I must consequently reiterate, to my deep regret, my request for the return of the VIth Army Corps (which was operating at that time in the Dobrudja) and for the despatch of this Corps, together with the 20th Infantry Division, commencing with the 15th Infantry Division.
In my opinion the Army Corps could be replaced by Bulgarians, whose task is unquestionably being lightened through the despatch of troops (British) to Egypt.
Should this not be the case, I would be ready to exchange two divisions from the Vth Army for the two infantry divisions of the VIth Army Corps, as the former are only suited for a war of position, and would have to be made mobile by the allotment of transport and equipment.
If these two infantry divisions were given up, the Vth Army would have only five infantry divisions of no great fighting value, a condition of things which is perhaps not very desirable.
For the moment my decision is: Defence of Syria by strengthening that front by one infantry division, and prosecution of the Yilderim scheme.
Should good prospects offer of beating the British decisively in Syria before they have been reinforced I will take up General von Falkenhayn"s proposal again, as far as it appears possible to carry it out, having in view the question of transport and rationing, which still has to be settled in some respects.--Turkish Main Headquarters, ENVER.
II
Von Falkenhayn despatched the following telegram from Constantinople on August 25, 1917, to German General Headquarters:
The possibility of a British attack in Syria has had to be taken into consideration from the beginning. Its repercussion on the Irak undertaking was obvious. On that account I had already settled in my conversations in Constantinople during May that, if the centre of gravity of operations were transferred to the Sinai Front, command should be given me there too. The news now to hand--reinforcement of the British troops in Egypt, taking over of command by Allenby, the demands of the British Press daily becoming louder--makes the preparation of a British attack in Syria probable.
Jemal Pasha wishes to meet it with a defensive. To that end he demands the divisions and war material which were being collected about Aleppo for Yilderim. The natural result of granting this request will be that true safety will never be attained on the Sinai Front by a pure defensive, and that the Irak undertaking will certainly fritter away owing to want of driving power or to delays.
I had consequently proposed to the Turkish Higher Command to send two divisions and the "Asia" Corps as quickly as possible to Southern Syria, so as to carry out a surprise attack on the British by means of an encircling movement before the arrival of their reinforcements. Railways allow of the a.s.sembly of these forces (inclusive of heavy artillery, material and technical stores) in the neighbourhood of Beersheba by the end of October. The disposable parts of the IVth Army (two to three divisions) would be added to it.
In a discussion between Enver, Jemal, and myself, Enver decided first of all to strengthen the IVth Army by the inclusion of one division from the Army Group. This division would suffice to ward off attack. The Irak undertaking could be carried through at the same time. Judging from all former experiences I am firmly convinced as soon as it comes to a question of the expected attack on the Sinai Front, or even if the IVth Army only feels itself seriously threatened, further troops, munitions, and material will be withdrawn from the Army Group, and Turkey"s forces will be shattered.
Then nothing decisive can be undertaken in either theatre of war. The sacrifice of men, money, and material which Germany is offering at the present moment will be in vain.
The treatment of the question is rendered all the more difficult because I cannot rid myself of the impression that the decision of the Turkish Higher Command is based far less on military exigencies than on personal motives. It is dictated with one eye on the mighty Jemal, who deprecates a definite decision, but yet on the other hand opposes the slightest diminution of the area of his command.
Consequently as the position now stands, I consider the Irak undertaking practicable only if it is given the necessary freedom for retirement through the removal of the danger on the Syrian Front. The removal of this danger I regard as only possible through attack. V. FALKENHAYN.
III
Here is another German estimate of the position created by our War Cabinet"s decision to take the offensive in Palestine, and in considering the view of the German Staff and the prospect of success any Turkish attack would have, it must be borne in mind that under the most favourable circ.u.mstances the enemy could not have been in position for taking an offensive before the end of October. Von Falkenhayn wished to attack the British "before the arrival of their reinforcements." Not only had our reinforcements arrived before the end of October, but they were all in position and the battle had commenced. Beersheba was taken on October 31. This appreciation was written by Major von Papen of Yilderim headquarters on August 28, 1917:
Enver"s objections, the improbability of attaining a decisive result on the Sinai Front with two divisions plus the "Asia Corps" and the difficulty of the Aleppo-Rayak transport question, hold good.
The execution of the offensive with stronger forces is desirable, but is not practicable, as, in consequence of the beginning of the rainy weather in the middle of November, the British offensive may be expected at the latest during the latter half of October; ours therefore should take place during the first part of that month.
The transport question precludes the a.s.sembly of stronger forces by that date.
Should the idea of an offensive be abandoned altogether on that account?
On the a.s.sumption that General Allenby--after the two unsuccessful British attacks--will attack only with a marked superiority of men and munitions, a pa.s.sive defence on a thirty-five kilometre front with an exposed flank does not appear to offer any great chance of success.
The conditions on the Western Front (defensive zone, attack divisions) are only partially applicable here, since the mobility of the artillery and the correct tactical handling of the attack division are not a.s.sured. The intended pa.s.sive defensive will not be improved by the theatrical attack with one division suggested by General von Kress.
On the contrary this attack would be without result, as it would be carried out too obliquely to the front, and would only mean a sacrifice of men and material.
The attack proposed by His Excellency for the envelopment of the enemy"s flank--if carried out during the first half of October with four divisions plus the "Asia Corps"--will perhaps have no definite result, but will at all events result in this: that the Gaza Front flanked by the sea will tie down considerable forces and defer the continuation of British operations in the wet season, during which, in the opinion of General von Kress, they cannot be carried on with any prospect of success.
The situation on the Sinai Front will then be clear. Naturally it is possible that the position here may demand the inclusion of further effectives and the Yilderim operation consequently become impracticable. This, however, will only prove that the determining factor of the decisive operation for Turkey during the winter of 1917-1918 lies in Palestine and not in Mesopotamia. An offensive on the Sinai Front is therefore--even with reduced forces and a limited objective--the correct solution.
PAPEN.
IV
_Letter from General Kress von Kressenstein to Yilderim headquarters, dated September_ 29, 1917, _on moral of Turkish troops_.
A question which urgently needs regulating is that of deserters.
According to my experience their number will increase still more with the setting in of the bad weather and the deterioration of rations.
Civil administration and the gendarmerie fail entirely; they often have a secret understanding with the population and are open to bribery.
The cordon drawn by me is too weak to prevent desertion. I am also too short of troops to have the necessary raids undertaken in the hinterland. It is necessary that the hunt for deserters in the area between the front and the line Jerusalem-Ramleh-Jaffa be formally organised under energetic management, that one or two squadrons exclusively for this service be detailed, and that a definite reward be paid for bringing in each deserter. But above all it is necessary that punishment should follow in consequence, and that the unfortunately very frequent amnesties of His Majesty the Sultan be discontinued, at least for some time.
The question of rationing has not been settled. We are living continually from hand to mouth. Despite the binding promises of the Headquarters IVth Army, the Vali of Damascus, the Lines of Communication, Major Bathmann and others, that from now on 150 tons of rations should arrive regularly each day, from the 24th to the 27th of this month, for example a total of 229 tons or only 75 tons per diem have arrived.
I cannot fix the blame for these irregularities. The Headquarters IVth Army has received the highly gratifying order that, at least up to the imminent decisive battle, the bread ration is raised to 100 grammes.
This urgently necessary improvement of the men"s rations remains illusory, if a correspondingly larger quant.i.ty of flour (about one wagon per day) is not supplied to us. So far the improvement exists only on paper. The condition of the animals particularly gives cause for anxiety. Not only are we about 6000 animals short of establishment, but as a result of exhaustion a considerable number of animals are ruined daily. The majority of divisions are incapable of operating on account of this shortage of animals. The ammunition supply too is gradually coming into question on account of the deficiency in animals. The menacing danger can only be met by a regular supply of sufficient fodder. The stock of straw in the area of operations is exhausted. With gold some barley can still be bought in the country.
Every year during the rainy season the railway is interrupted again and again for periods of from eight to fourteen days. There are also days and weeks in which the motor-lorry traffic has to be suspended.
Finally we must calculate on the possibility of an interruption of our rear communications by the enemy. I therefore consider it absolutely necessary that at least a fourteen days" reserve of rations be deposited in the depots at the front as early as possible.
The increase of troops on the Sinai Front necessitates a very considerable increase on the supply of meat from the Line of Communication area, Damascus district.
V
The troops of General Allenby"s Army before the attack on Beersheba were distributed as follows:
XXTH CORPS.
10th Division.
_29th Brigade. 30th Brigade. 31st Brigade_.
6th R. Irish Rifles. 1st R. Irish Regt. 5th R. Inniskillings.
5th Con. Rangers. 6th R. Munst. Fus. 6th R. Inniskillings.