjective ent.i.ties, which cannot be reduced to hormones and neurons. To think historically means to ascribe real power to the contents of our imaginary stories. Of course, historians don"t ignore objective factors such as climate changes and genetic mutations, but they give much greater importance to the stories people invent and believe. North Korea and South Korea are so different from one another not because people in Pyongyang have different genes to people in Seoul, or because the north is colder and more mountainous. It"s because the north is dominated by very different fictions.
Maybe someday breakthroughs in neurobiology will enable us to explain communism and the crusades in strictly biochemical terms. Yet we are very far from that point. During the twenty-first century the border between history and biology is likely to blur not because we will discover biological explanations for historical events, but rather because ideological fictions will rewrite DNA strands; political and economic interests will redesign the climate; and the geography of mountains and rivers will give way to cybers.p.a.ce. As human fictions are translated into genetic and electronic codes, the intersubjective reality will swallow up the objective reality and biology will merge with history. In the twenty-first century fiction might thereby become the most potent force on earth, surpa.s.sing even wayward asteroids and natural selection. Hence if we want to understand our future, cracking genomes and crunching numbers is hardly enough. We must also decipher the fictions that give meaning to the world.
The Creator: Jackson Pollock in a moment of inspiration.
Rudy Burckhardt, photographer. Jackson Pollock and Lee Krasner papers, c.19051984. Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Inst.i.tution. The PollockKrasner Foundation ARS, NY and DACS, London, 2016.
PART II.
h.o.m.o Sapiens Gives Meaning to the World.
What kind of world did humans create?.
How did humans become convinced that they not only control the world, but also give it meaning?
How did humanism the worship of humankind become the most important religion of all?.
4.
The Storytellers.
Animals such as wolves and chimpanzees live in a dual reality. On the one hand, they are familiar with objective ent.i.ties outside them, such as trees, rocks and rivers. On the other hand, they are aware of subjective experiences within them, such as fear, joy and desire. Sapiens, in contrast, live in triple-layered reality. In addition to trees, rivers, fears and desires, the Sapiens world also contains stories about money, G.o.ds, nations and corporations. As history unfolded, the impact of G.o.ds, nations and corporations grew at the expense of rivers, fears and desires. There are still many rivers in the world, and people are still motivated by their fears and wishes, but Jesus Christ, the French Republic and Apple Inc. have dammed and harnessed the rivers, and have learned to shape our deepest anxieties and yearnings.
Since new twenty-first-century technologies are likely to make such fictions only more potent, understanding our future requires understanding how stories about Christ, France and Apple have gained so much power. Humans think they make history, but history actually revolves around the web of stories. The basic abilities of individual humans have not changed much since the Stone Age. But the web of stories has grown from strength to strength, thereby pushing history from the Stone Age to the Silicon Age.
It all began about 70,000 years ago, when the Cognitive Revolution enabled Sapiens to start talking about things that existed only in their own imagination. For the following 60,000 years Sapiens wove many fictional webs, but these remained small and local. The spirit of a revered ancestor worshipped by one tribe was completely unknown to its neighbours, and seash.e.l.ls valuable in one locality became worthless once you crossed the nearby mountain range. Stories about ancestral spirits and precious seash.e.l.ls still gave Sapiens a huge advantage, because they allowed hundreds and sometimes even thousands of Sapiens to cooperate effectively, which was far more than Neanderthals or chimpanzees could do. Yet as long as Sapiens remained hunter-gatherers, they could not cooperate on a truly ma.s.sive scale, because it was impossible to feed a city or a kingdom by hunting and gathering. Consequently the spirits, fairies and demons of the Stone Age were relatively weak ent.i.ties.
The Agricultural Revolution, which began about 12,000 years ago, provided the necessary material base for enlarging and strengthening the intersubjective networks. Farming made it possible to feed thousands of people in crowded cities and thousands of soldiers in disciplined armies. However, the intersubjective webs then encountered a new obstacle. In order to preserve the collective myths and organise ma.s.s cooperation, the early farmers relied on the data-processing abilities of the human brain, which were strictly limited.
Farmers believed in stories about great G.o.ds. They built temples to their favourite G.o.d, held festivals in his honour, offered him sacrifices, and gave him lands, t.i.thes and presents. In the first cities of ancient Sumer, about 6,000 years ago, the temples were not just centres of worship, but also the most important political and economic hubs. The Sumerian G.o.ds fulfilled a function a.n.a.logous to modern brands and corporations. Today, corporations are fictional legal ent.i.ties that own property, lend money, hire employees and initiate economic enterprises. In ancient Uruk, Lagash and Shurupak the G.o.ds functioned as legal ent.i.ties that could own fields and slaves, give and receive loans, pay salaries and build dams and ca.n.a.ls.
Since the G.o.ds never died, and since they had no children to fight over their inheritance, they gathered more and more property and power. An increasing number of Sumerians found themselves employed by the G.o.ds, taking loans from the G.o.ds, tilling the G.o.ds" lands and owing taxes and t.i.thes to the G.o.ds. Just as in present-day San Francisco John is employed by Google while Mary works for Microsoft, so in ancient Uruk one person was employed by the great G.o.d Enki while his neighbour worked for the G.o.ddess Inanna. The temples of Enki and Inanna dominated the Uruk skyline, and their divine logos branded buildings, products and clothes. For the Sumerians, Enki and Inanna were as real as Google and Microsoft are real for us. Compared to their predecessors the ghosts and spirits of the Stone Age the Sumerian G.o.ds were very powerful ent.i.ties.
It goes without saying that the G.o.ds didn"t actually run their businesses, for the simple reason that they didn"t exist anywhere except in the human imagination. Day-to-day activities were managed by the temple priests (just as Google and Microsoft need to hire flesh-and-blood humans to manage their affairs). However, as the G.o.ds acquired more and more property and power, the priests could not cope. They may have represented the mighty sky G.o.d or the all-knowing earth G.o.ddess, but they themselves were fallible mortals. They had difficulty remembering all the lands belonging to the G.o.ddess Inanna, which of Inanna"s employees had received their salary already, which of the G.o.ddess"s tenants had failed to pay rent and what interest rate the G.o.ddess charged her debtors. This was one of the main reasons why in Sumer, like everywhere else around the world, human cooperation networks could not grow much even thousands of years after the Agricultural Revolution. There were no huge kingdoms, no extensive trade networks and no universal religions.
This obstacle was finally removed about 5,000 years ago, when the Sumerians invented both writing and money. These Siamese twins born to the same parents at the same time and in the same place broke the data-processing limitations of the human brain. Writing and money made it possible to start collecting taxes from hundreds of thousands of people, to organise complex bureaucracies and to establish vast kingdoms. In Sumer these kingdoms were managed in the name of the G.o.ds by human priest-kings. In the neighbouring Nile Valley people went a step further, merging the priest-king with the G.o.d to create a living deity pharaoh.
The Egyptians considered pharaoh to be an actual G.o.d rather than just a divine deputy. The whole of Egypt belonged to that G.o.d, and all people had to obey his orders and pay his taxes. Just as in the Sumerian temples, so also in pharaonic Egypt the G.o.d didn"t manage his business empire by himself. Some pharaohs ruled with an iron fist, while others pa.s.sed their days at banquets and festivities, but in both cases the practical work of administering Egypt was left to thousands of literate officials. Just like any other human, pharaoh had a biological body with biological needs, desires and emotions. But the biological pharaoh was of little importance. The real ruler of the Nile Valley was an imagined pharaoh that existed in the stories millions of Egyptians told one another.
While pharaoh sat in his palace in the capital city of Memphis, eating grapes and dallying with his wives and mistresses, pharaoh"s officials criss-crossed the kingdom from the Mediterranean sh.o.r.e to the Nubian Desert. The bureaucrats calculated the taxes each village had to pay, wrote them on long papyrus scrolls and sent them to Memphis. When a written order came from Memphis to recruit soldiers to the army or labourers for some construction project, the officials gathered the necessary men. They computed how many kilograms of wheat the royal granaries contained, how many work days were required to clean the ca.n.a.ls and reservoirs, and how many ducks and pigs to send to Memphis so that pharaoh"s harem could dine well. Even when the living deity died, and his body was embalmed and borne in an extravagant funerary procession to the royal necropolis outside Memphis, the bureaucracy kept going. The officials kept writing scrolls, collecting taxes, sending orders and oiling the gears of the pharaonic machine.
If the Sumerian G.o.ds remind us of present-day company brands, so the living-G.o.d pharaoh can be compared to modern personal brands such as Elvis Presley, Madonna or Justin Bieber. Just like pharaoh, Elvis too had a biological body, complete with biological needs, desires and emotions. Elvis ate and drank and slept. Yet Elvis was much more than a biological body. Like pharaoh, Elvis was a story, a myth, a brand and the brand was far more important than the biological body. During Elvis"s lifetime, the brand earned millions of dollars selling records, tickets, posters and rights, but only a small fraction of the necessary work was done by Elvis in person. Instead, most of it was done by a small army of agents, lawyers, producers and secretaries. Consequently when the biological Elvis died, for the brand it was business as usual. Even today fans still buy the King"s posters and alb.u.ms, radio stations go on paying royalties, and more than half a million pilgrims flock each year to Graceland, the King"s necropolis in Memphis, Tennessee.
Brands are not a modern invention. Just like Elvis Presley, pharaoh too was a brand rather than a living organism. For millions of followers his image counted for far more than his fleshy reality, and they kept worshipping him long after he was dead.
Left: Richard Nowitz/Getty Images. Right: Archive Photos/Stringer/Getty Images.
Prior to the invention of writing, stories were confined by the limited capacity of human brains. You couldn"t invent overly complex stories which people couldn"t remember. With writing you could suddenly create extremely long and intricate stories, which were stored on tablets and papyri rather than in human heads. No ancient Egyptian remembered all of pharaoh"s lands, taxes and t.i.thes; Elvis Presley never even read all the contracts signed in his name; no living soul is familiar with all the laws and regulations of the European Union; and no banker or CIA agent tracks down every dollar in the world. Yet all of these minutiae are written somewhere, and the a.s.semblage of relevant doc.u.ments defines the ident.i.ty and power of pharaoh, Elvis, the EU and the dollar.
Writing has thus enabled humans to organise entire societies in an algorithmic fashion. We encountered the term "algorithm" when we tried to understand what emotions are and how brains function, and defined it as a methodical set of steps that can be used to make calculations, resolve problems and reach decisions. In illiterate societies people make all calculations and decisions in their heads. In literate societies people are organised into networks, so that each person is only a small step in a huge algorithm, and it is the algorithm as a whole that makes the important decisions. This is the essence of bureaucracy.
Think about a modern hospital, for example. When you arrive the receptionist hands you a standard form, and asks you a predetermined set of questions. Your answers are forwarded to a nurse, who compares them with the hospital"s regulations in order to decide what preliminary tests to give you. She then measures, say, your blood pressure and heart rate, and takes a blood test. The doctor on duty examines the results, and follows a strict protocol to decide in which ward to hospitalise you. In the ward you are subjected to much more thorough examinations, such as an X-ray or an fMRI scan, mandated by thick medical guidebooks. Specialists then a.n.a.lyse the results according to well-known statistical databases, deciding what medicines to give you or what further tests to run.
This algorithmic structure ensures that it doesn"t really matter who is the receptionist, nurse or doctor on duty. Their personality type, their political opinions and their momentary moods are irrelevant. As long as they all follow the regulations and protocols, they have a good chance of curing you. According to the algorithmic ideal, your fate is in the hands of "the system", and not in the hands of the flesh-and-blood mortals who happen to man this or that post.
What"s true of hospitals is also true of armies, prisons, schools, corporations and ancient kingdoms. Of course ancient Egypt was far less technologically sophisticated than a modern hospital, but the algorithmic principle was the same. In ancient Egypt too, most decisions were made not by a single wise person, but by a network of officials linked together through papyri and stone inscriptions. Acting in the name of the living-G.o.d pharaoh, the network restructured human society and reshaped the natural world. For example, pharaohs Senusret III and his son Amenemhat III, who ruled Egypt from 1878 BC to 1814 BC, dug a huge ca.n.a.l linking the Nile to the swamps of the Fayum Valley. An intricate system of dams, reservoirs and subsidiary ca.n.a.ls diverted some of the Nile waters to Fayum, creating an immense artificial lake holding 50 billion cubic metres of water.1 By comparison, Lake Mead, the largest man-made reservoir in the United States (formed by the Hoover Dam), holds at most 35 billion cubic metres of water.
The Fayum engineering project gave pharaoh the power to regulate the Nile, prevent destructive floods and provide precious water relief in times of drought. In addition, it turned the Fayum Valley from a crocodile-infested swamp surrounded by barren desert into Egypt"s granary. A new city called Shedet was built on the sh.o.r.e of the new artificial lake. The Greeks called it Crocodilopolis the city of crocodiles. It was dominated by the temple of the crocodile G.o.d Sobek, who was identified with pharaoh (contemporary statues sometimes show pharaoh sporting a crocodile head). The temple housed a sacred crocodile called Petsuchos, who was considered the living incarnation of Sobek. Just like the living-G.o.d pharaoh, the living-G.o.d Petsuchos was lovingly groomed by the attending priests, who provided the lucky reptile with lavish food and even toys, and dressed him up in gold cloaks and gem-encrusted crowns. After all, Petsuchos was the priests" brand, and their authority and livelihood depended on him. When Petsuchos died, a new crocodile was immediately elected to fill his sandals, while the dead reptile was carefully embalmed and mummified.
In the days of Senusret III and Amenemhat III the Egyptians had neither bulldozers nor dynamite. They didn"t even have iron tools, work horses or wheels (the wheel did not enter common usage in Egypt until about 1500 BC). Bronze tools were considered cutting-edge technology, but they were so expensive and rare that most of the building work was done only with tools made of stone and wood, operated by human muscle power. Many people argue that the great building projects of ancient Egypt all the dams and reservoirs and pyramids must have been built by aliens from outer s.p.a.ce. How else could a culture lacking even wheels and iron accomplish such wonders?
The truth is very different. Egyptians built Lake Fayum and the pyramids not thanks to extraterrestrial help, but thanks to superb organisational skills. Relying on thousands of literate bureaucrats, pharaoh recruited tens of thousands of labourers and enough food to maintain them for years on end. When tens of thousands of labourers cooperate for several decades, they can build an artificial lake or a pyramid even with stone tools.
Pharaoh himself hardly lifted a finger, of course. He didn"t collect taxes himself, he didn"t draw any architectural plans, and he certainly never picked up a shovel. But the Egyptians believed that only prayers to the living-G.o.d pharaoh and to his heavenly patron Sobek could save the Nile Valley from devastating floods and droughts. They were right. Pharaoh and Sobek were imaginary ent.i.ties that did nothing to raise or lower the Nile water level, but when millions of people believed in pharaoh and Sobek and therefore cooperated to build dams and dig ca.n.a.ls, floods and droughts became rare. Compared to the Sumerian G.o.ds, not to mention the Stone Age spirits, the G.o.ds of ancient Egypt were truly powerful ent.i.ties that founded cities, raised armies and controlled the lives of millions of humans, cows and crocodiles.
It may sound strange to credit imaginary ent.i.ties with building or controlling things. But nowadays we habitually say that the United States built the first nuclear bomb, that China built the Three Gorges Dam or that Google is building an autonomous car. Why not say, then, that pharaoh built a reservoir and Sobek dug a ca.n.a.l?
Living on Paper Writing thus facilitated the appearance of powerful fictional ent.i.ties that organised millions of people and reshaped the reality of rivers, swamps and crocodiles. Simultaneously, writing also made it easier for humans to believe in the existence of such fictional ent.i.ties, because it habituated people to experiencing reality through the mediation of abstract symbols.
Hunter-gatherers spent their days climbing trees, looking for mushrooms, and chasing boars and rabbits. Their daily reality consisted of trees, mushrooms, boars and rabbits. Peasants worked all day in the fields, ploughing, harvesting, grinding corn and taking care of farmyard animals. Their daily reality was the feeling of muddy earth under bare feet, the smell of oxen pulling the plough and the taste of warm bread fresh from the oven. In contrast, scribes in ancient Egypt devoted most of their time to reading, writing and calculating. Their daily reality consisted of ink marks on papyrus scrolls, which determined who owned which field, how much an ox cost and what yearly taxes peasants had to pay. A scribe could decide the fate of an entire village with a stroke of his stylus.
The vast majority of people remained illiterate until the modern age, but the all-important administrators increasingly saw reality through the medium of written texts. For this literate elite whether in ancient Egypt or in twentieth-century Europe anything written on a piece of paper was at least as real as trees, oxen and human beings.
When the n.a.z.is overran France in the spring of 1940, much of its Jewish population tried to escape the country. In order to cross the border south, they needed visas to Spain and Portugal, and tens of thousands of Jews, along with many other refugees, besieged the Portuguese consulate in Bordeaux in a desperate attempt to get the life-saving piece of paper. The Portuguese government forbade its consuls in France to issue visas without prior approval from the Foreign Ministry, but the consul in Bordeaux, Aristides de Sousa Mendes, decided to disregard the order, throwing to the wind a thirty-year diplomatic career. As n.a.z.i tanks were closing in on Bordeaux, Sousa Mendes and his team worked around the clock for ten days and nights, barely stopping to sleep, just issuing visas and stamping pieces of paper. Sousa Mendes issued thousands of visas before collapsing from exhaustion.
The Portuguese government which had little desire to accept any of these refugees sent agents to escort the disobedient consul back home, and fired him from the foreign office. Yet officials who cared little for the plight of human beings nevertheless had deep respect for doc.u.ments, and the visas Sousa Mendes issued against orders were respected by French, Spanish and Portuguese bureaucrats alike, spiriting up to 30,000 people out of the n.a.z.i death trap. Sousa Mendes, armed with little more than a rubber stamp, was responsible for the largest rescue operation by a single individual during the Holocaust.2 Aristides de Sousa Mendes, the angel with the rubber stamp.
Courtesy of the Sousa Mendes Foundation.
The sanct.i.ty of written records often had far less positive effects. From 1958 to 1961 communist China undertook the Great Leap Forward, when Mao Zedong wished to rapidly turn China into a superpower. Mao ordered the doubling and tripling of agricultural production, using the surplus produce to finance ambitious industrial and military projects. Mao"s impossible demands made their way down the bureaucratic ladder, from the government offices in Beijing, through provincial administrators, all the way to the village headmen. The local officials, afraid of voicing any criticism and wishing to curry favour with their superiors, concocted imaginary reports of dramatic increases in agricultural output. As the fabricated numbers made their way up the bureaucratic hierarchy, each official only exaggerated them further, adding a zero here or there with a stroke of a pen.
One of the thousands of life-saving visas signed by Sousa Mendes in June 1940 (visa #1902 for Lazare Censor and family, dated 17 June 1940).
Courtesy of the Sousa Mendes Foundation.
Consequently, in 1958 the Chinese government was told that annual grain production was 50 per cent more than it actually was. Believing the reports, the government sold millions of tons of rice to foreign countries in exchange for weapons and heavy machinery, a.s.suming that enough was left to feed the Chinese population. The result was the worst famine in history and the death of tens of millions of Chinese.3 Meanwhile, enthusiastic reports of China"s farming miracle reached audiences throughout the world. Julius Nyerere, the idealistic president of Tanzania, was deeply impressed by the Chinese success. In order to modernise Tanzanian agriculture, Nyerere resolved to establish collective farms on the Chinese model. When peasants objected to the command, Nyerere sent the army and police to destroy traditional villages and forcefully move hundreds of thousands of peasants onto the new collective farms.
Government propaganda depicted the farms as miniature paradises, but many of them existed only in government doc.u.ments. The protocols and reports written in the capital Dar es Salaam said that on such-and-such a date the inhabitants of such-and-such village were relocated to such-and-such farm. In reality, when the villagers reached their destination, they found absolutely nothing there. No houses, no fields, no tools. The officials reported great successes to themselves and to President Nyerere. In fact, within less than ten years Tanzania was transformed from Africa"s biggest food exporter into a net food importer that could not feed itself without external a.s.sistance. In 1979, 90 per cent of Tanzanian farmers lived in collective farms, but they generated only 5 per cent of the country"s agricultural output.4 Though the history of writing is full of similar mishaps, in most cases writing did enable officials to organise the state much more efficiently than before. Indeed, even the disaster of the Great Leap Forward didn"t topple the Chinese Communist Party from power. The catastrophe was caused by the ability to impose written fantasies on reality, but exactly the same ability allowed the party to paint a rosy picture of its successes and hold on to power tenaciously.
Written language may have been conceived as a modest way of describing reality, but it gradually became a powerful way to reshape reality. When official reports collided with objective reality, it was often reality that had to give way. Anyone who has ever dealt with the tax authorities, the educational system or any other complex bureaucracy knows that the truth hardly matters. What"s written on your form is far more important.
Holy Scriptures Is it true that when text and reality collide, reality sometimes has to give way? Isn"t it just a common but exaggerated slander of bureaucratic systems? Most bureaucrats whether serving pharaoh or Mao Zedong were reasonable people, and surely would have made the following argument: "We use writing to describe the reality of fields, ca.n.a.ls and granaries. If the description is accurate, we make realistic decisions. If the description is inaccurate, it causes famines and even rebellions. Then we, or the administrators of some future regime, learn from the mistake, and strive to produce more truthful descriptions. So over time, our doc.u.ments are bound to become ever more precise."
That"s true to some extent, but it ignores an opposite historical dynamic. As bureaucracies acc.u.mulate power, they become immune to their own mistakes. Instead of changing their stories to fit reality, they can change reality to fit their stories. In the end, external reality matches their bureaucratic fantasies, but only because they forced reality to do so. For example, the borders of many African countries disregard river lines, mountain ranges and trade routes, split historical and economic zones unnecessarily, and ignore local ethnic and religious ident.i.ties. The same tribe may find itself riven between several countries, whereas one country may incorporate splinters of numerous rival clans. Such problems bedevil countries all over the world, but in Africa they are particularly acute because modern African borders don"t reflect the wishes and struggles of local nations. They were drawn by European bureaucrats who never set foot in Africa.
In the late nineteenth century, several European powers laid claim to African territories. Fearing that conflicting claims might lead to an all-out European war, the concerned parties got together in Berlin in 1884, and divided Africa as if it were a pie. Back then, much of the African interior was terra incognita to Europeans. The British, French and Germans had accurate maps of Africa"s coastal regions, and knew precisely where the Niger, the Congo and the Zambezi empty into the ocean. However, they knew little about the course these rivers took inland, about the kingdoms and tribes that lived along their banks, and about local religion, history and geography. This hardly mattered to the European diplomats. They took out an empty map of Africa, spread it over a well-polished Berlin table, sketched lines here and there, and divided the continent between them.
When the Europeans penetrated the African interior, armed with the agreed-upon map, they discovered that many of the borders drawn in Berlin hardly did justice to the geographic, economic and ethnic reality of Africa. However, to avoid renewed clashes, the invaders stuck to their agreements, and these imaginary lines became the actual borders of European colonies. During the second half of the twentieth century, as the European empires disintegrated and the colonies gained their independence, the new countries accepted the colonial borders, fearing that the alternative would be endless wars and conflicts. Many of the difficulties faced by present-day African countries stem from the fact that their borders make little sense. When the written fantasies of European bureaucracies encountered the African reality, reality was forced to surrender.5 The modern educational system provides numerous other examples of reality bowing down to written records. When measuring the width of my desk, the yardstick I am using matters little. My desk remains the same width regardless of whether I say it is 200 centimetres or 78.74 inches. However, when bureaucracies measure people, the yardsticks they choose make all the difference. When schools began a.s.sessing people according to precise marks, the lives of millions of students and teachers changed dramatically. Marks are a relatively new invention. Hunter-gatherers were never marked for their achievements, and even thousands of years after the Agricultural Revolution, few educational establishments used precise marks. A medieval apprentice cobbler did not receive at the end of the year a piece of paper saying he has got an A on shoelaces but a C minus on buckles. An undergraduate in Shakespeare"s day left Oxford with one of only two possible results with a degree, or without one. n.o.body thought of giving one student a final mark of 74 and another student 88.6 A European map of Africa from the mid-nineteenth century. The Europeans knew very little about the African interior, which did not prevent them from dividing the continent and drawing its borders.