Closely connected with the Polish question was the so-called Central-European project.
For obvious and very comprehensible reasons Germany was keenly interested in a scheme for closer union. I was always full of the idea of turning these important concessions to account at the right moment as compensation for prospective German sacrifices, and thus promoting a peace of understanding.
During the first period of my official activity, I still hoped to secure a revision of the Pact of London. I hoped, as already mentioned, that the Entente would not keep to the resolution adopted for the mutilation of the Monarchy, and I did not, therefore, approach the Central-European question closer; had I raised it, it would greatly have complicated our position with regard to Paris and London.
When I was compelled later to admit that the Entente kept firmly to the decision that we were to be divided in any case, and that any change in their purpose would only be effected, if at all, by military force, I endeavoured to work out the Central-European plan in detail, and to reserve the concessions ready to be made to Germany until the right moment had arrived to make the offer.
In this connection it seemed to me that the Customs Union was unfeasible, at any rate at first; but on the other hand, a new and closer commercial treaty would be desirable, and a closer union of the armies would offer no danger; it was hoped greatly to reduce them after the war. I was convinced that a peace of understanding would bring about disarmament, and that the importance of military settlements would be influenced thereby. Also, that the conclusion of peace would bring with it different relations between all states, and that, therefore, the political and military decisions to be determined in the settlement with Germany were not of such importance as those relating to economic questions.
The drawing up of this programme was met, however, by the most violent opposition on the part of the Emperor. He was particularly opposed to all military _rapprochement_.
When the attempt to approach the question failed through the resistance from the crown, I arranged on my own initiative for a debate on the economic question. The Emperor then wrote me a letter in which he forbade any further dealings in the matter. I answered his letter by a business report, pointing out the necessity of continuing the negotiations.
The question then became a sore point between the Emperor and myself.
He did not give his permission for further negotiations, but I continued them notwithstanding. The Emperor knew of it, but did not make further allusion to the matter. The vast claims put forward by the Germans made the negotiations extremely difficult, and with long intervals and at a very slow pace they dragged on until I left office.
Afterwards the Emperor went with Burian to the German Headquarters.
Following that, the Salzburg negotiations were proceeded with and, apparently, at greater speed.
CHAPTER X
BREST-LITOVSK
1
In the summer of 1917 we received information which seemed to suggest a likelihood of realising the contemplated peace with Russia. A report dated June 13, 1917, which came to me from a neutral country, ran as follows:
The Russian Press, bourgeois and socialistic, reveals the following state of affairs:
At the front and at home bitter differences of opinion are rife as to the offensive against the Central Powers demanded by the Allies and now also energetically advocated by Kerenski in speeches throughout the country. The Bolsheviks, as also the Socialists under the leadership of Lenin, with their Press, are taking a definite stand against any such offensive. But a great part of the Mensheviks as well, _i.e._ Tscheidse"s party, to which the present Ministers Tseretelli and Skobeleff belong, is likewise opposed to the offensive, and the lack of unanimity on this question is threatening the unity of the party, which has only been maintained with difficulty up to now. A section of the Mensheviks, styled Internationalists from their trying to re-establish the old _Internationale_, also called _Zimmerwalder_ or _Kienthaler_, and led by Trotski, or, more properly, Bronstein, who has returned from America, with Larin, Martow, Martynoz, etc., returned from Switzerland, are on this point, as with regard to the entry of Menshevik Social Democrats into the Provisional Government, decidedly opposed to the majority of the party. And for this reason Leo Deutsch, one of the founders of the Marxian Social Democracy, has publicly withdrawn from the party, as being too little patriotic for his views and not insisting on final victory.
He is, with Georgei Plechanow, one of the chief supporters of the Russian "Social Patriots," which group is termed, after their Press organ, the "Echinstvo" group, but is of no importance either as regards numbers or influence. Thus it comes about that the official organ of the Mensheviks, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_, is forced to take up an intermediate position, and publishes, for instance, frequent articles against the offensive.
There is then the Social Revolutionary party, represented in the Cabinet by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow. This is, perhaps, the strongest of all the Russian parties, having succeeded in leading the whole of the peasant movement into its course--at the Pan-Russian Congress the great majority of the peasants" deputies were Social Revolutionaries, and no Social Democrat was elected to the executive committee of the Peasants"
Deputies" Council. A section of this party, and, it would seem, the greater and more influential portion, is definitely opposed to any offensive. This is plainly stated in the leading organs of the party, _Delo Naroda_ and _Zemlja i Wolja_. Only a small and apparently uninfluential portion, grouped round the organ _Volja Naroda_, faces the bourgeois Press with unconditional demands for an offensive to relieve the Allies, as does the Plechanow group.
Kerenski"s party, the Trudoviks, as also the related People"s Socialists, represented in the Cabinet by the Minister of Food, Peschechonow, are still undecided whether to follow Kerenski here or not. Verbal information, and utterances in the Russian Press, as, for instance, the _Retch_, a.s.sert that Kerenski"s health gives grounds for fearing a fatal catastrophe in a short time. The official organ of the Workers" and Soldiers" Deputies" Council, the _Isvestia_, on the other hand, frequently a.s.serts with great emphasis that an offensive must unquestionably be made. It is characteristic that a speech made by the Minister of Agriculture, Tschernow, to the Peasants" Congress, was interpreted as meaning that he was opposed to the offensive, so that he was obliged to justify himself to his colleagues in the Ministry and deny that such had been his meaning.
While, then, people at home are seriously divided on the question of an offensive, the men at the front appear but little inclined to undertake any offensive. This is stated by all parties in the Russian Press, the symptoms being regarded either with satisfaction or with regret. The infantry in particular are against the offensive; the only enthusiasm is to be found among the officers, in the cavalry or a part of it, and the artillery.
It is characteristic also that the Cossacks are in favour of war.
These, at any rate, have an ulterior motive, in that they hope by success at the front to be able ultimately to overthrow the revolutionary regime. For there is this to be borne in mind: that while most of the Russian peasants have no landed property exceeding five deshatin, and three millions have no land at all, every Cossack owns forty deshatin, an unfair distinction which is constantly being referred to in all discussion of the land question. This is a sufficient ground for the isolated position of the Cossacks in the Revolution, and it was for this reason also that they were formerly always among the most loyal supporters of the Tsar.
Extremely characteristic of the feeling at the front are the following details:
At the sitting on May 30 of the Pan-Russian Congress, Officers"
Delegates, a representative of the officers of the 3rd Elizabethengrad Hussars is stated, according to the _Retch_ of May 1, to have given, in a speech for the offensive, the following characteristic statement: "You all know to what extremes the disorder at the front has reached. The infantry cut the wires connecting them with their batteries and declare that the soldiers will not remain _more than one month_ at the front, but will go home."
It is very instructive also to read the report of a delegate from the front, who had accompanied the French and English majority Socialists at the front. This report was printed in the _Rabocaja Gazeta_, May 18 and 19--this is the organ of the Mensheviks, i.e.
that of Tscheidse, Tseretelli and Skobeleff. These Entente Socialists at the front were told with all possible distinctness that the Russian army could not and would not fight for the imperialistic aims of England and France. The state of the transport, provisions and forage supplies, as also the danger to the achievements of the Revolution by further war, demanded a speedy cessation of hostilities. The English and French Socialist delegates were said to be not altogether pleased at this state of feeling at the front. And it was further demanded of them that they should undertake to make known the result of their experience in Russia on the Western front, i.e. in France. There was some very plain speaking, too, with regard to America: representatives from the Russian front spoke openly of America"s policy of exploitation towards Europe and the Allies. It was urged then that an international Socialist conference should be convened at the earliest possible moment, and supported by the English and French majority Socialists. At one of the meetings at the front, the French and English Socialists were given the following reply:
"Tell your comrades that we await definite declarations from your Governments and peoples renouncing conquest and indemnities. We will shed no drop of blood for Imperialists, whether they be Russians, Germans or English. We await the speediest agreement between the workers of all countries for the termination of the war, which is a thing shameful in itself, and will, if continued, prove disastrous to the Russian Revolution. We will not conclude any separate peace, but tell your people to let us know their aims as soon as possible."
According to the report, the French Socialists were altogether converted to this point of view. This also appears to be the case, from the statements with regard to the att.i.tude of Cachin and Moutet at the French Socialist Congress. The English, on the other hand, were immovable, with the exception of Sanders, who inclined somewhat toward the Russian point of view.
Private information reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this country states that shots were fired at M. Thomas, the Minister of Munitions, in the course of one of his war speeches at the Russian front.
The disorganisation at the front is described by an officer or soldier at the front in the same organ, the _Rabocaja Gazeta_ for May 26, as follows:
"The pa.s.sionate desire for peace, peace of whatever kind, aye, even a peace costing the loss of ten governments (i.e. districts), is growing ever more plainly evident. Men dream of it pa.s.sionately, even though it is not yet spoken of at meetings and in revolutions, even though all conscious elements of the army fight against this party that long for peace." And to paralyse this, there can be but one way: let the soldiers see the democracy fighting emphatically for peace and the end of the war.
The Pan-Russian Congress of Workers" and Soldiers" Delegates"
Councils and the Army Organisation at the front in St. Petersburg June 1-14 took for its first point in the order of the day the following: "The War, questions of defence and the struggle for peace." At this time the Government would doubtless have to give a declaration with regard to the answer already received at the beginning of June from the Allies as to their war aims. This congress will also probably decide definitely upon the nomination for the Stockholm Conference and appoint delegates. Point 4 deals with the question of nationality. An open conflict had broken out between the Petersburg Workers" and Soldiers" Deputy Councils and the Ukrainian Soldiers" Congress, sitting at Kieff, on account of the formation of an Ukrainian army. The appointment of an "Ukrainian Army General Committee" further aggravated the conflict.
With regard to the increasing internal confusion, the growing seriousness of the nationality dispute, the further troubles in connection with agricultural and industrial questions, a detailed report dealing separately with these heads will be forwarded later.
Towards the end of November I wrote to one of my friends the following letter, which I have given _in extenso_, as it shows faithfully my estimate of the situation at the time:
_Vienna, November 17, 1917._
MY DEAR FRIEND,--After many days, full of trouble, annoyance and toil, I write to you once more in order to answer your very noteworthy observations; to be in contact with you again turns my thoughts into other channels, and enables me, for the time at least, to forget the wretchedness of every day.
You have heard, you say, that matters are not going so well between the Emperor and myself, and you are sorry for this. I am sorry myself, if for no other reason than that it increases the friction of the daily working machine to an insupportable degree.
As soon as a thing of this sort leaks out--and it does so fast enough--all enemies, male and female, rush in with renewed strength, making for the vulnerable point, in the hope of securing my overthrow. These good people are like carrion vultures--I myself am the carrion--they can scent from afar that there is something for them to do, and come flying to the spot. And the lies they invent and the intrigues they contrive, with a view to increasing existing differences--really, they are worthy of admiration. You ask, who are these inveterate enemies of mine?
Well, first of all, those whom you yourself conjecture.
And, secondly, the enemies whom every Minister has, the numbers of those who would fain be in his place. Finally, a crowd of political mountebanks from the Jockey Club, who are disgusted because they had hoped for some personal advantage through my influence, and I have ignored them. No. 3 is a comfortingly negligible quant.i.ty, No. 2 are dangerous, but No. 1 are deadly.
In any case, then, my days are numbered. Heaven be thanked, relief is not far off. If only I could now settle things with Russia quickly, and thus perhaps secure the possibility of a peace all round. All reports from Russia seem to point to the fact that the Government there is determined on peace, and peace as speedily as possible. But the Germans are now full of confidence. If they can throw their ma.s.sed forces against the West, they have no doubt of being able to break through, take Paris and Calais, and directly threaten England. Such a success, however, could only lead to peace if Germany could be persuaded to renounce all plans of conquest. I at any rate cannot believe that the Entente, after losing Paris and Calais, would refuse to treat for peace as _inter pares_--it would at least be necessary to make every endeavour in that direction. Up to now Hindenburg has done all that he promised, so much we must admit, and the whole of Germany believes in his forthcoming success in the West--always taking for granted, of course, the freeing of the Eastern front; that is to say, peace with Russia. The Russian peace, then, _may_ prove the first step on the way to the peace of the world.
I have during the last few days received reliable information about the Bolsheviks. Their leaders are almost all of them Jews, with altogether fantastic ideas, and I do not envy the country that is governed by them. From our point of view, however, the most interesting thing about them is that they are anxious to make peace, and in this respect they do not seem likely to change, for they cannot carry on the war.
In the Ministry here, three groups are represented: one declines to take Lenin seriously, regarding him as an ephemeral personage, the second does not take this view at all, but is nevertheless unwilling to treat with a revolutionary of this sort, and the third consists, as far as I am aware, of myself alone, and I _will_ treat with him, despite the possibly ephemeral character of his position and the certainty of revolution. The briefer Lenin"s period of power the more need to act speedily, for no subsequent Russian Government will recommence the war--and I cannot take a Russian Metternich as my partner when there is none to be had.
The Germans are hesitating--they do not altogether like the idea of having any dealings with Lenin, possibly also from the reasons already mentioned; they are inconsistent in this, as is often the case. The German military party--which, as everyone knows, holds the reins of policy in Germany entirely--have, as far as I can see, done all they could to overthrow Kerenski and set up "something else" in his place. Now, the something else is there, and is ready to make peace; obviously, then, one must act, even though the party concerned is not such as one would have chosen for oneself.
It is impossible to get any exact information about these Bolsheviks; that is to say, there is plenty of information available, but it is contradictory. The way they begin is this: everything in the least reminiscent of work, wealth, and culture must be destroyed, and the bourgeoisie exterminated. Freedom and equality seem no longer to have any place on their programme; only a b.e.s.t.i.a.l suppression of all but the proletariat itself. The Russian bourgeois cla.s.s, too, seems almost as stupid and cowardly as our own, and its members let themselves be slaughtered like sheep.
True, this Russian Bolshevism is a peril to Europe, and if we had the power, besides securing a tolerable peace for ourselves, to force other countries into a state of law and order, then it would be better to have nothing to do with such people as these, but to march on Petersburg and arrange matters there. But we have not the power; peace at the earliest possible moment is necessary for our own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get to Paris--and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front is freed. That is the circle complete. All this the German military leaders themselves maintain, and it is altogether illogical of them now apparently to object to Lenin on personal grounds.
I was unable to finish this letter yesterday, and now add this to-day. Yesterday another attempt was made, from a quarter which you will guess, to point out to me the advantage of a separate peace. I spoke to the Emperor about it, and told him that this would simply be shooting oneself for fear of death; that I could not take such a step myself, but would be willing to resign under some pretext or other, when he would certainly find men ready to make the attempt. The conference of London has determined on a division of the Monarchy, and no separate peace on our part would avail to alter that. The Roumanians, Serbians and Italians are to receive enormous compensation, we are to lose Trieste, and the remainder is to be broken up into separate states--Czechish, Polish, Hungarian and German. There will be very slight contact between these new states; in other words, a separate peace would mean that the Monarchy, having first been mutilated, would then be hacked to pieces. But until we arrive at this result, we must fight on, and that, moreover, _against_ Germany, which will, of course, make peace with Russia at once and occupy the Monarchy.
The German generals will not be so foolish as to wait until the Entente has invaded Germany through Austria, but will take care to make _Austria itself the theatre of war_. So that instead of bringing the war to an end, we should be merely changing one opponent for another and delivering up provinces. .h.i.therto spared--such as Bohemia and Tyrol--to the fury of battle, only to be wrecked completely in the end.
On the other hand, we might perhaps, in a few months" time, secure peace all round, with Germany as well--a tolerable peace of mutual understanding--always provided the German offensive turns out successful. The Emperor was more silent then. Among his entourage, one pulls this way, another that--and we gain nothing in that manner among the Entente, while we are constantly losing the confidence of Berlin. If a man wishes to go over to the enemy, then let him do it--_le remede sera pire que le mal_--but to be for ever dallying with the idea of treachery and adopting the pose without carrying it out in reality--this I cannot regard as prudent policy.
I believe we could arrive at a tolerable peace of understanding; we should lose something to Italy, and should, of course, gain nothing in exchange. Furthermore, we should have to alter the entire structure of the Monarchy--after the fashion of the _federation Danubienne_ proposed in France--and I am certainly rather at a loss to see how this can be done in face of the Germans and Hungarians. But I hope we may survive the war, and I hope also that they will ultimately revise the conditions of the London conference. Let but old Hindenburg once make his entry into Paris, and then the Entente _must_ utter the decisive word that they are willing to treat. But when that moment comes, I am firmly determined to do the utmost possible, to appeal publicly to the _peoples_ of the Central Powers and ask them if they prefer to fight on for conquest or if they will have peace.
To settle with Russia as speedily as possible, then break through the determination of the Entente to exterminate us, and then to make peace--even at a loss--that is my plan and the hope for which I live. Naturally, after the capture of Paris, all "leading"