Although general in its terms, an order must be definite and must be the expression of a fixed decision. Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either vacillation or the inability to formulate orders.
383. Usually the orders of a commander are intended for, and are given to, the commanders of the next lower units, but in an emergency a commander should not hesitate to give orders directly to any subordinate. In such case he should promptly inform the intermediate commander concerned.
_Communication._
384. Communication is maintained by means of staff officers, messengers, relay systems, connecting files, visual signals, telegraph, or telephone.
385. The signal corps troops of the division establish lines of information from division to brigade headquarters. The further extension of lines of information in combat by signal troops is exceptional.
386. Each regiment, employing its own personnel, is responsible for the maintenance of communication from the colonel back to the brigade and forward to the battalions. For this purpose the regiment uses the various means which may be furnished it. The staff and orderlies, regimental and battalion, are practiced in the use of these means and in messenger service. Orderlies carry signal flags.
387. Connection between the firing line and the major or colonel is practically limited to the prescribed flag, arm, and bugle signals.
Other means can only be supplemental. Company musicians carry company flags and are practiced in signaling.
388. The artillery generally communicates with the firing line by means of its own staff officers or through an agent who accompanies some unit in or near the front. The infantry keeps him informed as to the situation and affords him any reasonable a.s.sistance. When the infantry is dependent upon the artillery for fire support, perfect coordination through this representative is of great importance.
COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE.
389. Combat reconnaissance is of vital importance and must not be neglected. By proper preliminary reconnaissance, deployments on wrong lines, or in a wrong direction, and surprises may generally be prevented.
390. Troops deployed and under fire can not change front and thus they suffer greatly when enfiladed. Troops in close order formation may suffer heavy losses in a short time if subjected to hostile fire. In both formations troops must be protected by proper reconnaissance and warning.
391. The difficulty of reconnaissance increases in proportion to the measures adopted by the enemy to screen himself.
The strength of the reconnoitering party is determined by the character of the information desired and the nature of the hostile screen. In exceptional cases as much as a battalion may be necessary in order to break through the hostile screen and enable the commander or officer in charge to reconnoiter in person.
A large reconnoitering party is conducted so as to open the way for small patrols, to serve as a supporting force or rallying point for them, and to receive and transmit information. Such parties maintain signal communication with the main body if practicable.
392. Each separate column moving forward to deploy must reconnoiter to its front and flank and keep in touch with adjoining columns. The extent of the reconnaissance to the flank depends upon the isolation of the columns.
393. Before an attack a reconnaissance must be made to determine the enemy"s position, the location of his flanks, the character of the terrain, the nature of the hostile field works, etc., in order to prevent premature deployment and the resulting fatigue and loss of time.
It will frequently be necessary to send forward a thin skirmish line in order to induce the enemy to open fire and reveal his position.
394. It will frequently be impossible to obtain satisfactory information until after the action has begun. The delay that may be warranted for the purpose of reconnaissance depends upon the nature of the attack and the necessity for promptness. For example, in a meeting engagement, and sometimes in a holding attack, the reconnaissance may have to be hasty and superficial, whereas in an attack against an enemy carefully prepared for defense there will generally be both time and necessity for thorough reconnaissance.
395. In defense, reconnaissance must be kept up to determine the enemy"s line of advance, to ascertain his dispositions, to prevent his reconnaissance, etc.
Patrols or parties posted to prevent hostile reconnaissance should relieve the main body of the necessity of betraying its position by firing on small bodies of the enemy.
396. Reconnaissance continues throughout the action.
A firing or skirmish line can take care of its front, but its flanks are especially vulnerable to modern firearms. The moral effect of flanking fire is as great as the physical effect. Hence, combat patrols to give warning or covering detachments to give security are indispensable on exposed flanks. This is equally true in attack or defense.
397. The fact that cavalry patrols are known to be posted in a certain direction does not relieve infantry commanders of the responsibility for reconnaissance and security.
To be surprised by an enemy at short range is an unpardonable offense.
398. The commander of a battalion on a flank of a general line invariably provides for the necessary reconnaissance and security on that flank unless higher authority has specifically ordered it. In any event, he sends out combat patrols as needed.
Where his battalion is on a flank of one section of the line and a considerable interval lies between his battalion and the next section, he makes similar provision.
399. Battalion commanders in the first line establish patrols to observe and report the progress or conduct of adjoining troops when these can not be seen.
FIRE SUPERIORITY.
_PURPOSE AND NATURE._
400. In a decisive battle success depends on gaining and maintaining fire superiority. Every effort must be made to gain it early and then to keep it.
Attacking troops must first gain fire superiority in order to reach the hostile position. Over open ground attack is possible only when the attacking force has a decided fire superiority. With such superiority the attack is not only possible, but success is probable and without ruinous losses.
Defending troops can prevent a charge only when they can master the enemy"s fire and inflict heavy losses upon him.
401. To obtain fire superiority it is necessary to produce a heavy volume of accurate fire. Every increase in the effectiveness of the fire means a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of the enemy"s fire.
The volume and accuracy of fire will depend upon several considerations:
(_a_) _The number of rifles employed._ On a given front the greatest volume of fire is produced by a firing line having only sufficient intervals between men to permit the free use of their rifles. The maximum density of a firing line is therefore about one man per yard of front.
(_b_) The _rate_ of fire affects its volume; an excessive rate reduces its accuracy.
(_c_) _The character of the target_ influences both volume and accuracy. Larger dimensions, greater visibility, and shorter range increase the rate of fire; greater density increases the effect.
(_d_) _Training and discipline_ have an important bearing on the rate or volume of fire, but their greatest influence is upon accuracy.
The firing efficiency, of troops is reduced by fatigue and adverse psychological influences.
(_e_) _Fire direction and control_ improve collective accuracy. The importance of fire direction increases rapidly with the range. Control exerts a powerful influence at all ranges.
_FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL._
_Opening Fire._
402. Beyond effective ranges important results can be expected only when the target is large and distinct and much ammunition is used.
Long-range fire is permissible in pursuit on account of the moral effect of any fire under the circ.u.mstances. At other times such fire is of doubtful value.