The Crisis at Tripuri to the Cripps Mission
The Congress victory in the 1937 election and the consequent formation of popular ministries changed the balance of power within the country vis-a-vis the colonial authorities. The growth of left-wing parties and ideas led to a growing militancy within the nationalist ranks. The stage seemed to be set for another resurgence of the nationalist movement. Just at this time, the Congress had to undergo a crisis at the top - an occurrence which plagued the Congress every few years.
Subhas Bose had been a unanimous choice as the President of the Congress in 1938. In 1939, he decided to stand again - this time as the spokesperson of militant politics and radical groups. Putting forward his candidature on 21 January 1939, Bose said that he represented the "new ideas, ideologies, problems and programmes" that had emerged with "the progressive sharpening of the anti-imperialist struggle in India." The presidential elections, he said, should be fought among different candidates "on the basis of definite problems and programmes."1 On 24 January, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, J.B. Kripalani and four other members of the Congress Working Committee issued a counter statement, declaring that the talk of ideologies, programmes and policies was irrelevant in the elections of a Congress president since these were evolved by the various Congress bodies such as the AICC and the Working Committee, and that the position of the Congress President was like that of a const.i.tutional head who represented and symbolized the unity and solidarity of the nation.2 With the blessings of Gandhiji, these and other leaders put up Pattabhi Sitaramayya as a candidate for the post. Subhas Bose was elected on 29 January by 1580 votes against 1377. Gandhiji declared that Sitaramayya"s defeat was "more mine than his."
But the election of Bose resolved nothing, it only brought the brewing crisis to a head at the Tripuri session of the Congress. There were two major reasons for the crisis. One was the line of propaganda adopted by Bose against Sardar Patel and the majority of the top Congress leadership whom he branded as rightists. He openly accused them of working for a compromise with the Government on the question of federation, of having even drawn up a list of prospective central ministers and therefore of not wanting a leftist as the president of the Congress "who may be a thorn in the way of a compromise and may put obstacles in the path of negotiations." He had, therefore, appealed to Congressmen to vote for a leftist and "a genuine anti-federationist."3 In the second part of his autobiography, Subhas put forward his thinking of the period even more crudely: "As Congress President, the writer did his best to stiffen the opposition of the Congress Party to any compromise with Britain and this caused annoyance in Gandhian circles who were then looking forward to an understanding with the British Government." "The Gandhiists", he wrote, "did not want to be disturbed in their ministerial and parliamentary work" and "were at that time opposed to any national struggle."4 The Congress leaders, labelled as compromisers, resented such charges and branded them as a slander. They pointed out in a statement: "Subhas Babu has mentioned his opposition to the federation. This is shared by all the members of the Working Committee. It is the Congress policy."5 After Subhas"s election, they felt that they could not work with a president who had publicly cast aspersions on their nationalist bonafides. Earlier, Gandhiji had issued a statement on 31 January saying: "I rejoice in this defeat" because "Subhas Babu, instead of being President on the sufferance of those whom he calls rightists, is now President elected in a contested election. This enables him to choose a h.o.m.ogeneous cabinet and enforce his programme without let or hindrance."6 Jawaharlal Nehru did not resign along with the twelve other Working Committee members. He did not like the idea of confronting Bose publicly. But he did not agree with Bose either. Before the elections, he had said that in the election no principles or programmes were at stake. He had been unhappy with Bose"s aspersions on his colleagues. Nor did he agree that the fight was between the Left and the Right. His letter to Subhas on 4 February 1939 would bear a long quotation: "I do not know who you consider a leftist and who a rightist. The way these words were used by you in your statements during the presidential contest seemed to imply that Gandhiji and those who are considered as his group in the Working Committee are the rightist leaders. Their opponents, whoever they might be, are the leftists. That seems to me an entirely wrong description. It seems to me that many of the so-called leftists are more right than the so-called rightists. Strong language and a capacity to criticize and attack the old Congress leadership is not a test of leftism in politics . . . I think the use of the words left and right has been generally wholly wrong and confusing. If, instead of these words, we talked about policies it would be far better. What policies do you stand for? Anti-federation, well and good. I think that the great majority of the members of the Working Committee stand for that and it is not fair to hint at their weakness in this respect."7 However, more importantly, basic differences of policy and tactics were involved in the underlying Bose-Gandhian debate. They were partially based on differing perceptions of the political reality, and differing a.s.sessments of the strength and weakness of the Congress and the preparedness of the ma.s.ses for struggle. Differing styles regarding how to build up a ma.s.s movement were also involved.
Subhas Bose believed that the Congress was strong enough to launch an immediate struggle and that the ma.s.ses were ready for such struggle. He was convinced, as he wrote later, "that the country was internally more ripe for a revolution than ever before and that the coming international crisis would give India an opportunity for achieving her emanc.i.p.ation, which is rare in human history."8 He, therefore, argued in his presidential address at Tripuri for a programme of immediately giving the British Government a six-months ultimatum to grant the national demand for independence and of launching a ma.s.s civil disobedience movement if it failed to do so.9 Gandhiji"s perceptions were very different. He, too, believed that another round for ma.s.s struggle was necessary to win freedom, for Indians were facing "an impossible situation."Already, in the middle of July 1938, he had written: "The darkness that seems to have enveloped me will disappear, and that, whether with another battle more brilliant than the Dandi March or without, India will come to her own."10 But, he believed, the time was not yet ripe for an ultimatum because neither the Congress nor the ma.s.ses were yet ready for struggle. Indians should first "put our own house in order." Making his position clear in an interview on 5 May 1939, Gandhiji declared: "He (Subhas Bose) holds that we possess enough resources for a fight. I am totally opposed to his views. Today we possess no resources for a fight . . . There is no limit to communal strife . . . We do not have the same hold among the peasants of Bihar as we used to . . . If today I am asked to start the "Dandi March," I have not the courage to do so. How can we do anything without the workers and peasants? The country belongs only to them. I am not equipped to issue an ultimatum to the Government. The country would only be exposed to ridicule."11 Gandhiji"s views were above all based on his a.s.sessment of the Congress organization. He was convinced that corruption and indiscipline had vitiated its capacity to fight. As we have seen earlier, during 1938 and early 1939, he repeatedly and publicly raised the issues of mutual rivalries and bickerings among Congressmen, bogus membership and impersonation at party elections, efforts to capture Congress Committees, and the general decline of authority in the Congress.
The internal strife reached its climax at the Tripuri session of the Congress, held from 8 to 12 March 1939. Bose had completely misjudged his support and the meaning of his majority in the presidential election. Congressmen had voted for him for diverse reasons, and above all because he stood for militant politics, and not because they wanted to have him as the supreme leader of the national movement. They were not willing to reject Gandhiji"s leadership or that of other older leaders who decided to bring this home to Subhas. Govind Ballabh Pant moved a resolution at Tripuri expressing full confidence in the old Working Committee, reiterating full faith in Gandhiji"s leadership of the movement and the Congress policies of the previous twenty years, and asking Subhas to nominate his Working Committee "in accordance with the wishes of Gandhiji." The resolution was pa.s.sed by a big majority, but Gandhiji did not approve of the resolution and refused to impose a Working Committee on Subhas. He asked him to nominate a Committee of his own choice.
Subhas Bose refused to take up the challenge. He had placed himself in an impossible situation. He knew that he could not lead the organization on his own, but he was also not willing to accept the leadership of the majority. To place the best construction on his policy, he wanted Gandhiji to be the leader of the coming struggle but he wanted Gandhiji to follow the strategy and tactics laid down by him and the left-wing parties and groups. Gandhiji, on the other hand, would either lead the Congress on the basis of his own strategy and style of politics or surrender the position of the leader. As he wrote to Bose: "If your prognosis is right, I am a back number and played out as the generalissimo of satyagraha."12 In other words, as Rajendra Prasad later wrote in his Autobiography, Gandhiji and the older leaders would not accept a situation where the strategy and tactics were not theirs but the responsibility for implementing them would be theirs.13 Bose could see no other way out but to resign from the presidentship. Nehru tried to mediate between the two sides and persuade Bose not to resign, while asking Gandhiji and the older leaders to be more accommodative. But Bose would not resile from his position. On the one hand, he insisted that the Working Committee should be representative of the new radical trends and groups which had elected him, on the other, he would not nominate his own Working Committee. He preferred to press his resignation. This led to the election of Rajendra Prasad in his place. The Congress had weathered another storm.
Bose could also not get the support of the Congress Socialists and the Communists at Tripuri or after for they were not willing to divide the national movement and felt that its unity must be preserved at all costs. Explaining its position, the CPI declared after Tripuri that the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle "demanded not the exclusive leadership of one wing but a united leadership under the guidance of Gandhiji."14 P.C. Joshi, General Secretary of the CPI, wrote in April 1939 that "the greatest cla.s.s struggle today is our national struggle," that the Congress was the main organ of this struggle, and that the preservation of its unity was a primary task.15 Subsequently, in May, Subhas Bose and his followers formed the Forward Bloc as a new party within the Congress. And when he gave a call for an all-India protest on 9 July against an AICC resolution, the Working Committee took disciplinary action against him, removing him from the presidentship of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee and debarring him from holding any Congress office for three years.
World War II broke out on 1 September 1939 when n.a.z.i Germany invaded Poland. Earlier Germany had occupied Austria in March 1938 and Czechoslovakia in 1939. Britain and France, which had been following a policy of appeas.e.m.e.nt towards. .h.i.tler, were now forced to go to Poland"s aid and declare war on Germany. This they did on 3 September 1939. The Government of India immediately declared India to be at war with Germany without consulting the Congress or the elected members of the central legislature.
The Congress, as we have seen earlier, was in full sympathy with the victims of fascist aggression, and its immediate reaction was to go to the aid of the anti-fascist forces. Gandhiji"s reaction was highly emotional. He told the Viceroy that the very thought of the possible destruction of the House of Parliament and Westminister Abbey produced a strong emotional reaction in him and that, fully sympathizing with the Allied cause, he was for full and unquestioning cooperation with Britain. But a question most of the Congress leaders asked was - how was it possible for an enslaved nation to aid others in their fight for freedom? The official Congress stand was adopted at a meeting of the Congress Working Committee held at Wardha from 10 to 14 September to which, in keeping with the nationalist tradition of accommodating diversity of opinion, Subhas Bose, Acharya Narendra Dev, and Jayaprakash Narayan were also invited. Sharp differences emerged in this meeting. Gandhiji was for taking a sympathetic view of the Allies. He believed that there was a clear difference between the democratic states of Western Europe and the totalitarian n.a.z.i state headed by Hitler. The Socialists and Subhas Bose argued that the War was an imperialist one since both sides were fighting for gaining or defending colonial territories. Therefore, the question of supporting either of the two sides did not arise. Instead the Congress should take advantage of the situation to wrest freedom by immediately starting a civil disobedience movement.
Jawaharlal Nehru had a stand of his own. He had been for several years warning the world against the dangers of n.a.z.i aggression, and he made a sharp distinction between democracy and Fascism. He believed that justice was on the side of Britain, France and Poland. But he was also convinced that Britain and France were imperialist countries and that the War was the result of the inner contradictions of capitalism maturing since the end of World War I. He, therefore, argued that India should neither join the War till she herself gained freedom nor take advantage of Britain"s difficulties by starting an immediate struggle. Gandhiji found that his position was not supported by even his close followers such as Sardar Patel and Rajendra Prasad. Consequently, he decided to support Nehru"s position which was then adopted by the Working Committee. Its resolution, while unequivocally condemning the n.a.z.i attack on Poland as well as n.a.z.ism and Fascism, declared that India could not be party to a war which was ostensibly being fought for democratic freedom while that freedom was being denied to her. If Britain was fighting for democracy and freedom, she should prove this in India. In particular, she should declare how her war aims would be implemented in India at the end of the War. Indians would then gladly join other democratic nations in the war effort to starting a ma.s.s struggle, but it warned that the decision could not be delayed for long. As Nehru put it, the Congress leadership wanted "to give every chance to the Viceroy and the British Government."
The British Government"s response was entirely negative. Linlithgow, the Viceroy, in his well considered statement of 17 October 1939 harped on the differences among Indians, tried to use the Muslim League and the Princes against the Congress, and refused to define Britain"s war aims beyond stating that Britain was resisting aggression. As an immediate measure, he offered to set up a consultative committee whose advice might be sought by the Government whether it felt it necessary to do so. For the future, the promise was that at the end of the War the British Government would enter into consultations with "representatives of several communities, parties, and interests in India, and with the Indian princes" as to how the Act of 1935 might be modified. In a private communication to Zetland, the Secretary of State, Linlithgow was to remark a few months later: "I am not too keen to start talking about a period after which British rule will have ceased in India. I suspect that that day is very remote and I feel the least we say about it in all probability the better."16 On 18 October, Zetland spoke in the House of Lords and stressed differences among Indians, especially among Hindus and Muslims. He branded the Congress as a purely Hindu organization.17 It, thus, became clear that the British Government had no intention of loosening their hold on India during or after the War and that it was willing, if necessary, to treat the Congress as an enemy.
The reaction of the Indian people and the national leadership was sharp. The angriest reaction came from Gandhiji who had been advocating more or less unconditional support to Britain. Pointing out that the British Government was continuing to pursue "the old policy of divide and rule," he said: "The Indian declaration (of the Viceroy) shows clearly that there is to be no democracy for India if Britain can prevent it . . . The Congress asked for bread and it has got a stone." Referring to the question of minorities and special interests such as those of the princes, foreign capitalists, zamindars, etc., Gandhiji remarked: "The Congress will safeguard the rights of every minority so long as they do not advance claims inconsistent with India"s independence." But, he added, "independent India will not tolerate any interests in conflict with the true interests of the ma.s.ses."18 The Working Committee, meeting on 23 October, rejected the Viceregal statement as a reiteration of the old imperialist policy, decided not to support the War, and called upon the Congress ministries to resign as a protest. This they did as disciplined soldiers of the national movement. But the Congress leadership still stayed its hand and was reluctant to give a call for an immediate and a ma.s.sive anti-imperialist struggle. In fact, the Working Committee resolution of 23 October warned Congressmen against any hasty action.
While there was agreement among Congressmen on the question of att.i.tude to the War and the resignation of the ministries, sharp differences developed over the question of the immediate starting of a ma.s.s satyagraha. Gandhiji and the dominant leadership advanced three broad reasons for not initiating an immediate movement. First, they felt that since the cause of the Allies - Britain and France - was just, they should not be embarra.s.sed in the prosecution of the War. Second, the lack of Hindu-Muslim unity was a big barrier to a struggle. In the existing atmosphere any civil disobedience movement could easily degenerate into communal rioting or even civil war. Above all, they felt that there did not exist in the country an atmosphere for an immediate struggle. Neither the ma.s.ses were ready nor was the Congress organizationally in a position to launch a struggle. The Congress organization was weak and had been corrupted during 1938-39. There was indiscipline and lack of cohesion within the Congress ranks. Under these circ.u.mstances, a ma.s.s movement would not be able to withstand severe repressive measures by the Government. It was, therefore, necessary to carry on intense political work among the people, to prepare them for struggle, to tone up the Congress organization and purge it of weaknesses, to negotiate with authorities till all the possibilities of a negotiated settlement were exhausted and the Government was clearly seen by all to be in the wrong. The time for launching a struggle would come when the people were strong and ready for struggle, the Congress organization had been put on a sound footing, and the Government took such aggressive action that the people felt the absolute necessity of going into ma.s.s action. This view was summed up in the resolution placed by the Working Committee before the Ramgarh Session of the Congress in March 1940. The resolution, after reiterating the Congress position on the War and a.s.serting that "nothing short of complete independence can be accepted by the people," declared that the Congress would resort to civil disobedience "as soon as the Congress organization is considered fit enough for the purpose, or in case circ.u.mstances so shape themselves as to precipitate a crisis."19 An alternative to the position of the dominant leadership came from a coalition of various left-wing groups: Subhas Bose and his Forward Bloc, the Congress Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Royists, etc. The Left characterized the War as an imperialist war and a.s.serted that the war-crisis provided the opportunity to achieve freedom through an all-out struggle against British imperialism. It was convinced that the ma.s.ses were fully ready for action and were only waiting for a call from the leadership. They accepted that hurdles like the communal problem and weaknesses in the Congress organization existed; but they were convinced that these would be easily and automatically swept away once a ma.s.s struggle was begun. Organizational strength, they said, was not to be built up prior to a struggle but in the course of the struggle. Making a sharp critique of the Congress leadership"s policy of "wait and see," the Left accused the leadership of being afraid of the ma.s.ses, of having lost the zest for struggle, and consequently of trying to bargain and compromise with imperialism for securing petty concessions. They urged the Congress leadership to adopt immediate measures to launch a ma.s.s struggle.
While agreeing on the need for an immediate struggle, the Left was internally divided both in its understanding of political forces and on the course of political action in case the dominant leadership of the Congress did not accept the line of immediate struggle. Subhas Bose wanted the Left to split the Congress if it did not launch a struggle, to organize a parallel Congress and to start a struggle on its own. He was convinced that the ma.s.ses and the overwhelming majority of Congress would support the Left-led parallel Congress and join the movement it would launch. The CSP and CPI differed from this view. They were convinced that Bose was grossly overestimating the influence of the Left and no struggle could be launched without the leadership of Gandhiji and the Congress. Therefore an attempt should be made not to split the Congress and thus disrupt the "national united front" but persuade and pressurize its leadership to launch a struggle.
Jawaharlal Nehru"s was an ambivalent position. On the one hand, he could clearly see the imperialistic character of the Allied countries, on the other, he would do nothing that might lead to the triumph of Hitler and the n.a.z.is in Europe. His entire personality and political thinking led to the line of an early commencement of civil disobedience, but he would do nothing that would imperil the anti-n.a.z.i struggle in Europe and the Chinese people"s struggle against j.a.panese aggression. In the end, however, the dilemma was resolved by Nehru going along with Gandhiji and the majority of the Congress leadership.
But politics could not go on this placid note for too long. The patience of both the Congress leadership and the ma.s.ses was getting exhausted. The Government refused to budge and took up the position that no const.i.tutional advance could be made till the Congress came to an agreement with the Muslim communalists. It kept issuing ordinance after ordinance taking away the freedom of speech and the Press and the right to organize a.s.sociations. Nationalist workers, especially those belonging to the left-wing, were hara.s.sed, arrested and imprisoned all over the country. The Government was getting ready to crush the Congress if it took any steps towards a ma.s.s struggle.
In this situation, the Indians felt that the time had come to show the British that their patience was not the result of weakness. As Nehru put it in an article ent.i.tled "The Parting of the Ways," the British rulers believed that "in this world of force, of bombing aeroplanes, tanks, and armed men how weak we are! Why trouble about us? But perhaps, even in this world of armed conflict, there is such a thing as the spirit of man, and the spirit of a nation, which is neither ign.o.ble nor weak, and which may not be ignored, save at peril."20 Near the end of 1940, the Congress once again asked Gandhiji to take command. Gandhiji now began to take steps which would lead to a ma.s.s struggle within his broad strategic perspective. He decided to initiate a limited satyagraha on an individual basis by a few selected individuals in every locality. The demand of a satyagrahi would be for the freedom of speech to preach against partic.i.p.ation in the War. The satyagrahi would publicly declare: "It is wrong to help the British war-effort with men or money. The only worthy effort is to resist all war with non-violent resistance." The satyagrahi would beforehand inform the district magistrate of the time and place where he or she was going to make the anti-war speech. The carefully chosen satyagrahis - Vin.o.ba Bhave was to be the first satyagrahi on 17 October 1940 and Jawaharlal Nehru the second - were surrounded by huge crowds when they appeared on the platform, and the authorities could often arrest them only after they had made their speeches. And if the Government did not arrest a satyagrahi, he or she would not only repeat the performance but move into the villages and start a trek towards Delhi, thus partic.i.p.ating in a movement that came to be known as the "Delhi Chalo" (onwards to Delhi) movement.
The aims of the Individual Satyagraha conducted as S. Gopal has put it, "at a low temperature and in very small doses"21 were explained as follows by Gandhiji in a letter to the Viceroy: "The Congress is as much opposed to victory for n.a.z.ism as any Britisher can be. But their objective cannot be carried to the extent of their partic.i.p.ation in the war. And since you and the Secretary of State for India have declared that the whole of India is voluntarily helping the war effort, it becomes necessary to make clear that the vast majority of the people of India are not interested in it. They make no distinction between n.a.z.ism and the double autocracy that rules India."22 Thus, the Individual Satyagraha had a dual purpose - while giving expression to the Indian people"s strong political feeling, it gave the British Government further opportunity to peacefully accept the Indian demands. Gandhiji and the Congress were, because of their anti-n.a.z.i feelings, still reluctant to take advantage of the British predicament and embarra.s.s her war effort by a ma.s.s upheaval in India. More importantly, Gandhiji was beginning to prepare the people for the coming struggle. The Congress organization was being put back in shape; opportunist elements were being discovered and pushed out of the organization; and above all the people were being politically aroused, educated and mobilized.
By 15 May 1941, more than 25,000 satyagrahis had been convicted for offering individual civil disobedience. Many more - lower level political workers - had been left free by the Government.
Two major changes in British politics occurred during 1941. n.a.z.i Germany had already occupied Poland, Belgium, Holland, Norway and France as well as most of Eastern Europe. It attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. In the East, j.a.pan launched a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbour on 7 December. It quickly overran the Philippines, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Burma. It occupied Rangoon in March 1942. War was brought to India"s doorstep. Winston Churchill, now the British Prime Minister, told the King that Burma, Ceylon, Calcutta and Madras might fall into enemy hands.
The Indian leaders, released from prisons in early December, were worried about the safety and defence of India. They also had immense concern for the Soviet Union and China. Many felt that Hitler"s attack on the Soviet Union had changed the character of the War. Gandhiji had earlier denounced the j.a.panese slogan of "Asia for Asiatics" and asked the people of India to boycott j.a.panese products. Anxious to defend Indian territory and to go to the aid of the Allies, the Congress Working Committee overrode the objections of Gandhiji and Nehru and pa.s.sed a resolution at the end of December offering to fully cooperate in the defence of India and the Allies if Britain agreed to give full independence after the War and the substance of power immediately. It was at this time that Gandhiji designated Jawaharlal as his chosen successor. Speaking before the AICC on 15 January 1941, he said: "Somebody suggested that Pandit Jawaharlal and I were estranged. It will require much more than differences of opinion to estrange us. We have had differences from the moment we became co-workers, and yet I have said for some years and say now that not Rajaji (C. Rajagopalachari) but Jawaharlal will be my successor. He says that he does not understand my language, and that he speaks a language foreign to me. This may or may not be true. But language is no bar to union of hearts. And I know that when I am gone he will speak my language."23 *
As the war situation worsened, President Roosevelt of the USA and President Chiang Kai-Shek of China as also the Labour Party leaders of Britain put pressure on Churchill to seek the active cooperation of Indians in the War. To secure this cooperation the British Government sent to India in March 1942 a mission headed by a Cabinet minister Stafford Cripps, a left-wing Labourite who had earlier actively supported the Indian national movement. Even though Cripps announced that the aim of British policy in India was "the earliest possible realization of self-government in India," the Draft Declaration he brought with him was disappointing. The Declaration promised India Dominion Status and a const.i.tution-making body after the War whose members would be elected by the provincial a.s.semblies and nominated by the rulers in case of the princely states. The Pakistan demand was accommodated by the provision that any province which was not prepared to accept the new const.i.tution would have the right to sign a separate agreement with Britain regarding its future status. For the present the British would continue to exercise sole control over the defence of the country. Amery, the Secretary of State, described the Declaration as in essence a conservative, reactionary and limited offer.24 Nehru, a friend of Cripps, was to write later: "When I read those proposals for the first time I was profoundly depressed."25 Negotiations between Cripps and the Congress leaders broke down. The Congress objected to the provision for Dominion Status rather than full independence, the representation of the princely states in the const.i.tuent a.s.sembly not by the people of the states but by the nominees of the rulers, and above all by the provision for the part.i.tion of India. The British Government also refused to accept the demand for the immediate transfer of effective power to the Indians and for a real share in the responsibility for the defence of India. An important reason for the failure of the negotiations was the incapacity of Cripps to bargain and negotiate. He had been told not to go beyond the Draft Declaration. Moreover, Churchill, the Secretary of State, Amery, the Viceroy, Linlithgow, and the Commander-in-Chief, Wavell, did not want Cripps to succeed and constantly opposed and sabotaged his efforts to accommodate Indian opinion. Stafford Cripps returned home in the middle of April leaving behind a frustrated and embittered Indian people. Though they still sympathized with the anti-fascist forces, especially the people of China and the Soviet people, they felt that the existing situation in the country had become intolerable. The time had come, they felt, for a final a.s.sault on imperialism.
35.
The Quit India Movement and the INA
"Quit India," "Bharat Choro". This simple but powerful slogan launched the legendary struggle which also became famous by the name of the "August Revolution." In this struggle, the common people of the country demonstrated an unparalleled heroism and militancy. Moreover, the repression that they faced was the most brutal that had ever been used against the national movement. The circ.u.mstances in which the resistance was offered were also the most adverse faced by the national movement until then - using the justification of the war effort, the Government had armed itself with draconian measures, and suppressed even basic civil liberties. Virtually any political activity, however peaceful and "legal," was at this time an illegal and revolutionary activity.
Why had it become necessary to launch a movement in these difficult conditions, when the possibility of brutal repression was a certainty?
For one, the failure of the Cripps Mission in April 1942 made it clear that Britain was unwilling to offer an honourable settlement and a real const.i.tutional advance during the War, and that she was determined to continue India"s unwilling partnership in the War effort. The empty gesture of the "Cripps offer" convinced even those Congressmen like Nehru and Gandhiji, who did not want to do anything to hamper the anti-fascist War effort (and who had played a major role in keeping in check those who had been spoiling for a fight since 1939), that any further silence would be tantamount to accepting the right of the British Government to decide India"s fate without any reference to the wishes of her people. Gandhiji had been as clear as Nehru that he did not want to hamper the anti-fascist struggle, especially that of the Russian and Chinese people. But by the spring of 1942 he was becoming increasingly convinced of the inevitability of a struggle. A fortnight after Cripps" departure, Gandhiji drafted a resolution for the Congress Working Committee calling for Britain"s withdrawal and the adoption of non-violent non-cooperation against any j.a.panese invasion. Congress edged towards Quit India while Britain moved towards arming herself with special powers to meet the threat. Nehru remained opposed to the idea of a struggle right till August 1942 and gave way only at the very end.1 Apart from British obduracy, there were other factors that made a struggle both inevitable and necessary. Popular discontent, a product of rising prices and war-time shortages, was gradually mounting. High-handed government actions such as the commandeering of boats in Bengal and Orissa to prevent their being used by the j.a.panese had led to considerable anger among the people.
The popular willingness to give expression to this discontent was enhanced by the growing feeling of an imminent British collapse. The news of Allied reverses and British withdrawals from South-East Asia and Burma and the trains bringing wounded soldiers from the a.s.sam-Burma border confirmed this feeling.
Combined with this was the impact of the manner of the British evacuation from Malaya and Burma. It was common knowledge that the British had evacuated the white residents and generally left the subject people to their fate. Letters from Indians in South-East Asia to their relatives in India were full of graphic accounts of British betrayal and their being left at the mercy of the dreaded j.a.panese. Was it not only to be expected that they would repeat the performance in India, in the event of a j.a.panese occupation? In fact, one major reason for the leadership of the national movement thinking it necessary to launch a struggle was their feeling that the people were becoming demoralized and, that in the event of a j.a.panese occupation, might not resist at all. In order to build up their capacity to resist j.a.panese aggression, it was necessary to draw them out of this demoralized state of mind and convince them of their own power. Gandhiji, as always, was particularly clear on this aspect.
The popular faith in the stability of British rule had reached such a low that there was a run on the banks and people withdrew deposits from post-office savings accounts and started h.o.a.rding gold, silver and coins. This was particularly marked in East U.P. and Bihar, but it also took place in Madras Presidency.
So convinced was Gandhiji that the time was now ripe for struggle that he said to Louis Fischer in an interview in the beginning of June: "I have become impatient . . . I may not be able to convince the Congress . . . I will go ahead nevertheless and address myself directly to the people."2 He did not have to carry out this threat and, as before, the Congress accepted the Mahatma"s expert advice on the timing of a ma.s.s struggle.
Though Gandhiji himself had begun to talk of the coming struggle for some time now, it was at the Working Committee meeting at Wardha on 14 July, 1942 that the Congress first accepted the idea of a struggle. The All-India Congress Committee was then to meet in Bombay in August to ratify this decision.
The historic August meeting at Gowalia Tank in Bombay was unprecedented in the popular enthusiasm it generated. Huge crowds waited outside as the leaders deliberated on the issue. And the feeling of antic.i.p.ation and expectation ran so high that in the open session, when the leaders made their speeches before the many thousands who had collected to hear them, there was pin-drop silence.
Gandhiji"s speech,3 delivered in his usual quiet and unrhetorical style, recount many who were in the audience, had the most electrifying impact. He first made it clear that "the actual struggle does not commence this moment. You have only placed all your powers in my hands. I will now wait upon the Viceroy and plead with him for the acceptance of the Congress demand. That process is likely to take two or three weeks." But, he added: "you may take it from me that I am not going to strike a bargain with the Viceroy for ministries and the like. I am not going to be satisfied with anything short of complete freedom. Maybe, he will propose the abolition of salt tax, the drink evil, etc. But I will say: "Nothing less than freedom."" He followed this up with the now famous exhortation: "Do or Die." To quote: "Here is a mantra, a short one, that I give you. You may imprint it on your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it. The mantra is: "Do or Die." We shall either free India or die in the attempt; we shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery."
Gandhiji"s speech also contained specific instructions for different sections of the people. Government servants would not yet be asked to resign, but they should openly declare their allegiance to the Congress, soldiers were also not to leave their posts, but they were to "refuse to fire on our own people." The Princes were asked to "accept the sovereignty of your own people," instead of paying homage to a foreign power."And the people of the Princely States were asked to declare that they "(were) part of the Indian nation and that they (would) accept the leadership of the Princes, if the latter cast their lot with the People, but not otherwise." Students were to give up studies if they were sure they could continue to remain firm till independence was achieved. On 7 August, Gandhiji had placed the instructions he had drafted before the Working Committee, and in these he had proposed that peasants "who have the courage, and are prepared to risk their all" should refuse to pay the land revenue. Tenants were told that "the Congress holds that the land belongs to those who work on it and to no one else." Where the zamindari system prevails . . . if the zamindar makes common cause with the ryot, his portion of the revenue, which may be settled by mutual agreement, should be given to him. But if a zamindar wants to side with the Government, no tax should be paid to him."4 These instructions were not actually issued because of the preventive arrests, but they do make Gandhiji"s intentions clear.
The Government, however, was in no mood to either negotiate with the Congress or wait for the movement to be formally launched. In the early hours of 9 August, in a single sweep, all the top leaders of the Congress were arrested and taken to unknown destinations. The Government had been preparing for the strike since the outbreak of the War itself, and since 1940 had been ready with an elaborate Revolutionary Movement Ordinance. On 8 August, 1940, the Viceroy, Linlithgow, in a personal letter to the Governors made his intentions clear: "I feel very strongly that the only possible answer to a "declaration of war" by any section of Congress in the present circ.u.mstances must be a declared determination to crush the organization as a while."5 For two years, Gandhiji had avoided walking into the trap set for him by refusing to make a rash and premature strike and had carefully built up the tempo through the Individual Civil Disobedience Movement, organizational revamping and a consistent propaganda campaign. But now, the Government was unwilling to allow him any more time to pursue his strategy. In antic.i.p.ation of the AICC"s pa.s.sing the Quit India resolution, instructions for arrests and suppression had gone out to the provinces.
The sudden attack by the Government produced an instantaneous reaction among the people. In Bombay, as soon as the news of arrests spread, lakhs of people flocked to Gowalia Tank where a ma.s.s meeting had been scheduled and there were clashes with the authorities. There were similar disturbances on 9 August in Ahmedabad and Poona. On the 10th, Delhi and many towns in U.P. and Bihar, including Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi and Patna followed suit with hartals, public demonstrations and processions in defiance of the law. The Government responded by gagging the press. The National Herald and Harijan ceased publication for the entire duration of the struggle, others for shorter periods.
Meanwhile, many provincial and local level leaders who had evaded arrest returned to their homes through devious routes and set about organizing resistance. As the news spread further in the rural areas, the villagers joined the townsmen in recording their protest. For the first six or seven weeks after 9 August, there was a tremendous ma.s.s upsurge all over the country. People devised a variety of ways of expressing their anger. In some places, huge crowds attacked police stations, post offices, kutcheries (courts), railway stations and other symbols of Government authority. National flags were forcibly hoisted on public buildings in defiance of the police. At other places, groups of satyagrahis offered arrest in tehsil or district headquarters. Crowds of villagers, often numbering a few hundreds or even a couple of thousand, physically removed railway tracks. Elsewhere, small groups of individuals blew up bridges and removed tracks, and cut telephone and telegraph wires. Students went on strike in schools and colleges all over the country and busied themselves taking out processions, writing and distributing illegal news-sheets: hundreds of these "patrikas" came out all over the country. They also became couriers for the emerging underground networks. Workers too struck work: in Ahmedabad, the mills were closed for three and a half months, workers in Bombay stayed away from work for over a week following the 9 August arrests, in Jamshedpur there was a strike for thirteen days and workers in Ahmednagar and Poona were active for several months.
The reaction to the arrests was most intense in Bihar and Eastern U.P., where the movement attained the proportions of a rebellion. From about the middle of August, the news reached the rural areas through students and other political activists who fanned out from the towns. Students of the Banaras Hindu University decided to go to the villages to spread the message of Quit India. They raised slogans of "Thana jalao" (Burn the police station), "Station phoonk do" (Burn the railway stations) "Angrez bhag gaya" (Englishmen have fled). They hijacked trains and draped them in national flags. In rural areas, the pattern was of large crowds of peasants descending on the nearest tehsil or district town and attacking all symbols of government authority. There was government firing and repression, but the rebellion only gathered in momentum. For two weeks, Tirhut division in Bihar was totally cut off from the rest of the country and no Government authority existed. Control was lost over Patna for two days after firing at the Secretariat. Eighty percent of the police stations were captured or temporarily evacuated in ten districts of North and Central Bihar. There were also physical attacks on Europeans. At Fatwa, near Patna, two R.A.F. officers were killed by a crowd at the railway station and their bodies paraded through the town. In Monghyr, the crews of two R.A.F. planes that crashed at Pasraha on 18 August and Ruihar on 30 August were killed by villagers. Particularly important centres of resistance in this phase were Azamgarh, Ballia and Gorakhpur in East U.P. and Gaya, Bhagalpur, Saran, Purnea, Shahabad, Muzaffarpur and Champaran in Bihar.
According to official estimates, in the first week after the arrests of the leaders, 250 railway stations were damaged or destroyed, and over 500 post offices and 150 police stations were attacked. The movement of trains in Bihar and Eastern U.P., was disrupted for many weeks. In Karnataka alone, there were 1600 incidents of cutting of telegraph lines, and twenty-six railway stations and thirty-two post offices were attacked. Unarmed crowds faced police and military firing on 538 occasions and they were also machine-gunned by low-flying aircraft. Repression also took the form of taking hostages from the villages, imposing collective fines running to a total of Rs 90 lakhs (which were often realized on the spot by looting the people"s belongings), whipping of suspects and burning of entire villages whose inhabitants had run away and could not be caught. By the end of 1942, over 60,000 persons had been arrested. Twenty-six thousand people were convicted and 18,000 detained under the Defence of India Rules. Martial law had not been proclaimed, but the army, though nominally working under the orders of the civilian authorities, often did what it wanted to without any reference to the direct officers. The repression was as severe as it could have been under martial law.
The brutal and all-out repression succeeded within a period of six or seven weeks in bringing about a cessation of the ma.s.s phase of the struggle. But in the meantime, underground networks were being consolidated in various parts of the country. An all-India underground leadership with prominent members such as Achyut Patwardhan, Aruna Asaf Ali, Ram Manohar Lohia, Sucheta Kripalani, Chootubhai Puranik, Biju Patnaik, R.P. Goenka and later, after his escape from jail, Jayaprakash Narayan had also begun to emerge. This leadership saw the role of the underground movement as being that of keeping up popular morale by continuing to provide a line of command and a source of guidance and leadership to activists all over the country. They also collected and distributed money as well as material like bombs, arms, and dynamite to underground groups all over the country. They, however, did not see their role as that of directing the exact pattern of activities at the local level. Here, the local groups retained the initiative.Among the places in which local underground organizations were active were Bombay, Poona, Satara, Baroda and other parts of Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra, U.P., Bihar and Delhi. Congress Socialists were generally in the lead, but also active were Gandhian ashramites, Forward Bloc members and revolutionary terrorists, as well as other Congressmen.
Those actually involved in the underground activity may nave been few but they received all manner of support from a large variety of people. Businessmen donated generously. Sumati Morarjee, who later became India"s leading woman industrialist, for example, helpedAchyut Patwardhan to evade detection by providing him with a different car every day borrowed from her unsuspecting wealthy friends. Others provided hide-outs for the underground leaders and activists. Students acted as couriers. Simple villagers helped by refusing information to the police. Pilots and train drivers delivered bombs and other material across the country. Government officials, including those in the police, pa.s.sed on crucial information about impending arrests. Achyut Patwardhan testifies that one member of the three-man high level official committee formed to track down the Congress underground regularly informed him of the goings on in that committee.6 The pattern of activity of the underground movement was generally that of organizing the disruption of communications by blowing up bridges, cutting telegraph and telephone wires and derailing trains. There were also a few attacks on government and police officials and police informers. Their success in actually disrupting communications may not have been more than that of having nuisance value, but they did succeed in keeping up the spirit of the people in a situation when open ma.s.s activity was impossible because of the superior armed might of the state. Dissemination of news was a very important part of the activity, and considerable success was achieved on this score, the most dramatic being the Congress Radio operated clandestinely from different locations in Bombay city, whose broadcast could be heard as far as Madras. Ram Manohar Lohia regularly broadcast on this radio, and the radio continued till November 1942 when it was discovered and confiscated by the police.7 *
In February 1943, a striking new development provided a new burst of political activity. Gandhiji commenced a fast on 10 February in jail. He declared the fast would last for twenty-one days. This was his answer to the Government which had been constantly exhorting him to condemn the violence of the people in the Quit India Movement. Gandhiji not only refused to condemn the people"s resort to violence but unequivocally held the Government responsible for it. It was the "leonine violence" of the state which had provoked the people, he said. And it was against this violence of the state, which included the unwarranted detention of thousands of Congressmen, that Gandhiji vowed to register his protest, in the only way open to him when in jail, by fasting.8 The popular response to the news of the fast was immediate and overwhelming.9 All over the country, there were hartals, demonstrations and strikes. Calcutta and Ahmedabad were particularly active. Prisoners in jails and those outside went on sympathetic fasts. Groups of people secretly reached Poona to offer satyagraha outside the Aga Khan Palace where Gandhiji was being held in detention. Public meetings demanded his release and the Government was bombarded with thousands of letters and telegrams from people from all walks of life - students and youth, men of trade and commerce, lawyers, ordinary citizens, and labour organizations. From across the seas, the demand for his release was made by newspapers such as the Manchester Guardian, New Statesmen, Nation, News Chronicle, Chicago Sun, as well as by the British Communist Party, the citizens of London and Manchester, the Women"s International League, the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Ceylon State Council. The U.S. Government, too, brought pressure to bear.
A Leaders" Conference was held in Delhi on 19-20 February and was attended by prominent men, politicians and public figures. They all demanded Gandhiji"s release. Many of those otherwise unsympathetic to the Congress felt that the Government was going too far in its obduracy. The severest blow to the prestige of the Government was the resignation of the three Indian members of the Viceroy"s Executive Council, M.S. Aney, N.R. Sarkar and H.P. Mody, who had supported the Government in its suppression of the 1942 movement, but were in no mood to be a party to Gandhiji"s death.
But the Viceroy and his officials remained unmoved. Guided by Winston Churchill"s statement to his Cabinet that "this our hour of triumph everywhere in the world was not the time to crawl before a miserable old man who had always been our enemy,"10 they arrogantly refused to show any concern for Indian feeling. The Viceroy contemptuously dismissed the consequences of Gandhiji"s possible death: "Six months unpleasantness, steadily declining in volume, little or nothing at the end of it." He even made it sound as if he welcomed the possibility: "India would be far more reliable as a base for operations. Moreover, the prospect of a settlement will be greatly enhanced by the disappearance of Gandhi, who had for years torpedoed every attempt at a settlement."11 While an anxious nation appealed for his life, the Government went ahead with finalizing arrangements for his funeral. Military troops were asked to stand by for any emergency. "Generous" provision was made for a plane to carry his ashes and for a public funeral and a half-day holiday in offices.12 But Gandhiji, as always, got the better of his opponents, and refused to oblige by dying.
The fast had done exactly what it had been intented to do. The public morale was raised, the anti-British feeling heightened, and an opportunity for political activity provided. A symbolic gesture of resistance had sparked off widespread resistance and exposed the Government"s high-handedness to the whole world. The moral justification that the Government had been trying to provide for its brutal suppression of 1942 was denied to it and it was placed clearly in the wrong.
A significant feature of the Quit India Movement was the emergence of what came to be known as parallel governments in some parts of the country. The first one was proclaimed in Ballia, in East U.P., in August 1942 under the leadership of Chittu Pande, who called himself a Gandhian. Though it succeeded in getting the Collector to hand over power and release all the arrested Congress leaders, it could not survive for long and when the soldiers marched in, a week after the parallel government was formed, they found that the leaders had fled.13 In Tamluk in the Midnapur district of Bengal, the Jatiya Sarkar came into existence on 17 December, 1942 and lasted till September 1944. Tamluk was an area where Gandhian constructive work had made considerable headway and it was also the scene of earlier ma.s.s struggles. The Jatiya Sarkar undertook cyclone relief work, gave grants to schools and organized an armed Vidyut Vahini. It also set up arbitration courts and distributed the surplus paddy of the well-to-do to the poor. Being located in a relatively remote area, it could continue its activities with comparative ease.14 Satara, in Maharashtra, emerged as the base of the longest-lasting and effective parallel government. From the very beginning of the Quit India Movement, the region played an active role. In the first phase from August 1942, there were marches on local government headquarters, the ones on Karad, Tasgaon and Islampur involving thousands. This was followed by sabotage, attacks on post offices, the looting of banks and the cutting of telegraph wires. Y.B. Chavan, who had contacts with Achyut Patwardhan and other underground leaders, was the most important leader. But by the end of 1942, this phase came to an end with the arrest of about two thousand people. From the very beginning of 1943, the underground activists began to regroup, and by the middle of the year, succeeded in consolidating the organization. A parallel government or Prati Sarkar was set up and Nani Patil was its most important leader. This phase was marked by attacks on Government collaborators, informers and talatis or lower-level officials and Robin Hood-style robberies. Nyayadan Mandals or people"s courts were set up and justice dispensed. Prohibition was enforced, and "Gandhi marriages" celebrated to which untouchables were invited and at which no ostentation was allowed. Village libraries were set up and education encouraged. The native state of Aundh, whose ruler was pro-nationalist and had got the const.i.tution of his state drafted by Gandhiji, provided invaluable support by offering refuge and shelter to the Prati Sarkar activists. The Prati Sarkar continued to function till 1945.15 The Quit India Movement marked a new high in terms of popular partic.i.p.ation in the national movement and sympathy with the national cause. As in earlier ma.s.s struggles, the youth were in the forefront of the struggle. Students from colleges and even schools were the most visible element, especially in the early days of August (probably the average age of partic.i.p.ants in the 1942 struggle was even lower than that in earlier movements). Women, especially college and school girls, played a very important role. Aruna Asaf Ali and Sucheta Kripalani were two major women organizers of the underground, and Usha Mehta an important member of the small group that ran the Congress Radio. Workers were prominent as well, and made considerable sacrifice by enduring long strikes and braving police repression in the streets.
Peasants of all strata, well-to-do as well as poor, were the heart of the movement especially in East U.P. and Bihar, Midnapur in Bengal, Satara in Maharashtra, but also in other parts including Andhra, Gujarat and Kerala. Many smaller zamindars also partic.i.p.ated, especially in U.P. and Bihar. Even the big zamindars maintained a stance of neutrality and refused to a.s.sist the British in crushing the rebellion. The most spectacular of these was the Raja of Darbhanga, one of the biggest zamindars, who refused to let his armed retainers be used by the Government and even instructed his managers to a.s.sist the tenants who had been arrested. A significant feature of the pattern of peasant activity was its total concentration on attacking symbols of British authority and a total lack of any incidents of anti-zamindar violence, even when, as in Bihar, East U.P., Satara, and Midnapur, the breakdown of Government authority for long periods of time provided the opportunity.16 Government officials, especially those at the lower levels of the police and the administration, were generous in their a.s.sistance to the movement. They gave shelter, provided information and helped monetarily. In fact, the erosion of loyalty to the British Government of its own officers was one of the most striking aspects of the Quit India struggle. Jail officials tended to be much kinder to prisoners than in earlier years, and often openly expressed their sympathy.
While it is true that Muslim ma.s.s partic.i.p.ation in the Quit India Movement was not high, yet it is also true that even Muslim League supporters gave help by providing shelter to underground workers and did not act as informers. Also, there was a total absence of any communal clashes, a sure sign that though the movement may not have aroused much support from among the majority of the Muslim ma.s.ses, it did not arouse their hostility either.
The powerful attraction of the Quit India Movement and its elemental quality is also demonstrated by the fact that hundreds of Communists at the local and village levels partic.i.p.ated in the movement despite the official position taken by the Communist Party. Though they sympathized with the strong anti-fascist sentiments of their leaders, yet they felt the irresistible pull of the movement and, for at least a few days or weeks, joined in it along with the rest of the Indian people.
The debate on the Quit India Movement has centered particularly on two issues. First, was the movement a spontaneous outburst, or an organized rebellion? Second, how did the use of violence by the people in this struggle square with the overall Congress policy of non-violent struggle?
First the element of spontaneity in the movement of 1942 was certainly larger than in the earlier movements, though even in 1919-22, as well as in 1930-31 and 1932, the Congress leadership allowed considerable room for popular initiative and spontaneity. In fact, the whole pattern of the Gandhian ma.s.s movements was that the leadership chalked out a broad programme of action and left its implementation at the local level to the initiative of the local and gra.s.s roots level political activists and the ma.s.ses. Even in the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930, perhaps the most organized of the Gandhian ma.s.s movements, Gandhiji signalled the launching of the struggle by the Dandi March and the breaking of the salt law; the leaders and the people at the local levels decided whether they were going to stop payment of land revenue and rent, or offer satyagraha against forest laws, or picket liquor shops, or follow any of the other items of the programme. Of course, in 1942, even the broad programme had not yet been spelt out clearly since the leadership was yet to formally launch the movement. But, in a way, the degree of spontaneity and popular initiative that was actually exercised had been sanctioned by the leadership itself. The resolution pa.s.sed by the AICC on 8 August 1942 clearly stated: "A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instruction or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress committees can function. When this happens, every man and woman who is partic.i.p.ating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide."17 Apart from this, the Congress had been ideologically, politically and organizationally preparing for the struggle for a long time. From 1937 onwards, the organization had been revamped to undo the damage suffered during the repression of 1932-34. In political and ideological terms as well, the Ministries had added considerably to Congress support and prestige. In East U.P. and Bihar, the areas of the most intense activity in 1942 were precisely the ones in which considerable mobilization and organizational work had been carried out from 1937 onwards.18 In Gujarat, Sardar Patel had been touring Bardoli and other areas since June 1942 warning the people of an impending struggle and suggesting that no-revenue campaigns could well be a part of it. Congress Socialists in Poona had been holding training camps for volunteers since June 1942.19 Gandhiji himself, through the Individual Civil Disobedience campaign in 1940-41, and more directly since early 1942, had prepared the people for the coming battle, which he said would be "short and swift."20 In any case, in a primarily hegemonic struggle as the Indian national movement was, preparedness for struggle cannot be measured by the volume of immediate organizational activity but by the degree of hegemonic influence that the movement has acquired over the people.
How did the use of violence in 1942 square with the Congress policy of non-violence? For one, there were many who refused to use or sanction violent means and confined themselves to the traditional weaponry of the Congress. But many of those, including many staunch Gandhians, who used "violent means" in 1942 felt that the peculiar circ.u.mstances warranted their use. Many maintained that the cutting of telegraph wires and the blowing up of bridges was all right as long as human life was not taken Others frankly admitted that they could not square the violence they used, or connived at, with their belief in non-violence, but that they did it all the same. Gandhiji refused to condemn the violence of the people because he saw it as a reaction to the much bigger violence of the state. In Francis Hutchins" view, Gandhiji"s major objection to violence was that its use prevented ma.s.s partic.i.p.ation in a movement, but that, in 1942, Gandhiji had come round to the view that ma.s.s partic.i.p.ation would not be restricted as a result of violence.21 The great significance of this historic movement was that it placed the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of the national movement. After "Quit India," there could be no retreat. Any future negotiations with the British Government could only be on the manner of the transfer of power. Independence was no longer a matter of bargain. And this became amply clear after the War.
With Gandhiji"s release on 6 May 1944, on medical grounds, political activity regained momentum. Constructive work became the main form of Congress activity, with a special emphasis on the reorganization of the Congress machinery. Congress committees were revived under different names - Congress Workers a.s.semblies or Representative a.s.semblies of Congressmen - rendering the ban on Congress committees ineffective. The task of training workers, membership drives and f