Considered in their _ensemble_, the several groups of evidences a.s.signed amount almost to proof. We have seen that, when critically examined, the speculations of late years current respecting the nature of the nebulae, commit their promulgators to sundry absurdities; while, on the other hand, we see that the various appearances these nebulae present, are explicable as different stages in the precipitation and aggregation of diffused matter.
We find that comets, alike by their physical const.i.tution, their immensely-elongated and variously-directed orbits, the distribution of those orbits, and their manifest structural relation to the Solar System, bear testimony to the past existence of that system in a nebulous form. Not only do those obvious peculiarities in the motions of the planets which first suggested the Nebular Hypothesis, supply proofs of it, but on closer examination we discover, in the slightly-diverging inclinations of their orbits, in their various rates of rotation, and their differently-directed axes of rotation, that the planets yield us yet further testimony; while the satellites, by sundry traits, and especially by their occurrence in greater or less abundance where the hypothesis implies greater or less abundance, confirm this testimony. By tracing out the process of planetary condensation, we are led to conclusions respecting the internal structure of planets which at once explain their anomalous specific gravities, and at the same time reconcile various seemingly contradictory facts. Once more, it turns out that what is _a priori_ inferable from the Nebular Hypothesis respecting the temperatures of the resulting bodies, is just what observation establishes; and that both the absolute and the relative temperatures of the Sun and planets are thus accounted for. When we contemplate these various evidences in their totality--when we observe that, by the Nebular Hypothesis, the leading phenomena of the Solar System, and the heavens in general, are explicable; and when, on the other hand, we consider that the current cosmogony is not only without a single fact to stand on, but is at variance with all our positive knowledge of Nature; we see that the proof becomes overwhelming.
It remains only to point out that while the genesis of the Solar System, and of countless other systems like it, is thus rendered comprehensible, the ultimate mystery continues as great as ever. The problem of existence is not solved: it is simply removed further back. The Nebular Hypothesis throws no light on the origin of diffused matter; and diffused matter as much needs accounting for as concrete matter. The genesis of an atom is not easier to conceive than the genesis of a planet. Nay, indeed, so far from making the Universe a less mystery than before, it makes it a greater mystery. Creation by manufacture is a much lower thing than creation by evolution. A man can put together a machine; but he cannot make a machine develop itself. The ingenious artizan, able as some have been, so far to imitate vitality as to produce a mechanical pianoforte-player, may in some sort conceive how, by greater skill, a complete man might be artificially produced; but he is unable to conceive how such a complex organism gradually arises out of a minute structureless germ. That our harmonious universe once existed potentially as formless diffused matter, and has slowly grown into its present organized state, is a far more astonishing fact than would have been its formation after the artificial method vulgarly supposed. Those who hold it legitimate to argue from phenomena to noumena, may rightly contend that the Nebular Hypothesis implies a First Cause as much transcending "the mechanical G.o.d of Paley," as this does the fetish of the savage.
VII. BAIN ON THE EMOTIONS AND THE WILL.
After the controversy between the Neptunists and the Vulcanists had been long carried on without definite results, there came a reaction against all speculative geology. Reasoning without adequate data having led to nothing, inquirers went into the opposite extreme, and confining themselves wholly to collecting data, relinquished reasoning. The Geological Society of London was formed with the express object of acc.u.mulating evidence; for many years hypotheses were forbidden at its meetings; and only of late have attempts to organize the ma.s.s of observations into consistent theory been tolerated.
This reaction and subsequent re-reaction, well ill.u.s.trate the recent history of English thought in general. The time was when our countrymen speculated, certainly to as great an extent as any other people, on all those high questions which present themselves to the human intellect; and, indeed, a glance at the systems of philosophy that are or have been current on the Continent, suffices to show how much other nations owe to the discoveries of our ancestors. For a generation or two, however, these more abstract subjects have fallen into neglect; and, among those who plume themselves on being "practical," even into contempt. Partly, perhaps, a natural accompaniment of our rapid material growth, this intellectual phase has been in great measure due to the exhaustion of argument, and the necessity for better data. Not so much with a conscious recognition of the end to be subserved, as from an unconscious subordination to that rhythm traceable in social changes as in other things, an era of theorizing without observing, has been followed by an era of observing without theorizing. During the long-continued devotion to concrete science, an immense quant.i.ty of raw material for abstract science has been acc.u.mulated; and now there is obviously commencing a period in which this acc.u.mulated raw material will be organized into consistent theory. On all sides--equally in the inorganic sciences, in the science of life, and in the science of society--may we note the tendency to pa.s.s from the superficial and empirical to the more profound and rational.
In Psychology this change is conspicuous. The facts brought to light by anatomists and physiologists during the last fifty years, are at length being used towards the interpretation of this highest cla.s.s of biological phenomena; and already there is promise of a great advance. The work of Mr.
Alexander Bain, of which the second volume has been recently issued, may be regarded as especially characteristic of the transition. It gives us in orderly arrangement, the great ma.s.s of evidence supplied by modern science towards the building-up of a coherent system of mental philosophy. It is not in itself a system of mental philosophy, properly so called; but a cla.s.sified collection of materials for such a system, presented with that method and insight which scientific discipline generates, and accompanied with occasional pa.s.sages of an a.n.a.lytical character. It is indeed that which it in the main professes to be--a natural history of the mind.
Were we to say that the researches of the naturalist who collects and dissects and describes species, bear the same relation to the researches of the comparative anatomist tracing out the laws of organization, which Mr.
Bain"s labours bear to the labours of the abstract psychologist, we should be going somewhat too far; for Mr. Bain"s work is not wholly descriptive.
Still, however, such an a.n.a.logy conveys the best general conception of what he has done; and serves most clearly to indicate its needfulness. For as, before there can be made anything like true generalizations respecting the cla.s.sification of organisms and the laws of organization, there must be an extensive acc.u.mulation of the facts presented in numerous organic bodies; so, without a tolerably-complete delineation of mental phenomena of all orders, there can scarcely arise any adequate theory of the mind. Until recently, mental science has been pursued much as physical science was pursued by the ancients: not by drawing conclusions from observations and experiments, but by drawing them from arbitrary a priori a.s.sumptions. This course, long since abandoned in the one case with immense advantage, is gradually being abandoned in the other; and the treatment of Psychology as a division of natural history, shows that the abandonment will soon be complete.
Estimated as a means to higher results, Mr. Bain"s work is of great value.
Of its kind it is the most scientific in conception, the most catholic in spirit, and the most complete in execution. Besides delineating the various cla.s.ses of mental phenomena as seen under that stronger light thrown on them by modern science, it includes in the picture much which previous writers had omitted--partly from prejudice, partly from ignorance. We refer more especially to the partic.i.p.ation of bodily organs in mental changes; and the addition to the primary mental changes, of those many secondary ones which the actions of the bodily organs generate. Mr. Bain has, we believe, been the first to appreciate the importance of this element in our states of consciousness; and it is one of his merits that he shows how constant and large an element it is. Further, the relations of voluntary and involuntary movements are elucidated in a way that was not possible to writers unacquainted with the modern doctrine of reflex action. And beyond this, some of the a.n.a.lytical pa.s.sages that here and there occur, contain important ideas.
Valuable, however, as is Mr. Bain"s work, we regard it as essentially transitional. It presents in a digested form the results of a period of observation; adds to these results many well-delineated facts collected by himself; arranges new and old materials with that more scientific method which the discipline of our times has fostered; and so prepare the way for better generalizations. But almost of necessity its cla.s.sifications and conclusions are provisional. In the growth of each science, not only is correct observation needful for the formation of true theory; but true theory is needful as a preliminary to correct observation. Of course we do not intend this a.s.sertion to be taken literally; but as a strong expression of the fact that the two must advance hand in hand. The first crude theory or rough cla.s.sification, based on very slight knowledge of the phenomena, is requisite as a means of reducing the phenomena to some kind of order; and as supplying a conception with which fresh phenomena may be compared, and their agreement or disagreement noted. Incongruities being by and by made manifest by wider examination of cases, there comes such modification of the theory as brings it into a nearer correspondence with the evidence.
This reacts to the further advance of observation. More extensive and complete observation brings additional corrections of theory. And so on till the truth is reached. In mental science, the systematic collection of facts having but recently commenced, it is not to be expected that the results can be at once rightly formulated. All that may be looked for are approximate generalizations which will presently serve for the better directing of inquiry. Hence, even were it not now possible to say in what way it does so, we might be tolerably certain that Mr. Bain"s work bears the stamp of the inchoate state of Psychology.
We think, however, that it will not be difficult to find in what respects its organization is provisional; and at the same time to show what must be the nature of a more complete organization. We propose here to attempt this: ill.u.s.trating our positions from his recently-issued second volume.
Is it possible to make a true cla.s.sification without the aid of a.n.a.lysis?
or must there not be an a.n.a.lytical basis to every true cla.s.sification? Can the real relations of things be determined by the obvious characteristics of the things? or does it not commonly happen that certain hidden characteristics, on which the obvious ones depend, are the truly significant ones? This is the preliminary question which a glance at Mr.
Bain"s scheme of the emotions suggests.
Though not avowedly, yet by implication, Mr. Bain a.s.sumes that a right conception of the nature, the order, and the relations of the emotions, may be arrived at by contemplating their conspicuous objective and subjective characters, as displayed in the adult. After pointing out that we lack those means of cla.s.sification which serve in the case of the sensations, he says--
"In these circ.u.mstances we must turn our attention to _the manner of diffusion_ of the different pa.s.sions and emotions, in order to obtain a basis of cla.s.sification a.n.a.logous to the arrangement of the sensations. If what we have already advanced on that subject be at all well founded, this is the genuine turning point of the method to be chosen, for the same mode of diffusion will always be accompanied by the same mental experience, and each of the two aspects would identify, and would be evidence of, the other. There is, therefore, nothing so thoroughly characteristic of any state of feeling as the nature of the diffusive wave that embodies it, or the various organs specially roused into action by it, together with the manner of the action. The only drawback is our comparative ignorance, and our inability to discern the precise character of the diffusive currents in every case; a radical imperfection in the science of mind as const.i.tuted at present.
"Our own consciousness, formerly reckoned the only medium of knowledge to the mental philosopher, must therefore be still referred to as a princ.i.p.al means of discriminating the varieties of human feeling. We have the power of noting agreement and difference among our conscious states, and on this we can raise a structure of cla.s.sification. We recognise such generalities as pleasure, pain, love, anger, through the property of mental or intellectual discrimination that accompanies in our mind the fact of an emotion. A certain degree of precision is attainable by this mode of mental comparison and a.n.a.lysis; the farther we can carry such precision the better; but that is no reason why it should stand alone to the neglect of the corporeal embodiments through which one mind reveals itself to others. The companionship of inward feeling with bodily manifestation is a fact of the human const.i.tution, and deserves to be studied as such; and it would be difficult to find a place more appropriate than a treatise on the mind for setting forth the conjunctions and sequences traceable in this department of nature. I shall make no scruple in conjoining with the description of the mental phenomena the physical appearances, in so far as I am able to ascertain them.
"There is still one other quarter to be referred to in settling a complete arrangement of the emotions, namely, the varieties of human conduct, and the machinery created in subservience to our common susceptibilities. For example, the vast superstructure of fine art has its foundations in human feeling, and in rendering an account of this we are led to recognise the interesting group of artistic or aesthetic emotions. The same outward reference to conduct and creations brings to light the so-called moral sense in man, whose foundations in the mental system have accordingly to be examined.
"Combining together these various indications, or sources of discrimination,--outward objects, diffusive mode or expression, inward consciousness, resulting conduct and inst.i.tutions--I adopt the following arrangement of the families or natural orders of emotion."
Here, then, are confessedly adopted, as bases of cla.s.sification, the most manifest characters of the emotions; as discerned subjectively, and objectively. The mode of diffusion of an emotion is one of its outside aspects; the inst.i.tutions it generates form another of its outside aspects; and though the peculiarities of the emotion as a state of consciousness, seem to express its intrinsic and ultimate nature, yet such peculiarities as are perceptible by simple introspection, must also be cla.s.sed as superficial peculiarities. It is a familiar fact that various intellectual states of consciousness turn out, when a.n.a.lyzed, to have natures widely unlike those which at first appear; and we believe the like will prove true of emotional states of consciousness. Just as our concept of s.p.a.ce, which is apt to be thought a simple, undecomposable concept, is yet resolvable into experiences quite different from that state of consciousness which we call s.p.a.ce; so, probably, the sentiment of affection or reverence is compounded of elements that are severally distinct from the whole which they make up. And much as a cla.s.sification of our ideas which dealt with the idea of s.p.a.ce as though it were ultimate, would be a cla.s.sification of ideas by their externals; so, a cla.s.sification of our emotions, which, regarding them as simple, describes their aspects in ordinary consciousness, is a cla.s.sification of emotions by their externals.
Thus, then, Mr. Bain"s grouping is throughout determined by the most manifest attributes--those objectively displayed in the natural language of the emotions, and in the social phenomena that result from them, and those subjectively displayed in the aspects the emotions a.s.sume in an a.n.a.lytical consciousness. And the question is--Can they be correctly grouped after this method?
We think not; and had Mr. Bain carried farther an idea with which he has set out, he would probably have seen that they cannot. As already said, he avowedly adopts "the natural-history-method:" not only referring to it in his preface, but in his first chapter giving examples of botanical and zoological cla.s.sifications, as ill.u.s.trating the mode in which he proposes to deal with the emotions. This we conceive to be a philosophical conception; and we have only to regret that Mr. Bain has overlooked some of its most important implications. For in what has essentially consisted the progress of natural-history-cla.s.sification? In the abandonment of grouping by external, conspicuous characters; and in the making of certain internal, but all-essential characters, the bases of groups. Whales are not now ranged along with fish, because in their general forms and habits of life they resemble fish; but they are ranged with mammals, because the type of their organization, as ascertained by dissection, corresponds with that of the mammals. No longer considered as sea-weeds in virtue of their forms and modes of growth, zoophytes are now shown, by examination of their economy, to belong to the animal kingdom.
It is found, then, that the discovery of real relationships involves a.n.a.lysis. It has turned out that the earlier cla.s.sifications, guided by general resemblances, though containing much truth, and though very useful provisionally, were yet in many cases radically wrong; and that the true affinities of organisms, and the true h.o.m.ologies of their parts, are to be made out only by examining their hidden structures. Another fact of great significance in the history of cla.s.sification is also to be noted. Very frequently the kinship of an organism cannot be made out even by exhaustive a.n.a.lysis, if that a.n.a.lysis is confined to the adult structure. In many cases it is needful to examine the structure in its earlier stages; and even in its embryonic stage. So difficult was it, for instance, to determine the true position of the Cirrhipedia among animals, by examining mature individuals only, that Cuvier erroneously cla.s.sed them with Mollusca, even after dissecting them; and not until their early forms were discovered, were they clearly proved to belong to the Crustacea. So important, indeed, is the study of development as a means to cla.s.sification, that the first zoologists now hold it to be the only absolute criterion.
Here, then, in the advance of natural-history-cla.s.sification, are two fundamental facts, which should be borne in mind when cla.s.sifying the emotions. If, as Mr. Bain rightly a.s.sumes, the emotions are to be grouped after the natural-history-method; then it should be the natural-history-method in its complete form, and not in its rude form. Mr.
Bain will doubtless agree in the position, that a correct account of the emotions in their natures and relations, must correspond with a correct account of the nervous system--must form another side of the same ultimate facts. Structure and function must necessarily harmonize. Structures which have with each other certain ultimate connexions, must have functions that have answering connexions. Structures that have arisen in certain ways, must have functions that have arisen in parallel ways. And hence if a.n.a.lysis and development are needful for the right interpretation of structures, they must be needful for the right interpretation of functions.
Just as a scientific description of the digestive organs, must include not only their obvious forms and connexions, but their microscopic characters, and also the ways in which they severally result by differentiation from the primitive mucous membrane; so must a scientific account of the nervous system, include its general arrangements, its minute structure, and its mode of evolution; and so must a scientific account of nervous actions, include the answering three elements. Alike in cla.s.sing separate organisms, and in cla.s.sing the parts of the same organism, the complete natural-history-method involves ultimate a.n.a.lysis, aided by development; and Mr. Bain, in not basing his cla.s.sification of the emotions on characters reached through these aids, has fallen short of the conception with which he set out.
"But," it will perhaps be asked, "how are the emotions to be a.n.a.lyzed, and their modes of evolution to be ascertained? Different animals, and different organs of the same animal, may readily be compared in their internal and microscopic structures, as also in their developments; but functions, and especially such functions as the emotions, do not admit of like comparisons."
It must be admitted that the application of these methods is here by no means so easy. Though we can note differences and similarities between the internal formations of two animals; it is difficult to contrast the mental states of two animals. Though the true morphological relations of organs may be made out by the observations of embryos; yet, where such organs are inactive before birth, we cannot completely trace the history of their actions. Obviously, too, the pursuance of inquiries of the kind indicated, raises questions which science is not yet prepared to answer; as, for instance--Whether all nervous functions, in common with all other functions, arise by gradual differentiations, as their organs do? Whether the emotions are, therefore, to be regarded as divergent modes of action, that have become unlike by successive modifications? Whether, as two organs which originally budded out of the same membrane, have not only become different as they developed, but have also severally become compound internally, though externally simple: so two emotions, simple and near akin in their roots, may not only have grown unlike, but may also have grown involved in their natures, though seeming h.o.m.ogeneous to consciousness. And here, indeed, in the inability of existing science to answer these questions which underlie a true psychological cla.s.sification, we see how purely provisional any present cla.s.sification is likely to be.
Nevertheless, even now, cla.s.sification may be aided by development and ultimate a.n.a.lysis to a considerable extent; and the defect in Mr. Bain"s work is, that he has not systematically availed himself of them as far as possible. Thus we may, in the first place, study the evolution of the emotions up through the various grades of the animal kingdom: observing which of them are earliest and exist with the lowest organization and intelligence; in what order the others accompany higher endowments; and how they are severally related to the conditions of life. In the second place, we may note the emotional differences between the lower and the higher human races--may regard as earlier and simpler those feelings which are common to both, and as later and more compound those which are characteristic of the most civilized. In the third place, we may observe the order in which the emotions unfold during the progress from infancy to maturity. And lastly, comparing these three kinds of emotional development, displayed in the ascending grades of the animal kingdom, in the advance of the civilized races, and in individual history, we may see in what respects they harmonize, and what are the implied general truths.
Having gathered together and generalized these several cla.s.ses of facts, a.n.a.lysis of the emotions would be made easier. Setting out with the unquestionable a.s.sumption, that every new form of emotion making its appearance in the individual or the race, is a modification of some pre-existing emotion, or a compounding of several pre-existing emotions; we should be greatly aided by knowing what always are the pre-existing emotions. When, for example, we find that very few if any of the lower animals show any love of acc.u.mulation, and that this feeling is absent in infancy--when we see that an infant in arms exhibits anger, fear, wonder, while yet it manifests no desire of permanent possession, and that a brute which has no acquisitive emotion can nevertheless feel attachment, jealousy, love of approbation; we may suspect that the feeling which property satisfies, is compounded out of simpler and deeper feelings. We may conclude that as, when a dog hides a bone, there must exist in him a prospective gratification of hunger; so there must similarly at first, in all cases where anything is secured or taken possession of, exist an ideal excitement of the feeling which that thing will gratify. We may further conclude that when the intelligence is such that a variety of objects come to be utilized for different purposes--when, as among savages, divers wants are satisfied through the articles appropriated for weapons, shelter, clothing, ornament; the act of appropriating comes to be one constantly involving agreeable a.s.sociations, and one which is therefore pleasurable, irrespective of the end subserved. And when, as in civilized life, the property acquired is of a kind not conducing to one order of gratifications, but is capable of administering to all gratifications, the pleasure of acquiring property grows more distinct from each of the various pleasures subserved--is more completely differentiated into a separate emotion.
This ill.u.s.tration, roughly as it is sketched, will show what we mean by the use of comparative psychology in aid of cla.s.sification. Ascertaining by induction the actual order of evolution of the emotions, we are led to suspect this to be their order of successive dependence; and are so led to recognize their order of ascending complexity; and by consequence their true groupings.
Thus, in the very process of arranging the emotions into grades, beginning with those involved in the lowest forms of conscious activity and end with those peculiar to the adult civilized man, the way is opened for that ultimate a.n.a.lysis which alone can lead us to the true science of the matter. For when we find both that there exist in a man feelings which do not exist in a child, and that the European is characterized by some sentiments which are wholly or in a great part absent from the savage--when we see that, besides the new emotions that arise spontaneously as the individual becomes completely organized, there are new emotions making their appearance in the more advanced divisions of our race; we are led to ask--How are new emotions generated? The lowest savages have not even the ideas of justice or mercy: they have neither words for them nor can they be made to conceive them; and the manifestation of them by Europeans they ascribe to fear or cunning. There are aesthetic emotions common among ourselves, that are scarcely in any degree experienced by some inferior races; as, for instance, those produced by music. To which instances may be added the less marked but more numerous contrasts that exist between civilized races in the degrees of their several emotions. And if it is manifest, both that all the emotions are capable of being permanently modified in the course of successive generations, and that what must be cla.s.sed as new emotions may be brought into existence; then it follows that nothing like a true conception of the emotions is to be obtained, until we understand how they are evolved.
Comparative psychology, while it raises this inquiry, prepares the way for answering it. When observing the differences between races, we can scarcely fail to observe also how these differences correspond with differences in their conditions of existence, and therefore in their daily experiences.
Note the contrast between the circ.u.mstances and between the emotional natures of savage and civilized. Among the lowest races of men, love of property stimulates to the obtainment only of such things as satisfy immediate desires or desires of the immediate future. Improvidence is the rule: there is little effort to meet remote contingencies. But the growth of established societies, having gradually given security of possession, there has been an increasing tendency to provide for coming years: there has been a constant exercise of the feeling which is satisfied by a provision for the future; and there has been a growth of this feeling so great that it now prompts acc.u.mulation to an extent beyond what is needful.
Note, again, that under the discipline of social life--under a comparative abstinence from aggressive actions, and a performance of those mutually-serviceable actions implied by the division of labour--there has been a development of those gentle emotions of which inferior races exhibit but the rudiments. Savages delight in giving pain rather than pleasure--are almost devoid of sympathy. While among ourselves philanthropy organizes itself in laws, establishes numerous inst.i.tutions, and dictates countless private benefactions.
From which and other like facts, does it not seem an unavoidable inference that new emotions are developed by new experiences--new habits of life? All are familiar with the truth, that in the individual, each feeling may be strengthened by performing those actions which it prompts; and to say that the feeling is _strengthened_, is to say that it is in part _made_ by these actions. We know further, that not unfrequently, individuals, by persistence in special courses of conduct, acquire special likings for such courses disagreeable as these may be to others; and these whims, or morbid tastes, imply incipient emotions corresponding to these special activities.
We know that emotional characteristics, in common with all others, are hereditary; and the differences between civilized nations descended from the same stock, show us the c.u.mulative results of small modifications hereditarily transmitted. And when we see that between savage and civilized races, which diverged from each other in the remote past, and have for a hundred generations followed modes of life becoming ever more unlike, there exist still greater emotional contrasts; may we not infer that the more or less distinct emotions which characterize civilized races, are the organized results of certain daily-repeated combinations of mental states which social life involves? Must we not say that habits not only modify emotions in the individual, and not only beget tendencies to like habits and accompanying emotions in descendants, but that when the conditions of the race make the habits persistent, this progressive modification may go on to the extent of producing emotions so far distinct as to seem new? And if so, we may suspect that such new emotions, and by implication all emotions a.n.a.lytically considered, consist of aggregated and consolidated groups of those simpler feelings which habitually occur together in experience: that they result from combined experiences, and are const.i.tuted of them.
When, in the circ.u.mstances of any race, some one kind of action or set of actions, sensation or set of sensations, is usually followed, or accompanied by, various other sets of actions or sensations, and so entails a large ma.s.s of pleasurable or painful states of consciousness; these, by frequent repet.i.tion, become so connected together that the initial action or sensation brings the ideas of all the rest crowding into consciousness: producing, in a degree, the pleasures or pains that have before been felt in reality. And when this relation, besides being frequently repeated in the individual, occurs in successive generations, all the many nervous actions involved tend to grow organically connected. They become incipiently reflex; and on the occurrence of the appropriate stimulus, the whole nervous apparatus which in past generations was brought into activity by this stimulus, becomes nascently excited. Even while yet there have been no individual experiences, a vague feeling of pleasure or pain is produced; const.i.tuting what we may call the body of the emotion. And when the experiences of past generations come to be repeated in the individual, the emotion gains both strength and definiteness; and is accompanied by the appropriate specific ideas.
This view of the matter, which we believe the established truths of Physiology and Psychology unite in indicating, and which is the view that generalizes the phenomena of habit, of national characteristics, of civilization in its moral aspects, at the same time that it gives us a conception of emotion in its origin and ultimate nature, may be ill.u.s.trated from the mental modifications undergone by animals.
It is well-known that on newly-discovered lands not inhabited by man, birds are so devoid of fear as to allow themselves to be knocked over with sticks; but that in the course of generations, they acquire such a dread of man as to fly on his approach; and that this dread is manifested by young as well as old. Now unless this change be ascribed to the killing-off of the least fearful, and the preservation and multiplication of the more fearful, which, considering the comparatively small number killed by man, is an inadequate cause; it must be ascribed to acc.u.mulated experiences; and each experience must be held to have a share in producing it. We must conclude that in each bird that escapes with injuries inflicted by man, or is alarmed by the outcries of other members of the flock (gregarious creatures of any intelligence being necessarily more or less sympathetic), there is established an a.s.sociation of ideas between the human aspect and the pains, direct and indirect, suffered from human agency. And we must further conclude, that the state of consciousness which impels the bird to take flight, is at first nothing more than an ideal reproduction of those painful impressions which before followed man"s approach; that such ideal reproduction becomes more vivid and more ma.s.sive as the painful experiences, direct or sympathetic, increase; and that thus the emotion in its incipient state, is nothing else than an aggregation of the revived pains before experienced.
As, in the course of generations, the young birds of this race begin to display a fear of man before yet they have been injured by him; it is an unavoidable inference that the nervous system of the race has been organically modified by these experiences: we have no choice but to conclude that when a young bird is thus led to fly, it is because the impression produced on its senses by the approaching man, entails, through an incipiently-reflex action, a partial excitement of all those nerves which in its ancestors had been excited under the like conditions; that this partial excitement has its accompanying painful consciousness; and that the vague painful consciousness thus arising, const.i.tutes emotion proper--_emotion undecomposable into specific experiences, and therefore seemingly h.o.m.ogeneous_.
If such be the explanation of the fact in this case, then it is in all cases. If emotion is so generated here, then it is so generated throughout.
We must perforce conclude that the emotional modifications displayed by different nations, and those higher emotions by which civilized are distinguished from savage, are to be accounted for on the same principle.
And concluding this, we are led strongly to suspect that the emotions in general have severally thus originated.
Perhaps we have now made sufficiently clear what we mean by the study of the emotions through a.n.a.lysis and development. We have aimed to justify the positions that, without a.n.a.lysis aided by development, there cannot be a true natural history of the emotions; and that a natural history of the emotions based on external characters, can be but provisional. We think that Mr. Bain, in confining himself to an account of the emotions as they exist in the adult civilized man, has neglected those cla.s.ses of facts out of which the science of the matter must chiefly be built. It is true that he has treated of habits as modifying emotions in the individual; but he has not recognized the fact, that where conditions render habits persistent in successive generations, such modifications are c.u.mulative: he has not hinted that the modifications produced by habit are emotions in the making.
It is true, also, that he occasionally refers to the characteristics of children; but he does not systematically trace the changes through which childhood pa.s.ses into manhood, as throwing light on the order and genesis of the emotions. It is further true that he here and there refers to national traits in ill.u.s.tration of his subject; but these stand as isolated facts, having no general significance: there is no hint of any relation between them and the national circ.u.mstances; while all those many moral contrasts between lower and higher races which throw great light on cla.s.sification, are pa.s.sed over. And once more, it is true that many pa.s.sages of his work, and sometimes, indeed, whole sections of it, are a.n.a.lytical; but his a.n.a.lyses are incidental--they do not underlie his entire scheme, but are here and there added to it. In brief, he has written a Descriptive Psychology, which does not appeal to Comparative Psychology and a.n.a.lytical Psychology for its leading ideas. And in doing this, he has omitted much that should be included in a natural history of the mind; while to that part of the subject with which he has dealt, he has given a necessarily-imperfect organization.
Even leaving out of view the absence of those methods and criteria on which we have been insisting, it appears to us that meritorious as is Mr. Bain"s book in its details, it is defective in some of its leading ideas. The first paragraphs of his first chapter, quite startled us by the strangeness of their definitions--a strangeness which can scarcely be ascribed to laxity of expression. The paragraphs run thus:--
"Mind is comprised under three heads--Emotion, Volition, and Intellect.