The greatest success of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, however, has been the formal recognition by France of the formation of an autonomous Czecho-Slovak army in France with the National Council at its head. By this act France recognised:
(1) That the Czecho-Slovaks have a right to form an army of their own, which right appertains only to a sovereign and independent nation;
(2) That the Czecho-Slovaks have a right to fight on the side of the Entente, and therefore are to be considered as one of the Allies;
(3) That the political direction of the army is reserved to the Czecho-Slovak National Council, which right is usually accorded only to the government of an independent state.
The full text of this historic doc.u.ment, signed by the President of the French Republic, M. Poincare, the French Premier, M. Clemenceau, and the Foreign Secretary, M. Pichon, and dated December 19, 1917, reads as follows:
"1. The Czecho-Slovaks organised in an autonomous army and recognising, from the military point of view, the superior authority of the French high command, will fight under their own flag against the Central Powers.
"2. This national army is placed, from the political point of view, under the direction of the Czecho-Slovak National Council whose headquarters are in Paris.
"3. The formation of the Czecho-Slovak army as well as its further work are a.s.sured by the French Government.
"4. The Czecho-Slovak army will be subject to the same dispositions as regards organisation, hierarchy, administration and military discipline as those in force in the French army.
"5. The Czecho-Slovak army will be recruited from among:
(_a_) Czecho-Slovaks at present serving with the French army;
(_b_) Czecho-Slovaks from other countries admitted to be transferred into the Czecho-Slovak army or to contract a voluntary engagement with this army for the duration of war.
"6. Further ministerial instructions will settle the application of this decree.
"7. The President of the War Cabinet, the Secretary of War, and the Foreign Secretary are charged each in his own sphere to bring into effect the present decree, which will be published in the _Bulletin des Lois_ and inserted in the _Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise_."
In a covering letter, dated December 16, 1917, and addressed to M.
Poincare, the French Premier and the Foreign Secretary declared:
"France has always supported by all means in her power the national aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks. The number of volunteers of this nationality who at the outbreak of the war enlisted to fight under the French flag was considerable; the gaps created in their ranks prove unquestionably the ardour with which they fought against our enemies.
"Certain Allied governments, especially the Russian Provisional Government, did not hesitate to authorise the formation on our front of units composed of Czecho-Slovaks who had escaped from the oppression of their enemy.
"It is only just that this nationality should be given means of defending, under their own flag and side by side with us, the cause of right and liberty of peoples, and it will be in accord with French traditions to a.s.sist the organisation of an autonomous Czecho-Slovak army."
Needless to say, the joy over this recognition was very great in Bohemia, while the German papers were furious. The _Neue Freie Presse_ of December 28 devoted its leading article to the Czecho-Slovak army on the Western front, and concluded with the following remarks:
"Although the strength of this new army is estimated at 120,000 men, the Czecho-Slovak army will not have a decisive influence on the military operations. Nevertheless, it may do us considerable harm in case we should transfer troops to the Western front. However, the greatest harm is in the moral effect which this act of wholesale treachery of the Czechs will have on the military power of the monarchy. In any case the co-operation of the Czecho-Slovak army on the side of the Entente will only strengthen the Allies" belief that right is on their side."
Soon afterwards Italy also generously allowed an expeditionary corps of the Czecho-Slovak army to be formed from the Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war who surrendered to her. On May 23, 1918, the Czecho-Slovak troops welcomed the Prince of Wales to Rome, and soon afterwards they distinguished themselves on the Piave and were mentioned in one of General Diaz"s dispatches and also in the official Italian _communique_ of September 22, 1918.
From the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak army followed the full recognition which the National Council obtained from the Allies.
4. While the general secretariat was actively working for these concessions in the West, Professor Masaryk, after devoting his attention to the education of public opinion in Great Britain on the importance of Bohemia, by means of private memoranda and various articles in the _New Europe, Weekly Dispatch_ and elsewhere, decided in May, 1917, to go to Russia.
In Russia, Professor Masaryk succeeded admirably in uniting and strengthening all Czecho-Slovak forces, and in organising a regular army of the many thousands of Czecho-Slovak prisoners there. As we have already pointed out elsewhere, before the Revolution these efforts of the National Council and the Czech prisoners, who were always eager to fight for the Allies, were rendered immensely difficult by the obstacles inherent in the geographic conditions of Russia and by obstacles placed in their way by the old Russian regime.
Unfortunately now, when the Czecho-Slovaks had at last succeeded after much work in realising their plans, the Czecho-Slovak army became powerless owing to the collapse of Russia. Without ammunition, without support from anywhere, the Czecho-Slovaks thought they could no more render very effective service to the Allies in the East. They decided, therefore, to go over to join their compatriots in France.
The position of our army was as follows: After the offensive of July, 1917, the Czechs retreated to Kieff where they continued to concentrate fresh forces. At that time they numbered about 60,000, and this number had gradually increased to 80,000 by the end of 1917. They always observed strict neutrality in Russia"s internal affairs on the advice of their venerable leader, Professor Masaryk. It was necessary to counsel this neutrality for the sake of our army itself, since it contained partisans of different creeds and parties disagreement among whom might have led to its dissolution. On the whole, the Czecho-Slovaks, who are an advanced nation, fully conscious of their national aspirations, remained unaffected by the misleading Bolshevist theories. The Czechs abstained throughout from interfering with Russian affairs, yet they did not wish to leave Russia as long as there was any chance for them to a.s.sist her. It was not until the shameful peace of Brest-Litovsk in February, 1918, that Professor Masaryk decided that the Czecho-Slovak army should leave Russia _via_ Siberia and join the Czecho-Slovak army in France. The Bolsheviks granted them free pa.s.sage to Vladivostok.
This journey of some 5000 miles was not, however, an easy task for an army to accomplish. The troops had to move in small echelons or detachments, and concentration at the stations was prohibited. They had to procure their trains and their provisions, and they had constant trouble with the Bolsheviks, because in every district there was a practically independent Soviet Government with whom the Czechs had to negotiate. The first detachments with the generalissimo of the army, General Diderichs, at the head arrived in Vladivostok at the end of April, 1918. But the other detachments were constantly held up by the Bolsheviks and had great trouble in pa.s.sing through.
They moved from Kieff _via_ Kursk, Tambov, Penza and Samara. The two last-named towns lie on the line between Moscow and Tcheliabinsk at the foot of the Urals, whence a direct line runs across Siberia to Vladivostok.
As we have already pointed out, the Bolsheviks agreed in principle to allow our troops to leave Russia. Their commander-in-chief, General Muraviev, allowed the Czechs free pa.s.sage to France on February 16. The same concession had been granted by the Moscow Soviet. On the whole the Czechs were on tolerably good terms with the Bolsheviks. Professor Masaryk rejected every plan directed against the Bolsheviks submitted to him even by such of their political adversaries as could not justly be called counter-revolutionaries. The Czecho-Slovak troops went still further; they actually complied with the request of the Bolsheviks and partially disarmed. The trouble only began in May, 1918, when the Bolsheviks yielded to German intrigues and resolved to destroy our army.
Already at the beginning of May the Czechs had begun to feel embittered against the Bolsheviks, because in defiance of the agreement their troops were constantly being held up by local Soviets. At Tambov, for instance, they were held up for a whole month. At Tcheliabinsk the Czechs had a serious scuffle with Magyar ex-prisoners on May 26, and the Bolsheviks sided entirely with the Magyars, even arresting some Czecho-Slovak delegates. The Czechs simply occupied the city, liberated their comrades, and at a congress held by them at Tcheliabinsk on May 28 it was decided to refuse to surrender any more arms and ammunition and to continue transports to Vladivostok, if necessary with arms in their hands. This was a reply to Trotsky"s telegram that the Czecho-Slovaks should be completely disarmed, which the Czecho-Slovaks defied as they knew that another order had been issued by Trotsky simultaneously, no doubt on the instigation of Count Mirbach, saying that the Czecho-Slovak troops must be dissolved at all costs and interned as prisoners of war. The Bolsheviks now arrested prominent members of the Moscow branch of the Czecho-Slovak National Council on the ground that they were "anti-revolutionaries." They alleged also that they had no guarantee that ships would be provided for the Czechs to be transported to France, and that the Czechs were holding up food supplies from Siberia. The Bolsheviks deliberately broke their word, and Trotsky issued an order to "all troops fighting against the anti-revolutionary Czecho-Slovak brigades" in which he said:
"The concentration of our troops is complete. Our army being aware that the Czecho-Slovaks are direct allies of the anti-revolution and of the capitalists, fights them well. The Czecho-Slovaks are retreating along the railway. Obviously they would like to enter into negotiations with the Soviets. We issued an order that their delegates should be received. We demand in the first place that they should be disarmed.
_Those who do not do so voluntarily will be shot on the spot._ Warlike operations on the railway line hinder food transports. Energetic steps must be taken to do away with this state of affairs."
The Czecho-Slovaks were greatly handicapped, since they were not only almost unarmed, but were also dispersed along the trans-Siberian line in small detachments which had considerable difficulty in keeping in touch with each other. Nevertheless the fates were favourable to them. They were victorious almost everywhere, thanks to their wonderful spirit and discipline.
The first victories gained by the Czecho-Slovaks over the Bolsheviks were at Penza and Samara. Penza was captured by them after three days" fighting at the end of May. Later the Czecho-Slovaks also took Sysran on the Volga, Kazan with its large a.r.s.enal, Simbirsk and Yekaterinburg, connecting Tcheliabinsk with Petrograd, and occupied practically the whole Volga region.
In Siberia they defeated a considerable force of German-Magyar ex-prisoners in Krasnoyarsk and Omsk and established themselves firmly in Udinsk. On June 29, 15,000 Czecho-Slovaks under General Diderichs, after handing an ultimatum to the Bolsheviks at Vladivostok, occupied the city without much resistance. Only at one spot fighting took place and some 160 Bolsheviks were killed. The Czecho-Slovaks, a.s.sisted by j.a.panese and Allied troops, then proceeded to the north and north-west, while the Bolsheviks and German prisoners retreated to Chabarovsk. In September the Czech and Allied troops from Vladivostok joined hands with the Czecho-Slovaks from Irkutsk and Western Siberia, and thus gained control over practically the whole trans-Siberian railway. By this means they have done great service to the Allies, especially to Great Britain, by defending the East against the German invaders. Furthermore, it was the Czecho-Slovaks" bold action which induced j.a.pan and America at last to intervene in Russia and for the sake of Russia, and it was their control of the Siberian railway which made such intervention possible. Let us hope that their action will lead to the regeneration and salvation of the Russian nation.
The service rendered by Czecho-Slovak troops to the Allied cause was, of course, justly appreciated by the Allies. Mr. Lloyd George sent the following telegram to Professor Masaryk on September 9:
"On behalf of the British War Cabinet I send you our heartiest congratulations on the striking successes won by the Czecho-Slovak forces against the armies of German and Austrian troops in Siberia. The story of the adventures and triumphs of this small army is, indeed, one of the greatest epics of history. It has filled us all with admiration for the courage, persistence and self-control of your countrymen, and shows what can be done to triumph over time, distance and lack of material resources by those holding the spirit of freedom in their hearts. Your nation has rendered inestimable service to Russia and to the Allies in their struggle to free the world from despotism. We shall never forget it."
The deeds of our army met with equal admiration and grat.i.tude also in Bohemia. This is clearly shown by the speech of the Czech deputy Stribrn, delivered in the Austrian Reichsrat on July 17, and entirely suppressed in the Austrian and German press. Despite the vigilance on the part of the Austrian authorities, however, we have been able to secure the full text of this remarkable speech which reads as follows:
"GENTLEMEN,--Let me first of all emphasise that my speech is not a defence of the Czech nation and of the Czech soldiers. There are no judges in this parliament competent to judge us.
"You call us traitors. We accept your declaration as the view of our enemy. Nothing more--nothing less.
"You gentlemen on the German benches, you dared, however, to touch the honour of our soldiers--you called them cowards. And in this respect we are not going to keep silent. We shall always protest against such injustice! We shall never permit these heroes to be abused by being called "cowards." If there is a single gentleman among you he ought for a moment to reflect on the soul of a Czech soldier--a soldier who has been compelled by force to fight in a war which the German Imperial Chancellor has openly called "a war of Germans against the Slavs"; a soldier who was compelled under the threat of immediate execution to take up arms against the interests of the Slavs, against the interests of his brothers, against the interests of his own country--Bohemia.
Well then, was it cowardice on the part of this soldier when he, exposed to the fire of Austrian and German guns and machine guns from behind, went over to the other side? Was he a coward when, while free to remain in his captivity as a prisoner of war safely waiting until the end of the war, he volunteered to fight again and was ready to risk his life and health once more? Is that Czech soldier a coward who went once more into the trenches, although aware that if he were captured he would not be treated as an ordinary prisoner of war but as a deserter, and hanged accordingly? Is that man a coward who sacrifices his family which he has left behind and his soil and property inherited from his ancestors? Is that man a coward who sacrifices himself, his father and mother, his wife and children for the sake of his nation and country?
"Is that Czech soldier not a hero who to-day is voluntarily fighting from the Ural Mountains to Vladivostok, on the Piave and in France?
"If there is a single gentleman, a real gentleman among you, let him stand up and answer these questions.
"And if there is not such a gentleman among you, remember the words of our bitter enemy the late Minister for Home Defence, Baron Georgi, who related to this House in a secret sitting all that our regiments have accomplished. He could not as a soldier suppress a sigh and say, "We regret all those treacheries of Czech soldiers, still more because from their deeds committed on the side of our enemy we can realise what a splendid military material we have lost." And if this is not sufficient, I will remind you of the opinion of those who are in your eyes the best judges--the Prussian officers. In an Austrian officers"
canteen where Czech soldiers had been abused the whole evening by being called cowards, the Prussian officers present were asked to give their opinion on this point. They answered, "We shall only be able to judge as to whether the Czechs are cowards or not when they begin to fight against us."
"You should at least be gentlemanly enough not to slander your enemies who have proved themselves to be greater heroes than any other soldiers, because they are voluntary heroes, whereas the others are heroes under compulsion!
"This question of cowardice is therefore, I hope, settled forever.
"And now with regard to the t.i.tle of "traitors." _We are traitors to Austria--every one of us admits it honestly_. Not one of you, however, has the right to reproach us for this. All of you are patriots by order, and it cannot be otherwise in a dynastic state like Austria.
"With regard to the patriotism of the Magyars, we have proofs of this dating from 1866. They have done the same as we are doing to-day. They surrendered and organised Klapka"s legions against Austria. The fact that they were punished for their treachery by being given their own independence does not speak against us.
"Yes, gentlemen, we are traitors as much as you Magyars, or as you Germans were, or would be under similar circ.u.mstances. And _we want the same as you want_, i.e. _to be free citizens of our own state_. Our own state--that does not mean to have a few officials or one more university. To have a state of our own--that means to be able to decide freely if our soldiers shall go to war again, and if they do, to see that they go only for the interests of their own nation, and not for the interests of their enemies. An independent state--that means for us no longer to die by order of foreigners, and no longer to live under foreign domination.